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The study of Graeco-Persian relations is not new to academia, however, 
as much of our information is found within Greek literary texts, we are largely at 
the mercy of Greek bias concerning these relations.  This thesis will present a 
detailed re-examination of the relevant sources to gain further understanding of 
Graeco-Persian relations, with a view to looking beyond Greek literary bias.  This 
thesis proposes that the influence of the Persian Empire upon the Greeks was 
greater than is initially implied by our sources and I argue that in the majority of 
the contacts between Greek and Persian, Persia took control.  The notable 
exception to this is the highly debated Peace of Callias, which forced Persia to 
offer concessions to the Greeks, but it should be noted that we have no record of 
possible Greek concessions to Persia, and so we must treat this topic with 
caution.  This thesis expands our knowledge of Graeco-Persian relations by 
taking a view of the entire period of these relations, from initial contacts until the 
accession of Alexander the Great, allowing us to view more general trends 
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The study of Greek history during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. is 
not new.  In the English speaking world alone we may take as examples G. 
Grotes, History of Greece, written in the nineteenth century, and, in our own time, 
works such as N.G.L. Hammonds A History of Greece to 322 B.C. and S. 
Hornblowers, The Greek World 479-323 B.C.  Achaemenid history, however, has 
largely been ignored, as is acknowledged by G. Cawkwell.1  For a long time the 
standard work was A.T. Olmsteads History of the Persian Empire, posthumously 
published in 1948.  It was not until 1983 that J.M. Cook produced The Persian 
Empire, which coincided with the Achaemenid Workshops which ran from 1987-
1994.  Two noteworthy works have relatively recently been produced, P. Briants 
From Cyrus to Alexander: a History of the Persian Empire, and A. Kuhrts source 
book, The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period.   
This recent growth in Achaemenid studies has provided a greater 
understanding of the Empire, however, they tend to focus on Persian culture and 
history, and not especially on international relations.  Kuhrt, however, notes that 
it is worth remembering that the lives of Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries 
were intimately bound up with the Achaemenid Empire,2 and that many of our 
Greek sources had considerable experience of the Empire.  Herodotus was born 
within its borders, Ctesias was a doctor for the Persian court, and Xenophon had 
commanded Greek mercenaries within and against the Persian Empire.  
Notable of the scholarship above is that it is divided between Greek 
history and Achaemenid history, but it is self-evident that there is reason for 
them to be studied together in an attempt to understand the influence of each 
upon the other.  This has previously been attempted by A.R. Burn in Persia and 
the Greeks and H. Bengtson in The Greeks and Persia, however, both Bengtson and 
Burn were published a number of years ago, 1970 and 1962 respectively; 
although Burn was republished in 1984 with a postscript there were no major 
additions to the main body of his work from 1962.  Likewise, D. Gillis 
                                                          
1 G. Cawkwell, 2005, preface. 
2 Kuhrt, 2010, p. 7. 
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Collaboration with the Persians examines with the subject, but was published in 
1979.  Therefore, a fresh study of the question would seem to be required.   
 
In the same way that the Persian Empire was a constant factor in Greek 
politics,3 it is easy to underestimate the importance of the Greeks in Persian 
politics and, thus, the need for Persia to attempt to control this.  It should not be 
forgotten that the resistance of the Greek states prevented the expansion of the 
Persian Empire West.  Also, this subsequent assertion of Greek power interfered 
with Persian control of those peoples who had already been conquered, for 
example, the Egyptians, the Cypriots and the Ionian Greeks.  These actions 
forced Xerxes and his successors to abandon the previous Persian policy of 
expansionism and, instead, look to consolidating the territory already held by the 
Persian Empire.  It cannot be ignored that the use of Greek mercenaries by Cyrus 
the Younger in 401 B.C. and their subsequent employment by Egypt and the 
rebellious satraps in the 360s B.C. was a major concern for Artaxerxes II.  Indeed, 
the presence of Greek mercenaries in Egypt, which rebelled in the 390s, can, 
arguably, explain why it was able to rebel from Persia for such a long period of 
time: it was not reconquered by Persia until 343 B.C., again with the use of Greek 
mercenaries.  Thus, we can see that the Greeks were not simply of minor concern 
to the Persian Empire.4 A separate study looking at these political interactions is 
necessary, therefore, to provide a more comprehensive view of Greek and 
Persian international relations during this period. 
This thesis intends to focus on the political relationship between Greece 
and Persia, looking especially at the methods used by Persia in an attempt to 
dominate this relationship to her own advantage.  These methods include 
dividing Greek resistance to Persia by seducing individual Greeks, as well as 
whole states, to support Persia, or, in some cases, to not resist Persia.  This was 
most prevalent during the initial phase of the relationship between the two 
peoples in the sixth century through to the mid-fifth century until the Peace of 
Callias, and was termed medism by the Greeks.  Persia was also able to 
                                                          
3 A similar relationship can be seen in that between Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
4 Lenfant, 2015, pp. 281-283, argues that much of the modern notion of Greek-Persian natural 
hostility originates from Isocrates. 
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dominate political negotiations with the Greeks through the embassies sent by 
both peoples and the resulting treaties made after the Persian Invasion.  We will 
see that in the fourth century Persia had achieved such dominance over the 
Greeks and, despite not actually conquering them,  Artaxerxes II was able to 
dictate to them how to settle their internal wars in order to employ Greek 
mercenaries within the Persian Empire.   
It is hoped that, as a result of studying the ways by which Persia 
attempted to dominate the Greeks, conclusions can be reached which expand our 
knowledge of how international relations between Greece and Persia impacted 
on their more general foreign policies.  
 
This thesis will argue that Persias impact on Greek interstate and 
international policy was largely as the result of a Persian policy, which attempted 
to control their relationship with the Greeks.  This will become apparent by 
Persian attempts not only to conquer the Greeks, by invading Greece in the early 
fifth century, but also to woo them through bribery, which was employed not 
only during the Persia invasion but also during the second Peloponnesian War.  
It is hoped that by studying the political interactions between the Greeks and 
Persia it will become apparent that there was a general Persian foreign policy 
concerning the Greeks.  It has been suggested to me that this, in some ways, 
resembles Britains Irish Question in that we have a greater power attempting to 
dominate a lesser one. 
 
It must be noted that this study will be governed by the nature of the 
sources available.  Persian sources, with the exception of the Behistun 
Inscription, do not provide an historical narrative, but instead emphasise the 
physical and mental qualities of the king, and the vastness of the Persian 
Empire.5  Thus, we are forced to use primarily Greek sources, the majority of 
which are literary. The most important historical sources of Herodotus, Ctesias of 
Cnidus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus are central to our 
                                                          
5 Behistun: Brosius, 2000, n. 44. For samples of other inscriptions regarding the vastness of the 
Persian Empire see Brosius n. 12, n. 45, n. 46, n. 48, n. 63, n. 103, n. 104. Much of the remaining 
inscriptions are related to Persian building programs. Cf. Briant, 2002, p. 5. 
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research and will be accompanied by relevant available inscriptions and 
epigraphical evidence. We are fortunate that the sources we have cover most of 
the period of study, enabling us to assess historical developments. Whilst we are 
forced to work within the limitations of the sources available, in many cases we 
may also make reasonable conjectures based on the basis of this material. Kuhrt 
notes the wealth of potential information available from Greek sources 
concerning the Achaemenid Empire, but warns that we must take into account 
their context and the aims of the writers to ensure we account for their bias and 
exaggerations.6 
 
Kuhrt suggests Herodotus partisan attitude towards the leading Greeks 
during the Persian Wars should be borne in mind.  However, Briant correctly 
notes that Herodotus shows no evidence of systematic hostility to the Persians7 
and, thus, we are able to learn much from him. Bengtson, whilst recognising that 
in general he is to be trusted, notes that when consulting Herodotus we should 
use strict critical judgement.8  Thus, we must be mindful that Herodotus 
conception of historical truth is different to ours.9 Despite advising that some of 
Herodotus accounts of much earlier history to the fifth century lead to caution 
against taking Herodotus narrative at face value, Flower concedes that 
Herodotus still remains the best and fullest sources for Achaemenid history.10 
Despite the classical opinions of Cicero and Plutarch, charging Herodotus with 
falsifying his accounts of the East, A. Momigliano notes that most of Herodotus 
accounts of the East have now been verified by archaeological evidence and the 
modern ability to translate inscriptions from Egypt, Persia, and Babylon, which 
Herodotus was unable to do.  Taken into consideration with his account of the 
Persian invasion of Greece, Momigliano concludes that the information we can 
double check gives no reason to doubt Herodotus.11  He notes that the classical 
tradition to doubt Herodotus stems from Thucydides criticism of his methods to 
                                                          
6 Kuhrt, 2010, p. 7. 
7 Briant, 2002, p. 7. This opinion is supported by Flower, 2006, p. 286. 
8 Bengtson, 1970, p. 38. 
9 Flower, 2006, p. 278. 
10 Flower, 2006, pp. 280-281.  
11 Momigliano, 2013, p. 33. Cf. Pritchett, 1993, passim. 
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enquire into the remote past rather than simply account contemporaneous 
events.  Finley suggests, however, that despite his apparent criticism of 
Herodotus, the fact that Thucydides did not recount the Persian Wars suggests 
he felt that he did not need to.12 
 
Most of Ctesias work, which was 23 books in total, is lost to us and the 
remainder is available only via references in other works and the summary by 
Photius.  Ctesias writings were derived from personal observation as well as the 
oral tradition of the Persian court.  Brosius argument that Ctesias may never 
have been at the Persian, which rests on the examination of the extant fragments, 
ignores completely this fragmentary nature.13  It has been suggested that Ctesias 
began his medical career in Persia c. 415 B.C.14 and that he returned to Greece 
after 399 B.C.15 Llewelyn-Jones notes his poor reputation, due to the fragmentary 
state of his work,16 but Kuhrt defends his accounts for events closer to his own 
time in Persia  appear to be reliable and suggests he provides a different 
perspective rather than false testimony.17  Stronk suggests that it is feasible that 
Ctesias could have orally consulted the temple scribes at Babylon which is 
suggested in Diodorus Siculus XI.22.5, thus, he should not be dismissed 
entirely.18  Stronk reminds us that one of the criteria of Photius for selecting what 
he did of Ctesias was that it differed from Herodotus accounts, thus, we are left 
primarily with the contentious parts of Ctesias and cannot judge their historical 
value fairly against the backdrop of Herodotus.  He notes the further issue with 
the extant work is that historical copyists had a tendency to adapt work to their 
own purpose, thus, we cannot be one hundred per cent sure of the accuracy of 
that which is attributed to Ctesias.19  He believes that Ctesias Persica fails as a 
history due to his interest in form rather than matter.20  
 
                                                          
12 Finley, 1972, p. 15. 
13 Brosius, 2011, pp. 73-77. 
14 Eck, 1990, pp. 430-431. 
15 Stronk, 2010, p. 11. 
16 Llewellyn-Jones, 2010, p. 3. 
17 Kuhrt, 2010, p.8. 
18 Stronk, 2010, p. 32. 
19 Stronk, 2010, pp. 35-36. 
20 Stronk, 2010, pp. 36. 
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Llewellyn-Jones treats Ctesias as he would a historical novel, which 
necessarily has fictional and historical elements interwoven, believing that it was 
not Ctesias aim to write a history, per se.  Thus, he suggests, the history in 
Ctesias must be filter(ed) through other literary genres that interweave 
throughout the narrative.21  He notes that the oral traditions of the East suggest 
an interest in general trends rather than specific facts or dates, thus, the Persica 
was subject to these constraints and operates within them.22  Therefore, it is 
necessary to be wary of the information we can obtain from Ctesias as we must 
take into account the controversy which surrounds his Persica. 
 
Adcock, discussing Thucydides motives, notes that we should not judge 
him by the modern practice of a historian because the main purpose for his 
writing was purely intellectual enlightenment.23 Thucydides himself says that 
his aim was simply to report the facts of the Peloponnesian War without 
comment to instruct future generations of the actions of the War and then let 
them make their own conclusions. Finley notes that Thucydides lack of 
references to his sources makes it difficult to assess the account intelligently.24 
This is especially true because his manuscript was published posthumously and 
the manuscript seems to be unfinished.  We are fortunate in that Thucydides was 
contemporaneous to the events he relates and, more so for his exile in 424 B.C., 
which allowed him to collect information from both sides of the war. Adcock 
believes that Thucydides wrote at least notes of events and a draft of his work as 
they occurred and that Thucydides was conscious of writing in the present 
about the present.25 Of particular interest to this research is Finleys comment 
that Book VIII suggests Thucydides realisation of the importance of Persia to the 
Peloponnesian War.  Thus, he poses the question whether Thucydides would not 
have supplemented his earlier books in light of this.26 Unlike Herodotus, 
Thucydides does not give alternative views to his accounts and, so Finley notes, 
                                                          
21 Llewellyn-Jones, 2010, pp.4-5. 
22 Llewellyn-Jones, 2010, p. 66. 
23 Adcock, 1963, p. 13. 
24 Finley, 1972, p. 11. 
25 Adcock, 1963, pp. 110-111. 
26 Finley, 1972, p. 13. 
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we must take his account on faith.27  In some cases he is supported by 
inscriptions, against which we can cross reference his work and, also, later works 
by the likes of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch, with whom we will deal below. 
 
Xenophon, writing after Thucydides, continues the narrative of the 
Peloponnesian War in his Hellenica and, we are led to believe, attempted to 
mimic Thucydides style.  Cawkwell, however, notes that Xenophon lacks 
Thucydides accuracy and it is believed that he wrote his Hellenica in, at least, 
two parts, the break being at II.3.10 with the conclusion of the Peloponnesian 
War.  The part prior to II.3.10 it is believed was written roughly 
contemporaneously and the rest was written after c. 350 B.C., thus many years 
after the events had occurred. The primary problem with Xenophons narrative 
is his notorious omissions of facts, which we must discern from other sources.  
Indeed, Cawkwell claims Xenophons historical judgements are superficial, his 
interests narrow and his omissions outstanding, even within the range of his 
interests.28 Thus, it is necessary to supplement his account with the likes of 
Plutarch and the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who is judged to be more accurate than 
Xenophon.  It is believed likely that Xenophon did not use other sources 
available to him but wrote from his own memories, thus, Cawkwell likens 
Xenophons Hellenica to a memoir rather than a history. This explains in part 
why the events at which he was personally present have more details than other 
events, from which he was absent.29 Cawkwell suggests Xenophon obtained 
much of his information from first-hand experience or from contact with those 
who had first-hand experience of the events and was, therefore, subject to their 
perspective on events.30  It is apparent that much of his Hellenica is influenced by 
his anti-Theban and pro-Spartan feelings: Xenophon underplays Spartas 
medising with Persia and the various peace treaties of the fourth century until 
Thebes involvement in the 360s. However, taking all this into consideration, 
Xenophon did serve with the ten thousand and was contemporary to the events 
                                                          
27 Finley, 1972, pp. 29-30. 
28 Cawkwell, 1979, p. 13. 
29 Cawkwell, 1979, p. 23. 
30 Cawkwell, 1979, pp. 24-28. 
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he records in both his Anabasis and Hellenica. Flower notes that Xenophons 
audience would expect his Anabasis to be free from outright fabrications.31 We 
must be mindful that Xenophon was not the only one to write of the Greek 
mercenaries in Asia Minor or, indeed, a history of Greece in the fourth century 
B.C.: we have already noted the Oxyrhynchus Historian above. Thus, we can 
suggest that, although subject to Xenophons feelings and the effects of time on 
his memory, the essential facts of his Hellenica and Anabasis are correct.  His 
experiences, first in Athens and then later Persia, Sparta and Corinth, make him 
uniquely placed in that it is likely, as we have said, he had first-hand experience 
of the events he narrates.   
 
Peter Green notes that Diodorus Siculus, despite his poor reputation as 
simply a copyist, provides the only continuous narrative of events from the 
Persian Wars through to Alexander the Great.32  That he has a reputation as a 
copyist is possibly the real value to be placed on him, in that texts now lost to us 
are available via Diodorus Siculus. Specifically of value to this study is Ephorus 
of Cyme, c. 405-330 B.C., who was roughly contemporary with Xenophon and 
whom Diodorus Siculus seems to have followed.33  Green notes that, in his 
attempt to date events, Diodorus Siculus was occasionally caught out by his 
misunderstanding of non-consular interregna. However, he also believes that the 
charges of uncertain autopsy, lack of military experience, ignorance of 
geography, over dependence on earlier written sources levelled against 
Timaeus by Polybius recurred as regular charges against universal historians, 
including Diodorus Siculus and Green believes that in the case of Diodorus 
Siculus they have been over emphasised.34  He suggests that Diodorus Siculus is 
a typical product of the late Hellenistic age affected by the works of his 
historical predecessors and believes that he had read the likes of Herodotus and 
Thucydides, amongst others, in their original as part of his basic education.35   
Gray notes that Ephorus, who Diodorus Siculus is believed to have copied for 
                                                          
31 Flower, 2012, p. 64. 
32 Green, 2010, p. 1. 
33 Dates takes from Green, 2010, p. 5. 
34 Polybius, XII.3-4. Green, 2010, pp. 5-6. 
35 Green, 2010, p. 7. 
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the majority of his account of the later fifth and early fourth centuries, was 
himself copying the Oxyrhynchus Historian and warns us to be mindful of 
distortions as a result of the double transmission.36   
 
We have discussed above the strengths and weakness of our primary 
classical sources and will finally turn to Plutarch, who has been useful to 
supplement some of our above sources.  Like Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch wrote 
much later than the events he relates in his Greek lives, living and writing in the 
first century A.D. Unlike our other classical sources his intention was not to write 
history for the sake of it, but to draw parallels between the lives of famous 
Greeks and Romans from a moral standpoint. Also like Diodorus Siculus, 
Plutarch draws on a range of sources, however, Scott-Kilvert warns us that 
Plutarch was better at amassing evidence than sifting it.37  We must be 
especially careful of his stylistic exaggerations of his characters for dramatic 
effect. Pelling notes that Plutarchs critical alertness is variable rather than 
constant, although he concedes that he is more rigorous when writing of a 
Themistocles or Caesar.38  Despite his apparent exaggerations, Pelling notes that 
there are many things which (Plutarch) would not invent. Reality can be bent, 
but not too far.39  Thus, as with many of the other classical historians mentioned 
above, although we must be wary of taking Plutarch at face value, the essential 
facts he relates in his Lives are likely to be correct. 
 Reviewing the classical historical sources above, we can ascertain 
that we must, in most instances, be wary of taking them at face value to ascertain 
the likely facts of the situation. 
 
Although this study will look at three distinct aspects of Greek and 
Persian political relations, rather than approaching the study thematically, it will 
be conducted chronologically.  This is so that the impact of each theme is more 
apparently obvious on the general question of international relations.  A 
                                                          
36 Gray, 1987, p. 73. 
37 Scott-Kilvert, 1960, p. 10. 
38 Pelling, 2002, p. 160. 
39 Pelling, 2002, p. 161. 
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chronological approach facilitates a view of the period from the perspective of 
the longue durée enabling us to isolate those factors which are constant over the 
period. Also, it enables us, therefore, to view elements which change from 
generation to generation. As mentioned above, Greek history and Achaemenid 
studies tend to be seen as separate disciplines and it is hoped that by combining 
the two disciplines a more rounded perspective of the history of both can be 
achieved. 
The first chapter of the thesis begins with the initial contacts between the 
Greek states and Persia, and discusses the origins of the negative connotations of 
medism in Greek ideology.  It begins with the subjugation of the Greeks of Asia 
Minor by Cyrus the Great and considers the reactions to this by the Greeks of the 
islands and mainland. It concludes with the Greek involvement in the Ionian 
Revolt led by Aristagoras.  The second chapter treats the first Persian invasion of 
mainland Greece, led by Datis, and the Greek response to the Athenian victory at 
Marathon.  The third chapter researches Greek attitudes to submission to and 
collaboration with Persia preceding and during the Persian invasion of Xerxes, 
with a look at the actions of both individuals and states.  The fourth chapter 
looks at the period known as the Pentecontaetia, discussing the consequences of 
Xerxes invasion in relation to the war of the Delian League, and the accusations 
of medism of Pausanias and Themistocles; it concludes with a discussion 
concerning the Peace of Callias.  The fifth chapter focuses on the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War in 430 B.C. and the attempts by Athens and Sparta to woo 
Persia.  It investigates the implications of the evolving political situation as a 
result of a new generation of Greeks, who did not personally witness the Persian 
invasions of Greece, and concludes with the Spartan victory over Athens in 405 
B.C. The sixth chapter investigates the implications of the Greek involvement in 
the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, and the outbreak of the Corinthian War.  The 
final chapter discusses the Greek attempts to dominate the other Greek states by 
utilising Persias influence as arbiter of the Greek common peaces. It also 
discusses the implications of and the Greek reactions to Persias newly gained 
dominance over Greek interstate and international affairs.  It finishes with Philip 
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of Macedons League of Corinth and Alexander the Greats siege of Thebes, prior 
to his invasion of Asia Minor. 
Then, by way of conclusion, we shall draw together the various threads 
of our detailed investigation in order to draw as wide a picture as possible of the 
issue we are addressing. 
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Chapter 1: First contacts and the Ionian Revolt 
 
 The initial conflict between Greek and Persian took place almost at the 
point when Persian imperialism began to manifest itself.  The period in question 
is delimited by Cyrus conquest of Lydia and Ionia, and the crushing of the 
Ionian Revolt by Darius.  It is marked off from the period which immediately 
follows by two characteristics.  The Greeks direct and immediate dealings with 
the Persians were confined to Asia Minor, the islands, Thrace and Macedon.  For 
the mainland Greeks relations were largely conducted at a distance and by 
means of diplomacy.  With Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian 
Revolt this changed and the next phase of relations, with direct attacks on the 
Greek mainland, was ushered in.  
 In this initial phase we shall be concerned with how Greek viewed 
Persian and how Persian viewed Greek, and we shall attempt to define the 
characteristics of that relationship.  Once this has been done, we shall be in a 
position to see, in subsequent chapters, what elements remained the same and 
what changed over time. 
 
The Persian conquest of Asia Minor 
To begin this investigation it is necessary to look at the Persian conquest 
of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. This conquest brought about the initial contact 
between the mainland Greeks, primarily those states which had colonised the 
coast of Asia Minor, and the Persian Empire.  Thus, from these initial contacts, 
we will be able to study how the two peoples first reacted to each other, and also 
the direct causes of Greek hostility to Persia, which led to the Ionian Revolt from 
Persia, instigated by Aristagoras, and its support by Athens and Eretria. Greek 
hostility to Persian rule is particularly interesting when we consider that there 
seems, in contrast, to have been little apparent hostility to Lydian domination of 
the Greeks of Asia Minor. The Spartan alliance with Croesus suggests that the 
Greek states of the mainland similarly did not object to this.  
The Greek colonisation of the coast of Asia Minor during the 8th century 
B.C. led to the establishment there of 12 cities: Mycale, Miletus, Ephesus, Samos, 
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Chios, Priene, Colophon, Phocaea, Clazomenai, Erythrai, Myous and Smyrna.40 
These eventually formed the Ionian League, which rebelled from the Persian 
Empire in 499 B.C.41  The majority of these early colonies seem to have been 
linked to Athens, although some were founded by other cities, - for example, 
Priene was of apparent Theban origins.42 Prior to their first Pan Ionian meeting 
mentioned in Herodotus, I.141, the cities apparently acted largely on an 
individual basis without any major co-ordination. Certainly, when Alyattes was 
campaigning against Miletus in the late sixth century the city received help only 
from Chios, indicating a lack of unity amongst the cities at that time.43 It is 
possible that this lack of support was remembered by Miletus when Cyrus the 
Great offered an alliance against Croesus. M.O.B. Caspari argues that the 
destruction of Melie indicates that the members of the Pan Ionian League had, in 
fact, formed a league by 650 B.C.44  L.H. Jeffery notes that Pan Ionian action is 
not, in fact, attested prior to the Persian attacks of the 540s, but she concedes that 
the attempt by Thales of Miletus to form a common government based at Teos in 
the first half of the sixth century supports the idea of a Pan Ionian League at this 
time.45  Thus, on this evidence it is likely there was some form of unification of 
the Ionian Greeks, albeit very loose, possibly based on their common cultural 
heritage, and that it was formed prior to their subjugation to the Lydian Empire.  
Herodotus says that the Ionian Greek cities were subjugated to the Lydian 
Empire one at a time; some by conquest and others by treaties of friendship.46  
He says that this was begun under Gyges and was completed by the reign of 
                                                          
40 Emlyn-Jones, 1980, p. 17, notes there was a thirteenth Ionian city, Melie, which was destroyed by 
the other league members. Cf. Vitr., IV.1.3-5.  
41 Cf. pp. 39-48 for the Ionian Revolt.  Caspari, 1915, p. 181, notes that after the Ionian Revolt it is 
almost beyond doubt that the League was disbanded, despite the lack of direct evidence to support 
this. Contra Cawkwell, 2005, p. 80. 
42Herodotus, I.142. Emlyn-Jones, 1980, p. 21, notes the close connection with Boeotian names and 
cults. 
43 Herodotus, I.18. Also, for the Milesian-Lydian treaty of friendship see Herodotus, I. 18-22. 
Asheri, 2007, p. 88, notes that the campaigns of Sadyattes and Alyattes against Miletus coincided 
with Perianders rule, thus we can suggest that this took place between 625-585 B.C., cf. Herodotus. 
I. 20. 
44 Caspari, 1915, pp. 174-176. 
45 L.H. Jeffery, 1976, p. 209. 
46 Herodotus, I.6. 
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Croesus.47  Thus, by the mid-sixth century all the Ionian cities were under the 
rule of the Lydian Empire. 
For many of the Ionian Greek cities, loss of political independence may 
not have been too arduous.  Croesus is known for his philhellenic sympathies 
and there seems to have been religious tolerance for the Ionian Greeks under the 
Lydians.  As far back as the eighth century, we find Gyges dedicating gifts to 
Delphi.48  This tradition seems to have been maintained by Croesus and it is 
likely that intervening generations also dedicated to Greek sanctuaries.49  
Herodotus states at I. 6 that Croesus only took tribute from those Ionian cities he 
conquered militarily but that with the others he made treaties of friendship, 
which implies exemption from paying tribute.  Hirsch argues that the lack of a 
Lydian navy was a psychological safety-valve for the Greeks who could, if the 
situation demanded, take to their ships, as some did in response to Cyrus the 
Greats reprisals.50  
 
The first contacts between the Greeks of the mainland and the Persian 
Empire were a result of the Lydian aggression against the Persians.  We learn 
from Herodotus of the alliance between Sparta and Croesus when he was 
recruiting allies for his campaign against Cyrus, and also that prior to this 
alliance Sparta, had had friendly dealings with Croesus.  Herodotus, I.69-70, 
mentions that the Spartans were well disposed to Croesus, not only because they 
were flattered by his interpretation of the oracle from Delphi, but also because he 
had granted them a favour in donating gold to them for a statue of Apollo.  Burn 
suggests that the gift of gold was, in fact, Croesus attempt to woo the Spartans 
into an alliance against Persia.51  Herodotus further states that by the time 
Croesus had received the oracle the Spartans had subdued most of the 
Peloponnese52, thus, we can see that Croesus was courting the most powerful 
state in Greece at the time.  When Croesus called on the Spartans for support 
                                                          
47 Herodotus, I.2, cf. Asheri, 2007, pp. 80, 95. 
48 Herodotus, I.14.  
49 Herodotus, I.14, 25, 50, 85. We also find Croesus re-building the temple at Didyma and 
dedicating gifts there as well as to other Greek sanctuaries, Herodotus, I.92. 
50 S.W. Hirsch, 1986, p. 227. 
51 A.R. Burn, 1984, p. 39. 
52 Herodotus, I.68. 
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during his campaign against Cyrus the Great, they were brought into conflict 
with the newly emerging Persian Empire. 
 
The Ionian response in the face of Persian conquest was varied; some 
simply fled, for example the Phocaeans and Teians,53 whilst others joined 
Croesus campaign against Cyrus.  It should be borne in mind that prior to the 
fall of Sardis Cyrus offered the Ionian Greeks friendly submission if they 
defected from Croesus.  These Ionian cities refused, except Miletus, and were 
unable to achieve the same terms with Cyrus afterwards.54  The treatment of the 
Ionian Greeks is a good example of Persias policy of trying to divide its enemies 
by seduce elements of their armies, an earlier example of which can be found in 
Cyrus conquest of Babylon.55   
 
Despite Croesus flattery and gift of gold, the Spartans do not seem to 
have been initially moved by the capture of Croesus and the conquest of the 
Ionian Greeks.  Herodotus notes that Ionian and Aeolian envoys went to Sparta 
to ask for help against subsequent Persian aggression and were refused.  When 
the Spartans did send an envoy to Persia it was in a pentekonter and the Spartan 
envoy simply forbade Cyrus from harming the Ionian Greeks.56  The Ionian and 
Aeolian embassy is an interesting precursor to the journey of Aristagoras at the 
beginning of the Ionian Revolt of 494 B.C.  Although the details of the story of 
the Ionian and Aeolian embassy to Sparta could be deemed unhistorical, Asheri 
maintains that the embassy from Sparta to Cyrus at Sardis may have an element 
of truth in it, despite the influence of fifth century Spartan characteristics 
seemingly being applied retrospectively onto the sixth century Spartan envoy, 
Lacrines.57  If we believe an embassy was sent from Sparta to Cyrus quite soon 
                                                          
53 Herodotus, I.163-169. 
54 Herodotus, I.76 and 141.  Balcer, 1995, p. 56, believes that after the death of Alyattes the treaty of 
friendship between Lydia and Miletus was not renewed. Subsequently Miletus ports had been 
subject to numerous Lydian attacks, which may have encouraged Miletus to accept Cyrus offer to 
defect. 
55 Cf. Briant, 2002, pp. 40-42. Also, Brosius, 2000, 12.13-19. 
56 Herodotus, I.152. Wallinga, 1984, p. 407, notes that pentekonters were a new military innovation 
and were still rare at this time. Thus, we may suggest the use of one by Sparta in this instance was 
also part of their threat.  For general remarks on Greek embassies see Piccirelli, 2002, pp. 23-31. 
57 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 125, Asheri, 2007, p. 180. 
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after the defeat of Croesus, we must consider the motivation for this.  Herodotus 
asserts that the primary reason was to ascertain the might of Cyrus in the wake 
of his success against Croesus.58  Certainly it was in the interests of Sparta to 
gauge the potential Persian impact on its interests in the Aegean, for example, 
the islands Thera, Melos and the other islands settled by the Spartans in the eight 
century B.C.59  It is worth bearing in mind that the Spartans may have refused to 
help the Ionian and Aeolian embassy because they did not think this was in 
Spartas direct interests and because the envoys were not Dorian.  However, the 
embassy of Lacrines may also have been motivated by the realisation that the 
expansion of the Persian Empire westwards might affect Spartas interests. 
Nearly all agree that Herodotus purpose here is to demonstrate the 
cultural differences between Greece and Persia.60  He highlights the difference 
between Persian palace culture and Greek polis culture, contrasting Greek 
society, particularly the presence of market places, with barbarian society, stating 
that there are no markets in the Persian Empire.61 It is interesting to observe that 
Cyrus response to Lacrines is generally dismissive.  He is apparently not yet 
aware of Sparta and is forced to consult those Greeks present about the Spartans.  
This is not too surprising when we consider that Cyrus was not the aggressor in 
the Persian  Lydian conflict and he had been distracted from subduing Babylon 
by Croesus belligerence.  Therefore, Cyrus would not yet have needed to know 
about the Greeks living across the sea from Asia Minor. Cyrus ignorance of 
Sparta mirrors their ignorance of Persia, as is seen from their response to the 
potential threat from Persia was to send Lacrines in one ship with a threat. 
 
The capture of Croesus did not mark the full subjugation of the Ionian 
cities, which were quick to rebel with the Lydians when Cyrus marched away 
from Sardis.62  The rebellion of the Ionian Greeks may have been motivated as 
much by their desire to regain their privileged position previously held under 
the Lydians as by their loyalty to their former masters.  Balcer claims that the 
                                                          
58 Herodotus, I.152. Burn, 1984, p. 44. 
59 See Craik, 1980, p. 30. 
60 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 125, Asheri, 2007, p. 180. 
61 Asheri, 2007, p. 180. 
62 Herodotus, I.154-161. 
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Ionian Greeks believed that Croesus Lydian cavalry would defeat Cyrus when 
he attacked him. Although this may be correct prior to the defeat of Croesus, it 
does not explain why the Ionians rebelled with and remained loyal to the 
defeated Lydians.63 On the advice of Croesus, the Lydians surprisingly are not 
punished for their rebellion but are simply disarmed.64  The Ionians, however, 
were treated more harshly. Herodotus notes that Cyrus commanded Mazares to 
enslave all those who supported the Lydian rebellion against Sardis.65 The 
implication behind the sentence is that Cyrus is referring to all who supported 
the Lydian rebellion but not the Lydians themselves.  Furthermore, the use of the 
verb A?AiA?AhA?AlA?A?AjA?A?AaAtȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
the rebellion.66 
In response to the efforts of Harpagos, the new satrap of Sparda based at 
Sardis, to re-conquer the rebellious Ionian cities the Phocaeans and Teians fled 
their cities.67 The remaining Ionian cities were defeated piecemeal and the islands 
took fright and surrendered to Cyrus.68 How and Wells note that whilst 
Herodotus seems to be referring here to the larger islands of Samos and Chios, 
Samos at least, in fact, was independent.  This is demonstrated in his later 
account of the assassination of Polycrates of Samos by Oroetes, satrap of Sardis, 
which we will consider below.69 It is noteworthy that, despite the Spartan show 
of strength after the initial subjugation of Lydia and the Ionian Greeks, they were 
not involved in this rebellion. This suggests that the Spartan threat to punish 
Cyrus should he harm the Greeks was empty.  Looking at these very first 
contacts between the Ionian Greeks and the Persian Empire, we notice certain 
prominent features. Firstly, that the Persians seem to have known very little 
about the Greeks, which is not surprising when we consider that until attacked 
by Croesus, Cyrus seems to have had no intention of expanding the Empire that 
                                                          
63 Balcer, 1995, p. 59. 
64 Herodotus, I.154-156. 
65 Herodotus, I.156. 
66Asheri, 2007, p. 181, notes that the practice of A?AiA?AhA?AlA?A?AjA?A?Aa? d h was inherited from the 
Neobabylonians and literally meant the annihilation of a city through mass-deportation of its 
inhabitants. 
67 Herodotus, I.163-169. 
68 Herodotus, I.169. 
69Herodotus, III.120-125. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 129. 
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far West at that time. He was pulled to the West by the attack of Croesus and had 
not had an opportunity to reconnoitre the peoples in that region. However, it 
seems clear that by the time of the rebellion of the Lydians and Ionians, Cyrus 
understood that these were two separate peoples since he punished the Ionians 
but simply disarmed the Lydians. 
We also notice that not all of the Ionian cities were loyal to Lydia, as is 
shown by the example of Miletus. We may suggest that Ionian loyalty was based 
largely on self-interest. The fact that the Ionians rebelled against Cyrus with the 
Lydians indicates they believed the Lydians would defeat Cyrus this second 
time, despite losing to him initially. Thus we may conjecture that neither the 
Lydians nor the Ionian Greeks knew much about Cyrus who had quite an 
impressive military record by this time.  We also see that despite Spartas threat 
to Cyrus, Sparta was too cautious to follow this up when the opportunity arose. 
That the threat was made at all suggests Sparta was equally ignorant of the 
newly emerging Persian Empire, however, the lack of support of the Lydian and 
Ionian rebellion from Cyrus suggests that the Spartans were not keen to 
antagonise too greatly this new empire.  
 
Samos, Polycrates and Syloson 
As the Persian Empire expanded west it subjugated Samos, which was a 
strong, independent island and had started to intrude on Persias interests. The 
subjugation of Samos began with the assassination of Polycrates, tyrant of 
Samos, by Oroetes, satrap of Sardis. Although Polycrates had sent a naval force 
with Cambyses for the latters campaign against Egypt, it is worth noting that 
this, according to Herodotus, was Polycrates own suggestion to remove his 
political enemies from the island.70  This is a good early example of a Greek 
tyrant medising for his own direct gain, i.e. the removal of his political enemies 
whilst allying with the Persian Empire.  Balcer notes that there is evidence of a 
Persian attack against Samos in the 540s and believes the island was subjugated 
                                                          
70 Herodotus, III.44. Balcer, 1995, p. 65, doesnt believe that Polycrates alliance with Egypt was not 
at variance with Samos subjugation to the Persian Empire. 
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by Harpagos, prior to the reign of Cambyses.71  If this is the case, it appears that 
Samos was accorded a good degree of independence by Cyrus.  Prior to his 
assassination, Herodotus mentions that Polycrates power was so great that his 
actions were becoming a threat to Oroetes control of his satrapy and that 
Polycrates, who had a powerful navy, may have had designs on Ionia and the 
islands along that coast.72  Herodotus notes that Polycrates was: 
the talk of Ionia and the rest of Greece. All his campaigns were 
victorious, his every venture a success. He (had) a fleet of a hundred 
pentekonters and a force of a thousand bowmen. His plundering raids were 
wide and indiscriminate . He captured many of the islands and a number of 
the towns on the mainland as well.73 
Herodotus further emphasises the power and the fall of Polycrates in his 
story of the ring which Polycrates discarded on the advice of Amasis of Egypt. At 
this time Polycrates and Amasis were allies, but, according to Herodotus, 
Amasis, uneasy at Polycrates mounting success, advised him to discard 
something of value in an attempt to avert the bad fortune he believed would 
accompany Polycrates previous good fortune.  When the ring which Polycrates 
had discarded was returned to him, Amasis broke off the alliance.74  Herodotus 
story of the ring demonstrates his belief that Polycrates assassination was the 
result of fate rather than for political reasons.75  Asheri, noting Herodotus failure 
to consider political motivations behind the assassination, suggests that 
Polycrates support of Cambyses against Oroetes may have been one of them.76 
                                                          
71 Pausanias VII.5.2, Balcer, 1995, p. 92, citing Boardman, 1959, pp. 199-201, and Shipley, 1987, p. 80, 
believes the destruction of the Heraion to be evidence of wide-scale fighting c. 540. 
72 Herodotus, III.122. Herodotus later assigns the motivation behind Oroetes assassination of 
Polycrates to personal reasons, i.e. Oroetes verbal abuse by a fellow satrap for not having 
conquered Samos, or because Polycrates had snubbed a messenger of Oroetes. Both tales would 
have resulted in damaged prestige for Oroetes, which would have been further reason for Oroetes 
to have desired the removal of Polycrates.  This contrasts with the friendly relationships of 
Alcibiades and Lysander with Persia, which also affected Persian foreign policy, albeit to their 
benefit rather than their detriment. 
73 Herodotus, III.39. Asheri, 2007, p. 439, quoting D. Fehling, 1989, pp. 230-231, notes that 
Herodotus reference to a hundred pentekonters is a typical number. 
74 Herodotus, III.40-43. Modern scholarship suggests that it was Polycrates later support of 
Cambyses Egyptian campaign that broke the alliance between Samos and Egypt. See Asheri, 2007, 
pp. 440-441, How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, pp. 266-267. 
75 Herodotus, III.40-42. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 268, describe the whole story (as) a folk 
tale. Asheri, 2007, pp. 440-441, describes it as pure literary fiction. 
76 Herodotus, III.122-123. Asheri, 2007, p. 507. 
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On the other hand, Balcer suggests the assassination took place later, during the 
period of Oroetes rebellion against Darius.77  In his message to Polycrates, 
Herodotus states that Oroetes was inviting Polycrates to revolt against Cambyses 
and Polycrates was assassinated by Oroetes whilst in Sardis to discuss this 
proposal.  Therefore, it may be, contrary to Balcer, that Polycrates was 
assassinated not because he supported Cambyses against Oroetes, but because 
he had shown his hand as a potential threat to the Persian Empire or at least 
Oroetes area of influence over it: i.e. Polycrates planned to conquer Ionia and the 
islands and, also, he was willing to become involved in a rebellion against 
Cambyses. That Oroetes later rebelled against Darius, who may have been 
involved to some degree in the death of Cambyses and the usurpation of the 
Persian throne, may suggest his support for Cambyses.  What is clear is that 
Polycrates, as a Greek tyrant accorded relative leniency by Persia, was happy to 
take advantage of this relationship and to play along with Persia until he over-
reached himself by becoming involved in a possible rebellion.  The crucifixion of 
Polycrates after his assassination indicates the severity of the charges against 
him.78   
  
Herodotus notes that when Polycrates was assassinated, Oroetes released 
the Samians and allowed them to return to Samos, but took as prisoners those 
who were either foreigners or slaves.79  The assassination of Polycrates 
confirmed the islands loyalty to the Persian Empire; when Darius became king 
he had Oroetes executed and he re-instated on Samos Syloson, the brother of 
Polycrates, who was loyal to Darius.80 According to Herodotus the installation of 
Syloson was at Sylosons own request and was not a Persian-led initiative. We 
are told that Syloson and Darius were briefly acquainted whilst Darius was 
serving in Cambyses Egyptian campaign and during this time Syloson gave 
                                                          
77 Balcer, 1995, p. 119. 
78 Herodotus, VII. 194. Histiaeus was likewise impaled when he was captured after the Ionian 
Revolt and Herodotus uses the same verb, A?AhA?AnAoA?ApAlA?Atǰȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ǯȱ
Likewise, Herodotus, VII. 238 and IX. 78, Leonidas head was cut off and A?AhA?AnAoA?A?AlAtAnA?Ad on a 
stake after his defeat at Thermopylae.  Thus, we may be able to glean the seriousness of the offense 
committed by Polycrates when we look to other uses of the verb A?AhA?AnAoA?ApAlA?Atǯ 
79 Herodotus, III.125. 
80 Herodotus, III.140. 
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Darius his cloak.81 Upon the assassination of Polycrates, Syloson approached 
Darius and asked to be installed as the tyrant of Samos. This would have been a 
wise choice of tyrant for Darius. Syloson supposedly was personally known to 
him and, therefore, likely to remain loyal and trustworthy. Also he had 
previously shared the tyranny over Samos with Polycrates and another brother, 
Pantagnotus, and, therefore, had experience of ruling it.82 Syloson was installed 
as tyrant with the backing of Otanes and a Persian army against resistance from a 
faction on the island.83 This faction fled to Sparta looking for military support 
there, but due to the increasing Persian influence this military aid, unlike on 
previous occasions, was no longer forthcoming.84 
From a Persian perspective the installation of Syloson not only ensured 
that the island was friendly to Persia and removed the threat to Persian control 
of the coast of Asia Minor as had been presented by Polycrates. It also was a 
further expansion of Persian power in the Aegean. Furthermore, due to Otanes 
slaughter of the men and boys on the island, it will have removed Samian piracy 
from the coast of Asia Minor and the islands, further securing that territory for 
the Persian Empire and keeping the Greeks of Asia Minor affected by Samian 
piracy content, until Otanes repopulated the island later.85 
From a Greek perspective, the subjugation of Samos and installation of 
Syloson demonstrated that Darius was willing to support individuals, namely 
tyrants, who would be loyal to him.  M.M. Austin notes that Samos and 
Sylosons family were closely linked to Darius and the Persian royal family after 
this.86  Sylosons son ruled during Persias Scythian campaign and was reinstated 
after the Ionian revolt.87  It is likely that the example of Syloson affected Hippias 
decision to approach Persia whilst in exile from Athens.88  The examples of 
Syloson and Polycrates likely contributed to the Greek notion that Persia had a 
                                                          
81 Herodotus, III.139. 
82 Herodotus, III.39. 
83 Herodotus, III.144. 
84 Herodotus, III.148. 
85 Herodotus, III.149. 
86 M.M. Austin, 1990, p. 300. 
87 Herodotus, VI.13. and VI.25. 
88 For Hippias, cf. pp. 32-38. 
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pro-tyranny stance.  They also indicate that Persia was willing to exploit personal 
quarrels to their advantage. 
 
Democedes of Croton 
Another consequence of the assassination of Polycrates was the capture 
of Democedes of Croton, a friend of and doctor to Polycrates who had travelled 
to Sardis with him.  Democedes was taken prisoner by Oroetes when Polycrates 
was assassinated.89  When Darius had Oroetes murdered, Democedes became 
one of Darius slaves and gained fame in the Persian court initially when he 
cured Darius dislocated ankle and later when he cured a breast malady for 
Queen Atossa.90  Despite A. Griffiths assertions that the tale of Democedes has 
too many folk-tale features to be believable, he does still maintain that it is likely 
that Democedes was a doctor at the Persian court and argues he was there on a 
contract rather than as a slave.91  Griffiths suggests that the account was 
romanticised during the Persian wars to dispel accusations of medism against 
Croton.  Davies takes this argument one stage further marrying folk-take motifs 
to each section of Herodotus account of Democedes.92  However, even Davies 
concedes that historical narrative can be shaped by folk-tales without being a 
folk-tale itself, and he agrees with Griffiths that this may have been due to the 
fact that Herodotus sources were likely to have been descendants of Democedes 
and were prone to exaggeration.93 In weighing up such stories it is advisable that 
at all times we should be aware of Greek tendencies to exaggerate their 
importance in the Persian Empire.94 
Whether the tale of Democedes as related by Herodotus is strictly true or 
not is not the subject of this study. The tale of Democedes is a good example of a 
named individual Greek living and working within the Persian Empire.95 
Herodotus stresses that Democedes became wealthy and influential because of 
                                                          
89 Herodotus, III.120-125. 
90 Herodotus, III.130. 
91 A. Griffiths, 1987, pp. 37-46. Although this may seem unlikely, it is worth noting that Persia hired 
Greek mercenaries. Thus, the idea of Democedes working on a contract is not impossible. 
92 M. Davies, 2010, pp. 31-39. 
93 Davies, 2010, p. 22. Griffiths, 1987, p. 47.  
94 Cf. Keaveney, 2012, passim. 
95 For evidence for Ionian Greeks working within the Persian Empire cf. Fornara, 1983, n. 45 which 
records rations given to Ionian wives. Also, Kuhrt, 2010, n.  40. 
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his skills as a doctor: he was influential enough to be able to liberate from jail the 
Elean prophet, Sciton, and also to intercede on behalf of the Egyptian doctors 
who had failed to cure Darius and were due to be executed.  Herodotus also 
implausibly attributes Darius invasion of Greece to the influence of Democedes 
on Atossa.96  Thus, we can see that by the end of the sixth century skilled Greeks 
were being employed in the Persian Empire and were able to become wealthy 
and, perhaps influential, as a result of their skills.  Despite his supposed 
influence, Herodotus emphasises Democedes lowly status.  Democedes status, 
whether literal or not, would have been important in Herodotus narration, 
which continues that Democedes was employed as a guide for the Persians sent 
to survey the coast of Greece and that he escaped during this time.97  Democedes 
assistance to Darius in surveying Greece will need to have been portrayed as 
involuntary to avoid parallels being drawn with Hippias and Demaratus, who 
freely acted as guides for Persian invasions of Greece.98  M. Brosius notes that 
Democedes was not unusual in being employed at the Persian court and notes, 
also, that in most cases foreign (Greek and Egyptian) doctors arrived at the 
Persian court either at the kings request or voluntarily.99  However, she also 
notes that since non-Persians only filled positions at court below those of 
Persians, it is highly unlikely that Democedes was able to influence Atossa to 
the degree that she could persuade Darius to campaign in Greece.100  Thus, it 
seems more likely that Darius, when considering the notion of expanding the 
Persian Empire west, knew that there was a Greek doctor at court and consulted 
him for local information.  We can suggest, then, a more plausible account of 
Democedes which supports our contention that, despite the bias in our Greek 
sources, the Persians were the ones in control of their relationships with the 
                                                          
96 That Democedes escaped the Persians in Italy may be seen as a Persian attempt to expand the 
Empire that far. In contrast to the later deference of Gelon, we find the Italians of Croton unafraid 
of Persia when they refuse to hand over Democedes. Herodotus, III.137. Thus, Democedes escape 
also shows the limitations of Persian power at that time. 
97 Herodotus, III.135-137. Whether Democedes was employed on a contract as Griffiths believes or 
was a slave captured when Polycrates was assassinated is not overly important if we consider that 
to the Greeks all subjects of the King were slaves. What seems to have been important is the need 
to emphasise Democedes powerlessness to refuse working for Darius, which assisted the eventual 
invasion of Greece. 
98 For Hippias cf. pp. 32-38 and for Demaratus cf. pp. 73-76.   
99 M. Brosius, 2011, pp. 72-73. 
100 Brosius, 2011, p. 76. 
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Greeks.  It seems more plausible that, arriving at the Persian court whether as a 
slave or on a commission, Democedes became known to Darius through his 
medical expertise and was eventually called upon for his knowledge of Greece 
when Darius was beginning to consider expanding Persian influence there. Thus, 
he was seemingly the first in a list of Greek guides working for the Persian 
Empire.   
 
Thrace and Macedon 
We have discussed above the expansion of the Persian Empire through 
the Levant and the Aegean islands, but the Persian Empire also expanded north-
west into Thrace and Macedon.  In 513 B.C., whilst en route to the Danube on his 
Scythian campaign, Darius received the surrender of some of the Thracian tribes 
without any fighting whilst others, namely the Getae, resisted and were 
defeated.101  The Scythian envoys at Herodotus, IV. 118 claim that Darius had 
conquered Thrace before bridging the Danube.  However, Balcer notes that, 
despite Herodotus, IV. 118, Darius had only conquered Byzantium, parts of the 
Thracian Pontic coast, and the Hebros valley at this time.102  Miltiades, the future 
Athenian hero of Marathon, was the tyrant of one of the cities which surrendered 
to Darius prior to his Scythian campaign.  During Darius Scythian campaign 
Miltiades was amongst the Ionian Greeks guarding the bridge across the 
Danube.103  If Herodotus is correct, we can see the first signs of Miltiades 
disaffection from the Persian Empire when he initially supports the Scythian 
invitation to abandon Darius in Scythia.  Herodotus states that Miltiades 
subsequently fled his city in the Thracian Chersonese fearing he would be 
captured by Phoenician triremes at Tenedos due to his advice given at the 
Danube.104  However, we must treat this account with caution and bear in mind 
that Herodotus wrote it nearly 60 years after Miltiades led the Athenians to 
victory at Marathon.  Balcer notes that there is no sign that Miltiades was coerced 
to support Darius Scythian campaign105 and we may suggest that the evidence 
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103 Herodotus, IV.137-138. 
104 Herodotus, VI.40-41. 
105 Balcer, 1995, p. 150. 
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for Miltiades support of the Scythian proposal to abandon Darius came from 
Herodotus pro-Athenian sources.  Cawkwell believes the account to be entirely 
fictitious and was part of Miltiades apologia in his trial in 493 B.C.106  Certainly 
this seems convincing, given the lack of reprisals against his son, who was 
captured during the familys flight from the Chersonese and given a Persian wife 
and cities to support him. This is improbable treatment for the son of a supposed 
traitor, although we should not discredit Persian generosity.107  
On his return from his campaign Darius left behind Megabazus to 
conquer the rest of Thrace.108  Burn suggests Megabazus seems to have 
completed this task in one campaign as he was able to return to Asia with the 
Paeonians before Darius arrived in Susa.109  However, again, Balcer notes that the 
conquest of Megabazus only included the lower Hebros valley and Doriskos; 
Byzantium and the Pontic coast seem to have been lost from Persian control. 
Byzantium was later re-conquered by Otanes, who replaced Megabazus.110  
Balcer notes that Persian control of Thrace was not consistent and that after the 
Ionian Revolt the cities of the Thracian Chersonese needed to be reconquered.  
Likewise, the Thracian cities along the coast of the Aegean were not properly 
subjected until Datis campaign against Eretria and Athens in 490 B.C.111  Persian 
control of the Thracian coast lasted only until 479 B.C. and Balcer suggests that 
Artabazos retreat inland to Byzantium after Plataea from where he crossed to 
Asia suggests his fear of the hostile and rebellious Greeks and Thracians, and a 
critical concern for his safety at Sestos.112  Persian control of Thrace was 
                                                          
106 Cawkwell, 2005, p. 48.  
107 Herodotus, VI.41.  Thucydides, I.138, and below pp. 122-128 for Xerxes generosity toward 
Themistocles.  How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 343, noting Thirlwall, 1845, p. 486 that Darius 
returned from his Scythian expedition through Miltiades territory and there is no hint  the 
tyrant was disloyal.  Burn, 1985, p. 133, n. 14, notes the chronological issues presented by 
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against Darius or he fled immediately and returned only at the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt.  How 
and Wells reconcile this discrepancy with Cornelius Nepos account that Miltiades immediately 
fled after the Scythian expedition and note evidence that he seems to have served as a condottiero 
with the Thracian prince Olorus.  
108 Herodotus, V.2. 
109 Herodotus, V.1-25. Burn, 1984, p. 134. 
110 Herodotus, V.26. Otanes also captured Chalcedon, Antandrus and Lamponium along with the 
islands of Lemnos and Imbros.  
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terminated by the Hellenic and, later, Delian League fleets, which we will discuss 
in detail later.113  
During his campaign in Thrace Megabazos sent an embassy to Amyntas, 
king of Macedon.114  This embassy is informative on the composition and 
importance of embassies sent overseas by Darius.  Herodotus tells us that 
Megabazus A?A?AgA?A?Ad A?A?A?A?AfAjApAm ?Am M ?AeA?A?AjAhA?AbAh A?Ah ? l ? m A?A Ao? Aጃ?AlAnA?Am, jA? gA?Ao 
A?ЄAoAjAh ?AeA??hAjAh ?AnA?Ah ?AjAeAdAgЏAoA?AoAjAd A?Ah oХ AnAoAlA?AoAjA?A?A?У.115 The description 
A?AjAeAdAgЏAoA?AoAjAd used by Herodotus is useful when noting the importance of these 
envoys in the Persian hierarchical system. The Persian Empire had a heavy 
military bias which was natural in an ever expanding empire, where holding 
onto your throne could mean fighting off the competition, in a somewhat literal 
fashion at times. An example of how military talents were valued in the 
Achaemenid Empire is found in the annual prizes given from the king to the 
man who produced the most male children or most distinguished himself in 
battle.116 That the A?AjAeAdAgЏAoA?AoAjAd in the army after the commander were sent as 
envoys is reasonable, given their likely knowledge of and vested interest in the 
campaign.  It is also in keeping with the significance of these initial offers of 
submission. 
When Diodorus Siculus117 speaks of the ambassadors, in the fourth 
century, as friends of Artaxerxes II, this may mean that the A?AjAeAdAgЏAoA?AoAjAd in an 
embassy may also have had personal connections to the Great King, or may have 
been formally enrolled amongst his friends.118  Those who distinguished 
                                                          
113 Balcer, 1988, pp. 1-21, argues that Thrace was never fully conquered by the Persian Empire but 
that some Thracian cities were controlled from Sardis under the satrapy of Sparda. 
114 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 7, date Amyntas reign to c. 540-498 B.C. 
115 Herodotus, V.17. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, pp. 7-8, find this whole affair implausible 
describing the subsequent actions of Alexander as inconsistent. They also note that the story is very 
similar to another told in Pausanias, IV.4.3, Plutarch, Solon VIII, Polyaenus, I.20 and Xenophon, 
Hellenica, V.4.4-6. The importance of the number 7 in the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism can be 
seen in the number of the good forces (the Spentas and Ahuramazda). This number is also reflected 
in the number of conspirators involved in the assassination of Smerdis, the Magus who usurped 
the Persian throne, which ultimately led to Darius I being chosen as king in 522 B.C. Later recorded 
embassies from Persia do not tell us exactly how many envoys were involved, however, we may 
conjecture that accompanying the named ambassador there may have been another six dokimotatoi. 
116 Herodotus, I.135 on prowess and producing male children. 
117 Diodorus Siculus, XI.74.5 specifically describes those sent by Artaxerxes as certain of his 
friends. 
118 For the importance of being a friend of the Great King, cf. how Orontes was demoted from 
being a friend of Artaxerxes II when he was found guilty of slandering Tiribazus during Persias 
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themselves militarily would have been granted favours by the king and would, 
undoubtedly, have become better personally connected to him, thus, as they 
became more distinguished they became more favoured.  Briant notes that 
within the Persian court any promotion brought the noble into the circle of 
cronies,119 citing Tiribazus as a good example. He notes how after Tiribazus 
great deeds during a campaign against the Cardusians  (he)  set out 
homewards in the company of the King.120  As Tiribazus did not ride with the 
king initially during this campaign, this is a clear indication of his increased 
prestige.  Briant notes that status in the Persian court was generally symbolized 
by a title indicating the recipients proximity to the king, either as a family 
relation or in a literal sense i.e. his cupbearer, arms-bearer etc.  That these titles 
were primarily honorific does not detract from the point that the bearer of the 
title held a position of favour at the royal court.  The status of the envoys sent to 
Macedonia, as A?AjAeAdAgЏAoA?AoAjAd, likely reflects the importance of the embassys 
purpose and demonstrates Darius appreciation of diplomacy when expanding 
the territory under the control of the Persian Empire.  
Herodotus claims that the Persian envoys insulted Macedonian royal 
women at a dinner provided by Amyntas and they were murdered by Prince 
Alexander.121  The notion that this story was a later fabrication to prove the 
patriotism of Alexander after the withdrawal of the Persian army is proposed 
by How and Wells, and also supported by Badian.122  Badian suggests that the 
envoys were so high ranking to cover the fact that initial overtures for an alliance 
came from Macedon rather than Persia.  He also believes that the bribe paid by 
Alexander to pay off the Persian army sent to investigate the missing envoys is in 
fact a skilful interpretation of Macedonian tribute being paid to Persia as a 
vassal state.123  Whether the story of the murders is a fabrication or not, one result 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cypriot campaign of the 490s. Orontes was also given a smaller satrapy.  Diodorus Siculus, 
XV.911.2. cf. Wiesehöfer, 1996, p. 37. 
119 Briant, 2002, p. 311. Also see Keaveney, 2003, p. 81. 
120 Ibid. taken from Plutarch, Artaxerxes, 14.9. 
121 Herodotus, V.18-20. 
122 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 7. Badian, 1994, p. 108. 
123 Badian, 1994, p. 108, n.1. 
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of the embassy is that Alexanders sister, Gygaea, married the Persian general, 
Bubares, and Macedonia became tied by marriage to this Persian family.124   
We know that by c. 492 B.C. Macedon was a full vassal state of the 
Persian Empire. Herodotus states that whilst en route to Greece Mardonius land 
troops re-conquered Macedonia and added the Macedonians to the list of 
Darius slaves.125  The strategic importance of Macedon is illustrated by its use 
by Xerxes as a supplies depot for the Persian army during preparations for his 
invasion of Greece in the 480s and also its use as a base, from which the invasion 
could take place.126  Badian suggests that between the initial offer of tribute and 
the time of the reconquest of Macedon by Megabazus, Alexander likely ceased to 
pay tribute and resumed paying upon the reconquest.127 
Once subjugated to the Persian Empire, Macedon worked in the interests 
of Persia, which no doubt coincided with its own interests, and Alexander was 
used as an envoy to the Greeks when necessary. Alexander is an interesting 
character in that during the Persian invasion he not only acted in an official 
capacity as a messenger for Mardonius, but also he seems to have been able to 
act in an unofficial and private capacity, sending messages to the Greeks at 
Tempe and Plataea.  He claimed to have been of ancient Greek descent128 and 
Herodotus states that he was specifically chosen as a Persian envoy to Athens 
because of his official relationship with the city, which was backed by 
deeds.129 Thus, we find Mardonius exploiting a pre-existing relationship 
                                                          
124 Herodotus, VIII.136, states that Gygaea and Bubares had a son who stayed in Asia, named 
Amyntas after his maternal grandfather, who enjoyed by the Kings gift the revenue of the 
important Phrygian town of Alabanda. Briant, 2002, p. 145, notes that Bubares was the son of 
Megabazus, who was jointly in command of the subjugation of Macedonia prior to the Persian 
invasion proper by Darius at Herodotus, VII.108. Badian, 1994, p. 116, suggests that the young 
Amyntas was so called because he was the intended heir to Macedonia after Alexander and would 
have been a loyal Persian vassal. However, Badian doesnt explain what he believes would have 
happened to Alexanders heir, who he suggests would have been supplanted by the young 
Amyntas. 
125 Herodotus, VI.44. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 80, note that Herodotus implies that 
Megabazus had conquered Macedon before Mardonius, but that it is likely that the Persian army 
did not cross the Strymon until 492 B.C. 
126 Herodotus, VII.25. 
127 Badian, 1994, p. 117. 
128 Herodotus, IX.45. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 283, doubt that Alexander and the 
Macedonian royal family was of Greek descent, claiming the story to be a folk tale. 
129 Herodotus, VIII.136. 
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between Athens and Alexander.130 How and Wells suggest that the deeds 
mentioned may refer to Alexanders involvement in the withdrawal of Greek 
forces from Tempe, which we will discuss below.131 However, Badian believes 
that Herodotus omission of the specific information indicate the deeds were 
more politically embarrassing.  He believes that it was Alexander who suggested 
to Athens they should approach Persia for an alliance in 507 B.C. when 
threatened by the invasion of Cleomenes.132  Whilst this proposal is attractive, we 
should bear in mind that there is a good deal of speculation in Badians 
reconstruction. Wallace suggests that the xenia of Alexanders father, Amyntas, 
will have ceased in 510 B.C. when he backed Hippias in exile.  However, it is 
likely to have resumed with the accession of Alexander during a period when it 
was least likely to cause offense in Persia and he could point to the fact that 
Hippias didnt actually reside in Macedonia, despite the offer.133   
Like Thrace, after the Persian defeat at Salamis, Persian control of 
Macedon ceased. We may conjecture that, had Xerxes campaign in Greece 
succeeded, both Thrace and Macedon would have been organised into a satrapy 
or individual satrapies. However, due to the failure of the campaign and the 
subsequent actions of the Hellenic League fleet, direct Persian control of both 
countries was limited to the time when there was a Persian army in them. 
 Noteworthy of the Persian conquest of Macedon is the Persian attempt 
to woo the state politically, which, despite Herodotus tale of the assassinated 
envoys, seems to have worked.  One might argue that this worked only because 
there was a Persian army on Macedons door-step, as soon as it withdrew 
Persian control diminished. However, the marriage of Gygaea to Bubares 
suggests an attempt at an amicable arrangement for both Persia and Macedon 
and it may simply be that as the Persian army was called away to other business 
Macedon was forced to look to its own interests and, consequently became 
independent again. 
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Cleomenes invasion of Attica and the Athenian embassy to Persia  
We have noted above the possibility that Alexander may have suggested 
that Athens turn to Persia for some form of alliance in c. 507 B.C. in response to 
Cleomenes invasion of Attica. The embassy sent from Athens is recorded in 
Herodotus V.73.  At this time the Athenians were beginning to establish 
themselves as a democracy and during the civil unrest between the parties of 
Isagoras and Cleisthenes, Isagoras turned to Cleomenes, one of the kings of 
Sparta, for help.  Isagoras, Cleomenes, and a small force of men were able to 
banish Cleisthenes, but when they occupied the Acropolis they encountered 
resistance from the remaining Athenians and were forced to leave Athens under 
truce after two days.  In response to this humiliation Cleomenes amassed a large 
force from the Peloponnesian League and invaded Attica.  It was during these 
movements that the Athenians sent an embassy to Sardis from fear of 
Cleomenes reprisals134 and we may conjecture that they knew he had started to 
call up the various Peloponnesian League contingents by the time of their 
embassy.  This fear was confirmed by Cleomenes invasion of Attica.135  
Fortunately for the Athenians, the Corinthian contingent, supported by 
Demaratus, the other Spartan king, withdrew from the Peloponnesian League 
forces at Eleusis, causing many of the other contingents to follow suit.136 
The greater impact of Cleomenes invasion of Attica, and of more direct 
concern to us here, was the Athenian embassys submission of earth and water to 
Artaphernes.  The direct aim of this embassy is unclear.  Herodotus states that 
the Athenians wished to conclude an alliance with Persia, but we dont know 
whether they believed this would result in a Persian force actually being sent to 
help defend Athens from Cleomenes invasion or whether they believed that 
threat of a Persian force alone would be sufficient.  Once the envoys had 
submitted earth and water the Persians deemed Athens to be part of the Persian 
Empire.  Furthermore, although we are told that the envoys were censured on 
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their return to Athens, we are not told that Athens formally retracted this treaty, 
which would have been not only politically embarrassing but may be have been 
perceived as tantamount to declaring war with Persia.137  
N.K. Kramer suggests that no treaty was formally ratified, however, later 
he contradicts himself believing that the envoys did take earth and water with 
them, which he also concedes were signs of submission.138  Balcers suggestion 
that the Athenians simply forgot about the treaty seems a little farfetched, but 
we can see that they certainly seem to have ignored it once it was no longer 
necessary.139  R.M. Berthold suggests that, in his desperation, Cleisthenes turned 
to his familys connections in Sardis and he questions the notion that Cleisthenes 
would have made a treaty with Persia without giving the envoys instructions 
regarding submission.140  This lends itself to the notion that due to the urgency 
of the situation perhaps the envoys were given prior instructions by Cleisthenes, 
as suggested by Berthold.  That the treaty was concluded upon the first embassy 
suggests the negotiations were rushed.  D.J. Mosley notes that this is the only 
instance during the Classical Period when a treaty was concluded by one state 
with another seemingly upon the first embassy.  He notes that usually a 
minimum of three embassies would be required in most cases .... before a treaty 
came into force.141  Therefore, this first treaty between Athens and Persia is 
exceptional in that it was concluded so quickly. It is unlikely that the concept of 
providing earth and water to Persia was completely unknown to Athens, who 
had a proxenia with Macedon, which had already provided earth and water in 
submission to Darius only a few years earlier.142 It seems likely, however, that the 
Athenians didnt fully understand the implications of providing earth and water 
to the Persian Empire. That the Athenian embassy was able to furnish earth and 
                                                          
137 Herodotus, V.73. 
138 Kramer, 2004, pp. 259-264. 
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water upon its first and the only known visit to Sardis suggests these items were 
taken with them.143 Although Hornblower notes that Herodotus states the 
envoys only promised to submit the earth and water, not that they gave earth 
and water to Artaphernes, he concedes that the actions of Spartas allies imply 
that earth and water was actually given. 144 Also, we may suggest that the 
Athenians could not have hoped to have concluded a military treaty with Persia 
without these items. Therefore, it seems most likely that the embassy expected to 
submit them as part of the terms of the treaty with Persia and in order to save 
time pre-empted the expected request and took the tokens with them.   
Herodotus speaks specifically of the alliance using the noun AnApAgAgA?ArA?A?, 
thus, we can see that Herodotus believed the Athenians were looking for a 
defensive military alliance. Bauslaugh notes that non-military alliances were 
usually termed A?AdAfíA?, which was an alliance of friendship with no military 
functions attached.145 From this we may conclude that Athens was looking 
specifically for military aid from Persia, either de facto or de iure. The relative ease 
with which the Athenians ignored the treaty further suggests that, although 
submitting earth and water to Persia, the Athenians did not fully understand the 
significance of such an act. Berthold is likely correct in suggesting that the actions 
of the envoys were condemned due to the change in the circumstances to which 
the Athenian envoys returned.  Had Cleomenes still been marching on Athens, 
the Athenians would have been much less hostile to an alliance with Persia but 
once the threat of invasion had subsided, the need for an alliance was no longer 
there.146 Furthermore, having defeated both the Boeotians and Chalcidians, 
Berthold suggests, the Athenians would not have agreed to the terms of an 
alliance which suggested an inferior status.147  
We may conclude that Athens was in an impossible situation after its 
envoys agreed to an alliance with Persia.  Having given earth and water, Athens 
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became either subject to the Persian Empire or, if it reneged on this, was at war 
with it. It seems that, if we take Herodotus at face value, the Athenian response 
to this situation was to do simply nothing.  Mosley seems to be correct when he 
notes that it was likely that the agreement was ignored rather than formally 
repudiated.148   
From the Athenian attitude to their treaty with Persia we can see that the 
Athenians were not impressed by Persia, despite the gains it had made, or at 
least not enough to honour their treaty fully.  It seems that Athens viewed Persia 
not as an empire, but in the same way it seems to have viewed other Greek 
states; as an equal power which could be called upon or ignored when necessary.  
This may have been the result of the seemingly lenient treatment of Macedon, 
which may have convinced the Athenians that an alliance with Persia was not a 
serious burden. It was not until Athens became involved in the Ionian Revolt 
that there were serious ramifications for their apparent submission.  However, 
the Athenian refusal to reinstate Hippias at the behest of Artaphernes, which we 
will discuss below, did not help relations between Athens and Persia.  From the 
Persian point of view, once Athens had submitted earth and water it had 
submitted to the Persian Empire. Simply because Athens chose to ignore this 
submission will not have made it any less real to Persia, especially as the 
submission was apparently not formally retracted. There will have been other 
peoples within the Persian Empire which also did not require constant 
reminding that they were part of it and it is likely that Darius simply viewed the 
Athenians in this way. 
 
The medism of Hippias 
Prior to Athens submission, in 510 B.C the Athenian tyrant, Hippias, had 
been deposed and, when the Spartan attempt to reinstate him failed, he took 
residence in exile and maligned the Athenians to Artaphernes, the Satrap of 
Lydia and governor of Sardis.149  When Artaphernes sent messengers to Athens 
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commanding the reinstatement of Hippias, the Athenians refused.  Artaphernes 
seems to have considered Athens subject to the Persian Empire by this time and, 
since they did not submit earth and water until c. 507 B.C., it is probable Hippias 
arrived at Artaphernes court after this time.150  As a subject Athens was obliged 
to obey Persian commands.  If the Athenians deemed themselves not to be 
subject to Persian commands, then Herodotus statement that the Athenians sent 
envoys to Sardis to complain about Hippias slandering of them makes no 
sense.151 A.E. Raubitschek suggests that by sending the envoy to Sardis, to 
complain about Hippias, we can see that Athens was still on friendly terms with 
Persia.  In fact, the only grounds for complaint the Athenians would be able to 
use would be from the position of an ally, if not a subject, of Persia.152  We should 
bear in mind that it is unlikely that news of the Athenian denouncement of the 
embassy once it returned to Athens did not reach Sardis. However, without 
official action in the form of a new embassy to Persia to officially renegotiate the 
terms of their treaty, the existing situation would have been deemed correct by 
both Athens and Persia. We must consider, therefore, that the Athenian 
complaints against Hippias may have been motivated by a desire to appease 
Artaphernes and from fear of possible retributions.153 A third possibility is that 
Athens and Persia genuinely misunderstood the nature of their treaty: Athens 
believing them to be equals and allies; Persia believing Athens to have 
submitted. In Greece cities did not submit to each other, they were allies, 
enemies or were conquered and annexed (as in the case of the Messenians to the 
Spartans).  However, Persia did not make alliances which deemed both parties to 
be equal, rather it accepted the submission of cities and states with terms of 
varyingly favourable degrees for the submissive party depending on the 
circumstances. Therefore, Athens complaint about Hippias may have been sent 
in light of the Athenian belief that it was complaining to an ally of equal status. 
                                                          
150 Herodotus, V.91-96 relates how Hippias initially fled to Sigeum, near Miletus, but then was 
taken to Sparta as part of their planned invasion of Attica to reinstate him. This invasion was 
thwarted by Spartas allies, and Hippias returned to Sigeum.  Herodotus states that Hippias began 
maligning the Athenians to Artaphernes upon his return to Sigeum. 
151 Herodotus, V.96. 
152 Raubitschek, 1991, p. 154. 
153 This view is supported by Arnush who believes that the embassy was part of a wider Athenian 
rapprochement with Persia. Arnush, 1995, p. 143.   
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Kramer develops this idea of an asymmetrical relationship between Athens and 
Persia, believing that Artaphernes demand that they take back Hippias was in 
response to an Athenian enquiry how best to protect themselves from the 
expanding Persian Empire.154 However, if this was the case we would expect 
some mention of it in Herodotus, who simply says that the Athenians went to 
Artaphernes to complain. 
Persia did not always install tyrants in cities to ensure its loyalty, 
although this was frequently the case. For example, after the Ionian Revolt 
Mardonius installed democratic governments in some of the Ionian cities. 
Mardonius may have been unique in this, but this suggests that he recognised 
the need to be flexible in such matters to ensure the loyalty of these cities.155 It 
seems that after the Ionian Revolt the Persians were happy to support whatever 
type of government ensured the loyalty of the city, be it a tyranny or democracy. 
Although the Ionian Revolt occurred after this Athenian embassy to 
Artaphernes, this does not preclude a similar Persian attitude prior to the Ionian 
Revolt. We may suggest that the Athenians may have hoped to confirm their 
previous and existing relationship with Persia, via Artaphernes, as a democracy 
rather than under the leadership of Hippias.  It is worth bearing in mind that the 
embassy which promised to submit earth and water took place in 507/6 B.C. after 
Hippias was ejected from Athens in 510/9 B.C. Thus, the envoys submitted 
Athens when it was a democracy and it seems probable that the embassy to 
Persia was sent in order to maintain the status quo. The Athenian idea that Persia 
was linked with imposing tyrants on Greek cities may be traced back to this 
embassy.  
 
Upon Athens refusal of Artaphernes command, Hippias began actively 
encouraging a Persian invasion of Greece with a view to being reinstated tyrant 
of Athens.  Hippias had shown pro-Persian inclinations prior to his exile, 
especially when he married his daughter, Archedice, to Aeantidas, son of 
Hippoklos, the tyrant of Lampsacus.  The reason given by Thucydides for this is 
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155 Herodotus, VI.43. 
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that Hippoklos of Lampsacus had great influence with Darius.156  Thucydides 
also notes that when Hippias went from Sigeum to the court of Darius he went 
via Lampsacus, further supporting the notion of a close relationship between 
Hippoklos and Hippias.  Not only did Hippias have pro-Persian inclinations 
before his exile, but he also had land in the north Aegean, namely the Thracian 
Chersonese.  Miltiades, the pre-eminent Athenian general at the battle of 
Marathon, was sent by Hippias to be tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese and 
returned to Athens only as the result of Persian expansion.157  That Hippias, 
whilst in exile, took up residence at Sigeum on the Scamander River, in the 
Hellespont, opposite the Chersonese, clearly demonstrates that he still had some 
territory or friends remaining after Miltiades had left the area in 496 B.C.158 
Hippias desire to strengthen his Asiatic contacts by marrying his 
daughter to Aeantidas may have been motivated by the murder of Hipparchus, 
which also led to Hippias tightening his control over the people of Athens, as 
recorded by Herodotus and Athenian Constitution.159  It is likely he thought of his 
fathers many depositions from, and reclaiming of, power in Athens and 
assumed that he could do the same.160  However, it was not until after the 
Athenians became involved in the Ionian Revolt that Hippias was actually able 
to join the Persian invasion at Marathon, twenty years after he had left Athens. 
Hippias inability to find allies in Greece may have been the result of anti-
tyrannical sentiments at the time. The refusal of Spartas allies to help Hippias 
may have been motivated as much by their distaste of tyranny as by their 
unhappiness with Cleomenes leadership. 
We can see that on one level Hippias role in the invasion of Greece, 
similar to that of Democedes, was little more than as a guide to Datis and 
                                                          
156 Thucydides, VI.59.3. H. Wade-Gery, 1951, argues that the tyrant of Lampsacus, Hippoklos, had 
gained such a position demonstrating his loyalty to Darius during the Scythian campaign when 
Miltiades supported destroying the bridge across the Danube and Hippoklos opposed him. 
157 Herodotus, VI.40-41. Cf p. 23 above. 
158 Ibid.  Miltiades was forced to flee the Chersonese twice.  The first time was due to the migration 
of the Scythians who had congregated there as a result of Persian expansion.  The second time was 
due to the approach of the Phoenician fleet which captured his eldest son.  Both the migration of 
the Scythians and the presence of the Phoenician fleet suggest that Miltiades had lost whatever 
territory he had previously controlled. Marincola, 2003, p. 661, n. 17, suggests that Miltiades exile 
took place from 511-496 B.C. 
159 Herodotus, V.62. (Aristotle), Athenian Constitution, 19. 
160 For the repeated exiles and returns of Pisistratus, see Herodotus, I.60-64. 
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Artaphernes, although had it been successful he may have been installed as a 
vassal tyrant for Persia.  He may have been at the court of Artaphernes since 510 
B.C., but Hippias clearly did not have enough influence to persuade Darius to 
organise a Persian invasion of Attica simply because he wished for it.  If Hippias 
believed he could persuade the Persians to invade in 510 B.C., he was optimistic 
at best and somewhat naive.  The invasion was eventually conducted only in 
response and retaliation to the Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian 
Revolt, which we will discuss later.  H. Bengtson notes that the reasons given by 
Herodotus for this first Persian invasion of Greece are: firstly in retaliation for 
involvement in the Ionian Revolt, secondly due to the urgings of Hippias and 
thirdly because Darius wished to expand the Empire westward.161  I would 
suggest that the sequence of reasons given by Herodotus reflects the importance 
of each reason, decreasing in order. That is, the invasion of Greece was primarily 
in retaliation to the Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian Revolt. That 
the retaliation of Persia against Greece was able to quiet Hippias complaints was 
an added benefit and that Hippias was available to help with the invasion was 
also useful.  It can be argued that a Persian invasion of Greece was inevitable due 
to the Persian policy of expansion. Herodotus claims that Persia had been 
planning on conquering mainland Greece since Democedes treatment of 
Atossa.162 Also, Sparta would have been aware of this since the time of the Ionian 
and Aeolian embassy during the Persian conquest of Lydia.163  It should not be 
forgotten that Darius had a general interest in expanding the empire and had not 
only campaigned north in an attempt to expand the empire beyond the Danube, 
but prior to that he had expanded the empire east into India.164 Hippias, who will 
have been aware of this general Persian attitude via his own contacts in Asia 
Minor, may have hoped to use the Persian expansion to effect his reinstatement 
in Athens.  An illustrative example for Persian installation of friendly tyrants can 
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162 Herodotus, III.135-135. 
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be found in the case of Aeaces of Samos, who was reinstated by the Persians 
after the Ionian Revolt.165 
It is apparent from Hippias case that in the early fifth century Greeks 
may have been welcome to live in exile in Persia.  However, if they wished to 
achieve a particular personal aim, they had to wait until the King was ready.  
That is, Hippias may have loudly protested about his ejection from Athens but 
Darius wasnt going to reinstate him as tyrant unless it tied in with his other 
plans, i.e. punishment and expansion. Darius clearly did not intend to mete out 
the same punishment to Athens as he did to Eretria and this may be simply 
because Hippias was in exile living in Persia and Darius saw an opportunity in 
him.  Rather than destroying Athens and deporting the population, as he did 
with Eretria, Darius could reinstate Hippias as tyrant, as a vassal of the Persian 
Empire, and have a foothold in mainland Greece. A. Keaveney notes that 
Hippias would not be a mere figurehead or man of straw as a Persian installed 
tyrant; the Persians had long been accustomed to allow a great deal of latitude 
to their underlings provided those underlings acknowledged the suzerainty of 
their overlords.166   
M.M. Austins suggestion that by the time of the Ionian Revolt it was well 
established that self-interested Greeks could approach the King in the justified 
expectation of gaining power and rewards in return for services rendered to 
him167 is supported by the evidence that Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, received 
Myrcinus in reward for keeping the bridge across the Bosporus safe for Darius 
retreat during the Scythian campaign of 513-512 B.C.168  Austin argues that by the 
time of Hippias eviction from Athens, Darius had already created a reputation 
for richly rewarding Greeks who could perform services for him.  If Austin is 
correct we could surmise that Hippias, in order to gain Persian assistance, may 
well have offered Athens to Darius as an initial landing post for his invasion of 
Greece.  We know that Hippias was living in exile in the Persian Empire with a 
                                                          
165 Herodotus, V.25, states that Aeaces was reinstated as tyrant because the Persians considered 
him to be a man of great worth, who had done them great service. 
166 Keaveney, 2011, p. 28. Cf. pp. 17-20, above for Polycrates of Samos who was an ally at least, if 
not a full vassal, of Persia and yet was allowed enough independence to encroach on the Persian 
control of the Ionian islands and desired to encroach on the Ionian cities of the coast of Asia Minor. 
167 Austin, 1990, p. 291. 
168 Herodotus, IV.137 for bridge, Herodotus, V.11 for reward by Darius. 
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view to using Persian assistance to be reinstated as tyrant of Athens.  Hippias 
will have been aware that were Darius to reinstate him as tyrant of Athens he 
would be a vassal of the Persian Empire, but he may also have recognised the 
relative leniency he would have received due to Athens being so far from the 
coast of Asia Minor.  Recognising that he would need to perform a service for 
Darius in order to gain a reciprocal service back, we may speculate that Hippias 
went to Darius specifically offering Athens to him and may speculate further that 
the idea was initiated by Hippias rather than Darius.  It is at least plausible that 
Darius, with a view to expanding the Persian Empire but having been prevented 
from expanding northwards by the Scythians, would look favourably upon a 
Greek arriving at his court offering a city in the West as a prospect for expansion 
in that direction.  Thrace and Macedonia had already submitted to the Persian 
Empire by this time.169   
If it is correct that Hippias, or indeed Democedes before him, suggested 
Darius should expand the Persian Empire westward, this confirms that prior to 
the Persian invasion of 480 B.C. self-interested Greeks medised pro-actively 
rather than reactively. In this respect Hippias is similar to Syloson of Samos.170  
Hippias actively lobbied Darius to support his reinstallation as tyrant of Athens 
and the notion of westward expansion may have been the primary argument 
used by Hippias which persuaded Darius.  Thus, we may suggest that the early 
Persian kings, at least, were open to good ideas regardless of their origin.  Whilst 
it may well be that Demaratus and Hippias suggested expanding the Persian 
Empire west, it seems far more probable that the king already conceived such 
notions.  Thus, we should be mindful of following the Greeks in exaggerating 
their own role in the Persian court.  We will see again, particularly with 
Alcibiades and Lysander, how Greeks might have influenced Persian policy, but 
here again they may simply have suggested already conceived ideas. 
We may also suggest that this was common enough knowledge for 
Greeks such as Hippias to attempt to use this to their own advantage.  However, 
if this is the case, we must be mindful that it took nearly 20 years after Hippias 
                                                          
169 Macedonia submitted earth and water at Herodotus, V.17. Thrace had been subdued by the time 
we reach IV.118 in Herodotus.  See the discussion on Macedon pp. 22.27. 
170 Cf. pp. 19-20. 
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exile for Darius to invade Attica, proving that Darius took action in his own time 
and not at the urgings of the Greeks. 
We hear no more of Hippias after Marathon, although we know of the 
Persian defeat and can conclude his death took place very shortly after this; he 
was, after all, an old man of 80 during the invasion.  Looking at the Greek 
attitudes to the Persian Empire as portrayed through Hippias medism we can 
see how negative connotations became associated with the notion of medism for 
the Greeks and how, for the Athenians, Persia became linked with deposed 
tyrants and, thus, became an enemy to Greek democracy.  This transition appears 
to have occurred in the space of only a few years. In 507 B.C. the Athenians 
offered tokens of submission to Persia in response to the threat of invasion from 
Sparta.  We may speculate that, it is unlikely that Hippias was with Artaphernes 
before 507 B.C., since the Athenians seem to have submitted before he began 
maligning them to Artaphernes.  The primary point of conflict occurred when 
Athens refused to take him back when they were ordered to do so by 
Artaphernes, which indicates that Persia viewed Athens as a subject of the 
empire rather than as an ally, despite what the Athenians may have previously 
believed.  By refusing to obey Artaphernes and by becoming involved in the 
Ionian Revolt, the Athenians became rebellious subjects in the eyes of Persia and 
it is clear that Hippias played on this idea. Far from being so influential that he 
could persuade Darius to invade Greece, Hippias, we can see, was merely taking 
advantage of the political situation at the time.  
 
Aristagoras and the Ionian revolt 
We noted above that the Athenian involvement in the Ionian Revolt was 
the catalyst for Datis invasion in 490 B.C. In Herodotus account of the Ionian 
revolt, Aristagoras approached Artaphernes, the son of Histaspes and brother 
of Darius171 and satrap of Sardis, with a plan to subdue Naxos by reinstalling 
the islands exiled leaders.  However, due to a dispute with Megabates, the 
Persian commander of the force, which subsequently led to the failed siege of 
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Naxos, Aristagoras was forced either to await punishment from Darius, or to 
look for ways to avoid this.172 
 
Looking at the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C. in more detail and briefly 
reconstructing the events from our sources,173 we can see that Aristagoras 
approached Artaphernes to gain permission from Darius to launch his offensive 
against Naxos.174  This indicates that in matters of foreign policy all things 
required the Great Kings approval.  Aristagoras main argument was that the 
island in spite of its small size, was a rich and fertile island, close to the Ionian 
coast, and rich both in treasure and slaves.175   Aristagoras stated further that, if 
Artaphernes were to restore the Naxian exiles (who had approached Aristagoras 
in the first place), he would not only add to the Great Kings land but would also 
be able to use the island and its dependent islands as a base for further military 
campaigning to expand the empire.  As an added argument, he stated that he 
was able to fund the whole operation himself (which was not strictly true as it 
was the Naxian exiles who had agreed to fund the operations), therefore, 
Artaphernes would not lose any money at the outset but only stand to gain.  
These arguments appear to have been enough to persuade Artaphernes, who not 
only set about gaining approval from Darius but also set about preparing an 
expeditionary fleet twice the size suggested by Aristagoras.   
We can discern Aristagoras own motivation for his offensive against 
Naxos from the arguments he gave Artaphernes, i.e. that the island was rich in 
natural resources, treasure and slaves.  Despite the supposed reason for 
Aristagoras offensive against Naxos being to install the exiled leaders, 
Herodotus states that Aristagoras, in reality, wanted to gain the island for 
himself.  His arguments about using the island as a place from which Darius 
could expand the Persian Empire presupposes that, with the reinstalled exiles, or 
                                                          
172 Herodotus, V.33-35.  Herodotus also states that Aristagoras had lost a lot of his personal fortune 
on the venture and due to his quarrel with Megabates feared he would lose his position in Miletus.  
See Keaveney, 1988, pp. 76-81 and Tozzi, 1978, pp. 136-137. 
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indeed Aristagoras himself, in control of the island, Naxos would be on friendly 
terms with Darius. 
It seems plausible to argue that the main part of the scheme which caught 
Darius attention was the idea of using Naxos as a base for further expansion of 
the Persian Empire into the Cyclades and Euboia.176  This is supported by the size 
of the force sent to capture the island, which was double the size suggested by 
Aristagoras.  In order for Aristagoras to obtain a fleet from Artaphernes, the 
matter would need to be referred to Darius for approval and it is because of this 
that Aristagoras was so fearful of the consequences when the campaign turned 
sour.177 
 
Herodotus claims that the campaign against Naxos failed due to a 
dispute between Aristagoras and Megabates concerning the leadership of the 
Persian fleet.  In anger Megabates informed the islanders on Naxos of the 
impending invasion and they were able to prepare for a siege, which lasted 4 
months before Aristagoras and the Persians gave up.178   Whilst Cawkwell denies 
the historicity of this account,179 Keaveney puts forward two arguments for 
accepting it.  He points out that whilst Aristagoras had command of the fleet 
itself, Megabates had overall command of the campaign.  From this clumsy 
command structure quarrels arose.  Keaveney also argues that Megabates 
account of events would have been believed over that of Aristagoras, hence he 
had nothing to fear.180  Two weaknesses in Keaveneys arguments must be noted. 
Firstly, would Megabates dislike of Aristagoras be sufficient to lead him to 
sabotage his own expedition?  Secondly, it would have taken a considerable 
amount of time for Naxos to have been able to prepare for a siege which lasted 
for 4 months.   
                                                          
176 Darius interest in expanding the Persian Empire had been demonstrated earlier in Herodotus 
III.134 in the story concerning Atossa and Democedes.  
177 See Keaveney, 1988, for a full study regarding who betrayed the Persian forces to Naxos.  Also, 
Keaveney, forthcoming, for further discussion regarding the absolute authority of Persian kings 
over their satraps. 
178 Herodotus, V. 34. 
179 Cawkwell, 2005, pp. 67-68. 
180 Keaveney, 1988. On the command structure cf. Hauben, 1970, Hornblower, 2013, pp. 134-135. 
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Herodotus continues that after the siege Aristagoras, fearing for his 
position as tyrant of Miletus abdicated his position in favour of democracy in 
order to organise an Ionian-wide revolt from the Persian Empire and appealed to 
Sparta for aid in this new objective.181  It is interesting to speculate why, rather 
than simply fleeing the Persian Empire, Aristagoras decided to foment revolt 
amongst the other Ionian Greek cities.  It would seem reasonable to suppose that 
he believed the other Ionian cities would revolt which suggests the Ionian cities 
were generally unhappy with Persian dominance at this time.  P. Tozzi suggests 
that Aristagoras received such a large following in Ionia due to his new anti-
tyrannical stance182 and that sympathy with another new democracy against 
Persian backed tyrannies was one of the factors which persuaded the Athenians 
to become involved in the Ionian Revolt, to which we might add the democratic 
movement in Athens may have inspired the Ionians. 183  Certainly the fact that 
after the revolt Mardonius installed democracies suggests this was a reason 
behind Ionian dissatisfaction.184 Cawkwell on the other hand would not give as 
much weight to the question of tyranny, pointing out that only ten tyrants 
gathered at the Danube, which may reflect that only ten Ionian cities within the 
Persian Empire were ruled by tyrannies.  However, this fails to carry complete 
conviction as it does not take into account the possibility that there may have 
been other tyrants who were not present at that time, i.e. they were not called up 
by Darius.  He also notes that the removal of tyrants from the Ionian cities was 
not mentioned by Aristagoras when he tried to persuade Cleomenes to support 
the revolt.185  However, it is unlikely that this line of argument would interest 
Sparta which, in fact, had suffered humiliation at the hands of the Athenian 
democracy.186 
                                                          
181 Aristagoras was not unique in appealing to Sparta for aid against Persia, see also the Aeolian 
and Ionian embassy to Sparta at Herodotus, I. 141, mentioned above pp. 14-15, and also the 
Spartan support of Samian exiles against Polycrates at Herodotus, III.44.  
182 Herodotus, V.37. P. Tozzi, 1978, p. 141. 
183 P. Tozzi, 1978, p. 161, also suggests that the Athenians became involved in the revolt due to a 
desire to regain from Persian rule the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros and also that they had 
been suffering commercial difficulties due to Persian control of the Straits. 
184 Herodotus, VI.43. 
185 Cawkwell, 2005, pp. 71-74. 
186 Cf. pp. 28-29 above. 
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A number of other reasons are suggested by H.T. Wallinga for Ionian 
displeasure with Persian rule, the primary one being a general misunderstanding 
of their relationship with Darius.  Wallinga suggests that prior to the Scythian 
campaign the Milesians believed themselves to be allies rather than subjects of 
the Persian Empire, unlike the other Ionian cities, who will have been under no 
illusions after their re-subjugation by Mazares in the 540s B.C.187  Wallinga also 
notes the increase in tribute imposed by Cambyses to fund his Egyptian 
campaign, resulting in rebellions across the Empire.188  This may have 
exacerbated resentment by the Ionian Greeks.  If the story of the debate on the 
Danube is correct, the need for Histiaeus to persuade the leaders of the Ionian 
contingents on the Scythian campaign not to cut off Darius retreat suggests 
Ionian resentment as early as the late 520s B.C.189  Corcella notes that, as Darius 
orders were to wait 60 days at the bridge, the Ionians would not have been 
considered to have disobeyed Darius had they abandoned their position, this is 
also what Herodotus has the Scythians argue to the Ionians.190  Although 
Cawkwell argues that the Ionian cities had previously paid tribute to the Lydians 
and that this tribute is unlikely to have increased, he fails to note that the Lydian 
Empire did not seem to undertake the same number of military campaigns as the 
Persian Empire did and did not seem to have undertaken naval campaigns. The 
Egyptian campaign of Cambyses seems to have been particularly costly and the 
creation of a Persian navy, albeit mostly Phoenician, will have increased the 
tribute of the Ionian Greek cities from that under the Lydian Empire. That this 
was a factor is evidenced by Darius re-assessment of tribute after the Ionian 
Revolt. Cawkwell may argue from Diodorus Siculus191 that the tribute amount 
prior to the re-assessment was not so burdensome for the Ionians, but simply 
because a city was able to pay the increased tribute doesnt necessarily mean that 
it was happy to do so.  Furthermore, the increase and collection of tribute will 
have been a reminder of their subjugation by the Persians. 
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The idea that Aristagoras could turn to Sparta for military aid after the 
failure of the Naxian expedition may have come from his recollection of the 
actions of Croesus and knowledge of previous embassies from Scythia and 
Samos, who had all applied to Sparta for an alliance against the expanding 
Persian Empire.192 However, we must bear in mind that the Spartans did not take 
up these offers.  In his efforts to persuade Cleomenes he produced a bronze map 
of the then known world to demonstrate the geography of Asia Minor and the 
relative wealth of each region, attempting to persuade Cleomenes what wealth 
he may be able to gain from the various regions of Asia Minor on the 
campaign.193 Thus, we find Aristagoras tried to employ economic incentives in 
Sparta as well as in Athens later.  Aristagoras also appealed to their common 
Greek ancestry and belittled Persian valour.  Ultimately, Cleomenes rejected 
Aristagoras appeal on the grounds that Susa was too far from the coast and, 
therefore, too dangerous an expedition for Sparta, even with the promise of land 
and wealth. It is noteworthy that in Herodotus the primary reason for refusing to 
give aid was the distance of Susa from the coast of Asia Minor.194  This indicates 
that Aristagoras was not simply intent on liberating the Ionian cities along the 
coast of Asia Minor, but his plan to march further inland suggests grander ideas, 
although we do not know exactly what these may have been.195  Cawkwell 
disputes this, claiming that Herodotus was retrospectively transposing later Pan-
Hellenic ideas onto the situation, but he fails to take into account the fact that 
Athens did actually march to Susa.196 It is true that rather than marching three 
months inland the Athenians only marched three days to Sardis. However, this 
may have been their response to Aristagoras suggestion to march inland, i.e. they 
had only agreed to go as far as Sardis.  
                                                          
192 Herodotus, VI.84 and III.148.  
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Cleomenes response to Aristagoras may also have come from political 
motives as well as traditionally practical ones. The constant threat of a helot 
revolt in Sparta meant that deploying Spartan hoplites abroad for any long 
periods of time was risky.  Had Sparta supported Aristagoras by sending 
hoplites to Ionia, it would then be lacking the same hoplites to defend itself 
against any potential revolt by the helots.  In addition, the long standing enmity 
between Sparta and Argos also meant that Sparta may have feared sending any 
of its hoplites out of the Peloponnese in case of an Argive invasion. J.A.O. Larson 
notes that the domestic conditions in Greece were such as to make Spartan 
intervention in the Ionian Revolt impossible.197  Furthermore, at this time the 
logistics of transporting Spartan forces to Ionia, although not impossible, would 
have been a daunting task. If we consider that the campaign might be potentially 
three months march from the coast, the idea may have seemed more trouble 
than it was worth.  It is likely that Cleomenes wished to veto the idea before 
proposing it to the council, where it would be dismissed, and, thus, he would 
lose face.198  Larson speculates that at this time Cleomenes political and military 
prestige was in a period of decline and that this, combined with practical 
considerations due to the distance of the campaign and potential hindrance from 
the newly formed Peloponnesian League, as occurred during Cleomenes 
invasion of Attica, would have been the other reasons behind the lack of Spartan 
support.199  Through the leadership of Cleomenes, Sparta had expanded its 
influence in Greece, compelling many of the Peloponnesian Greek states to join 
the Peloponnesian League.  Although Sparta was technically leader of the 
Peloponnesian League, because it was a League and not Spartas empire, the 
League members could choose not to follow Spartan leadership.  As noted 
above, Corinth had refused to march with Cleomenes when the Corinthians had 
realised that he was intent on invading Attica to subdue Athens.200  Spartas 
leadership of the Peloponnesian League may have been the primary reason 
Aristagoras approached Cleomenes, in the hope that he may have received not 
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only Spartan support, but also support from some of the other league members.  
To Aristagoras, and many others viewing the situation from Asia Minor, the 
Peloponnesian League was led by, if not completely under the control of, Sparta 
and, therefore, ultimately Cleomenes.  The embassies to Sparta from Maiandrios 
of Samos in c.517-516 and from the Scythians in c.513 in retaliation for the failed 
Persian invasion also suggest this.201  W.G. Forrest notes that until the failed 
Spartan invasion of Attica Sparta had been able to use the League army for its 
own purposes, but afterwards League actions were voted on by its members.202  
It seems Aristagoras had not realised the change in this situation when he 
approached Cleomenes.  However incorrect Aristagoras view of the situation 
may have been, it is conceivable that he would have applied to Sparta for 
military aid thinking that this would include aid from other members of the 
League too.203   
It is interesting that Herodotus does not mention the expansion of the 
Persian Empire as one of Aristagoras arguments to persuade Sparta or, indeed, 
Athens.  Darius had been expanding the Persian Empire since the beginning of 
his reign, which was evidenced by their newly acquired control of Samos, their 
failed campaign north into Scythia, their successful expansion into Thrace and 
Macedonia, and their failed campaign against Naxos.  Despite the failure of 
Naxos and Scythia, these campaigns show Darius intent to expand his empire 
beyond the coast of Asia Minor.  Sparta will have been able to see the trend from 
the Samian exiles who went to Sparta upon the installation of Syloson of Samos 
and the embassy from Scythia.204  Furthermore, it was Aristagoras who 
suggested to Artaphernes that one of the reasons for a campaign against Naxos 
was to use it as a naval stepping stone to the rest of the Cyclades and, ultimately, 
Greece.  Both Larson and G. De Sanctis agree that Greek aid and intervention in 
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the Ionian Revolt may have been wise to have forestalled (the) invasion.205  It 
seems that Aristagoras may have been trying to down play the might of Persia in 
an attempt to persuade Sparta, and, later Athens, to campaign in Asia Minor. We 
can see that he represents the campaign as a Greek attack on the Persian Empire, 
rather than a defensive intervention; but this Greek attack in order to liberate the 
Ionian Greeks was not realised until the fourth century. 
 
Aristagoras next applied to Athens using the same arguments he used at 
Sparta.  He also made an appeal to their common kinship as Miletus had been 
founded by Athenian settlers.206  As commented above, Aristagoras political 
career was in a precarious position at that time, more so than it was when he 
approached Sparta, and we may conjecture that by the time he arrived in Athens 
Aristagoras would probably have promised the Athenians anything.  If we are to 
believe Herodotus chronology, Aristagoras arrived at the same time that the 
Athenians refused to reinstate Hippias.207  We may conjecture that Aristagoras 
may have known about this dispute between Artaphernes and Athens.  Athens 
anti-tyranny stance and recent dispute with Artaphernes may have been one of 
the factors which persuaded him to appeal to them. It is suggested by J.F. 
Lazenby that the Athenians may have sent aid to the Ionians in an attempt to 
remove a potential source of support for Hippias.208  Thus, feelings of Greek 
freedom and sympathy for their Greek counterparts in Ionia seem to have been a 
factor in the Athenian decision to aid Aristagoras.  Also, as mentioned above, the 
expansion of the Persian Empire will have been noticed by Athens and the other 
Greek poleis, as well as Sparta.  For Athens specifically, an opportunity to halt 
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this expansion and, perhaps, regain control of their commercial interests in 
Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros may have seemed economically wise.209 
 
With Athenian and Eretrian support Aristagoras achieved some early 
successes in his rebellion.  They managed to reach Sardis and fire the city 
including the temple of Cybele, although not the acropolis of the town which 
was defended by Artaphernes in person with a considerable force.210  Although 
the Athenians were defeated in battle at Ephesus, there were far reaching results 
of Athens involvement in Aristagoras Ionian revolt.  Firstly was the subsequent 
refusal of Athens to lend any further support to Aristagoras in spite of frequent 
appeals.211  Also, with the attention of Darius drawn to Athens and Eretria, 
Herodotus would also have us believe this was the primary reason for the 
Persian invasion of Greece.212  Ultimately Herodotus believed that the 
destruction of the Acropolis of Athens was in retaliation for the firing of the 
temple of Cybele.  C. Hignett declares that this view demonstrates Herodotus 
weak grasp of historical causation213 although Hignett seems not to have taken 
into account the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism, which advocated the idea of 
balance.  Darius was a follower of this religion and in light of this it is not 
implausible that he would fire the Acropolis, as a site of religious sanctuaries, in 
retaliation for the firing of the temple of Cybele by the Athenians.  I feel it is fair 
to argue that, although Darius would most probably have invaded Greece as part 
of his expansions of the Persian Empire, the involvement of the Athenians and 
Eretrians acted as a catalyst for this invasion. The Ionian revolt itself did not end 
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until after the naval battle of Lade, in 496 B.C. when Miletus finally fell.214  
During the revolt Aristagoras was killed besieging a town in Thrace.215  
We can see that Aristagoras, like Polycrates and Hippias, tried to take 
advantage of the current political situation in Persia, i.e. the expanding empire. 
As an Ionian, he would have been much more aware of the possible 
repercussions for the failure of the Naxian expedition. Despite Herodotus 
assertion that Aristagoras tried to pull rank on Megabates, I believe it is 
unlikely that he would have been unaware of the Persian belief that all non-
Persians were inferior to them.216  It seems more likely that Aristagoras fled to 
cause rebellion because he realised that he would be blamed for the failed 
Naxian expedition since he was its primary advocate.  Interestingly, we find that 
Aristagoras seemingly exploited the Greek lack of knowledge of the Persians and 
the Persian Empire, by belittling the valour of the Persians and emphasising the 
financial gains. Although this did not work for the more cautious Spartans, the 
Athenians, who may have known more, took the opportunity to assert their 
independence from Persia by joining Aristagoras. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
When looking at the initial contacts between the Ionian Greeks and the 
Lydians and later the Persians we note a number of points.  Firstly, whilst being 
culturally different from the Lydians, the Ionian cities did not object to being 
subjugated to that Empire because they were afforded privileged treatment, 
especially in relation to religion.  If we believe, as Caspari does, that prior to their 
subjugation by Lydia the Pan Ionian League was formed in defence against 
Aeolian encroachments on Ionian territory, we may suggest that under the 
protection of the Lydian Empire the need for a Pan Ionian League became 
primarily religious.217  Further, Cawkwell notes that Croesus had family ties with 
the Ionian Greeks in his Ionian step-brothers.218  Ionian loyalty to Lydia is 
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demonstrated by the refusal of the Ionian cities to join Cyrus before the capture 
of Croesus, with the notable exception of Miletus, which continued to enjoy its 
privileged status because it defected to Cyrus when the other cities did not. The 
Ionian affinity with the Lydians was such that the Ionian Greeks were willing to 
join a rebellion against Cyrus, shortly after their initial subjugation. 
Further, if we are to believe Herodotus, it becomes clear that Cyrus the 
Great did not intend at first to subdue Lydia and Asia Minor at the time that he 
did, being more concerned with conquering the Mesopotamian cities north of the 
Tigris, which was delayed by Croesus invasion.219 Croesus invasion of 
Cappadocia forced Cyrus to look westward and to protect the Persian frontier 
there. This provocation by Croesus brought Cyrus and the Persian Empire to the 
attention of the Greeks and we find that from these very first contacts Cyrus 
dominated this relationship.  Miletus switched allegiances to Persia prior to the 
defeat of Croesus and when the other Ionian states subsequently tried to follow 
suit Cyrus would only accept them as subjects and dealt with their rebellion 
decisively.220  From the outset we can see that Cyrus policy was to win over at 
least some of his enemies by diplomacy.  We cant be privy to Cyrus exact 
thoughts but we can argue for mixed motivations. On one level this would sow 
dissension among his enemies and weaken them, on another it could argue for a 
certain amount of magnanimity.  Whatever the truth of this, we find Darius 
pursuing a broadly similar policy.  He gave Macedon the opportunity to submit 
peacefully and it did so.  In Thrace, by contrast, some tribes had to be subdued 
by force whilst others yielded peacefully. This policy was also continued by 
Xerxes, as we shall see. 
The assassination of Polycrates of Samos may have been in response to a 
perceived threat to Persian territory. Herodotus states that Polycrates, taking 
advantage of Persian leniency, had already captured Ionian cities on the 
mainland, which was now Persian, and so his assassination by Oroetes seems to 
have been a practical way of removing a potential threat and installing a vassal 
tyrant to ensure a compliant island. Although affecting the Ionian Greek cities, 
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the Persian subjugation of the Lydian Empire did not directly affect the interests 
of the mainland Greeks.  Sparta may have sent an envoy threatening Cyrus to 
leave the Ionian Greeks alone but did not follow through with this threat when 
the Ionians rebelled and were re-conquered by Persia.  Hirsch argues that for the 
mainland Greeks the lack of Persian navy under Cyrus provided a psychological 
barrier against further Persian expansion.221  This seems to be true in that part of 
Spartas threat was the use of a pentekonter to carry the embassy of Lacrines to 
Persia.  
The lack of direct impact on the interests of mainland Greeks continued 
under Cambyses, who expanded the Persian Empire into Egypt. If Wallinga is 
correct, it was Cambyses who first formed a Persian navy.222  Prior to Cambyses 
Egyptian campaign there was no need for a navy and Cambyses influence still 
only affected some of the islands along the coast of Asia Minor.  Hirsch notes 
that until the Naxian campaign of Aristagoras and Artaphernes the Persian fleet 
seems to have been made up of requisitioned ships from their island subjects.223   
This is evident from when Samos, which was the most powerful of these islands 
during Cambyses reign, sent men and ships for Cambyses Egyptian campaign. 
As Samos may not yet have been fully subject to the Persian Empire, they seem 
to have been sent voluntarily and were not conscripted. It is noteworthy that 
sending these volunteers was to the advantage of Polycrates as they were 
political opponents.  Thus, not only did he remove these political opponents but 
he also showed his loyalty to the Persian Empire.224  Polycrates sending men 
voluntarily suggests, by contrast, that those islands and towns which were 
subject to the Persian Empire had men and ships requisitioned for the campaign.  
The first clash of interests between Persia and the mainland Greeks 
appears in the reign of Darius.  Samos, which seems to have acted relatively 
independently, was brought fully into the Persian Empire when Syloson was 
reinstated as tyrant of the island.  Under Cambyses Sparta had sheltered Samian 
exiles and attempted to besiege the island with no success, but under Darius 
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Cleomenes of Sparta refused to help Maiandrios against Syloson and eventually 
had Maiandrios evicted from Sparta.225  Also, Darius Scythian campaign 
provoked the Scythians to look to Sparta for help retaliating, but they were 
refused too.  Under Cyrus and Cambyses the Spartans had been willing to 
become involved in Greek affairs in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands to a 
limited extent, but they were not so willing to do this under Darius.  This new 
Spartan policy not to become involved in Persian affairs is highlighted by 
Aristagoras appeal to the Spartans, which was also refused.  This may have been 
due to their preoccupation with mainland Greek affairs, as argued by Jeffery, but 
there is a correlation between the growing Persian involvement in the Aegean, 
the formation of a Persian navy and the lack of Spartan involvement in the 
Aegean when asked.  Hirsch suggests that a contributing factor to the reasons 
behind the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C. was the removal of the Ionian safety valve, 
i.e. their ability simply to leave the Persian Empire by sea if they wished.226  We 
may suggest that the growth of the Persian navy and Persias activities in the 
Aegean also may have cowed Spartan bravado, and Spartan caution of this new 
empire may have encouraged the kings to look to mainland issues rather than 
engage in overseas ones. 
Much of these early contacts between the Lydian and then Persian 
Empire and the Greeks of the mainland concern Sparta and the occasional 
Peloponnesian state, such as Corinth.227  We might suggest that the Spartan 
threat delivered by Lacrines upon the Persian conquest of Asia Minor, followed 
by Spartan inaction upon Persias re-conquest after the Lydian and Ionian 
rebellion, made Sparta appear weak to Persia.  Thus, Persia dealt with all future 
Greek interactions from a position of superiority and strength.  
We find that Greek states beyond the Isthmus of Corinth did not become 
involved in relations with Persia until later, certainly the Athenians did not 
become involved until after the exile of Hippias.  This may have been due to the 
internal politics within Athens and the apparently friendly relationship between 
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the Pisistratids and Persia.  The new democracy tried to continue this friendly 
policy with Persia until it believed that Persia was trying to interfere with her 
constitution.  This new attitude, coupled with Athenian sympathies with and 
sense of cultural unity with the Ionian Greeks, encouraged their involvement in 
the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C, thus, breaking their AnApAgAgA?ArA?A? with Persia. We may 
conclude that, although it was Athens which first broke this treaty with Persia, it 
was Persia which provoked this by trying to meddle in Athens political affairs 
and to install Hippias.  Thus, we can see that from their earliest contacts Persia 
viewed the Ionian Greeks, the Athenians and the Spartans with condescension, 
whilst the Greek initial response was generally one which underestimated 
Persian might. 
Looking at those individuals who medised during the rise of the Persian 
Empire we notice that, in general, they approached the Persian king rather than 
the other way round.  Polycrates, Syloson and Hippias all sought to take 
advantage of Persian power to their own benefit and medised pro-actively rather 
than reactively.  In the case of Polycrates it was to remove political opponents 
from Samos by sending them on Cambyses Egyptian campaign.  However, it 
would also appear that Polycrates early on appreciated the power of Persia and 
this was a further motivation for his joining the Egyptian expedition. In the case 
of Syloson it was to be reinstated as tyrant of Samos and in the case of Hippias it 
was to be reinstated as the tyrant of Athens. We can see that the relationships 
between these three tyrants and the Persian Empire were all controlled by Persia. 
In the case of Polycrates, he was eventually assassinated for becoming a threat, in 
the case of Syloson he was unable to be reinstalled without Persian aid and the 
same can be said of Hippias, who was forced to wait twenty years before an 
attempt was made to reinstall him as tyrant of Athens.  
Although Democedes seems to have been employed by the Persian court 
rather than as a slave in the traditional sense, we still find that in order for him to 
realise his plan to return to Greece, like Syloson and Hippias, he was forced to 
wait upon the king to send a reconnaissance ship to Greece. We are not told how 
long it took for Darius to send the reconnaissance ship, but it is unlikely that he 
would have sent it until it tied in with his other plans. Thus, yet again, we find a 
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Greek dependent on taking advantage of the plans of the King, rather than 
influencing him into making them. 
A notable exception amongst the Greek individuals in the Persian Empire 
is Miltiades, who we briefly mentioned was at one time a tyrant of a city in the 
Thracian Chersonese, allied with Darius and supported him in his Scythian 
campaign. His seeming freedom seems to stem from his location on the edge of 
the Persian Empire, which in turn afforded him the ability to abandon his city 
and return to Greece when he thought it necessary.228  When subject to the 
Persian Empire we can conclude he was loyal, since his son who was captured 
whilst fleeing to Athens was given cities and a Persian wife by Darius. Had 
Miltiades been suspect of dissident behaviour we would not expect his son to 
have been so well treated when he was captured.229  In fact, we may note that the 
only evidence for Miltiades supposedly rebellious behaviour comes from 
Herodotus pro-Athenian sources.  
We can conclude that from the first contacts between the Greeks and the 
Persian Empire, the relationships were dominated by Persia.  For the Greeks of 
Asia Minor, the islands, Thrace and Macedon the choice was simple.  They could 
accept the offer of peaceful submission or be conquered.  The mainland Greeks 
largely ignored the issue until Sparta forced Athens to look to her own safety. 
However, she reneged on her treaty almost immediately. 
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Chapter 2: Datis Invasion of Greec 
 
The invasions of Greece 
After the defeat of the Ionians in 496 B.C., Persian policy turned to 
securing its borders and consolidating its territory before expanding further into 
the West.  We have already noted (p.31) that Mardonius allowed the Ionian cities 
to choose how they wished to be governed, i.e. democracy or tyranny.  
Artaphernes reassessed their tribute amounts which quieted any residual unrest 
after the Ionian Revolt.230  Eventually Darius seems to have taken up Hippias on 
his postulated offer to become a Persian installed vassal tyrant of Athens, which 
would create a foothold for further Persian expansion into Greece.  The primary 
question concerning Persian expansion into the West is whether this was 
motivated solely by the desire to punish Athens and Eretria for breaking their 
AnApAgAgA?ArA?A? treaty and supporting the Ionian Revolt, or whether this was part of a 
more general policy to expand the Persian Empire. 
Herodotus claims that the initial expedition, led by Datis, had Athens and 
Eretria as its primary goal. However, he also states that the Persians intended to 
subject as many Greek towns as they could and relates how Mardonius 
subjected Thasos and secured Persian control over Macedon. 231  Balcer suggests 
that rather than retaliation for Greek involvement in the Ionian Revolt, it was the 
new imperial policies of the Great King after 520 B.C. which provoked the 
Persian invasion of Greece.232  This idea is accepted by Cawkwell and Sealey.233  
Given the size of the Persian forces sent first to Eretria and then Marathon, I am 
inclined also to believe that Datis campaign was intended to be the first stage in 
a Persian expansion into Greece and the West.  Herodotus account of 
Mardonius campaign against Thasos and Macedonia indicates that Darius 
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expanded Persian control to the north of Greece with the apparent intention 
eventually to expand into Greece itself.234  
The following chapter intends to discuss the Greek reaction to the first 
Persian invasion of Greece.  We have seen how the hostile relationship between 
the Athenians and Persians developed in the sixth century and we will now look 
at how this view affected the Athenian attitude towards those Greeks who 
submitted to Persia in the wake of the Empires expansion. 
 
The medism of Aegina 
Part of the Persian expansion plan seems to have been, yet again, to 
exploit the divisions between the Greek states, inviting those states which 
wished to medise to submit earth and water. Of the islands which did submit 
earth and water, Herodotus highlights the response of Athens to the submission 
of Aegina, which they believed had acted out of personal enmity towards 
Athens. The Athenian response was to accuse Aegina of treachery and also to 
call on Sparta to join in the islands condemnation.235 
The strong response of Athens and Sparta to the medism of Aegina, 
compared to their treatment of the other medising islands, invites us to take a 
closer look at it.  On the face of it we may suggest that it was the proximity of 
Aegina to Attica which provoked such a strong Athenian response, this may also 
explain the Spartan willingness to become involved. However, Aegina was not 
the only island off the coast of Attica which submitted to Persia, there was also 
Ceos, Paros, Andros, Melos and Delos. We will look at Miltiades treatment of 
Paros in due course, but we ought also to remember that, although levelling the 
accusation, Athens had also submitted earth and water to Persia in the not so 
distant past, as mentioned above.236  Herodotus statement that the Athenians 
believed the Aeginetans had medised out of personal enmity to Athens is telling 
and it is worth noting that Aegina is the only island named by Herodotus, 
despite the claim that all of the islands visited, except Naxos, submitted earth 
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and water.237   Herodotus also states that Athens used Aegenitan submission as a 
pretext238 to call upon Sparta. Thus, we must ask: what was it about Aegina in 
particular that upset Athens so much? 
Behind the obvious reason for the accusation of Aeginas medism, i.e. 
Aegina did actually submit earth and water, is the animosity between Aegina 
and Athens. This animosity was firmly rooted by the 490s. Herodotus gives us 
two reasons for the animosity between the two cities: the Aeginetan raids on the 
Attic coast in c. 506-505 B.C.239 and the dispute between the two cities regarding 
the olive wood statues of Epidaurus.240 Both of these seem to have been the result 
of Aeginas increase in wealth from trade.241 P. Green suggests in the decade 
between Marathon and Xerxes invasion, Aegina rivalled Athens in the area of 
trade and, indeed, intercepted much of the trade that would have gone to 
Athens.  We may speculate that this would have begun prior to Marathon and 
was the reason Aegina could build up a navy large enough to raid the Attic 
coast.  Only the windfall of silver from Laurium enabled Athens to build enough 
ships to deal with their war against Aegina and to break Aeginas trade-
monopoly.242  At V.81 Herodotus explains the Aeginetan attacks on the Attic 
coast were due in part to their great prosperity, which appears to coincide with 
the growth of the Aeginetan navy.  Figueira conjectures that the growth of the 
Aeginetan navy may have led to their rebellion from, and later their raids 
against, Epidaurus, which led to the taking of the olive wood statues.243  The 
perception that the foundation story of the Aeginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia, 
                                                          
237 Herodotus, VI.49. T. Kelly, 2003, p. 184 argues that evidence in Herodotus of the Persian force 
taking hostages from the Aegean islands en route to Carystus and evidence of the inhabitants of 
Naxos and Delos fleeing these islands indicates that many of the Aegean islands likely had not 
submitted earth and water the previous year.  He also notes that the Lindian Temple Chronicle 
states that Rhodes only submitted after Lindos had been besieged and had run out of water. 
238 AeA? A?AnAgA?AhAjAd A?AlAjA?A?AnAdAjAm A?A?A?AfA?A?AjAhAoAj 
239 Herodotus, V.82. 
240 Herodotus, V.82-85 tells us of some olive wood statues given by the Athenians to Epidaurus and 
stolen by Aegina during a raid. Whereas Epidaurus paid tribute to Athens during its possession of 
the statues, it ceased doing so once the statues had been stolen and the Aeginetans also refused 
despite possessing them.  L. Jeffery believes that the hostilities between Athens and Aegina lasted 
with varying intensity for 24 years in total and ended just after Marathon in 489 B.C., contrary to 
Herodotus, VIII.145.  Jeffery, 1962, pp. 46 and 54. Cf. p. 82. For Herodotus, VIII.145.  Burn, 1985, pp. 
294-295, suggests a more likely date of 483 B.C. Cf p. 57. 
241 Scott, 2005, p. 547, Figueira, 1985, p. 62. 
242 Green, 1970, pp. 49 and 58. 
243 Figueira, 1985, p. 62. 
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to whom the olive wood statues were dedicated, which is so closely connected 
with the theft of these statues and the hostility with Athens, may signify that the 
hostility between Athens and Aegina stemmed from the beginning of Aeginas 
independence from Epidaurus and the growth of the Aeginetan navy.  These 
rivalries and hostilities, coupled with the difference in their ethnicities, Athens 
being Ionian and Aegina being Dorian, would have made Aegina an easy target 
of Athenian censure when Aegina submitted to Persia; thus, we can see there 
were many reasons for Athenian-Aeginetan hostility.   
A further reason behind the Athenian accusations may have been the fear 
of a Persian supported Aeginetan navy.244  R. Sealey notes that, with Persian 
backing, the Aeginetan navy would have vastly outnumbered the Athenian 
navy, giving Aegina a clear advantage in the on-going skirmishes of the Herald 
less War.245  Figueiras claim that medising was the final result of the ... 
Herald less War opened by the Aegenitan attack on the Attic coast in 506246 is 
incorrect.  He seems to have forgotten that the end of the Herald less War 
occurred when the members of the Hellenic League agreed to put aside their 
disputes in order to work together in the defence of Greece, nearly a decade 
later.247  Thus, we can conclude that the Athenian response to Aeginas medism 
was largely the result of animosity between the two cities tinged with the fear of 
a Persian supported Aegina against her. 
Spartan intervention at Aegina, at the Athenian behest, creates additional 
interest. Only a few years prior to Darius heralds, the Spartans themselves had 
tried to reinstall Hippias as tyrant of Athens.  It was precisely because of this 
action that Athens had turned to an alliance with Persia.  It can hardly be 
claimed that Sparta and Athens had had friendly relations in the intervening 
years before Aeginas medism and the Athenian accusation need not necessarily 
                                                          
244 Figueira, 1985, p. 72 presents a convincing argument that the Aeginetan story concerning the 
justification of its attacks along the Attic coast, i.e. at the behest of Thebes due to the oracle 
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with private motives now forgotten. Although there is no way of confirming this from the 
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would give even further justification for Athenian animosity towards Aegina. Herodotus, V.82-89. 
245 Sealey, 1976, p. 20. 
246 Figueira, 1985, p. 50. 
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have been of interest to Sparta.  What appears to have caught Spartas attention 
was that the Aeginetans, prior to this submission, had allied themselves with 
Argos. 248  When Aegina stole the olive wood statues from Epidaurus and Athens 
retaliated, Argos sent men to help Aegina in the fighting.249  We cannot be certain 
what Athens hoped to achieve by appealing to Sparta and Spartas actions may 
be attributed primarily to the impulsive nature of Cleomenes.  However, we can 
surmise that the opportunity to act against an ally of Argos, and thereby weaken 
Argos with the gloss of legitimacy, was a tempting offer presented to Sparta by 
Athens.250   
R.A. Tomlinsons believes that Cleomenes desire to secure Spartas 
hegemony was in preparation against the growing Persian menace. 251  However, 
we should treat this suggestion with caution.  It seems more likely that the 
Spartan desire to secure its position as hegemon was due to the fact that Argos 
challenging it and not necessarily because of the Persian threat.  It is true that 
Sparta will have been aware of the growing Persian menace and we noted above, 
pp. 49-50, that as Persian might grew, Spartan interference in Ionia and the 
Aegean diminished.  However, if Cleomenes was as far-sighted as Tomlinson 
suggests and if this was part of an anti-Persian policy as suggested by Sealey,252 
we must question why Cleomenes refused to help the Scythians, Samians and 
Ionians when they requested help against Persia years earlier?  It seems more 
reasonable to suggest that Cleomenes became involved in punishing Aegina 
primarily for mainland Greek reasons, rather than due to a specific anti-Persian 
agenda.  I would suggest that these reasons were to assert Spartas position as 
hegemon and to retaliate against Argos via Argos alliance with Aegina. 
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249 Scott, 2005, p. 329, suggests possible religious connections via the cult of Pythian Apollo at 
Asine. 
250 Kelly, 1970, argues that enmity between Sparta and Argos began in the mid-sixth century BC 
and was not traditional. However, this does not affect our argument here, that there was and had 
been for some time enmity between Sparta and Argos by the 490s BC. For a more in depth 
discussion of this, see the medism of Argos below, p. 37-43. 
251 Tomlinson, 1972, p. 92, also Sealey, 1976, p. 16. 
252 Sealey, 1976, pp. 17-18, suggests that Spartan involvement in this affair is symptomatic of 
Cleomenes anti-Persian policy, claiming that this was Cleomenes attempt to resist Persian 
encroachment south of Thessaly.   
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The notion of an understanding between Athens and Sparta, as proposed 
by Lazenby,253 is supported by Cleomenes actions when he left ten Aeginetan 
hostages in Athenian care, having arrested them.  The arrest of these ten leading 
men suggests that they may have been members of the ruling party responsible 
for Aeginas submission of earth and water.  It is true that Athens would not 
have called on Sparta if there wasnt some form of understanding between the 
two states, especially after Cleomenes previous interference in Athenian politics.  
However, not knowing what this might have been we must tread carefully when 
speculating about it.  
Looking to the motivation for Aeginas submission to Persia we must 
admit that we cannot really know whether or not Aegina medised as part of their 
Herald less War and to spite Athens.  I do not believe that the animosity 
between the two states did not contribute in some measure to the Aeginetan 
reasoning behind submitting, however, I disagree with T. Kellys argument that 
Aegina did not submit from fear of Persia, but rather for their own selfish 
reasons.254  We can as easily conjecture that Aegina medised from a real belief 
that all the other Greek islands and cities which had been approached by Persia 
had already submitted, or were about to submit, and Aegina simply did not 
want to become isolated in this instance.  It is worth remembering that the 
Ionians had just been defeated in their rebellion and Mardonius had recently 
subdued Thasos and re-secured Persian control of Macedon; these Persian 
victories will have influenced the reasoning behind the submission of all of the 
islands, Aegina included.  The actions of Aegina during Xerxes invasion clear 
the island of any later suspicion and may indicate a change in governance 
between this first request for submission and Xerxes invasion.255  We may 
                                                          
253 Lazenby, 1993, p. 46. 
254 Kelly, 2003, p. 184. 
255 Proof of Athens accusations are dispelled when we see that the Aeginetans distinguished 
themselves in the defence of Greece.  Examples of Aeginetan loyalty can be found in Herodotus, 
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27.)  Whether we regard the Troezen Decree as authentic or as a third century forgery, this 
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suggest that the islanders may have initially submitted to Persia without further 
thought of the consequences of their actions, i.e. they didnt believe that Darius 
or Xerxes would actually invade Greece.  The change in Aeginetan attitude to 
Persia seems to have stemmed from the Athenian victory at Marathon, the 
occurrence of which will have demonstrated to the Aeginetans and the other 
Greek states that resistance to the Persian threat was possible.  It would also have 
demonstrated Athenian strength.  We mentioned above the possibility of the 
ruling party at the time of Aeginas submission being pro-Persian and the 
removal of this party by Cleomenes may also explain Aeginas U-turn in foreign 
policy regarding Persia.   
The case of Aegina is a good example of the Persian policy of factionalism 
being used against the Greeks.  It is noteworthy that once Cleomenes had 
removed the ten leading Aeginetans the island seems to have become anti-Persia.  
Thus, we may speculate that the Persian request for submission caused the 
island to divide along pro-Persian and anti-Persian lines.  The heavy handed 
approach of Athens and Sparta to Aegina may not only have been retaliation for 
past grievances, but may have served as a warning of similar treatment to the 
other islands which had submitted.  If this is the case, this warning was not as 
strong as the Persian threat.  It is not impossible that the islands may have 
remembered the treatment by Cyrus the Great of the Ionian cities which did not 
submit when asked and were treated harshly later. It would certainly be in the 
interests of Persia to stress this and we may speculate that the Persian envoys 
sent to the islands may have done so.  As mentioned above, the more recent 
treatment of the Ionian Greeks will have demonstrated more easily Persias 
might over the Greeks.  Despite later opinions that the Ionian Greeks were not as 
valiant as the mainland Greeks, there is no indication that these beliefs were held 
in the 490s.  It is likely that these opinions were conceived after Marathon, 
                                                                                                                                                              
evidence with the Serpent-Column and Herodotus attests to the Aeginetan commitment to the 
Hellenic Leagues cause. Both Diodorus Siculus, XI.27.2 and Herodotus, VIII.93 give Aegina the 
award for valour after Salamis. Aegina sent men and ships to Mycale in Ionia, indicating the island 
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Salamis, Plataea and Mycale, when the mainland Greeks had proved they could 





Evidence for a possible Persian policy of causing factionalism in Greece 
prior to Datis invasion may also be found at Eretria. Herodotus says one party 
proposed abandoning the town and taking refuge in the Euboean hills, another ... 
was preparing to betray the city.256  The talk of a split counsel, How and Wells 
suggest, can go some way to explain the inadequate Athenian action to defend 
their ally.257  F Maurice suggests that, as the Eretrians were able to withstand the 
siege until the seventh day, the medisers within Eretria were a small 
minority.258  However, this is contradicted by How and Wells, who note 
Herodotus implication that Aeschines was the only honest man in a rotten 
state.259  We are told by Herodotus that, on the advice of Aeschines, those of the 
Athenians who had already arrived260 of the four thousand Athenians, who had 
been sent to help defend the island, returned home before any action was taken. 
This implies that the Athenians returned home before the whole force had 
arrived on the island.  How and Wells suggest that Herodotus anxious 
justification of Athenian actions may be the result of the thought that after 
Marathon a bold stand might have been made at Eretria.261  This may be a true 
interpretation of Athenian sentiments after Marathon, however, it is worth 
remembering that prior to Marathon Persian conquests had only been halted by 
the Scythians, and the Greek victory at Marathon was largely due to the Greek 
attack occurring seemingly as the Persians were preparing to abandon the plain. 
Once the Eretrians had decided to make their stand against the Persian 
force, we are told that the town was betrayed by two particular Eretrians, 
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Euphorbus the son of Alchimachus and Philagrus the son of Cyneas.262  We 
hear nothing further of these two men after the defeat of Eretria.  The mention of 
these two specific Eretrians may reflect Herodotus sympathy with the island, by 
diverting the blame from the general population to two specific individuals.  
Herodotus treatment of Eretria contrasts with that of Aegina, which he suggests 
medised specifically from motives of malice against Athens.263  The diversion of 
blame from the population to two specific individuals calls to mind Herodotus 
treatment of Thebes, where he denounced Timagenidas and Attaginus as the 
primary medisers.264  Herodotus portrayal of Eretria suggests that the Eretrians 
recognised that with such minimal support from the rest of Greece and with 
medising elements within the city, resistance to Datis invasion would be futile.  
It may also suggest that there may have been fewer medising elements within 
the city compared to Athens.  We see that, unlike with Athens, Datis besieged the 
city immediately rather than waiting for a number of days for the medising 
elements to hand over the city. 
We may also suggest that the return of the Athenian force would have 
benefitted Eretria too. Had the Athenian force remained, it would have made it 
more difficult for the Eretrians to submit to Persia and it would have prolonged 
the battle for the island. It was not until after Marathon that the Greek states 
believed that a Persian invasion force could be resisted. Were the Eretrians to 
maintain the Athenians, believing that no other defence force from Greece was 
coming, the situation may have been exacerbated.  And, so, after an initial short 
struggle the island submitted.  
The treatment of Eretria, after its betrayal is also disputed.  J.R. Green and 
R.K. Sinclair note that those Eretrians who were captured by the Persians were 
probably not the entirety of the population and suggest that many Eretrians fled 
the polis and took refuge in the hills of the island. 265  This theory contradicts 
Plato who states that soldiers marched to the limits of Eretria and posted 
themselves at intervals from sea to sea; then they joined hands and passed 
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through the whole of the country, in order that they might be able to report to 
the king that not a man had escaped out of their hands.266  However, we find 
that the Eretrians were able to field 600 men at Plataea and supply seven ships 
for Artemisium and Salamis, which suggests that, in fact, a number of Eretrians 
were not deported by Datis.267  This treatment of the Eretrians by Persia will have 
served to strengthen the idea that resistance to Persia was not only futile but that 
the repercussions of resisting were high.  For Persia it is likely that they 
considered it more economic to relocate the skilled Ionian population to another 
part of the Empire than to kill them all outright. 
 
Marathon 
Having subdued Eretria, Datis proceeded to Attica aiming for the plain of 
Marathon as suggested by Hippias.  Herodotus mentions that the decision to 
fight a pitched battle was divided amongst the 10 generals chosen by Athens, 
echoing the situation on Eretria, and that half of the generals feared that the 
Athenian army was too small.268  It took the vote of Callimachus the polemarch 
to sway the council to fight at Marathon.  In his arguments to convince 
Callimachus, Miltiades 
Miltiades claimed that if the Athenians did not fight against the Persian 
army, then Hippias would certainly return to his position as tyrant of Athens.  
Herodotus sentence, A?AfA?AjAgA?Ad AoAdAh? nAoA?AnAdAh AgA?A?A?AfAbAh A?AdA?AnA?A?AnA?AdAh A?g ? n jІAnA?Ah 
AoA? AcAbAhA?A?AtAh A?Al j A?AgA?AoA? Г nAoA? AgAbA?A?AnA?Ad in essence accuses those generals, who 
did not wish to fight, of medism.  Miltiades also may have recalled the previous 
tensions between Hippias and himself, when Hippias was in power in Athens.  
N.A. Doenges suggests that the story may be Philiad political propaganda but 
notes that it also indicates that there was a delay of some days between the 
Athenian arrival at Marathon and the battle.269  He does not dispute that there 
were possible Persian supporters in Athens, but believes that had Datis had a 
vast numerical superiority as suggested by Herodotus, VI.44, he would not have 
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been so dependent on the need for an uprising in Athens itself.270  Whether Datis 
had as vast a numerical superiority as suggested by Herodotus or not does not 
affect Datis desire for treachery from within Athens.  As can be seen with 
Eretria, treachery was quicker, and therefore cheaper, than sieges regardless how 
big the attacking force is.  Hignett is likely correct in believing that Hippias 
probably still had some supporters remaining in Athens.271  A.-H. Chroust notes 
that ties of loyalty to friendship and political clubs based on common beliefs 
tended to out-weigh patriotism to ones city.272  On this basis, we may suggest 
that many of Hippias supporters were pro-oligarchy, rather than pro-Hippias 
per se.  Furthermore, that there were pro-Persian factions in Eretria and not 
Athens is unlikely.  C.A. Robinson, disagreeing with A.W. Gomme, argues that 
prior to the Athenian victory at Marathon there were no major repercussions for 
pro-Persian sympathisers in Athens, noting Aristotles comment that the 
Athenians, with the usual leniency of democracy, allowed all the friends of the 
tyrants, who had not joined in their evil deeds in the time of troubles, to remain 
in the city.273   This also seems to be reflected by the erection of an altar by 
Hippias the younger in the 490s and the presence in Athens of his kinsman 
Hipparchus, who was ostracised in 488/7 B.C.274  However, we can see that there 
seems to be a connection between the suspicion of medism and ostracism, which 
is evidenced by some of the ostraca dating to the 480s B.C.  R. McMullin notes 
that two of the first three Athenians ostracised were connected to the 
Alcmeonidae, who were suspected of medism at Marathon.275  Robinson 
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continues to argue that at the end of the sixth century the aristocratic party 
within Athens was not only pro-tyrannist but also pro-Spartan, citing the 
Spartan congress in 504 B.C. to restore Hippias to Athens.276  He concludes that, 
since the Athenian aristocracy were largely pro-tyranny and pro-Sparta, and also 
Persia was helping to restore Hippias, the aristocratic party within Athens was 
also, therefore, pro-Persian.277  Robinsons argument centres on the primary idea 
all parties had in common, which was the desire to overthrow the democratic 
constitution.278  I agree that those Athenians which were pro-tyranny we also 
likely pro-Persia, however, Robinson fails to acknowledge that Sparta was 
involved in removing the leaders of the medising party from Aegina. In light of 
this I would suggest that those Athenians which were pro-Sparta were unlikely 
also to be pro-Persia. We may suggest that, of those who didnt wish to engage in 
a pitched battle, not all of them came to that decision because of their desire to 
reinstate Hippias.279 We have already noted a possible fear of the Persian army 
and the doubt of an Athenian victory.  It seems likely that the Athenian victory at 
Marathon was largely due to the fact they seem to have attacked whilst the 
Persians were leaving the field and embarking back on their ships.  Cawkwell 
believes that this would explain the small number of Athenian casualties and 
also the small number of Persian ships captured by the Athenians, i.e. the rest 
were already out to sea.280 
We learn from Herodotus that after the battle a shield signal was given to 
the Persians who were embarked on their ships ready to sail to Athens.281  The 
debate regarding the origin of the shield signal is wide and from Herodotus 
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information we cannot know for certain who gave the signal, if, indeed, it was a 
deliberate signal. Herodotus defends the Alcmeonidae, almost to the point of 
suspicion, who were accused of the act back in Athens.282  Much speculation 
exists.   
If we believe that a signal was given to the Persians, we can infer, 
whether Alcmeonid or not, that communication between some party from inside 
Athens and the Persian army was taking place.  Given the divided feelings 
amongst the generals prior to the battle, this seems more than likely.  P.K. Baillie 
Reynolds suggests that instead of the shield signal sending a message of 
confirmation to Datis, as commonly thought, it actually sent a signal to let the 
Persians know that something had gone wrong.  He believes that Datis had 
arranged for the capture of Athens by treachery, as with Eretria, and that the 
shield signal was a warning from those who were working for him that the 
treachery had not worked.283  However, K. Gillis presenting arguments counter 
to Herodotus, notes that despite defending the Alcmeonidae Herodotus does not 
suggest other culprits who were likely to have given the shield signal.284  Kelly 
similarly notes that official charges were not brought against the Alcmeonidae, 
which seems testament to the lack of evidence that they had medised.285  We can 
discount Maurices contention that the signal was not intended for the Persians 
but was caused by Miltiades own men signalling to him the movements of the 
Persian fleet, as we may assume Herodotus sources would know of this.286  
Despite the many attempts to interpret the shield signal, we must resign 
ourselves to the fact they are speculation. 
 
The dissension and potential medism present in the Athenian army likely 
reflected a similar situation back in Athens and suggests either pro-Pisistratid 
sympathies, pro-Persian sympathies or, perhaps, simply pro-oligarchic 
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sympathies were present amongst the Athenians.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
Hippias would have lost all contact with his former supporters.  Hippias 
presence in the campaign testifies to his belief that he still had supporters within 
Athens.  Therefore, it is not too great a leap to suggest that he and they may have 
been working together, regardless of the individual motivations behind this.  It 
may be that a few individuals within Athens, realising the size of the Persian 
force and believing that resistance would only aggravate the Persians further, 
believed that by betraying Athens they were acting in the citys best interests, i.e. 
if the city willingly medised, the Athenians would be treated more leniently than 
if it fell to the Persians unwillingly.287  Likewise it may be that the unknown 
medisers were partisans of Hippias or, more opportunistically, were already in 
contact with Datis. We cannot know the motivations of the medising individuals 
but can surmise that they were probably a combination of all of the possible 
reasons above.   
Whatever the message, if we believe that a signal was deliberately given, 
it confirms communication between a faction within Athens itself and the 
Persians.  Fortunately for the relatively young democracy, the medisers were too 
few to act effectively after the Athenian victory at Marathon and, we may 
conjecture that, the result of Marathon directly influenced whether the city 
would medise.  It is worth bearing in mind, as noted by Chroust, that political 
dissention within Athens formed around clubs was not a new idea, conceived 
upon the invasion of Hippias and Datis in an attempt to reinstate Hippias as 
tyrant.  Chroust notes that in 632 B.C., Cylon and his fellow club-members, 
joined by Megarian mercenaries, tried to seize the city; in 508/7 B.C., Isagoras 
and his partisans called upon Sparta to suppress Cleisthenes; and later, on the 
eve of Plataea some Athenian oligarchs attempted to overthrow the democratic 
regime by betraying the Greek cause to the Persians.288  Chroust demonstrates 
that political club-loyalties tended to out-weigh patriotism and so we may also 
conclude that the dissension within the army noted by Miltiades and a shield 
                                                          
287 Gillis, 1969, p. 138. 
288 Chroust, 1954, pp. 283-284, citing Thucydides 1.126 for the affair of Cylon. (Aristotle), Athenian 
Constitution, 20.1-4, Herodotus, V.70-73 for Isagoras and Cleisthenes; Plutarch, Aristides, 13 for the 
conspirators on the eve of the Battle of Plataea. 
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signal to the Persian army are evidence of Greek political factionalism, which the 
Persians attempted to exploit.  From this we may conclude, as mentioned above 
p. 62, that there may have been a larger medising element in Athens compared to 
Eretria. Datis was willing to wait a number of days for these medisers to betray 
the city to him even though the Spartans were eventually expected to arrive to 
help the Athenians.289  
 
Miltiades punishment of Paros 
Herodotus tells us that, after the Athenian victory at Marathon and the 
defence of Athens, Miltiades asked for seventy ships and the required men and 
money for an attack against Paros, which had medised at the same time as 
Eretria.290  Herodotus claims that Miltiades attack against Paros was because the 
Parians had sent a trireme to Marathon with the Persian fleet.291  He also 
claims that Miltiades was angry with a certain Parian, Lysagoras son of Teisias, 
who had slandered him to Hydarnes the Persian.292  At Paros Miltiades 
demanded a hundred talents to prevent him besieging the city, which seems to 
have been the actual reason for his attack.  However, the siege failed and 
Miltiades returned to Athens having achieved nothing more than destroying the 
crops and injuring his leg. 
Of significant interest to our research is the retaliation for Paros medism 
being used to cover other motives; namely Paros wealth.  Herodotus 
explanation that Miltiades wanted revenge against Paros solely because of the 
slander of one Parian seems farfetched.  However, the accusation of medism 
seems to be an obvious attempt to make the blatant Athenian aggression more 
acceptable.  How and Wells note the prosperity of the island, especially in 
marble.293  They also note that when Paros paid tribute to Athens, later in the 
fifth century, it paid 16 ½ talents, which is only exceeded by Thasos and Aegina 
and is more than twice as much as Naxos and Andros, both larger islands. Paros 
was not only wealthy from its marble, Green notes that it was also on one of the 
                                                          
289 Scott, 2005, pp. 434-435. 
290 Herodotus, VI.132. 
291 Herodotus, VI.133. 
292 Herodotus, VI.133. 
293 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 120. 
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busiest Aegean sea routes and so we may assume that it also gained some of its 
wealth from trade.  The blackmail of 100 talents indicates that Miltiades was 
primarily interested in Parian wealth, particularly since Athens had only recently 
fought Marathon.  This seems to be a constant in Greek history as we can see 
below.  Scott notes that when Aristagoras succeeded in persuading the 
Athenians to send aid for the Ionian Revolt one of the reasons given was the 
wealth of Persia.  He also notes that the wealth of Sicily was part of the lure 
when the Athenians prepared for the disastrous Sicilian expedition which failed 
in 413 B.C. 294  Conversely, Paros wealth from trade, as well as turning Athens 
against them, is another likely reason the island medised, i.e. in an attempt to 
protect the trade routes to and from Asia Minor, as well as medising from a basic 
sense of self-preservation, like Aegina. 
After the battle of Salamis we learn that Themistocles also demanded 
large sums of money from Paros, as one of a number of Aegean islands which 
had supposedly medised.295  Herodotus informs us that both Paros and Carystus 
paid the demanded sums as soon as they heard that Themistocles was besieging 
Andros.  However, Herodotus, VII.67 states that as Xerxes army marched 
through Attica the Parians did not join him.  Rather, they stayed behind to watch 
the course of the war.  Thus, the actions of Themistocles leads us to conclude two 
things.  Firstly that the Greeks believed that neutrality or abstention was 
equivalent to medism.  Secondly, Athens was interested in punishing primarily 
those islands and states from which they could benefit financially.  Clearly whilst 
repelling medism, Athens still had an eye on her commercial interests.  
Herodotus confirms that, once Paros paid the demanded sum, Themistocles left 
the island alone and no more is heard regarding accusations of Parian medism.   
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Looking at the first Persian invasion of Greece, we can see much of the 
relationship between them concerns the struggle for Greek independence in the 
wake of the expanding Persian Empire. The Athenian and Eretrian involvement 
                                                          
294 Green, 1970, p. 44. Link, 2000, thinks Miltiades aim was exclusively to obtain money as he holds 
that Athens at this time was pursuing a foreign policy with short term goals. 
295 Herodotus, VIII.112. 
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in the rebellion of Aristagoras, it may be argued, was a catalyst for the invasion 
of Datis.  To Darius Athens was a rebellious state, which had aided the Ionians in 
their rebellion.  Athens and Eretrias involvement in the Ionian Revolt provided 
a good opportunity to expand the Persian Empire westward via these two places. 
The presence of Hippias would have acted as a constant reminder that 
not only had the Athenians broken their AnuAgAgA?ArA?A? with Persia and aided the 
Ionians, but also that Darius could prevent this from happening again by 
installing Hippias as a vassal tyrant of the city and expand Persian control 
further west. We have already noted that despite Herodotus assertion that 
Hippias was able to persuade Darius to order the invasion, it is more likely that 
the real motivation behind Datis invasion of Attica was Darius desire to expand 
the Persian Empire west, beyond Macedon, which was already subject, whilst 
simultaneously punishing those Greeks which were involved in the Ionian 
Revolt.296 Contrary to Hignett, we can agree with Balcer that Datis Marathon 
campaign was part of a wider Persian policy of expansion westward rather than 
a small campaign simply to create a bridgehead to Athens and to reinstall 
Hippias as tyrant.  If the campaign was merely to punish Athens, it is unlikely 
there would have been demands for earth and water.297 
It was in response to this, very real, threat to Greece that the negative 
connotations of medism were confirmed.  We can see that, once these negative 
feelings were established, Athens opportunistically used the charge of medism as 
a device to punish her political enemies and attempted to profit from it.  This is 
clear from the case of Aegina, against whom Athens had had previous conflict, 
and, later, Paros, a wealthy island, from which Miltiades attempted to extort 
money.  Due to lack of evidence to the contrary, we may suggest that both 
actions were the result of political opportunism, in which, in the case of Aegina, 
Sparta was willing to become involved.   That said, the threat of a Persian 
invasion and the fear of medism and Persian instigated factionalism must be 
emphasised.  In the face of Persias expansion, only the Scythians had 
successfully resisted and the punishment of Miletus and Eretria will have served 
as a reminder of what could happen if resistance failed.  
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We can see from the division within the Greek islands and states that in 
order to expand the Persian Empire Darius continued the policy whereby he 
invited cities and islands to medise prior to invading them, causing factionalism, 
which he then exploited. The only city on which this policy failed was Athens, 
and it can be argued that this was because Athens likely believed that, in light of 
the treatment of Eretria, it would be treated harshly by the Persians. It is also 









Chapter 3: Xerxes Invasion of Greece 
 
Upon the failure of Datis and Artaphernes, Darius planned a larger 
invasion of Greece, which was realised by Xerxes, once he had confirmed his 
royal succession.  It is noteworthy that Herodotus spends VII. 5-20 narrating 
Xerxes hesitation to campaign against Greece possibly indicating that the new 
king may have deemed it less of a priority than his father had done. However, 
once Xerxes is persuaded to campaign against Greece we see that he employs 
dissension amongst his enemies in a similar way to Cyrus and Darius. This begs 
the question; was Xerxes continuing the policy of Cyrus and Darius and had this 
approach become a standard Persian tactic by this time?  It may be considered 
that Xerxes campaign was very similar to that of Darius in terms of causing 
factionalism, but on a much wider scale. 
This chapter will look at the interactions between the Greeks and the 
Persian Empire with a particular emphasis on the medism of these states and 
individuals at this time.  We will discuss the causes for this medism and how 
these relationships were controlled by Persia.  We will see that the medism of 
individuals and states in Greece was, as we have said, a continuation of the 
Persian policy to cause factionalism in order to conquer the Greeks piecemeal.  
This chapter will consider the Greek response to this Persian policy, looking at 
the development of attitudes between Persia and the Greeks, in light of the 
Athenian victory at Marathon. 
 
The medism of Demaratus  
A notable figure in the Persian invasion of Greece was the Spartan King 
Demaratus who, having been deposed, was living in exile at the Persian royal 
court.298  Demaratus exile at the Persian court was not unprecedented behaviour; 
Hippias of Athens had done the same thing 20 years earlier and may have still 
                                                          
298 Herodotus, VII.101. See Parke, 1945, pp. 106-112, for a discussion on the deposing of Spartan 
Kings including that of Demaratus. Briant, 1996, p. 520, suggests that Xerxes was named Darius 
heir prior to 490 B.C. Thus, we can conclude that, for Demaratus to have been present during the 
discussions regarding Darius successor, he must have been at the court prior to 490 B.C. 
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been there when Demaratus arrived.299  By accompanying Xerxes on his invasion 
of Greece he made the transition from exile to mediser.  We noted above that the 
tale of Democedes of Croton made a point to emphasise that he did not aid the 
Persians willingly so as to avoid accusations of medism.300  Demaratus intent to 
medise is not entirely obvious and his retort that his exile would be the 
beginning for Sparta of either immense evil or immense good,301 is ambiguous 
at best.  If we are to believe from this statement alone that Demaratus planned 
from the start to medise in order to re-claim his throne, as Hippias did, I think 
we would be reading more into it than is there.  We should note that Demaratus 
initially took exile at Elis and fled to Persia as a result of being pursued from Elis 
by Spartan forces.302  Thus, we may suggest that perhaps Demaratus intended to 
spend his exile in Elis.  However, when he was pursued from Elis, it is likely that 
Demaratus may have recognised that Persia was the safest place for him 
considering the circumstances.  It would be to the advantage of Cleomenes, the 
Agiad king of Sparta and rival of Demaratus, to denounce him, especially after 
Demaratus had supported the Corinthian mutiny during Cleomenes invasion of 
Attica.  Despite the Corinthian mutiny, Cleomenes still carried great influence 
throughout the Peloponnese, limiting Demaratus options for places of exile.  The 
only state traditionally capable of standing up to Sparta was Argos, which was 
unlikely to welcome a Spartan king, albeit a dethroned one, because of the 
Argive defeat at Sepeia which had occurred only 4 years earlier.  Thus, despite 
particularly strong Argive sentiments, Argos was not yet strong enough to face 
Sparta again and would have wished to avoid such provocation by offering 
refuge to an exiled Spartan king.  Another option may have been Athens.  
However, Athenian might had not been fully tested against Sparta and the later 
                                                          
299 Hippias went to the court of Artaphernes c. 510 (Herodotus, V.96) and Demaratus went to 
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300 Cf. pp. 21-22 above. 
301 Herodotus, VI.67. 
302 Scott, 2005, p. 270. In an attempt to explain why Spartan forces appeared at Elis Plutarch, Agis, 
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prominence of Athens was primarily due to their victory at Marathon, which is 
unlikely to have taken place before Demaratus had left Elis.303  
It is noteworthy that when Demaratus went to Darius court, he would 
have known of Persias hostile intentions towards the Greeks, from the envoys 
sent demanding earth and water prior to the battle of Marathon.304  Furthermore, 
he would have been aware of the expansion of the Persian Empire and the Ionian 
Revolt, since the various envoys to Sparta from the Scythians, Samians, and 
Aristagoras, which saw Cleomenes, will not have been unknown to him.  Indeed, 
we may postulate that he fled to Persia from Elis because of the impending 
expedition of Datis and Artaphernes, and that perhaps he thought along the 
same lines as Hippias when he fled to the court of Artaphernes, i.e. to be 
reinstated upon a successful Persian invasion.305  That is, he did not necessarily 
leave Sparta thinking to flee to Persia to be reinstated in Sparta, but after being 
chased from Elis his thoughts then turned that way since Persia was now one of 
the few places he could go in exile.  It is worth bearing in mind, as stated above 
in the discussion regarding Hippias medism, Greeks exiles were welcomed to 
the Persian King, but in payment for this some form of service was required.  It is 
likely that Demaratus, like the Greek islands which submitted, expected this first 
campaign to be successful. Thus, had it been successful, he would have been able 
to offer Darius another city into which he could have expanded the Persian 
Empire from Attica.  The failure of the first invasion will not necessarily have 
dashed Demaratus hopes of being installed in Sparta with Persian backing.  It 
may be apt to note that Darius, recognising his own intention to invade Greece 
again, probably wanted to be able to call on Demaratus when necessary.  Like 
other exiles, he had to help expand the Persian Empire.  At the court of Darius 
                                                          
303 The battle of Marathon took place in 490 B.C. and Demaratus arrived at Darius court, 
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304 Herodotus, VII. 133. 
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Demaratus was given a royal welcome and three cities for his income: Pergamus, 
Halisarna, and Teuthrania.306   
Whilst in Persia we find Demaratus courting Xerxes, who had not yet 
been named heir to Darius at that time.  Herodotus credits Xerxes eventual 
succession to the Persian throne to advice given by Demaratus.307  It seems far-
fetched that Xerxes would have called on Demaratus for advice concerning his 
accession, and more likely that, in an attempt to gain favour with Xerxes, 
Demaratus may have given him his thoughts on the matter if the opportunity 
arose.  We are aware that Herodotus liked to exaggerate the importance of 
Greeks within the Persian court and Herodotus contradicts himself when he 
states that, even without Demaratus arguments, Xerxes would have gained the 
throne due to the influences of his mother, Atossa.308  Thus, we can see that 
Demaratus advice is unlikely to have had any direct influence.  It is probable 
that in offering good advice to Xerxes, Demaratus was attempting to enhance his 
status and gain favour with Xerxes in the future, thus, securing a good position 
at court.  It is worth noting that, when Xerxes was planning his invasion of 
Greece, Herodotus states that the medising Greeks, who helped persuade him, 
were the Pisistratidae of Athens and the Aleuadae of Thessaly, there is no 
mention of Demaratus in the account.309  This further suggests that Demaratus 
medised reactively rather than pro-actively. 
It appears that Demaratus primary purpose on Xerxes invasion 
campaign was in an advisory capacity once the Persian army was in Greece.310  
This seems to have been limited to information regarding the geography and 
peoples of Greece.  At Thermopylae, when Xerxes needed fuller details on the 
activities of the Lacedaemonians, he, naturally, called on Demaratus for his 
expertise.  We learn at this point that Demaratus was not wholly trusted by the 
Persian court and Xerxes brother, Achaemenes, accused him of plotting against 
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Xerxes.311 Mistrust of Demaratus by Achaemenes is not surprising when we 
consider that the advice given by Demaratus primarily focused on praise of 
Sparta and the Spartans.312  It is also worth considering that Achaemenes 
distrusted Demaratus on the grounds that he was not a Persian, which recalls 
Megabates dislike of Aristagoras.313  Although Herodotus would have us believe 
Demaratus carried great influence with Xerxes, it appears that, in reality, 
Demaratus was only asked for advice when it suited Xerxes.314   
We can see that Demaratus medism was motivated primarily by 
necessity and it appears that he did so almost unwillingly at times: Herodotus 
notes that, before the Persian invasion, Demaratus warned the Spartans with a 
secret message.315  His actions seem to have been motivated by his need to 
survive as an exile.  His flight to Persia was probably because Spartan forces 
were unlikely to pursue him as far as Persia.316  Persia had already sheltered at 
least one Greek exile, Hippias, so had set a precedent and, with the planned 
invasion of Greece, would likely welcome Demaratus as well.  Once at the 
Persian court, realising that he could no longer return to Sparta, Demaratus tried 
to secure a comfortable position and attempted to curry favour with the heir to 
the throne.  Prior to the launch of Xerxes invasion, he may have sent a warning 
to Sparta, but, necessarily, joined the expedition as one of the members of Xerxes 
court, who had vital geographic knowledge of the region and its peoples.  We are 
left to speculate precisely what service Xerxes expected from Demaratus, but the 
                                                          
311 Herodotus, VII.236. The accusation derived from Demaratus advice to split the Persian fleet and 
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most obvious suggestion would be to act as a vassal king, loyal to Xerxes and the 
Persian Empire, and, as we have seen, an agent of Persian dominance. 
What is certainly clear from looking at Demaratus is that, in sheltering 
with Darius and Xerxes, and then joining the Greek invasion, Demaratus was 
unable ever to return to Sparta or Greece without the support of Persia.  We hear 
in Xenophon that Demaratus descendants were still living in the Persian Empire 
when Agesilaus invaded.317  This confirms that Demaratus ended his days at 
Xerxes court as mentioned by Plutarch in his Life of Themistocles.  
After the failed Persian invasion we hear very little of Demaratus.  From 
the little evidence we do find, we see that Demaratus is reduced to living 
dependant on the kings favour.  Plutarchs Life of Themistocles narrates how 
Themistocles reconciled the Persian king to Demaratus, who had offended the 
king when he asked to wear the royal diadem when riding in state through 
Sardis.318  The offense caused by this is more apparent when we note that, in 
Persian society, royal garments were part of a Persian kings identity.  The tale of 
Artabanus wearing Xerxes clothes in order to trick a phantom highlights the 
Persian belief in a connection between the royal garments and accoutrements of 
office and the role of king.319  To be allowed to wear the kings clothing was a 
very great honour, which was bestowed by the king at his discretion; it was not 
something for which one could ask. Demaratus request to wear the royal 
diadem and ride in state through Sardis was, in essence, a request to become the 
king and seems to have been a greater honour than Demaratus deserved.320 
It is clear that once Demaratus had arrived at Darius court he was almost 
completely under Persian control and Demaratus attempt to curry favour with 
Xerxes prior to his enthronement suggests he knew this.  Furthermore, his 
advisory role whilst on the campaign was definitely not as an equal to Xerxes, 
but rather he was called upon as and when he was needed.  His one act of 
                                                          
317 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.I.6. Demaratus sons Eurysthenes and Procles had inherited from 
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independence, to warn Sparta of the invasion, was performed in such secrecy 
that only Gorgo, daughter of Cleomenes, was able to understand how to read the 
message.321 Thus, one might equate his role to that of no more than a servant, 
albeit one of distinguished rank. 
We can see from the account of Demaratus that Persia was still deemed a 
safe place for exiles.  The knowledge that exiles would need to perform a service 
for the king was likely a bonus for Darius and Xerxes, since it may have 
encouraged dissatisfied Greeks to support the invasion; we know of Hippias and 
Demaratus, but we can conjecture there will have been exiled Greeks from other 
states who will have been able to contribute in an advisory role too.322  Viewing 
Demaratus in this way, we can see that he is, in fact, one in a line of Greeks, from 
Hippias to Themistocles, utilised by Persia for their knowledge of Greece.  We 
also know of the Aleuadae, who we will discuss below.  What is interesting is the 
apparent lack of concern in Sparta that a Spartan king had fled to the Persian 
Empire, which they knew to be expanding westward and, possibly, on the eve of 
an invasion.  This might account for Spartas support of Athens at Marathon, 
albeit belatedly, but it is not immediately obvious that this is the case since we 
are unsure of the exact date when Demaratus fled Elis. 
 
Pisistratids in Xerxes army 
 Demaratus was not the only Greek present in Xerxes army, there were 
also members of the Pisistratids, who had been in exile in the Persian Empire, 
and Aleuadae from Thessaly, who we will discuss later.323  The presence of 
Pisistratids in Xerxes campaign indicates that their dreams of returning to and 
ruling Athens were not completely dead and, by this time, their loyalty to Persia 
made them ideal vassal rulers.  Not unsurprisingly, we do not hear of them until 
the Persian army is actually in Athens attacking the Acropolis and they are 
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employed to try to persuade the few defending Athenians to submit.324  That we 
do not hear of them until this point in the campaign is not unsurprising since it is 
unlikely they will have been as familiar with the geography of northern Greece 
as Demaratus, since by this time all living Pisistratids will have bene born and 
raised entirely from within the Persian Empire. Their lack of success at the 
Acropolis suggests that whilst anti-democratic elements had not have been 
entirely removed from the city, these elements were not obviously loyal to the 
Pisistratids.  Plutarch mentions that prior to Plataea there was a failed attempt at 
revolution in Athens, but we may suggest that the revolutionaries held oligarchic 
sympathies rather than tyrannist ones.325   
 Taking a closer look at the oligarchic revolutionaries, we can see that 
elements within the city would have been happy to take-up Mardonius offer.  
Herodotus states that Lycidas and his family we punished for suggesting 
accepting Mardonius offer and so it is unsurprising that there were other 
prominent Athenians who thought the same.326  We can see here how close to 
success came the Persian policy of creating and exploiting dissention within 
Athens. 
 
Argive neutrality during the Persian invasion 
The actions of Argos prior to and during Xerxes invasion have provoked 
debate regarding whether the state medised fully or simply remained neutral 
rather than joining the Hellenic League.  In preparation for the invasion, Xerxes 
sent envoys demanding earth and water, the traditional signs of submission.  
Whilst some Greek states decided to resist the Persian advance, forming the 
Hellenic League, others such as Thessaly and Argos did not do this.  Herodotus, 
reporting traditional Greek attitudes to neutrality, interprets Argive apathy to 
Xerxes invasion as medism.  He notes that although the Argives declined to join 
the Hellenic League, claiming that they had been advised by the oracle of Apollo 
not to join the confederacy,327 they were willing to ignore this oracle, if the 
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Spartans would agree to a thirty year truce with Argos.  They also requested that 
the Spartans divide the leadership of the confederacy equally with them.328  The 
invocation of the oracle and the request for joint leadership of the Hellenic 
League are usually interpreted as convenient excuses for Argos not to join the 
Hellenic League, allowing it to medise by remaining neutral.  R.A. Bauslaugh 
notes that Greek suspicion of neutrality can be found as far back as Solon who 
made it illegal for Athenians to abstain from political stasis.329  He suggests that 
neutral states were distrusted by the Greeks as potential enemies.  This mistrust 
would probably have been greater during the Persian invasion since Persia did 
not respect neutrality, as can be seen by Darius attack on Carystus which 
attempted to remain neutral in the 490s.330  Thus, Greek suspicions of neutral 
states seems to be derived from the belief that it was simply a cover for later 
medism as the neutral states knew Xerxes would not respect their neutrality so 
were likely to medise when he arrived at their door. 
Looking at the Argives reasons for neutrality, we note the Argive claim 
that they had been driven to seek advice from Delphi due to the dire position 
they were in after their defeat by Cleomenes at Sepeia in 494 B.C.331  How and 
Wells believe that the oracle in question may be dated to the earlier invasion of 
490 B.C., rather than c. 482 B.C.332  They note that there is no reason to discredit 
the oracle itself and there is no mention in Herodotus of a denial from Delphi, 
which we might expect if the oracle was false.333  We may suggest that, had the 
oracle been given only shortly prior to the envoys arrival, the Argives would 
have been less willing to ignore it for the prize of joint leadership of the Hellenic 
League.  The apparent ease with which the Argives were willing to ignore the 
oracle suggests that it should be dated to earlier than 482 B.C.  This in turn 
suggests that perhaps it was being used by the Argives as a pretext to disguise 
their real objections to joining the League, i.e. failing to obtain joint leadership. 
                                                          
328 Mosley notes that Herodotus, VII.149.2, states AoЗAh ?A? A?A?A?AfAtAh Ao jA? m ?A?A? AoA?Am A?A?A?AlAoAbAm thus we 
can deduce that the embassy was composed of more envoys from other states not just Sparta. 
Mosley, 1973, p. 62. 
329 (Aristotle), Athenian Constitution, 8. Bauslaugh, 1990, p.75. 
330 Herodotus, VI. 99. 
331 Herodotus, I.82-83. 
332 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, pp. 187-188.  
333 Also, Bauslaugh, 1990, p. 93. 
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Of particular note here is the pro-Persian inclination of the oracles from 
Delphi throughout Herodotus.  Ehrenberg describes the Delphic attitude toward 
Persia as cautious, even pessimistic.334  Burn believes that the generally safe 
policy of Delphi was influenced by the treatment of other sanctuaries of Apollo 
by Persia.  Delos at the time of Datis expedition, had won the favour of the 
Persians. Miletus, on the other hand, had courted disaster.335  However, it may 
also have been influenced by the direct treatment of Delos itself in the 490s. 
Herodotus states that in the wake of Datis landing on Delos the islanders fled 
from fear of him.336  However, he won them over by sacrificing three hundred 
talents of incense at the temple.  This more than anything, I suggest, would have 
won over the Pythia and her priests prior to the invasion of Xerxes.  Green notes 
that most of the oracles, if not strictly pro-Persian, were anti-resistance in nature. 
He suggests Delphi truly believed that Xerxes would be victorious.337  This is a 
true enough estimation of Delphis sentiments and it is more curious that Argos, 
apparently, was willing to ignore this oracle for a stake in the leadership of the 
League, unless, indeed, it was dated to an earlier occasion.   
 
Looking at Argos request for a thirty year truce with Sparta, we can 
suggest that it is unlikely that Sparta would have refused this, since one of the 
first actions of the League members was to resolve all of their inter-state 
disputes.338 Indeed, of the two states Sparta was the more dominant at the time 
and so would be likely to settle affairs to its advantage.339  Thus, we can see that 
Argos request was in keeping with the sentiments of the Hellenic League and 
would not have been a prohibiting factor.   
The primary point Sparta was not willing to concede was sharing the 
leadership of the Hellenic League with Argos.  Prior to the battle of Sepeia, in 494 
B.C., Argos rivalled Spartan dominance of the Peloponnese.  Had Sparta 
                                                          
334 Ehrenberg, 1993, p.152. 
335 Burn, 1984, p. 348 
336 Herodotus, VI.97. 
337 Green, 1970, p. 67. 
338 Cf. Herodotus, VII.145. 
339 Kelly, 1970, thinks that the notion of a traditional enmity between Argos and Sparta was a 
myth created in the fourth century; he bases his arguments on the political geography of the 
Peloponnese in the sixth century B.C.  Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why Argos would 
have reservations in submitting to Spartan leadership in 482. 
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conceded this point to Argos, it would have been tantamount to Spartan 
recognition that Argos was an equal power in the Peloponnese again.  Sparta 
was not willing to defend Greece at the expense of her own interests.340  Likewise 
a recently defeated and, therefore, depleted Argos would not want to let her 
enemy take command of her forces.  Diodorus Siculus, reiterating Herodotus, 
does not mention any Argive oracle or requests for a peace treaty, but simply 
states that Argos claimed it would join the Hellenic League if offered a share in 
the command.341  This seems to distil the primary reason why Argos declined to 
join the Hellenic League.  It is noteworthy that no charge of medism is levied by 
Diodorus Siculus. 
Argive mistrust of Spartan leadership may have been genuine and 
enough to prevent Argos from joining the League.  It is worth noting that, 
despite the lapse of fourteen years between the Argive defeat at Sepeia and the 
second Persian invasion, Argos was still in a relatively weakened state.  Having 
lost up to six thousand men at Sepeia, Argos then lost a further 1000 men 
supporting Aegina when it was attacked by Athens before Marathon.342  
Herodotus relates how, due to the loss of Argive men, their widows married 
their perioikoi and douloi in order to repopulate Argos.343  When the children of 
the dead Argive men of Sepeia grew to maturity there was conflict between the 
two groups, resulting in the perioikoi and douloi seizing Tiryns and setting 
themselves up in independence.344  When the Argives were approached to join 
the Greek coalition, not only was Argos trying to rebuild its army after Sepeia, 
but at the same time it was using the men it had to conquer Tiryns. 
 
                                                          
340 Evidence for Spartan self-interest during the Persian invasion can be taken from Herodotus, 
VIII.40, where we find Sparta, along with the other Peloponnesians, wanting to abandon the rest of 
Hellas after building a wall across the Isthmus so that they only needed to defend the Peloponnese. 
Huxley, 1967, argues that Spartas unwillingness to fight north of the Isthmus may have been the 
result of the medism of Caryae in Arcadia, which posed a potential threat to Spartan security in the 
Peloponnese. Cawkwell, 2005, p. 113, suggests that it was general Peloponnesian fear or 
pessimism, rather than that of the Spartans themselves, which delayed their crossing the Isthmus. 
341 Diodorus Siculus, XI.4. 
342 Herodotus, VI.92. 
343 For fuller discussion on this see Tomlinson, 1972, pp. 97-100, and Scott, 2005, pp. 306-308.  
Forrest, 1970, pp. 222-225, argues that the term douloi was not literal but was political abuse by 
opponents of an Argive democracy. 
344 The conflict between Argos and Tiryns was not resolved until the mid-460s. Scott, 2005, p. 308.  
See also Forrest, 1960. 
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Herodotus gives two further and different accounts, alongside this first 
one, to explain why Argos did not join the Pan-Hellenic League.  The first story 
given runs thus.  Xerxes, before setting out with his army, sent a man to Argos 
claiming that the Persians and the Argives had a common ancestor in Perseus. 
Therefore, he did not want to come into conflict with Argos, promising that, if 
Argos remained aloof, Xerxes would hold it in great esteem.  The Argives, 
impressed by the Persian offer, gave no initial overtures or demands to the Pan-
Hellenic League.  The later demand for a share in commanding the Pan-Hellenic 
army was made deliberately, with the knowledge that Sparta would refuse, 
allowing Argos to remain inactive.  Herodotus finishes this account by reporting 
the Argive embassy to Susa on the accession of Artaxerxes I, asking to continue 
the same friendly relationship with Artaxerxes as they had had with his father 
Xerxes. 345  We will discuss this embassy below.346  This account, I would suggest, 
is a fictitious embellishment of the likely facts.347  Since Xerxes sent envoys to all 
states demanding submission, it is likely that an envoy did go to Argos.  
However, the tale that the envoy claimed a common ancestor for Persia and 
Argos via Perseus seems like a malicious exaggeration by Herodotus sources. 
Herodotus second alternative account describes the Argives inviting the 
Persian invasion in order to gain support in the war against Sparta.348  However, 
we find no evidence of envoys from Argos at Xerxes court encouraging him to 
invade, as we find the Aleuadae and Alcmeonids did.349  Thus, we are able to 
discount this account. 
When relating these accounts, Herodotus claims that he is simply 
reporting them and that he does not believe either of them.  However, despite 
these claims to impartiality, we ought to remember that Herodotus made a 
deliberate choice to add those accounts that are in his history and omit others, he 
did not simply list his different stories with no purpose.  We may conjecture that, 
if he gave more than one account of something, it was either to support or 
discredit a previous one.  The three accounts get progressively more damning for 
                                                          
345 Herodotus, VII.150-151. Xerxes died and Artaxerxes ascended the Persian throne in 465 B.C. 
346 Below p. 50.  
347 Contra Bauslaugh, 1990, p.94. 
348 Herodotus, VII.152.3. 
349 Herodotus, VII.6, above p. 41 
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the Argives with nothing but circumstantial evidence to support the claims.  
Herodotus uses the Argive embassy to Susa in the 460s as retrospective evidence 
to verify his second account of Argive medism; he then compounds the 
accusation with the third, even more damning, account.   
 
We may suggest that the problem for Herodotus sources with the 
neutrality of Argos stemmed from Argive demands for joint leadership with 
Sparta.  It is noteworthy that, whilst describing the Persian advance through 
Attica towards the Peloponnese, Herodotus lists those Peloponnesian towns 
which were neutral, condemning neutrality as tantamount to medism.350  The 
second two stories clearly demonstrate suspicion amongst the allied Greeks 
regarding Argive neutrality.  Herodotus does not condemn cities which refused 
to participate for religious reasons alone, only those which had secondary 
agendas, hidden behind the facade of religion.  If the Argives had remained 
neutral on purely religious grounds, I believe they would not have faced such 
censure from Herodotus sources.  That they were so ready to ignore the oracle 
from Delphi may suggest that there was a hidden agenda.  It should be 
remembered, however, that despite mistrust of those cities which remained 
neutral, including Argos, they were not punished by the Hellenic League after 
the Persian invasion. Only those states which openly medised were punished.351 
 
Diodorus Siculus relates neither of these other details, but simply claims 
that Argos asked for a share in the leadership, as we noted above.352  Diodorus 
Siculus claims that, after the allied Greeks sent envoys to all the Greek states, the 
Argives sent their own to Corinth, offering Argive terms.  In Herodotus account 
we are told that the Argives gave their demands when the initial envoy arrived 
in Argos; the difference is only subtle, but it highlights a possible difference in 
Argive sentiments.  Herodotus account suggests that the Argive religious claims 
and request for a share in the leadership were empty.  However, Diodorus 
                                                          
350 Herodotus, VIII.73. 
351 Herodotus, IX. 86, for the punishment of Thebes, and IX. 106 for the Athenian refusal to replace 
medisers with loyal Ionians.  
352 Diodorus Siculus, XI. 3. 4-6. 
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Siculus account suggests that there was a genuine interest from Argos in 
resisting Xerxes invasion.  The Argives would not have taken the trouble to send 
an envoy had they not been interested.  Of course, we can speculate that 
Diodorus Siculus may have become confused with the sequence of events and, 
eventually, arrived at the same conclusion, i.e. that Argos claimed to wish to join 
the League provided that it could have a share in the leadership.  We may 
suggest, therefore, that, perhaps, Argos indeed wished to help the allied Greeks, 
but felt it could not do this under Spartan leadership.  Herodotus concludes this 
part of his account of Argos that the Argives were not the worst offenders353 
referring to other medising and neutral states.   
 
The primary evidence for Argive medism is at IX.13, when the Argives 
failed to prevent the Spartans from leaving the Peloponnese and also failed to 
give notice to Mardonius of this. Thus, we can see that the Argives did not 
medise very effectively. 354  
From the evidence presented above, it can be conjectured that Herodotus 
condemnation of Argos is based more on the hearsay of his sources than on hard 
facts.  I do not want to discredit Herodotus to the same degree as Plutarch, who 
declares that Herodotus A?A?AoA?A?Ah e ?AeAjAbAcA?AnAoA?AoAbAh ЀA?AjA?A?AfAfA?AoA?Ad.355  However, 
Herodotus deliberately brings his audiences attention to the rumours of medism 
surrounding Argos.356  He may not have had overt proof of Argive medism, but, 
I believe, Herodotus and his sources did not want the Argives to get off scot 
free for their neutrality.  Plutarch also notes the discrepancies in Herodotus 
portrayal of Argive behaviour and asks: why did (the Argives) not medise 
openly when (Xerxes) came?  And if they did not want to serve in the Kings 
army, why did they not at least plunder Laconia when they stayed behind or 
seize Thyrea again or do something else to harass the Spartans and impede their 
operations?357   
                                                          
353 Herodotus, VI.152. 
354 Herodotus, IX.9-13. 5,000 Spartans, along with their helots, had been sent secretly to Plataea in 
response to an Athenian embassy to the Sparta. 
355 Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitate, 28. 
356 Herodotus, VII.150-152.  
357 Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitate, 28. 
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We may suggest that, as the only hard evidence of Argive medism 
during the Persian invasion was to prevent Sparta leaving the Peloponnese, it 
may have been that a specific faction within Argos that medised and not the 
entire state.  Bauslaugh believes the entire account of Argos failing to prevent 
this Peloponnesian force from leaving is fictitious, but this in my view is going 
too far.358   Certainly, I find it difficult to believe that, had the whole state 
medised, Argos would have performed so few deeds for the Persians.  Despite 
the seemingly friendly relations between Argos and Athens, no embassy was 
sent to persuade Athens to join the Persians, like Alexander of Macedon did.359   
Men were not sent to help the Thebans and Thessalians at Plataea, nor to fight 
for Xerxes or Mardonius at any time.  Furthermore, Leonidas took men from 
Thebes, who Herodotus believes were hostages, to fight with him at 
Thermopylae and, thus, ensure the loyalty of Thebes, albeit temporarily, but he 
did not do the same to Argos.360  We have already noted that Argive numbers 
were still recovering after Sepeia, which may have been a factor in Argive 
neutrality; however, that is not to say that had they desired, or been ordered by 
Xerxes, they would not have been able to contribute some men to the Persian 
army.  They had been willing, apparently, to ignore an oracle had they been 
given joint leadership of the Hellenic Leagues forces and so, presumably, this 
would have included contributing men to the Hellenic Leagues army.  It is 
noteworthy that only four years after Sepeia 1000 Argive volunteers went to help 
Aegina.  Had Argos truly wished to medise, we could expect to see it able to 
raise possibly another 1000 men to contribute to the Persian army a decade after 
Marathon.  It is also worth noting that, had Argos medised prior to Xerxes 
invasion, we would expect to find an Argive envoy at Xerxes court prior to the 
invasion which, as we noted above, we do not.361 
                                                          
358 Bauslaugh, 1990, p. 93. 
359 For the embassy of Alexander of Macedon to Athens, cf. pp. 96-97.  Although it may be argued 
that Argos aided Aegina against Athens, it is worth noting that the Argives who participated were 
not there in an official capacity but volunteered when approached by the Aeginetans. This may 
indicate some factional differences within Argos. 
360 Cf. pp. 100-103, for a discussion on the loyalty of the Thebans sent with Leonidas to 
Thermopylae. 
361 Herodotus, VII.6, above p. 41 and p. 46. 
91 
 
In compensation for the absence of proof, Herodotus appears to cast 
doubt on Argive motives for remaining neutral.  I believe, like Plutarch, that if 
Argos as a whole had medised there would be more evidence for this, although 
we must be careful of deploying argumentum ex silentio.  That is not to say that 
there would not have been medising factions within Argos, but this can be said 
for all Greek cities at the time, even those who were members of the Hellenic 
League.   
 
Herodotus accusations of Argive medism may be explained if we 
consider Herodotus likely sources and the roles played by Athens and Sparta, at 
this time, and their relationships with Argos.  I believe it is likely that Argos was 
genuine in its request for joint command of the Hellenic League with Sparta, 
despite its state of weakness.  If Argos had simply wanted to medise, I do not 
think it would have gone to the effort of fabricating an excuse for neutrality 
when asked to join the Hellenic League.  The Aleuadae of Thessaly did not 
explain their behaviour, nor did Thebes or any other Greek city which 
voluntarily submitted to Persia.  As the second greatest power in Greece during 
the sixth century, it would not be unreasonable for Argos to request joint 
leadership with Sparta.  Since Sparta, along with Athens, was the saviour of 
Greece against the barbarian invasion, it follows that Herodotus sources did not 
wish to concede that the primary reason for Argive neutrality may have been 
Spartan obstinacy regarding leadership of the League.  To prevent Sparta 
appearing badly for refusing to share command of the League with Argos, it 
would be easier for Herodotus sources to cast doubt on the genuineness of 
Argive claims to neutrality.362  Furthermore, the animosity between Argos and 
Sparta, during the sixth and fifth centuries, makes the Herodotean account of 
supposed Argive medising more plausible. We can see that Herodotus 
considered those Greek cities which did not join the Hellenic League to be 
medisers, whether they acted on behalf of Persia or not.  Furthermore, due to the 
size of Argos, and the potential number of men and resources she could have 
supplied had she wished to join the Hellenic League, despite the losses of Sepeia 
                                                          
362 Cf. p. 81 above. 
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and the ongoing conflict with Tiryns, Argive neutrality was tantamount to 
medism in the eyes of Herodotus sources.  
If we compare Herodotus accounts of other medising states with that of 
supposed Argive medism, we can see that there are, in fact, very few similarities.  
Herodotus tells us that the Thessalians supplied scouts to the Persians to lead 
them through Greece,363 and that Thebes provided men to fight in the Persian 
army at Plataea.364  As far as we can tell, the only thing required of the medising 
faction within Argos was to watch and to prevent the Peloponnesians from 
leaving the Peloponnese, which they failed to do.365  
Finally, it is necessary to turn our attention to the Argive embassy at the 
court of Artaxerxes I in the 460s.366  Herodotus states that the aim of this embassy 
was to renew the friendship between Argos and Persia which had existed during 
Xerxes reign, which might appear to confirm that during the Xerxes invasion 
Argos had, indeed, medised.  However, we do not know exactly when the 
friendship between Argos and Xerxes began.  Looking at the evidence above, it 
seems more likely that this occurred sometime in the years after Xerxes invasion 
rather than before or during it.  It is noteworthy that the first concrete evidence 
we find for a formal alliance between Argos and Persia is when Athens was 
trying to do the same, i.e. in the 460s when Athens and Persia had fought each 
other to a standstill and Athens was beginning its negotiations for the Peace of 
Callias.  This embassy was sent to renew with Artaxerxes a previous treaty made 
with Xerxes, and, thus, it is possible that the formal alliance between Argos and 
Persia mentioned by Herodotus was made sometime between 479 B.C. and 465 
B.C.  It is not impossible, in an attempt to secure a strong ally during the rise to 
prominence of Athens and Sparta, Argos looked to Persia for an alliance at this 
time.  The Greeks may have viewed the repulsion of Xerxes and the Persians as a 
victory but this does not mean that subsequently they viewed the Persian Empire 
as weak. Unfortunately, we are lacking necessary sources for the period between 
the end of Xerxes invasion and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and, so, 
                                                          
363 Herodotus, VII.174. 
364 Herodotus, IX.2ff. 
365 Herodotus, IX.12. 
366 Herodotus, VII.150. 
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we must admit that this is speculation based on what is likely rather than what is 
fact.  However, it is noteworthy that, despite the Greek victories in winning 
Byzantium and Sestos from Persia, Eion and Doriskos remained Persian.367 
Furthermore, as Cawkwell notes, the accusations of medism against Pausanias 
are only credited because the Greeks expected another Persian invasion,368 
indicating their belief that the Persian Empire was strong enough after Xerxes 
failed invasion to mount yet another. With regards to Argos, our source material 
is abundant and we believe we have been able to dispel some myths concerning 




Sicily and Crete 
Herodotus treatment of the neutrality of Sicily and Crete strikingly 
contrasts with his treatment of Argos. Gelon, tyrant of Sicily, was also willing to 
join the Hellenic League, providing that he was polemarch of all the Greek 
forces.  Like with the Argives, the Spartans refused this condition.369  When he 
compromised and asked to command either the land forces or the navy, the 
Athenians refused.  The narration continues that Gelon, fearing for the fate of the 
Greeks, made preparations so that, should the Persian army defeat the Greeks, 
he could submit to Persia.  According to Herodotus, Gelon sent three 
pentekonters to Delphi with a large sum of money to wait for the outcome.  If the 
Persians were successful, his man in Delphi had orders to give the money to 
Xerxes along with Sicilian earth and water.  If the Greeks were successful, the 
man had orders to return with the money to Sicily. 
Despite the similarity in Herodotus portrayal of Argive behaviour, 
Herodotus does not charge Gelon with rumours of treachery, as he did the 
Argives.  Instead, he excuses Gelons actions with the story present in Sicily at 
the time that Gelon would have helped the Greeks, even under Spartan 
                                                          
367 Cf. pp. 115-116 below. 
368 Cawkwell, 2005, p. 129. Cf. Plato, Menexenus, 241d. 
369 Herodotus, VII.157-163.  
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leadership, had there not been a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily.370  Diodorus 
Siculus claims that this Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was timed to coincide 
with the battle at Salamis in a Persian-Carthaginian conspiracy are highly 
unlikely.371  Due to the scale of the Persian invasion, we can postulate that the 
Carthaginian invasion of Sicily may have been opportunistically timed because 
of the knowledge that the Greeks would be unable to spare any men to send to 
Gelons aid.  Brunt argues that this latter account of a pending Carthaginian 
invasion is clearly to extol Gelons patriotism and services to the Greeks.372  He 
conjectures that Herodotus Sicilian sources were concerned to answer the charge 
that Gelon had not helped the Greeks when asked and so, without denying this 
primary fact, they embellished the account.373  Brunts proposal, however, 
ignores the fact that a Carthaginian invasion was expected and actually did take 
place.  It is curious that Herodotus let Gelon off so lightly compared to Argos, 
considering that Herodotus believed Gelon sent a man to pro-Persian Delphi 
with a view to medising should it be necessary.  This medism is more overt than 
Argos actions and reflects his pro-Sicilian and anti-Argive sources for their 
respective sections of his history.  It also brings to mind earlier Persian intentions 
towards Sicily, which we can see in Democedes flight there during Persias 
reconnaissance of the area.374  It is likely Gelon was aware of these earlier 
intentions. 
Also similar to the actions of Argos, at VII.169 Herodotus tells of the 
embassy sent to Crete for help against the Persian invasion.  The Cretans sent to 
Delphi for advice on the matter and as a result of this decided to abstain from 
joining the Hellenic League.  Herodotus, unlike his treatment of the Argives, 
does not accuse the Cretans of medising through neutrality, but rather explains 
why the Delphic priestess had advised them against joining the Hellenic League, 
in order to preserve the population.375  How and Wells comment that Busolt 
                                                          
370 Herodotus, VII.165. 
371 Diodorus Siculus, XI.20ff. 
372 Brunt, 1953, p. 160. 
373 Brunt, 1953, ibid. 
374 Cf. p. 22, above. 
375 According to Herodotus, the Pythia had advised against the Cretans participating in the war 
because they were the third people to have populated the island. The first had migrated to Iapygia 
after they had been ship-wrecked there, with no way of returning to Crete. The second, on 
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suspects the oracular response to be a later forgery primarily because of the 
iambic meter,376 which is unusual since oracles were usually recorded in 
hexameter.377  They also note, whether a forgery or not, Herodotus clearly 
believed it was genuine, thus, his lack of censure against the Cretans.378   
The lenient treatment Herodotus gives the Cretans and Sicilians is 
notable in comparison with his treatment of Argos, especially in light of Cretes 
religious excuses which seemingly were believed in contrast to Argos religious 
excuses.   
 
The Procrastination of Corcyra 
Corcyra is also condemned by Herodotus which promised to send ships 
to join the Hellenic League, but procrastinated so the ships did not arrive in time. 
He claims that, like Gelon, the Corcyraeans wanted to wait to see the outcome of 
Salamis so that, if the Persian invasion was successful, the Corcyraeans could 
claim to have deliberately not helped Persias enemies.  The Corcyraean excuse 
for arriving late is that the island had sent sixty triremes which had been 
prevented from sailing round Cape Malea by prevailing north-easters.379  
Diodorus Siculus confirms this Corcyraean claim380 but he does recognise 
Herodotus story, that they were watching how events fell before committing to 
action, ascribing this account to certain historians.381  How and Wells comment 
that the winds mentioned by both Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus lasted for 
about forty days in August and September382 and we see evidence, possibly of 
the same winds, wrecking some of the Persian fleet off Sepia in Herodotus, 
VII.188.  The winds, therefore, were a real problem for the Corcyraeans.  
However, looking at Corcyras traditional attitude to foreign policy, which we 
                                                                                                                                                              
returning from the Trojan War, had been devastated by famine and plague. The Pythia then was 
protecting this third population by advising them against becoming involved in the war. 
376 Busolt, 1967, ii. 658 n.6, states that due to the iambic trimeter the words appear to be a later 
Cretan invention.   
Der delphische Spruch, auf den sich die Kreter beziehen, ist schon des iambishen Trimeter wegen 
verdächtig.  Er scheint in Kreta nachträglich zur Entschuldigung erdichtet worden zu sein. 
377 Parke, 1967, p. 84. 
378 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 203. 
379 Herodotus, VII.168. 
380 Diodorus Siculus, XI.15.1. 
381 Diodorus Siculus, XI.15.1. 
382 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 202. 
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will discuss shortly, the winds may also have been a convenient excuse.  The 
north-easterly winds, which cause sailing difficulties around cape Malea, occur 
annually, even today, and so the Corcyraeans would have been aware of them.383  
Had Corcyra wished to join the Hellenic League, she could have compensated 
for the winds, one might argue, and set out earlier.  
At Thucydides I.32 the Corcyraean envoys note that Corcyra had not 
been an ally of Athens before and, being so far removed from many of the Greek 
states who were major players in the fifth century, it seems likely that Corcyra 
may not have made many, if any, alliances prior to that made with Athens in 433 
B.C. It is not too far-fetched to think that Corcyra genuinely was preparing for 
the necessity of submission to Persia, believing that, if the Hellenic League could 
not curtail the expanding Persian Empire, then Corcyra would similarly be 
unable to prevent being absorbed into it.  How and Wells note that, in addition 
to her lack of allies in Greece, the threat of a Carthaginian invasion and the desire 
not to leave the island undefended for too long may also have prevented Corcyra 
from acting quickly.384   
Thucydides comment that Corcyra had not previously been an ally of 
Athens is noteworthy.  Had Corcyra been a member of the Hellenic League, 
surely she would have deemed this membership as an alliance with Athens, as 
well as the other members.  Thucydides also claims that Corcyra deliberately 
avoided all alliances prior to the one she was seeking with Athens in 433 B.C., 
which is strong evidence against Corcyra joining the Hellenic League in 481 B.C. 
Herodotus does not actually claim that Corcyra joined the Hellenic League, but 
merely promised to send ships to support its navy, a promise which she failed to 
realise. Marincola suggests Corcyra secretly wished for a Persian victory 
whereby they could profit at Corinths expense.385 Believing that the Hellenic 
League would fail and preparing for any possible profit that may be gained from 
this failure, we may conjecture that Corcyra may have promised aid to the 
envoys sent by the Hellenic League with no intention of fulfilling the promise.  In 
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384 How and Wells, 1991, vol. II, p. 202.  See also Bengtson, 1970, p. 52. 
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this way Corcyra would avoid the censure of the other Greek states whilst, at the 
same time, placing itself in a position whereby it could gain favour with Persia, 
should this course of action become necessary.  However, again, we should 
beware of argumentum ex silentio. 
Corcyra was not alone in this type of action: the Mantineans and Eleans 
arrived for the battle of Plataea late and, upon realising that they had missed the 
battle, exiled the leaders of their army.386  How and Wells suggest that this delay 
was likely due to the medism of the Mantinean generals, deliberately delaying 
their arrival.387  Like Corcyra, it appears that at least some individuals, if not 
actual factions, within Mantinea and Elea preferred not to support the Hellenic 
League too much until the issue of the Persian invasion was decided more 
clearly.  In these actions we can see that some Greeks states, whilst still 
ostensibly loyal to the Hellenic League, did not wish to stand against Persia too 
obviously in an attempt to keep in with the Persians should the Hellenic League 
be unsuccessful.  
 
Herodotus accounts of Argos, Crete and Corcyra suggest that these 
states were half-hearted in their support of the Hellenic League and may have 
been preparing for a Persian victory. Certainly we can see that fear of Persian 
might and uncertainty of a Greek victory led to much prevarication of the Greek 
states. We will now turn our attention to the clear and transparent medism of 
Thessaly, Thebes, and Macedon which openly and pro-actively supported 
Xerxes invasion.  
 
Thessaly 
The first mention of Thessalian medising is found at Herodotus, VII. 6, 
when we are told that messengers from the Aleuadae arrived at the court of 
Xerxes supporting Mardonius plan to invade Greece.388  Herodotus describes the 
Aleuadae as the AIA?AnAnA?AfA?AbAm ? ?AnAdAfA?A?Am, Thessalian kings, which may be seen as 
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literally true, albeit slightly misleading.  In effect the Aleuadae, despite 
opposition, were the most influential family in Thessaly at this time.389  With the 
fall of Macedon to Persia, Thessaly was exposed to Persian intentions earlier than 
most other Greek states.  For Xerxes to invade Greece, Thessaly needed to be 
pacified; the Aleuadae knew this and likely wanted to submit on the most 
favourable terms possible.  Westlake proposes that, since Mardonius pacified 
Macedonia in 492 B.C., it is probable that actual negotiations between Persia and 
the Aleuadae began at about that time.390  This does not seem unreasonable, and, 
as we noted, since a date of 485 B.C. is probable for the despatch of the embassy 
to Xerxes, Aleuad submission probably was proffered sometime between 492 
B.C. and 485 B.C.  
Despite the assurances of the Aleuadae, apparently not all of Thessaly 
wanted to medise. Herodotus states plainly that, as Xerxes army approached 
Thessaly, an envoy was sent to the Hellenic League in the Peloponnese 
requesting support against the invading army.  The envoy claimed that without 
support the Thessalians would have no choice but to submit to Persian 
domination.  Herodotus eloquently quotes them, you cannot compel us to fight 
your battle for you; for sheer inability is stronger than compulsion.391  Clearly 
the envoy represented a group of Thessalians who did not want to submit to 
Persia and whose options were limited.  We may speculate that this desire by 
some of the Thessalians not to submit may correspond with opposition to the 
medising Aleuadae.  The Aleuadae were one of the leading families in Thessaly 
but opposing factions from different families will likely have wished to usurp 
their position.  Thus, we can see that there were some Thessalians who wished to 
support the medism of the Aleuadae and others who did not, creating a divided 
state.  
The argument whether or not the whole of Thessaly submitted with the 
Aleuadae prior to Xerxes invasion rests on whether or not the Aleuadae held the 
tageia.  This elected position enabled them to control Thessalian military and 
foreign policy decisions.  N.D. Robertson believes that the Aleuadae did not hold 
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the tageia noting that, of those who held the office, none were from 
distinguished families.  He believes the Aleuadae were simply the leading family 
of Larissa and not of Thessaly as a whole, and suggests that when Herodotus 
calls them kings of Thessaly he actually means kings from Thessaly or 
Thessalian kings acknowledging their social standing within their own 
geographical domain.392  At VII.130 Herodotus states that Xerxes incorrectly 
believed the Aleuadae had sworn fealty to Persia on behalf of the whole of 
Thessaly.393  Herodotus implies that this was a misunderstanding by Xerxes and 
from this we can suggest that, in fact, the Aleuadae did not represent the whole 
of Thessaly.  Westlakes suggestion that the Aleuadae held the tageia and that 
Aleuad opposition was a minority, therefore, seems unlikely in light of 
Herodotus VII. 130.394  Whether this misunderstanding by Xerxes was a 
deliberate action by the Aleuadae or not is unclear.  Keaveney suggests that, 
although coming to some sort of arrangement with Xerxes before the invasion, 
the Thessalians developed cold feet when Xerxes actually began his invasion.  
He believes that Thessaly sent for help when it seemed resistance might work 
but, as soon as it became clear that this was no longer an option, Thessaly 
committed to its medism.395  Whatever the truth of the matter, we can see that in 
the wake of the Persian invasion Thessaly, like Eretria in 490 B.C., was divided.396  
Such divisions nearly always favoured the Persian invasion as the Greek allies, 
when faced with them, eventually abandoned the state to the Persians. 
In answer to the Thessalian plea, a land force of the Hellenic League was 
sent to the pass of Tempe, which led from Macedon into Thessaly, between 
mounts Olympus and Ossa.  Diodorus Siculus states that the Hellenic League 
wanted to head off the invading Persian army at Tempe as soon as they 
realised its size.  Plutarch stating that, since Themistocles plan to meet the 
Barbarians at sea as far away as possible was rejected, he accompanied the army 
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to Tempe, implying that the defence of Tempe was the next best option.397 
However, upon the advice of Alexander of Macedon, the Hellenic army 
withdrew from Thessaly after only a few days.398  Herodotus claims that the 
message from Alexander reported the numbers of the Persian army which 
intimidated the allied force.  They also learned of a second pass into Thessaly 
and both of these new pieces of information encouraged them to withdraw. 
Robertson disputes the notion that, upon arriving at Tempe, the Hellenic 
Leagues army was not acquainted with the territory and asserts that this would 
mean either that there were no Thessalians within the high command in this 
expedition, or that the high command had no means to obtain intelligence of this 
area of Thessaly.  Both situations are unlikely since the Hellenic Leagues army 
was present at the request of Thessaly.   
Robertson is likely correct in suggesting that the allied army would have 
been aware of the other passes leading from Macedon to Thessaly.399  Westlake 
suggests that the Hellenic Leagues army probably believed that these passes 
would have been guarded by Thessalian levies.400  Robertson notes that the 
position at Tempe was largely commanded from southern Thessaly.  Thus, we 
may conjecture that the Aleuad supporters were in the northern, mountainous 
region of Thessaly, and we must allow, therefore, that the Thessalians charged 
with, or presumed to be, guarding the other passes into Thessaly may have had 
divided, pro-Aleuad loyalties.  That the Aleuadae as the leading family of Larissa 
had supporters back in Thessaly whilst Thorax was with the Persian army seems 
highly likely.401  Hignett suggests that the arrival of the army of the Hellenic 
League so prematurely at Tempe is evidence that the Hellenic League was trying 
to convince those Aleuad supporters to join them.402 
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The knowledge of the size of the Persian army given by Alexander of 
Macedon also should not have affected the Greek army overly much.  Burn notes 
that it would have been in the interests of Macedon to promote the pro-Persian 
propaganda and possibly exaggerate the numbers he reported in an attempt to 
persuade the Greeks of the futility of their resistance.403  Alexander would not 
have wanted any unnecessary delay on the Persian armys passage through 
Macedon considering the cost to the hosting nation when supporting the vast 
force.  However, the Greek spies sent to reconnoitre the Persian army mentioned 
by Herodotus, VII.146, would also have been able to give a rough size of the 
Persian army long before the Greeks decided to invest Tempe.  We can estimate 
that the size of the army sent to Tempe by the Greeks, combined with the men 
supplied by Thessaly itself, numbered roughly 10,000 hoplites and Robertson 
conjectures there would have been an equal number of light armed troops, which 
would accompany the hoplites, and 6,000 cavalry from Thessaly.404  This would 
have been a large enough force to delay Xerxes army for a considerable amount 
of time if not indefinitely, especially if we consider the pass at Tempe to be as 
easily defensible as Thermopylae.405  We can suggest that the Greeks believed 
they had sent a strong enough force to combat the size of the Persian invasion as 
provided by their own intelligence.  Furthermore, the report on the numbers of 
the Persian army should, in fact, have increased the Greek conviction to halt its 
advance into Greece at Thessaly rather than further south in Greece.406  
Therefore, we should consider that Alexander likely used additional arguments 
to persuade the Greeks not to make a stand at Tempe.  
Evidence for these additional arguments may be found in Damastes of 
Sigeum407 who claims that Alexander told the Greeks of treachery within 
Thessaly.  Despite the size of the Hellenic Leagues army, without concrete 
support from the Thessalians, the allied armys lines of supply and retreat would 
have been exposed to attack.  In short, it would be at risk of what actually 
happened at Thermopylae.  By confirming to the Hellenic League the idea that 
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factions within Thessaly were about to medise, Alexander seems to have 
persuaded the Greek army to abandon Thessaly.  That the army left so quickly 
can be taken as evidence that the Hellenic League was unable to convince the 
Aleuadae and their supporters to join them.  Herodotus does not state explicitly 
that the reason for the withdrawal from Tempe was due to the suspicions of the 
medism of Thessaly.  He does not even comment on this when he says that the 
Thessalians worked whole heartedly in the Persian interest. However, the 
combination of the size of the Persian army, the knowledge of the other passes, 
and the probability of Thessalian medism present themselves convincingly 
enough to us. 408 It seems that even the suspicion of medism was enough to 
influence the Hellenic Leagues army and from this we can see that Persian 
influence, albeit indirect, had permeated as far as Thessaly ahead of the actual 
invasion. 
During the Persian invasion we find Thessaly attempting to exploit its 
relationship with Persia to the detriment of its enemies.  After the battle of 
Thermopylae the Thessalians attempted to blackmail their traditional enemy 
Phocis, claiming to have sufficient influence with Xerxes, by this time, that they 
could divert the Persian army from Phocian land for the sum of fifty talents. 409  
In contrast, Herodotus states that, whilst the Persian army was advancing 
through Dryopis, the inhabitants were not injured because they were friendly 
and also because the Thessalians wished them to be spared.410  We may 
suggest that the blackmail of Phocis was a bluff or exaggeration on the part of 
Thessaly in an opportunistic attempt to injure their long-standing neighbour and 
enemy.  Herodotus claims that, at the instigation of the Thessalians, the Persian 
army devastated all of Phocis, which included the burning and plundering of the 
temple of Apollo at Abae and excessive brutality against the Phocians.  However, 
it is likely that Phocis would have been punished by Xerxes for not submitting, 
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regardless of the sentiments of Thessaly.  At best we can concede that Thessaly, 
knowing that Phocis would not submit, may have influenced the degree to 
which the state was punished.411  We can see similarities in the treatments of both 
Phocis and Athens. When Xerxes sacked that city the Acropolis was fired and the 
remaining inhabitants were slaughtered.  The primary difference is that most of 
the population had been saved when they abandoned the city, an option which 
Phocis did not have.  We may even suggest that the treatment of Phocis served as 
a warning to the Greek cities of the kind of treatment they could expect, if they 
did not submit readily. This, in turn may have led to the submission of cities 
such as Dryopis and it would not have been in Persias interests to treat badly 
submissive states.  
After Xerxes withdrawal from Greece, Thessaly did not defect from her 
Persian alliance.412  We are informed that Thorax of Larissa escorted Xerxes to the 
Hellespont before returning with Mardonius and encouraged him in his efforts.  
How and Wells comment on Herodotus emphasis on the apparent free-will of 
the Aleuadae concerning Persian affairs, but note that this is inconsistent with 
Herodotus VIII.126 and VIII. 131.413  After Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont, we 
are informed that Mardonius wintered both his army and the remainder of the 
fleet in Thessaly.414  Thus, had Thessaly wished to renounce ties with Persia, it 
would have been unable.  We noted earlier the cost of hosting the Persian army415 
and even the reduced Persian forces would have depleted the resources of 
Thessaly immensely.  We may suggest, somewhat cynically, that the 
encouragement by the Aleuadae may simply have been an attempt to remove the 
Persian army and fleet from Thessaly before the state became impoverished.   
Looking at the actions of Thessaly during the Persian invasion we can 
suggest that the Aleuadae had probably realised, along with the rest of Greece, 
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that a Persian invasion was being planned and so sent an embassy to Xerxes in 
order to ensure Thessaly not only survived but that they themselves profited 
from it.  We noted above that it is unlikely that they held the tageia and so it is 
possible that the Aleuadae wished either to gain this elected position or to create 
a more permanent one, both with Persian backing.  That there was opposition to 
the Aleuadaes policy is apparent from the situation at Tempe.  The Thessalian 
cavalry which Herodotus notes joined the Hellenic League at Tempe would 
have amounted to Thessalian gentlemen and their retainers, in essence 
members of those leading families in Thessaly who opposed the Aleuadae.416  
Certainly from the time of the withdrawal of the Hellenic Leagues army from 
Tempe, we find that Thessaly medised fully and attempted to turn the situation 
to its advantage as the opportunity arose, most notably against Phocis.  
Interestingly the enmity between Thessaly and Phocis was enough that it was 




The other prominent state which willingly and openly medised during 
Xerxes invasion was Thebes.  The first we hear about suspicions of Theban 
medism is when Leonidas compelled the city to contribute men to the stand at 
Thermopylae.  Herodotus states plainly that, although men were sent with 
Leonidas, Theban sympathy was nevertheless with the enemy.418  How and 
Wells note that, whereas the other city states were sent messages requesting men 
to join Leonidas army, Leonidas personally went to Thebes and brought the 
Thebans back with him.419  Leonidas presence would carry a certain amount of a 
threat compelling Thebes to declare its loyalties, one way or the other.420  The 
                                                          
416 Burn, 1984, p. 342. 
417 Herodotus, VIII.30. 
418 Herodotus, VII.205. 
419 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 223. 
420 Herodotus, VII.205. Also see Keaveney, 1996, p. 38-48. 
105 
 
situation can be compared to the taking of political hostages by one state to 
ensure the loyalty of another.421  
Plutarch, in his attack on Herodotus, claims that, not only did Thebes 
send men with Leonidas to Thermopylae, but Thebes had also sent a force to 
Tempe.422  Buck, following Hignett, believes that accounts of Thebans at Tempe 
come from Aristophanes of Boeotia, which Hignett believes to be a tainted source 
and appears to contradict circumstantial evidence in Herodotus, who describes 
how the allied Greeks sailed to Halos around Boeotia.423  However, Hignett does 
not take in to account the fact that Plutarch, as a Boeotian, may have drawn his 
information from other, more trustworthy sources.  Robertson suggests that the 
allied Greeks sailed around Boeotia due to speed and convenience, rather than to 
avoid Thebes.424  It is worth remembering that Herodotus does not say that the 
allied Greeks sailed around Boeotia in order to avoid Thebes and the pro-Persian 
Boeotians.  Had this been the case, it is reasonable to assume Herodotus would 
have mentioned something of it.  Also any kind of attempted resistance in 
Thessaly, had both Thebes and the Boeotians medised, would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible.  We may conjecture that the allied Greeks may have 
sailed to Halos in an attempt to save time and energy, possibly to begin defence 
fortifications, and to consolidate a base against the invasion with the view that 
further reinforcements would arrive later over land.  Although it would be 
logical to collect Theban men en route to Tempe had the army marched there, this 
does not mean that the Thebans could not march directly to Tempe on their own, 
since it would have been an easier distance for them than the allied Greeks.  I 
suggest that Thebes was undecided at this time and that their allegiance was 
dependent upon the position of Thessaly.  It was also dependant on the attitudes 
of the rest of Greece.  Knowing this, Buck believes, the allies did not want to 
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precipitate matters and, at this time, did not want to force Thebes hand.425  
N.H. Demand notes that, since Thebes medised after Thermopylae, it was also in 
their interests for a stand to be made at Tempe.426  She also suggests that, since 
Plutarch is able to name the commander of the Theban force at Tempe, it is likely 
a force was sent.427 
Herodotus, listing those states, which gave earth and water to Xerxes 
prior to Thermopylae, includes Thebes and Boeotia.428  Buck suggests that, since 
there were Thebans and Thespians in the final stand at Thermopylae, we may 
suggest that the Boeotian League sent earth and water to Persia sometime 
between Tempe and Thermopylae as an insurance policy to ensure the 
survival of Thebes and the other Boeotian cities.429  Once they were able to detach 
themselves from the Spartan and Thespian army, we find the Thebans fell back 
on this insurance policy, in which they were supported by the Thessalians.430  
Keaveney argues, contrary to Buck, that those Thebans who fought at 
Thermopylae, and by extension possibly also Tempe, were likely pro-Greek 
supporters, of whom the rest of Thebes was gladly rid.431  
Theban loyalty is also questioned by Herodotus when Leonidas 
dismissed all men from Thermopylae, apart from the honour-bound Spartans 
and the Thebans, who he kept with him as hostages.432  This highlights that there 
are some problems with Herodotus account of the Thebans at Thermopylae.  
The first, presented by Plutarch,433 is that keeping hostages, whilst trying to 
defend the entry to Greece, would not only be a foolish action for Leonidas, but, 
as a consequence, would also be unlikely.  Plutarch also asserts that, since those 
Thebans who were at Thermopylae were branded, along with Leonidas and his 
three hundred Spartans, this should be taken as a sign of Theban fidelity to the 
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Hellenic League.  Furthermore, if we are to believe that those Thebans who went 
with Leonidas went willingly holding them as hostages would be an 
unnecessary action.434  How and Wells suggest that Herodotus was merely a 
victim of malignant Athenian gossip and that, as suggested by Diodorus 
Siculus,435 those Thebans who fought at Thermopylae were likely political 
enemies of the current political party in Thebes.  They recognised that, if the 
Greeks failed at Thermopylae, Boeotian loyalists within Thebes would be 
doomed.436  Therefore, those Thebans at Thermopylae were likely to fight 
willingly with the Spartans.  Herodotus states that, at the end, the Thebans 
deserted to Xerxes,437 which Keaveney suggests was only when the situation had 
obviously become untenable.438  Apart from sending earth and water to Xerxes, 
Thebes and the Boeotian League did not act in an openly pro-Persian manner 
until the fall of the allied Greeks at Thermopylae.   
 The defection of the Thebans at Thermopylae after the fall of the 
Spartans does not resolve the question of Theban loyalty.  On the one hand, we 
may speculate that, had those Thebans at Thermopylae been there under 
compulsion, there would be no way for them to defect to the Persian army until 
the Spartans were defeated, at which point, as Herodotus states, they were able 
to detach themselves.  On the other hand, had the Thebans been loyal to the 
Hellenic Leagues army, the realisation that the force at Thermopylae would be 
defeated may have led them to medise for purely practical purposes.  Had the 
Thebans openly declared that they were pro-Persian supporters prior to 
Thermopylae, as the Aleuadae did, they would not have been asked for men.  
Furthermore, if this had been the case, it is unlikely that serious action would 
have been taken against them by the Hellenic League at this time.  By the time 
the Hellenic League had managed to mount serious resistance to the Persian 
invasion at Thermopylae, Thebes was under the protection of Xerxes and any 
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serious retribution by the allied Greeks was not on the cards.  That Thebes did 
not openly declare their pro-Persian support until after Thermopylae suggests 
indecision within the city, which was resolved by the outcome of 
Thermopylae.439  Once it had defeated the Greeks at Thermopylae, the Persian 
army continued into Boeotia and any towns which did not submit were sacked 
by the invading army.  The Theban force likely realised as soon as the situation 
seemed hopeless that, if they did not surrender, at the very least they themselves 
would lose their lives, at worst Thebes would likely be sacked.  The Thebans will 
have noted what happened to Phocis prior to Thermopylae, as we mentioned 
above, which did not submit to Xerxes and suffered the plundering of the temple 
of Apollo at Abae and excessive brutality towards it people.440  Herodotus 
mentions that upon reaching Boeotia the Persian army found all Boeotian cities 
protected by Alexander of Macedons men, stationed within the cities, who 
indicated to the Persians that the Boeotians were friendly to the invading 
army.441   
We can see that once Thebes had submitted to Persia, she committed 
herself fully.  When Mardonius marched through Boeotia after Xerxes 
withdrawal from Greece, the Thebans suggested he bribe the leaders of the 
Hellenic League to medise.442  Further evidence for friendly relations between the 
Persians and Thebans is found at the banquet of Attaginus, who hosted high 
ranking Persians and Thebans on the eve of the battle of Plataea.443  When 
Mardonius sent Mys, the Carian, to consult various different oracles, whilst he 
was wintering in Thessaly, he sent three Thebans with him, presumably to help 
Mys gain access to the relevant sanctuaries and to act as translators where 
necessary.444  At the battle of Plataea, Herodotus distinguishes the Thebans, 
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required to acquiesce and conform to the rest of the pro-Persian Thebans. 
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labelling them Persias firm friends445 and attributing the cavalry attacks on the 
Greek forces to Thebes. During the rout of the Persian army, Herodotus notes 
that, whilst the other Greek forces which fought for the Persians retreated in 
disorder, the Thebans fought so hard that three hundred of their bravest and 
best men were killed.446  It seems apparent that, once the Thebans and Boeotians 
had committed to the Persian cause, they realised that they would need to 
commit completely and they also realised that the retaliation from the allied 
Greeks, should the Persian invasion fail, would likely be extreme.  It is also 
worth noting that at Plataea the Thebans were in effect fighting on their own 
territory and for their own survival.447  Thus, although Herodotus comments on 
how bravely and fiercely the Thebans fought at the battle, we may note that this 
was, in reality, to defend their own land.  
After Plataea the Hellenic League besieged Thebes for the role it played 
in the Persian invasion.448  The League demanded that A?ЁAoЗAh AoAjA?Am gAbA?A?AnA?AhAoA?Am 
be handed over, especially Timagenides and Attaginus.  Initially we are told that 
the state refused and it was not until the twentieth day of the siege that 
Timagenides persuaded the citizens of Thebes to hand him and Attaginus over 
to Pausanias in order that Boeotia should not suffer any longer.449  That 
Timagenides was compelled to persuade the Boeotians to hand him over 
indicates that it was not only a few oligarchical leaders who were responsible for 
the medism of Thebes.450  In Timagenides speech he states that it was with 
public approval that the Thebans joined the Persians.  He also states that, if the 
Hellenic League simply wished to hold him and Attaginus as a pretext for 
financial gain, then the ransom money could be taken from public funds, further 
proof that Timagenides and Attaginus actions were publically approved.451 
The demand for the surrender of the Theban medisers suggests that the 
Hellenic League wished to end the siege quickly and were willing to hold only 
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the leaders responsible.452  Although Timagenides persuaded the Boeotians to 
hand him and Attaginus over to the League, Attaginus escaped at the earliest 
opportunity.  Other pro-Persian Thebans, who were surrendered, were handed 
over to the allies at the Isthmus of Corinth and were executed on the orders of 
Pausanias.453  Hignett suggest that this seems to have been a favourite action of 
Thebes, to shift responsibility for inconvenient acts from the citizens in general 
to their leaders and cites Xenophon, Hellenica, III.V.8 as an example.454  
However, punishing a few leading individuals who were avid pro-Persian 
sympathisers ended the siege quickly, allowing the Hellenic League to disband 
its forces sooner, and it also spared the punishment in the entirety of such a 
prominent city in Greece.  This supports McMullins theory that, in the spirit of 
reconciliation, individuals rather than cities, which were too numerous, were 
condemned for their medism.455 
We can see from Herodotus account two quite different Theban policies 
during the Persian invasion. The first, whereby the state helped the Hellenic 
League by sending men to join those at Thermopylae, and, if we are to believe 
Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, possibly also to Tempe.  The second, after 
Thermopylae, whereby the Thebans openly supported the Persian army from the 
time they were protected by Alexander of Macedon.  The besieging of Thebes 
was a considered action by the Hellenic League and so we must acknowledge 
that the motivations for besieging the city given by Herodotus to be true, i.e. 
punishment for medising.  Looking at the two conflicting behaviours of Thebes 
we may conjecture that the dramatic U-turn in Theban foreign policy was 
probably motivated by self-interest and a desire to survive.  Plutarch is correct in 
noting that it would have been foolish for Leonidas to attempt to hold hostages 
at Thermopylae and, so, we must conjecture that these men, at least, were loyal 
                                                          
452 Keaveney, 2011, p. 114, notes the inefficiency of Greek siege craft until Dionysius I of Syracuse in 
the fourth century. 
453 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 327, suggest that when Herodotus states that the men were 
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destruction of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War on one man in order to escape blame, 
whilst requesting that Athens send aid to them against the Spartans. 
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to the Hellenic League at this time and medised after the battle from a desire for 
self-preservation.  
If we are to believe Diodorus Siculus, the men sent to Thermopylae and 
to Tempe were probably willing volunteers.  Diodorus Siculus claim that they 
belonged to the opposition party in Thebes is likely when we consider 
Timagenides later speech claiming that Thebes medised with public approval.  
Those who wished to support the allied Greeks at both Tempe and Thermopylae 
may have been willingly dispatched by the state to do this.456  The implication 
from Herodotus is that the Thebans went to Thermopylae voluntarily and it is 
not until Leonidas dismissed the other Greeks that Herodotus states explicitly 
that the Thebans were being held against their will.  We may conjecture that the 
Theban desire to leave Thermopylae, when the other Greek forces were 
dismissed, may have been motivated as much from the desire not to be 
slaughtered as the desire to return to Thebes in order to join the rest of the state 
in medising.  We can easily conjecture that, knowing the size of the Persian army 
and wanting to be rid of potential sources of trouble within the city, the Thebans 
sent anti-Persian sympathisers to Thermopylae knowing the likelihood of their 
return.  Thus, Thebes would both remove political opposition and also reassure 
the Hellenic League that it was not medising for a long enough period of time, 
until Alexander of Macedon and then the Persian army arrived in Boeotia.  When 
considering the above evidence we may surmise that there were at least two 
factions within Thebes at this time: pro-Persian and anti-Persian.  In this Thebes 
was not unique, we have already discussed Thessaly above but also in the wake 
of Datis invasion Eretria suffered the same situation.  The fall of the anti-Persian 
faction at Thermopylae left the pro-Persian faction in control. 
Herodotus does not explicitly state why Thebes medised, but we may 
conjecture the most obvious motive is that Thebes believed that resistance by the 
Hellenic League was futile, or, perhaps, unreliable given their withdrawal from 
Tempe.  Thermopylae was intended to slow down the invasion, but not to stop 
it; at Tempe the force sent by the allied Greeks to stop Xerxes army had 
withdrawn.  With this borne in mind, the Thebans, and the rest of the Boeotians, 
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probably recognised the Greek hesitation to defend Boeotia from the invading 
Persian army and so, with minimal help sent from the rest of Greece, they 
submitted to ensure they were not destroyed.  We may also suggest, somewhat 
cynically, that had Sparta and Athens been destroyed by Persia, Thebes probably 
hoped to make the best of the situation and to expand its own sphere of influence 




We noted above that as a consequence of Megabazus campaign in 
Thrace, Macedon became a vassal state of the Persian Empire.458  During Xerxes 
invasion it was used as a staging post and supply depot for the Persian Army.459  
Like Hippias and Demaratus, we find examples of Xerxes and, later Mardonius, 
using Alexander of Macedon to further Persian interests.  The first instance we 
find of this is when Alexander persuaded the Greek forces at Tempe to withdraw 
from the pass, allowing the Persian army through.  We have already discussed 
the likely reasons the Greeks were persuaded, however, it is worth noting here 
Xerxes decision to use Alexander here.460  
Similarly, Mardonius employed Alexander, after Xerxes withdrawal 
from Greece, to persuade the Athenians to medise. 461  It is worth noting that 
Mardonius would not have sent Alexander, if he had thought there was no 
possibility of him succeeding.  Likewise, the Spartans would not have sent their 
own embassy in response to this if they did not think the same.  Both of these 
opinions were likely based on Alexanders success at Tempe.  The terms offered 
by Xerxes were that, if the Athenians joined the Persians, they would be forgiven 
all the injuries they had committed against Persia, Mardonius would restore 
Athenian territory and give them any extra land they wished to govern 
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459 Herodotus, VII. 127-132. 
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autonomously, and, also, Mardonius would rebuild the destroyed Athenian 
temples.  The mention by Xerxes that he would forgive all the injuries committed 
by Athens against Persia seems to offer even more support to Raubitscheks 
suggestion that before the Ionian revolt the Athenians were considered subjects 
of Persia.462  It is also worth considering that this reward is in keeping with 
Persias general policy of rewarding good subjects and punishing bad ones. Had 
the Athenians submitted and been rewarded, other Greek states would have 
been more likely to submit to Persian advances.463  Diodorus Siculus records the 
Athenian response the Persians had neither good enough land nor sufficient 
gold to induce the Athenians to desert their fellow Hellenes.464  And so, 
Alexander returned to Mardonius, having failed in his mission.  Despite the 
Athenian rejection of Xerxes terms, it is worth noting that Alexanders mission 
wasnt a complete failure.  Herodotus states that the Athenians rebuked the 
Spartans for not trusting them but then when they were forced to abandon Attica 
a second time they sent an embassy to Sparta to remind them that without 
Spartan support the Athenians would make the best terms they could with 
Mardonius.465  Thus, despite Herodotus assertions at VIII. 144, we find that 
Athenian resolve depended largely on Spartan support against Persia. 
Turning our attention back to Alexander we can see that he was 
employed by Xerxes and Mardonius due to his persuasive abilities and also due 
to his pre-existing good relationship with Athens.  Alexander claimed to have 
been of ancient Greek descent himself466 and Herodotus states that he was 
specifically chosen as a Persian envoy to Athens because ... Alexanders 
relationship with Athens was an official relationship, and was backed by 
deeds.467  How and Wells mention that Alexanders title proxenos kai euergetes 
was honorific and they suggest that the euergetes mentioned may refer to 
Alexanders involvement in the withdrawal of Greek forces from Tempe.468  If 
                                                          
462 Herodotus, V.73. Raubitschek, 1991, p. 4, cf. pp. 32-34 above. 
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464 Diodorus Siculus, XI.28. 
465 Herodotus, IX. 6. 
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this is the case we may suggest this is illustrative of Alexanders diplomatic 
charisma.469  However, I believe Badians argument that his title referred to his 
role in brokering the Athenian alliance with Persia of 507 B.C. is more 
persuasive.470  Although this earlier alliance was politically embarrassing, it 
seems to me more likely that his title would refers to this earlier incident than the 
more recent one, where he enabled Xerxes army to enter Greece by persuading 
the Greeks to abandon Tempe; even if he did persuade them that their position 
was untenable due to medising factions within Thessaly. 
We find Alexander trying to maintain his good relationship with Athens 
when he sent a warning to the Athenians on the eve of the battle of Plataea that 
Mardonius intended to attack the next day, despite bad omens.471  How and 
Wells note there is no reason to doubt Alexanders philhellenism and that there 
probably were communications between the Athenians and the Macedonians. 
However, they also note that this story has some suspicious elements, such as 
Alexanders ability to avoid the Persian sentinels.472  Thus, this information may 
also be from the same pro-Macedonian sources who claimed that Alexander 
murdered the Persian envoys.473  I would suggest, contra How and Wells, that 
Alexander became more philhellenic when he realised that the Persian invasion 
had failed and I believe that the accounts of Macedonian philhellenism are 
apologia from after the invasion. 
We can see that during the expansion of the Persian Empire Macedon 
attempted to take advantage of whatever situation was presented to her.  It 
seems likely that Amyntas submitted early to Darius to gain the most favourable 
terms possible.474  Later, we find Alexander employed by Xerxes to help pacify 
the Greek states prior to the Persian armys need to march through them.  He 
was also employed to persuade the resisting states to medise.  It may be argued 
that Macedon had little choice but to submit to Persian dominance.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
The abundance of source material available for this period had made 
possible a detailed analysis of Persian attempts to control most of the prominent 
states of Greece.  Looking at the actions of the Greeks in the wake of and during 
Xerxes invasion we immediately notice two things.  Firstly it is clear that, despite 
the previous Athenian victory at Marathon, few states believed in resistance to 
the invasion and those which did were mostly quite southerly; therefore, they 
were directly impacted only later in the invasion. Thus, we can see quite a strong 
divide between those states in the north of Greece and those in the south. 
Secondly, those states which did medise seem to have done so when, 
arguably, they lacked other options.  Indeed, the Thessalian claim that sheer 
inability475 to resist the Persian advance without help from the Hellenic League 
was true.  A debatable exception to this is Macedon, which medised in the late 6th 
century prior to Xerxes invasion when Darius was expanding the Persian 
Empire via Thrace.  It could be argued that the states which worked pro-actively 
for Persia, notably the Thebans, Thessalians, and Macedonians first did this 
when the Persian army was on their doorstep.  We can see within all of them 
there was factionalism.  Although the Aleuadae of Thessaly submitted to Persia 
prior to the invasion, it should be noted that they only represented Larissa, 
regardless of what they told Xerxes.  Also, prior to their medism we find 
evidence of attempted resistance from both Thessaly and Thebes at Tempe and 
Thermopylae. Thus, we should note the presence of factions, both medising and 
pro-resistance, of varying degrees of power and influence and we can suggest 
that this situation was probably reflected in most of the Greek states north of the 
Isthmus.  We can see from the actions of Thessaly and Thebes that, once the 
Persian army had invaded a Greek state, it was better for that state to medise and 
to support the Persian army wholly, rather than to resist the army and be sacked.  
Even with the later retaliation of the Greeks after the Persian invasion, those 
states which medised seem to have fared better than those which did not.  
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With the medising states and those which resisted Xerxes invasion is a 
third group of Greek states; those which abstained from action to await the 
outcome.  Although Herodotus names only a few, which were mostly islands 
with the notable and important exception of Argos and also Sicily, Bauslaugh 
suggests that most of the Arcadian cities in the north-west Peloponnese also 
remained neutral as we hear very little about them.476  However, we do find 
Arcadians helping to build the wall across the Isthmus and also they were 
present at Plataea so we must tread carefully with this suggestion.477  Despite 
Herodotus assertions, the situation at Argos was ambiguous at best, probably 
deliberately so.  
Thus, we see three types of reactions from the Greeks states in the wake 
of and during Xerxes invasion: submission, resistance and neutrality, and we 
can see the Persian policy of dividing its enemies and then conquering them 
piecemeal was largely successful when applied to the Greeks.  This policy 
resulted in only a few Greek states willing to pro-actively resist the Persian army 
by the time it invaded.  Bauslaugh argues that even those states which remained 
neutral would have been considered a successful result of this policy as it is 
likely they would have eventually submitted without any extra effort for the 
Persian army, and, we may add, they would have brought Sicily into the range of 
Persian conquest.478 
T. Kelly discusses the Persian use of psychological warfare during Xerxes 
invasion of Greece and we may concede that the minimal resistance of the 
Greeks prior to Thermopylae and the number of states which medised or seem to 
have remained neutral are evidence of this.479 The Persian victory at 
Thermopylae reinforced the Persian propaganda of the futility of resistance and 
this idea is supported by the Peloponnesian abandonment of Attica to 
concentrate on building a wall across the Isthmus to protect themselves from the 
invading Persians. The need for Themistocles to threaten Eurybiades with 
Athenian desertion prior to Salamis further indicates how demoralised the 
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Peloponnesians were after Thermopylae.480  Despite the Persian defeat at Salamis 
and Xerxes return to Sardis, the presence of Mardonius in central Greece will 
have maintained Persian pressure on the Greeks.481  Both Briant and Cawkwell 
dispute Herodotus account that Xerxes fled to Sardis; Cawkwell noting the 
Persian tradition that their kings generally only campaigned for one season and 
then left their generals to mop up482, and Briant noting that Xerxes was in 
constant communication with Mardonius and oversaw the campaign from 
Sardis.483  After Salamis Xerxes still attempted to divide the Greeks, ordering 
Mardonius to offer favourable terms to Athens.484  These terms were rejected by 
Athens but the presence of the Spartan delegation suggests that Sparta feared the 
terms would be accepted and the later attempt at oligarchic revolution prior to 
Plataea suggests the Spartans may have been right to worry.  
We can see that throughout Xerxes invasion the Persians were able to 
control their relationship with the Greeks, most notably by applying their 
technique of dividing their enemies forces.  This they seem to have done mostly 
by propaganda and exploiting division, encouraging the states to medise by 
impressing on them the size of the Persian army and the futility of resistance.  
This worked most effectively on the northern and central Greek states.  Fear of 
the Persian army almost led to divisions amongst the states of the Hellenic 
League, which can be seen as lasting even until the battle at Plataea when the 
Hellenic League forces retreated in disorder.485  It was only with the death of 
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Chapter 4: The Pentecontaetia and the Peace of Callias 
 
In the period between the expulsion of the Persians from Greece and the 
outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in 432 B.C., known as the Pentecontaetia, we 
learn from Herodotus and Thucydides of the ongoing conflict between Greece 
and Persia.  Despite expelling the Persians from mainland Greece, we find that 
the Greek fear of further invasions led to the formation of the Delian League and 
also led to accusations of medism, most notably against Pausanias and 
Themistocles.486  Both of these are indications that the Greeks believed that 
offensive action would deter further Persian invasions. 
 
Mycale and the actions of the Hellenic League 
  After the Greek victory at Plataea and the retreat of the Persian army, the 
Hellenic League was invited to help the Ionian Greek cities rebel from Persian 
control, once again.  This resulted in the Greek victory at Mycale, although it is 
argued by Balcer that this victory was only ever intended to neutralise the 
Persian navy, which had been beached there, and wasnt intended to cause an 
Ionian wide rebellion as Herodotus suggests it did.487  Cawkwell notes that 
although there is limited evidence of Persian resistance to Greek incursions after 
Mycale, there is also limited evidence for Greek campaigns.488  The evidence we 
do have indicates that in the immediate years after Mycale the Hellenic League 
captured Sestos, Cyprus and Byzantium.489  However, the Persian fortress at 
Doriskos proves that Persia still controlled this region of Thrace.490  After the 
campaigns against Cyprus and Byzantium, and with the Spartan withdrawal 
from active campaigning as a result of accusations against Pausanias, the Delian 
League was founded on the premise of offensive action against Persia.491  
Under the leadership of Athens, Delian League actions resulted in 
expeditions against Rhodes and Cyprus, and land and sea victories at 
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Eurymedon and in the early 460s.492  It is in the context of this active 
campaigning against Persia that the charges of medism against Pausanias and 
Themistocles were brought. 
 
The medism of Pausanias 
There are few references to Pausanias medism in Herodotus, which is 
unsurprising since most of Herodotus history concerns Pausanias generalship 
during the Persian invasion.493  Thucydides, however, gives a fuller account in 
his Pentecontaetia in Book I, a condensed version of which can be found in 
Diodorus Siculus494 which, although omitting much of Thucydides narrative, 
agrees with him on the basic facts.  Diodorus Siculus version of events simply 
says that Pausanias was put to death by Sparta because of A?AfA?AjAhA?AiA?A?Ah AeA? 
A?AlAjA?AjAnA?A?Ah (greed (of power) and treason).495   
 
In brief, Thucydides states that when Pausanias was commander of the 
Hellenic Leagues fleet after the Persian invasion, the Greek allies complained 
about his leadership and requested that Athens take it on instead.  Pausanias was 
also accused of collaborating with Persia and was recalled to Sparta for an 
inquiry where he was acquitted.496  Despite Sparta replacing Pausanias with 
Dorkis, the allied Greeks refused to follow Spartan leadership and no attempt 
was made to enforce it; Dorkis was recalled, but Pausanias went on to Byzantium 
as a private citizen.497   
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Thucydides states that Pausanias ostensible reason for being in the 
Hellespont was to help in the war against Persia, but that, in fact, he resumed his 
intrigues with Xerxes.  He claims that, during the Greek capture of Byzantium, 
Pausanias had returned to Xerxes some of his friends and relatives who had been 
captured, in order to gain favour with him.498  Thucydides further claims that 
Pausanias had contacted Xerxes requesting to marry his daughter and to bring 
Greece into the Persian Empire, with himself as its dynast.  Xerxes replied 
favourably to Pausanias, who by this time was in Byzantium in a private 
capacity and who then began to act like a tyrant.  Pausanias was driven out of 
Byzantium by the Athenians and went to Colonae in the Troad.  From there he 
was recalled to Sparta for the second time and was betrayed to the ephors by a 
trusted slave. Thucydides narrates how the ephors, wishing to hear Pausanias 
condemn himself, staged a scene where Pausanias was confronted by the slave, 
whilst the ephors secretly listened to the confession.  Rather than arresting 
Pausanias instantly, they attempted to arrest him at a later date, but Pausanias 
took refuge in the temple of the goddess of the Brazen House inside which he 
was trapped and starved to death.499    
 
The primary points of interest to this research are the reasons for the 
accusations of medism against Pausanias and the evidence supporting these 
accusations.  
When looking at the story given by Thucydides, we notice some 
anomalies.  He states that complaints had been made concerning Pausanias 
arrogant nature and that instead of acting as commander-in-chief, he 
appeared to be trying to set himself up as a dictator.  However, although 
Pausanias was condemned for individual acts of injustice, he was acquitted on 
all the main counts.  We should remember that Herodotus, who was closer to the 
facts than Thucydides, states that Pausanias was recalled on the pretext of 
highhandedness500 but mentions nothing about his supposed medism.  Thus, it 
                                                          
498 Thucydides, I.128. 
499 Thucydides, I.34.3, states he was removed from the temple immediately before expiring in order 
to avoid polluting the temple. Diodorus Siculus, XI.44.6, claims that he died whilst still within the 
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appears the main accusation was Pausanias arrogant nature, which likely was 
emphasised by the Athenians who wished to win the hegemony from Sparta.501 
Pausanias arrogant nature may be explained by the fact he was a 
Spartan Regent and he had commanded the Greeks to victory over the Persians 
at Plataea.502  The Spartans were known for their harsh natures;503 although it can 
be argued that in battle the Athenians and Spartans were probably matched in 
terms of valour, the two cultures and, specifically, the attitudes of the two 
peoples were vastly different.  The successes of the Athenians give a sense of the 
under-dog winning against all odds;504 however, the Spartan ethos was to 
train to ensure military success.505  We can speculate that this Spartan harshness 
of character would have been a cultural eye-opener for many of the other 
Greeks in the fleet.506  We should consider also that, having evicted Persian forces 
from the Greek mainland, many Greeks in the allied fleet may have considered 
their participation in the war over or, perhaps, may have become complacent in 
their military duties.  The continued Spartan military strictness seems to have 
upset many of the allies.  It was not uncommon for the Ionians in particular to be 
aggrieved by such things.507 
It seems probable from the overall picture of events prior to Pausanias 
first recall to Sparta, that he simply upset the rest of the allied Greek fleet.  This 
notion is supported by their refusal to follow Dorkis, Pausanias replacement.  If 
the Greeks did not want to follow Pausanias personally, due to his questionable 
loyalty, surely they would have accepted his replacement from Sparta, which at 
this time still commanded the hegemony over the Hellenic League.  This was the 
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502 Pausanias arrogance is noted in Thucydides when he recalls how Pausanias inscribed the Greek 
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situation at the end of the fifth century, when Thibron was denounced by 
Spartas allies and replaced by Dercylidas.508  Here, however, the allied Greeks 
refused to follow any Spartan general, indicating that they took issue with the 
Spartan style of leadership, rather than the individual leader who was applying 
it.   
 
Looking at Thucydides more specific evidence of Pausanias medism, we 
are given a number of examples; Pausanias returned the high ranking Persians 
captured at Byzantium, he sent a letter with them to Xerxes offering Greece to 
him, he received Xerxes approval for this, he began dressing in Persian clothes, 
holding Persian banquets and employing Egyptian and Median bodyguards.509  
Thucydides claims that Pausanias secretly returned the political prisoners 
to Xerxes and sent a letter with Gongylus about which no-one knew, which begs 
the question that, if no-one knew about it, how did Thucydides sources find 
out?  Thucydides states that the text of the letter was revealed afterwards, but 
doesnt say how he came to learn of its contents. It is unlikely that Pausanias 
would have revealed anything about it to the man of Argilus when confronted 
by him; the only evidence is from Xerxes responding letter which is very vague.  
That both letters were discovered after Pausanias death raises our suspicions, 
especially as Pausanias letter to Xerxes logically should have been somewhere in 
Susa and not back in Sparta.  Blamires argument that Pausanias would have 
needed to keep some of his important correspondence for reference and for the 
establishment or confirmation of credentials510 is countered by the fact that the 
only credentials confirmed by the letter are no more than repetitions of the 
charges against Pausanias. i.e. that Pausanias returned some high ranking 
Persians to Xerxes and that he had agreed to advance Xerxes interests.  They do 
not prove that Xerxes was responding to Pausanias offer to bring Sparta and 
the rest of Hellas under (Xerxes) control.511 There is also no mention in 
Thucydides that Xerxes response acknowledged a request to marry one of 
                                                          
508 Cf. p. 198. 
509 Miller, 1997, p. 77, suggests that Pausanias medising clothes may have been Persian silks, which 
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510 Blamire, 1970, p. 302.   
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Xerxes daughters, which Herodotus reports as a request to marry Megabates 
daughter and which Herodotus himself does not seem to believe.512 It is possible 
that Thucydides sources may have recalled the marriage of Gygaea of Macedon 
to Bubares son of Megabazus, and emulated the tale for Pausanias.513 
Olmsteads argument for the authenticity of Xerxes letter is that the text 
has convincing phraseology similar to other Persian decrees in the Book of Ezra 
which leads him to conclude Thucydides copied the letter from an Ionic 
translation of an original Persian.514 However, we could claim also that the letter 
shown to Thucydides may have been created using the format of other Persian 
decrees.  At most we can conclude that Thucydides saw a letter in Ionic Greek 
which he believed had been copied from an original Persian.  The phraseology is 
convincingly challenged by J.F. Lazenby who notes the unusual use of 
AoA?Am A?A?A?AlAoAbAm rather than AoAxAhȱA?A?AeA?A?A?AdAgAjAhA?AtAhȱȱ¢ǰȱǯȱŗŘŞǯŝǯ515 Fornara 
concedes that Thucydides genuinely saw some letters but believes the letters 
themselves were unhistorical on the grounds that it is unlikely that Pausanias 
would have kept copies of such incriminating letters together for a period of 
years.516  Finally, the letters were supposedly exchanged during Pausanias first 
occupation of Byzantium, however, looking at the chronology it appears that 
there was scarcely time for this to have happened since it will have taken time 
for Pausanias to besiege and capture Byzantium, then return the prisoners with a 
letter and await the response from Xerxes.517  If Loomis is correct it is unlikely 
Byzantium capitulated until spring 477 B.C. leaving but a few months for 
Pausanias and Xerxes to correspond by letter, which, due to the distances 
involved, will have taken considerable time.518  Thus, we can agree with the 
communis opinio in disputing the authenticity of these letters.519 
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If we believe that the letters between Pausanias and Xerxes are 
suspicious, the next pieces of evidence are frankly absurd.  That is, his supposed 
adorning of Persian clothes, his use of Persian and Egyptian bodyguards, and his 
hosting of Persian style banquets.  An explanation for Pausanias Persian 
clothing may be found in Miller, who suggests that he may have worn silks 
which he acquired as part of the booty taken from Mardonius tent after 
Plataea.520  Thus, we may accuse him of cultural medism rather than political 
medism here.  However, the intent in Thucydides is sufficiently clear for us to 
understand that he believed Pausanias was wearing overtly suspicious clothing, 
and we may suggest the Greeks will have been aware that he possessed silk 
taken from Mardonius tent. Thus, the Persian clothing in the accusations appear 
to be new additions to his wardrobe.  Similarly, the accusations of Pausanias 
holding Persian style banquets, may be based in his eating local produce, cooked 
in the local tradition, but again, we should not discredit Thucydides intent that 
these actions were somewhat suspicious in themselves.521  I cannot account for 
the accusations of using Persian and Egyptian body guards, however, it would 
be unusual and quite foolish for a Greek trying to conceal his medism to act in 
this way.   
Thucydides account states that, on hearing of Pausanias behaviour, the 
ephors recalled him to Sparta, warning that if he did not return, he would be 
declared a public enemy. However, he also states that Pausanias БAm A?AeAdAnAoA? 
ЂA?AjA?AoAjAm ? ?Ah ?Ad and that he returned to Sparta because he felt confident that he 
could clear his name through bribery.522  If Pausanias particularly wished to 
avoid suspicion he didnt do a very good job of it.   
So far we have seen that the evidence for Pausanias medism prior to his 
second recall is not particularly convincing.  Further questions arise as the 
account continues. When Pausanias returned to Sparta the ephors, having 
                                                                                                                                                              
efficient couriers, I do not believe that Xerxes will have responded to Pausanias letter without 
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519 Rhodes, 1970, pp. 389-390. Lang, 1967, p. 84, Fornara, 1966, pp. 264 ff., Westlake, 1977, p. 103, 
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campaign. 
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arrested him, had to release him due to lack of evidence; it was not until a 
nameless man from Argilus came forward to condemn Pausanias that the 
ephors appear to have had any evidence, and, even then, they did not believe 
this nameless man and so the scene with the hidden ephors was staged.   
This provokes two questions: firstly, if Pausanias did medise and was 
issued orders to return to Sparta, why did he return?  He was on the border of 
the Persian Empire, which had developed a reputation for sheltering exiles.  If 
Pausanias was guilty of medism, why did he not simply take shelter in the 
Persian Empire?  This question is particularly pertinent if we believe that 
Pausanias was already in correspondence with Xerxes and attempting to marry 
into the Achaemenid family, in a similar way to the family of Alexander of 
Macedon had married Alexanders sister Gygaea to the Persian Bubares.523  
Thucydides claim, that Pausanias only returned because he believed he could 
use bribery to clear his name, emphasises the previous point.  If Pausanias 
actually was guilty, it would be more effort to return to Sparta to attempt to bribe 
the ephors than simply to hop across the border and take shelter in the Persian 
Empire.  Even Bengtson states that the reasons for Pausanias return are a 
mystery.524  I would suggest that Pausanias return to Sparta should be taken as 
evidence of his innocence, rather than his guilt.  Thucydides clearly states that 
the ephors had no irrefutable evidence to charge him when he returned to Sparta 
and so were forced to release him from jail.525  If there was enough evidence to 
recall Pausanias on charges of medism, surely there was also enough evidence to 
keep him in jail.  
Thus, it seems that Pausanias was recalled for other reasons.  Blamire 
notes that the herald sent to recall Pausanias to Sparta the second time carried a 
skytale, suggesting that Pausanias presence in Byzantium as a private citizen 
was, in fact, with some official function to discharge.526  This seems likely when 
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we consider that Pausanias would have needed official sanction in order to have 
commissioned a ship to sail to the Hellespont.   Spartans were forbidden 
personal wealth, although we know of cases of corruption which are generally 
seen as exceptions to the rule.  Pausanias may have acquired some wealth as a 
result of the Persian invasion and his subsequent campaigning in Cyprus and 
Byzantium, but I doubt he would have managed to conceal the necessary 
amount needed to personally fund a crew and boat from Hermione to 
Byzantium.  Thus, we can conjecture that the funds likely came from Sparta.  If 
this was the case, we can see that Pausanias may have returned to Byzantium on 
a discrete matter with Spartan sanction.  However, what Pausanias was actually 
doing in the Hellespont remains a mystery and is open to conjecture.  Indeed, 
Blamire suggests that Pausanias was sent to covertly impede Athenian activities.  
He postulates that Pausanias medised from Colonae, having been expelled from 
Byzantium by Athens, and then he was recalled to Sparta.  Certainly we can 
verify Thucydides claims that Pausanias presence in Byzantium was justified on 
a pretence of helping in the war against the Persians; it is unlikely he would have 
been expelled from Byzantium had he been working with the Athenians whilst 
there.  That he medised from Colonae can be refuted on the same grounds as 
argued above. Whether Pausanias medised from Byzantium or from Colonae, 
why would he return to Sparta when summoned?  It is simply illogical. 
The final stage in Pausanias story is of his eventual self-incrimination 
when confronted by the man from Argilus.  This account also presents 
questions.   Firstly, who is this nameless man from Argilus?  We are told he 
had once been the lover of Pausanias, a favoured and trusted servant of his, but 
apparently without a name.  Although not all characters in Thucydides are 
named, we may speculate that it would have added verisimilitude to 
Thucydides account, which has raised so many questions already.  We may 
suspect this man from Argilus is no more than a stock character.  Furthermore, 
if this man did exist and was supplying the ephors with sought after evidence for 
the case against Pausanias, whom they had recently been forced to release from 
jail, we would expect the ephors to accept this evidence enthusiastically.  
However, we are told that initially the ephors did not believe him.  The scenario 
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leading to Pausanias self-incrimination pushes the bounds of credulity, 
especially as even then the ephors did not arrest Pausanias.  It seems that either 
the ephors simply did not want to arrest him and were doing everything in their 
power to avoid doing this, or they had no evidence to arrest him on these 
charges.  There is certainly a fair amount of inconsistent behaviour on the part of 
the ephors in the account. 
 
So far we have found the evidence for Pausanias medism unsatisfactory.  
We can conclude that his arrogance upset the Greek allies in the Hellenic League 
and that his return to Byzantium may have been discrete but it is likely it had 
Spartas blessing, whatever he was doing there.  However, there is one piece of 
evidence we have not yet discussed which raises some real interest; the charge of 
intriguing with the helots.527  Thucydides claims that Pausanias was offering the 
helots their freedom and full rights, which would have been enough to raise an 
alarm in the minds of the ephors.528  Helots had served with the Spartans during 
the Persian wars and would no doubt have fought alongside them: perhaps 
Pausanias attitude towards them had softened?  However, Thucydides says that 
the ephors mistrusted the evidence of the helots, i.e. it was too unreliable to use.  
Rhodes makes the point that, although intriguing with the helots was popular 
amongst wayward Spartans, it is also likely that, since the helots rebelled 
within a few years of his death, Pausanias was almost bound to be accused of 
having done something to foment it, even if he was entirely innocent.529  The 
threat of a helot rebellion was ever present in Spartan minds and it is worth 
noting that, had the ephors been reluctant to arrest Pausanias previously, this 
charge alone would have been sufficient reason to arrest him.  However, the fact 
that there wasnt enough evidence for this suggests that Pausanias connection to 
the later helot rebellion was fabricated. 
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Looking through the account in Thucydides, we can conclude that the 
evidence for Pausanias medism is unconvincing and we must consider the real 
reasons behind his recall and subsequent death.  
I agree with Langs proposal that Thucydides source for this section of 
work possibly was the Spartan government, which, she suggests, explains why 
Thucydides does not appear to question the account himself.  It is unusual for 
Thucydides to be so uncritical of his sources, when presented with a weak 
account of events, and the most logical reason for this would be because his 
source was the Spartan government.530  However, there is not enough evidence 
to support her view that the Spartan government was covering up a change in 
their foreign policy to support Persia against an ever increasing Athenian threat 
to the Spartan hegemony over Greece.531  Furthermore, I doubt that Pausanias, 
who was awarded the individual prize for valour during the Persian Wars,532 
who had made a specific point of mocking Persian extravagance after capturing 
Mardonius tent, and who had subsequently captured Cyprus and Byzantium 
from Persia, would be willing to court Persia so soon afterwards, even though he 
may have worn Persian clothes.533   
Rhodes acknowledges that the account had probably undergone 
improvements before it reached Thucydides and suggests that the reluctance 
of the ephors to prosecute Pausanias successfully would indicate that his actions 
may have seemed more distasteful than strictly treasonous.534  Certainly his 
actions were enough to warrant his recall but not enough to convict him of 
anything without causing embarrassment  it is noteworthy that Pausanias did 
not stand trial before his death.   
  
We have spent a good deal of time discussing Pausanias because the most 
important thing about the accusation of medism is that the Greeks were 
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persuaded of his conspiring with Xerxes against Greece.  We have already noted 
that Pausanias actions during and after the Persian invasion can be used as 
evidence for his defence and yet Thucydides, at least, and probably many others, 
believed it was possible.  That such accusations were credited indicates that 
despite the Greek victories over Persia they still feared another Persian invasion.  
The Delian League was formed specifically to address this fear by taking the war 
into Asia Minor.535  It is in this context that we also turn to Themistocles, another 
prominent figure, who was accused of medism by Sparta as a direct consequence 
of the accusations and death of Pausanias in 471/470 B.C.  
 
The medism of Themistocles 
The first instance of Themistocles actual medism, contrary to Herodotus 
assertions, seems likely to have been as Thucydides states, after he was accused 
of medism and when he fled to the Persian Empire as an exile.536  Herodotus 
claims that Themistocles advice to the allied Greek forces not to pursue the 
retreating Persians across the Hellespont back to Asia Minor, was with a view to 
later medism seems to have been applied retrospectively in light of Themistocles 
later actions.537  Herodotus claims that should Themistocles have needed to flee 
Greece and live in exile, he would have been able to claim responsibility for this 
lack of Greek pursuit and, thus, gain favour with Xerxes.  However, despite 
Keaveney,538  it is unlikely that Themistocles would have envisioned the future 
need to take refuge at Xerxes court and, therefore, it is also unlikely that his 
actions were motivated with a view to gaining favour with Xerxes.  Indeed, 
Herodotus states that Themistocles was persuaded of the advice not to pursue 
the Persians by Eurybiades.539  This suggests that his intent really was to 
encourage the removal from Greece of as many Persians as possible, which is 
supported by Diodorus Siculus,540 unless we are to make the unlikely 
assumption that Eurybiades also had half a thought to future medism.  Gillis, 
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noting what he believes to be Herodotus pro-Alcmeonid bias and, conversely, 
his anti-Themistoclean bias, suggests that, rather than directly attacking 
Themistocles in his narrative, Herodotus undercuts his achievements, stresses his 
desire for acquiring money by taking bribes and fails to give him due credit for 
his achievements during the Persian invasion.  He notes an example of this is 
Herodotus paraphrasing of Themistocles speech on the eve of Salamis into one 
sentence, which is striking in a book overloaded with lengthy speeches, not all 
of them by any means relevant or even interesting.541 We can agree with Gillis 
that it seems that Herodotus is guilty of applying his own bias onto the 
motivations of Themistocles, which realistically he cannot have known. 
Briefly recapping the events surrounding Themistocles medism, we are 
told that when Themistocles was accused, he had already been ostracised from 
Athens and was at the time living in Argos; when he was informed that both 
Athenian and Spartan officials had been sent to arrest him, he fled to Corcyra.542  
The Corcyraeans, in fear of retribution from both Athens and Sparta, sent him 
back to the mainland where he took refuge with Admetus, the King of the 
Molossi.  From there, Themistocles made his way to Ionia on a merchant ship 
and thence sent a letter to Artaxerxes who had recently ascended to the Persian 
throne.   The letter stated that, although he had hindered the Persian invasion 
while acting in the defence of Greece, he had also performed good deeds for 
Artaxerxes during the Persian retreat, taking claim for the lack of Greek pursuit 
of the retreating Persian army.543  He asked for a year before giving an account of 
himself in front of Artaxerxes personally.  Thucydides says that during this year 
Themistocles learnt the Persian language and customs and after he arrived at 
Artaxerxes court he became a person of importance.  Thucydides brief 
account states that Themistocles gained a position of influence at the court 
during the rest of his life-time and died either from illness or poison.   
Fuller, more colourful accounts can be found in Plutarch and Diodorus 
Siculus, who give additional information, padding out the basic account given in 
Thucydides.  Plutarch claims that when Themistocles arrived in Ionia he 
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discovered that the King had declared that he would give a reward of 2 talents 
for the capture of Themistocles and that, as a result of this, Themistocles was 
forced to travel to the Persian court hidden in a womans carriage.544  When he 
arrived, he first had an audience with Artabanus, Artaxerxes Chiliarch, during 
which Themistocles did not declare that he wanted to live as an exile in Persia 
but, rather, that his purpose was to increase the fame and power of the king and 
to increase the number of those who did homage to him.  We are told that he 
won over the king and was awarded the 2 talents for handing himself in, he was 
also given three cities for his support - Magnesia, Lampsacus and Myus.545  On 
information from Neanthes of Cyzicus and Phanias, Plutarch says that 
Themistocles was also given, in addition, Percote and Palaescepsis.  Plutarchs 
account of Themistocles death states that when Cimon was sailing with the 
Athenian fleet to Cyprus, Egypt and the coast of Asia Minor, Themistocles was 
called upon by Artaxerxes to fulfil his promise of subjugating Greece to Persia.  
Themistocles committed suicide in response to this summoning, rather than 
betray Greece.546   
Looking at the medism of Themistocles, we can see that when he was 
accused, rather than returning to Athens to defend himself against the charges, 
like Pausanias who returned to Sparta, he preferred to take his chances living in 
exile.  He would have known what had happened to Pausanias and, thus, likely 
rated his chances of acquittal poorly;547 Keaveney notes that Themistocles was 
not well disposed to Sparta nor Sparta to him.548  The Spartan account, that 
Pausanias had supposedly contacted Themistocles inviting him to join in his 
medism may have reached Themistocles - whether this was true or not, the 
Spartan authorities had clearly already persuaded the Athenian authorities to 
arrest him.  According to Plutarch, when Themistocles was approached by 
Pausanias he refused to join in with his medising plans.549  As we concluded 
earlier, the evidence suggests Pausanias did not medise and, therefore, we can 
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suggest that also he did not invite Themistocles to join him.  Keaveney notes that, 
with Pausanias dead, evidence may have been produced which had the potential 
to be less than the whole truth. He suggests that the grounds for the charges of 
medism was that Themistocles had not denounced Pausanias when he had the 
opportunity and was, therefore, guilty of covering up the affair,550 while Forrest 
suggests that the accusation was partly the result of the popularity of Cimon, 
Themistocles political enemy, and partly the result of Themistocles pro-Argive 
policy in an attempt to curb the growth of Spartan power.551   
 
In Plutarchs account we are told that Themistocles attempted to defend 
himself in exile, writing a letter arguing that a man who constantly sought 
authority over others .... could never have sold himself and Greece to 
barbarians.552  However, there are number of problems with Plutarch.  Firstly, 
Themistocles supposed defence, that those who had been ostracised for aiming 
at dominion would not medise, is weak as many Athenians would still 
remember Hippias, who had done just that.  It is unlikely that such an astute 
character as Themistocles would give such a weak defence. Keaveney rightly 
believes it  more plausible that, rather than accusing him whilst he was in Argos 
and alerting him to the situation, Themistocles enemies would have summoned 
him back to Athens (just as Pausanias was recalled to Sparta) to answer the 
charge of medism, ensuring that he couldnt flee.553  Plutarchs further claim that 
Themistocles was then summoned before a Pan-Hellenic council, seems likely to 
be a later fiction, only found in Plutarch.554  It seems that, in order to pad-out 
his story of Themistocles, Plutarch is guilty of repeating fabrications, which, 
however implausible, make Plutarchs account more colourful.  Forrest notes that 
Plutarchs account here is an extraordinary muddle of Thucydides, Ephorus (?), 
Krateros, and no doubt others as well.555  He suggests that the fabricated 
charges were used against Themistocles precisely because Cimon was so 
                                                          
550 Keaveney, 2003, p. 9. 
551 Forrest, 1960. 
552 Plutarch, Themistocles, XXIII. 
553 Keaveney, 2003, p. 10. 
554 Plutarch, Aristides, XXI. 
555 Forrest, 1960, p. 237. 
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popular, thus, they would be believed with little real evidence.  It is noteworthy 
that Themistocles previously had been charged with medism and acquitted in 
472 B.C.556  He was ostracised shortly after and so we can see that he had become 
unpopular in Athens by 472 B.C.557  It is not difficult to consider that his political 
enemies in Athens may have joined his enemies in Sparta to denounce him.558  
Forrest notes that Aeschylus, an ally of Themistocles, lost in the Dionysia of 468 
B.C., after a winning streak of 8 or 9 plays.  He also observes that this was the 
same year that Cimon sat on the judging panel.559  Lenardon also believes in 
collaboration between Cimon and Sparta for the removal of Themistocles, noting 
Themistocles animosity with Sparta concerning the building of Athens wall and 
his role at the Amphictyonic council in 471 B.C., which helped to defeat all of 
Spartas proposals.560  That Sparta was able to impose its wishes upon the 
domestic policy of an allied state, from time to time, is convincingly argued by 
Yates.561  This seems plausible to me given the power and influence of Sparta at 
the time. 
Once Themistocles had learnt of these second charges he fled to Corcyra, 
which was friendly to him and treated him as a benefactor.562  However, the 
Corcyraean fear of resisting a combined force of Spartans and Athenians was 
enough for them to pass him back to the mainland and, thus, not incur the joint 
enmity of the two states.563  Themistocles apparent reluctance to go to Persia 
may be interpreted as evidence of his innocence.  If he had medised, the more 
natural place to go would have been Asia Minor.  Konishi notes that Thucydides 
description of Themistocles long-wandering flight indicates Thucydides 
belief that Themistocles was unwilling to go over to Persia and live in exile 
                                                          
556 Diodorus Siculus, XI.54.4-5. 
557 Green, 2006, p. 115, n. 204, suggests that his popularity lasted only until 477/476 B.C. with his 
last public appearance at the Olympic Games. 
558 Keaveney, 2003, p. 9. 
559 Forrest, 1960, p. 238. 
560 Lenardon, 1959, p. 33. 
561 Yates, 2005, pp. 65-76, notes the Spartan tradition of supporting Laconizing factions within allied 
and friendly cities and the Spartan ability to present a demand as mutually beneficial in order to 
persuade allied and friendly cities to acquiesce. He recognizes that such cities could not be 
bulldozed into supporting Spartan wishes and that the policy was mercurial as it relied on the 
support of Laconizing factions within cities. 
562 Thucydides, I.136. 
563 Keaveney, 2003, p. 7, notes that the pressure from Sparta and Athens was sufficient for Argos 
either to be unwilling or unable to protect him from them, hence his flight to Corcyra. 
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there.564  He supports this argument by noting that Themistocles, at one point, 
was forced to beg refuge from an enemy, Admetus, King of the Molossi in 
Epirus.565 
By the time Themistocles reached the court of Artaxerxes he must have 
realised that Artaxerxes was his last hope of safety: if Artaxerxes did not let him 
live in exile, he would be executed. And yet, if we believe Thucydides, 
Themistocles still did not ask anything greater than to live in exile in the Persian 
Empire and only hinted at a promise in return.  He gave account of his actions 
both for and against the Persian Empire and let Artaxerxes decide for himself.  
Whether he was innocent of medising prior to his arrival in Ephesus is open to 
speculation, but, I propose that the lack of evidence against Pausanias 
implicating Themistocles and Themistocles route via Corcyra and Ephesus to 
Persia, suggests that it is unlikely that he did medise, the accusations of medism 
seemingly were politically fabricated by his enemies.  Clearly, once he was living 
at the court of Artaxerxes, if he was required to perform military duties for 
another invasion of Greece, he would not have had a choice.566   
As with Pausanias we find an unconvincing case against Themistocles 
and yet it further supports our notion that the Greeks also believed that Persia 
was preparing for another invasion.  This is emphasised by the tales surrounding 
the death of Themistocles, one of which claims that he poisoned himself when 
called to assist Artaxerxes I against the Greeks in the 460s.567  Thus, paranoia 
claimed two great defenders of Greece. 
 
Noteworthy in the account is the role of Persia in the case of 
Themistocles.  Artaxerxes I, like his predecessors, was willing to accept exiled 
Greeks to his court; it is upon this premise that the accounts of Themistocles 
                                                          
564 Konishi, 1970, p. 62. 
565 Plutarch, Themistocles, XXIV, notes an account in Stesimbrotus, which reports that Themistocles 
also attempted to find refuge in Sicily, after he fled the Molossii and before he sailed to Persia.  This 
account is disputed by Plutarch and Keaveney, 2003, p. 19, notes the likelihood that it is a doublet 
created by Stesimbrotus of Themistocles wooing of Artaxerxes I. 
566 Keaveney, 2003, pp. 93-95, believes that Themistocles may have been able to offer other services 
besides military ones, such as using his influence back in Athens to cause unrest and stasis. 
567 Thucydides, I.138.4, Plutarch, Themistocles, 31.3-5. 
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medism is based.568  However, as we have already noted, the fate of Themistocles 
was in the hands of Artaxerxes. Once in the Persian Empire, Themistocles may 
have recognised that he would be completely subject to Artaxerxes, which may 
explain why he spent many years seeking refuge in different Greek states prior 
to his arrival at Artaxerxes court.569  It is easy to believe the misconception that 
high-ranking Greeks, such as Themistocles, could simply turn up in the Persian 
Empire and be automatically welcomed.  However, it should be noted that 
Themistocles spent a year learning to speak Persian and building his case for his 
audience with Artaxerxes I, which suggests that it was not easy to win the king 
over.  It should also be remembered that had Themistocles failed to persuade 
Artaxerxes I, it is likely he would have been imprisoned and executed as a 
former enemy of Persia.  
We can conclude from the cases of both Pausanias and Themistocles that, 
despite the Greek victories in the Persian War and despite the successes of the 
Delian League, the threat of another Persian invasion was a serious consideration 
and one, I would suggest, likely encouraged by Persia itself.570 
 
The first Peloponnesian War 
Whilst Themistocles was in exile in the Persian Empire, tensions between 
Athens and her allies and Sparta and her allies resulted in the outbreak of the 
first Peloponnesian War in c. 461 B.C.  These tensions had increased significantly 
after 465 B.C., when the Athenians were singularly dismissed from the allied 
forces sent to Ithome to help the Spartans besiege the rebellious Helots who had 
taken shelter there.  The consequence of this was the ostracism of the 
Laconophile Cimon and an Athenian alliance with Argos, the traditional enemy 
of Sparta.  Later, in 459 B.C. Megara also sought protection and an alliance with 
Athens during a border dispute with Corinth.  This eventually brought Sparta 
                                                          
568 That Themistocles arrived during the reign of Artaxerxes rather than Xerxes, as presented by 
Diodorus Siculus XI.56.5, is dealt with by Keaveney, 2003, pp. 24-25, who prefers the account of 
Thucydides over that of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch. 
569 Themistocles was ostracised in 470 B.C. and indicted for medism in 466 B.C. He arrived at the 
court of Artaxerxes in 465 B.C. having first sought refuge in Corcyra and with the Molossi. Green, 
2006, does not agree with Keaveney, 2003, p. 116, that Themistocles spent 4 years in Argos. 
570 Cf. Kelly, 2003, passim for Persian propaganda during the Persian Wars, which I doubt will have 
ceased entirely after Plataea. 
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into conflict with Athens, and a Spartan victory over Athens in 457 B.C. at 
Tanagra.571  Athens successfully defeated Boeotian forces at Oenophyta shortly 
afterwards in the same year.  The Five Years Truce, between Sparta and Athens, 
and the Thirty Years Peace, between Sparta and Argos, effectively ended this 
first Peloponnesian War, in 452/1 B.C. 
 
Persian bribery during Cimons Egyptian Campaign 
As a result of the succession struggles of Artaxerxes I upon the death of 
Xerxes in 465 B.C., the Persian satrapy of Egypt revolted and called upon Athens 
for assistance which sent 20 ships.572  Athens was a good choice for Inaros; 
Athenian influence over the Delian League had increased since it was formed in 
476/475 B.C., which is evidenced by the attempted, unsuccessful revolts of Naxos 
and Thasos.573 Also, under the leadership of Cimon, the Delian League had 
defeated Persian forces at the Eurymedon River and there is evidence for 
operations led by Cimon in Lykia and Caria prior to this.574 
In response to Athenian support of Inaros rebellion, Artaxerxes sent to 
Sparta a Persian named Megabazus with money to bribe the Spartans to invade 
Attica and so force the Athenians to recall their fleet from Egypt.575  When that 
failed Artaxerxes sent out to Egypt a Persian, Megabazus, son of Zopyrus, with 
a large army,576 who then crushed the rebellion there. 577  The failure of the 
Egyptian rebellion forced the Athenians to come to terms with Persia in order to 
release those Athenians who had been captured during the campaign.578  
                                                          
571 Meiggs, 1972, p. 99. 
572 Thucydides, I.104. 
573 Thucydides, I. 98, and I. 100-105.  Meiggs, 1972, pp. 70, 83-85.  Naxos unsuccessfully revolted 
from the league in 467 B.C. Thasos revolted in 465 B.C. and was besieged for 3 years before 
capitulating.  
574 Plutarch, Cimon, 12.1. Diodorus Siculus, XI.60-63. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 73-76. 
575 c. 460. Thucydides, I.104-109. Diodorus Siculus, XI.71. This was the third revolt of the Egyptians 
since it was initially conquered by Cambyses in 525 B.C. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Cf. Diodorus Siculus, XII.3.1. The result of the rebellion is disputed in that both Diodorus Siculus 
and Ctesias, FrGH 688 F14, agree that the Greek forces, on being abandoned by the Egyptians, 
destroyed their own ships forcing Megabazus into an armistice in which he released the Greek 
forces. However, Gomme, 1962, p. 322, comments that this is not consistent with Megabazus taking 
the Greeks to Persia as prisoners where Artaxerxes beheaded 50 before Megabazus managed to 
free the rest. 
578 See M. Caspari, 1913, W. Wallace, 1936, Westlake, 1950, J. Libourel, 1971, E. Robinson, 1999, for 
discussions regarding the size of the Athenian and allied fleet and, thus, the scale of Athenian and 
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Looking to Megabazus journey to Sparta, Diodorus Siculus states that 
Megabazus led an embassy comprising Friends of Artaxerxes I, which suggests 
it was more than a covert attempt to bribe a Greek state and recalls the initial 
Persian embassy to Macedon in the sixth century B.C.579  Diodorus Siculus claims 
that the Spartans neither accepted the money nor paid any attention whatever 
to the requests of the Persians.580  Whereas the more reliable Thucydides states 
that the Spartans spent part of Artaxerxes gold, but did not invade Attica, 
therefore Megabazus and the rest of the gold was subsequently recalled.581  
Lewis questions the notion that the money sent by Artaxerxes was 
intended as a bribe.  He suggests that the confusion may have come about as 
A?ЗAlAjh can refer both to a gift and a bribe. 582  It is likely that the money sent was 
to defray expenses583 and examples of this can be found during the second 
Peloponnesian War and the Corinthian War.  Whilst the Peloponnesian forces 
were operating on behalf of Persias interests in Persian territory it was agreed 
that Persia would pay their expenses and wages.  However, when the 
Peloponnesians were operating outside of Persian territory it was agreed that 
gold would be lent to them which would be repaid later.  Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable to conjecture that Megabazus and his embassy had travelled to 
Sparta not to bribe the Spartans but rather to employ them and, thus, gold was 
provided for this. 
Whether or not the Spartans accepted or used the gold is not strictly 
relevant, the point of note here is that Artaxerxes I thought they might.  It is 
worth speculating why Artaxerxes had confidence in Spartas cooperation.584 
Clearly, relations between Sparta and Persia had changed in the preceding 20 
years.  Unfortunately, the information we have concerning this period deals 
primarily with the relationship between Athens and Sparta, and only mentions 
Persia incidentally.  Not only had Spartas authority been challenged by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
allied losses in this campaign.  Also, see J. Barns, 1953, concerning Cimons actions in Egypt in the 
460s. 
579 Diodorus Siculus, XI.74.5. For the embassy to Macedon cf. p. 26 above. 
580 Diodorus Siculus, XI.74. 
581 Thucydides, I.109. 
582 Lewis, 1997, p. 371. 
583 McGregor, 1987, p. 58. 
584 Eddy, 1973, pp. 245.
139 
 
rebuilding of Athenian fortifications, 585 but Athens had now gained leadership of 
the Hellenic Leagues fleet and, therefore, led all operations against the Persian 
Empire.  Furthermore, the break-down in relations between the two powers at 
Ithome586 and the Athenian alliance with Argos, led to the first Peloponnesian 
War in c.461 B.C. whilst Athens was already involved in Inaros rebellion.   
We may consider it logical that Artaxerxes would try to ally himself with 
the enemy of his enemy, in this case - a Persian-Spartan alliance against Athens, 
and Thucydides states as much.587  It is possible that belated Spartan actions 
during the Persian invasion and their apparent initial willingness to abandon the 
Greek states north of the Isthmus of Corinth was remembered by Artaxerxes I.  
Meiggs observes a period of open hostility between Athens and Sparta prior to 
the 1st Peloponnesian War, noting the Athenian victory over Sparta at Oenoe on 
the Argive border and the Athenian capture of Halies which was later seized by 
Sparta.588  Despite the scanty evidence for this period, we may conjecture that the 
lack of Spartan involvement in anti-Persian operations, their open hostility with 
Athens and the subsequent 1st Peloponnesian War may have been enough to 
persuade Artaxerxes that the Spartans would not be averse to making a deal 
with Persia against Athens.     
Although Sparta was not quite ready to make the leap whereby it 
funded its war efforts from Persias coffers, we may speculate that this first offer 
by Artaxerxes may have encouraged Sparta in the second Peloponnesian War 
when finance was needed.  It is also certain that by this time Artaxerxes I was 
attempting to exploit interstate rivalries in Greece. 
 
                                                          
585 Thucydides, I.89-93 describes how Athens was able to rebuild the citys fortifications only by 
deceiving Sparta and the Peloponnesians. During the Persian wars, Sparta was undoubtedly the 
leading state of Greece - largely due to its leadership of the Peloponnesian League but also in part 
due to lack of credible opposition - and probably wished to continue in this position. Athens, in 
challenging Spartas wishes concerning the re-fortification of the city, also challenged Spartas 
authority as the leading state of Greece as a whole. See also Diodorus Siculus, XI.50, whose 
historicity is doubted (cf. Green, 2006, p. 1) but may reflect the general feeling in Sparta at this time. 
586 During the helot revolt, the Athenians were asked, along with other Spartan allies, to help in the 
siege at Ithome, c. 465. Thucydides, I.101-102. 
587 Thucydides, I.109. 
588 Meiggs, 1972, p. 97. 
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Although the Athenian defeat at the White Fort in Egypt in 454 B.C. is 
depicted by Thucydides as a total disaster,589 Athenian actions after this suggest 
that the city was quick to recover from it and reassert its control over those cities 
and islands which had attempted to revolt from the League.590  Meiggs suggests 
that fragments from two decrees concerning Erythrae and Miletus respectively, 
passed in Athens and dated to the late 450s,591 indicate an attempt by Artaxerxes 
to expand his influence over the islands of Asia Minor, which had been 
previously under Persian control, in the wake of the Athenian defeat in Egypt.592 
ATL ii. D 10 specifically forbids Erythrae from taking back the exiled oligarchs 
who seem to have been responsible for the islands rebellion and who had taken 
refuge with the Mede. The Cimonian campaign against Cyprus in 451 B.C.593 
indicates this island was also lost to Persia but also shows that the losses were 
not so crippling that Athens could not put out a fleet to successfully campaign on 
the island only 3-4 years later. 594  
 
The Peace of Callias 
One result of the Athenian victories at Cyprus was the apparent cessation 
of hostilities between Athens and Persia, which supports the likelihood of a 
peace treaty between the two powers.  Whether a formal peace treaty actually 
existed is much debated principally because it is known to us primarily from 
fourth century sources.  However, negotiations between Athens and Persia are 
suggested by Herodotus in his digression regarding the loyalty of Argos to the 
Hellenic League and its relationship with Persia.  He states that, in the 460s, 
Callias, son of Hipponicus, and a number of other Athenians were in Susa on 
other business.595  An approximate date for this is ascertainable from the 
accession of Artaxerxes I.  Badian proposes that as Xerxes died in August 465 
                                                          
589 Thucydides, I. 110. 
590 Meiggs, 1972, pp. 112-15, notes that Miletus and Erythrae are noticeably absent from the tribute 
lists of 453 and 452 and reappear in 451, suggesting they did not pay tribute in 453 and 452 due to 
rebellion from the League but were brought back into it by 451 B.C. 
591 ATL ii. D 10 and ATL ii. D 11. 
592 Meiggs, 1972, pp. 113-117. 
593 Meiggs, 1972, p. 124. 
594 There is confusion in the sources whether the land victory occurred before that at sea or vice 
versa, regardless of this confusion it is apparent that there were two victories against Persian 
forces. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 75-76. 
595 Herodotus, VII.151. Callias in Hoffstetter, 1978, 168. 
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B.C., 596 if we take into account the time it would take for Artaxerxes I to gain the 
throne and then for the Argive envoy to prepare for and make the journey to 
Susa, we can conjecture that the Argive embassy arrived by about the end of 464 
B.C.  This would place Callias and his companions at Susa during 464 B.C.  
That a state of peace between Athens and Persia existed is supported by 
evidence of trade between Persia and Athens during the initial years of the 2nd 
Peloponnesian War.  Thucydides states that six ships under the command of 
Melesander were sent by Athens to Caria and Lycia to collect tribute from those 
areas and to prevent Peloponnesian privateers from using it as a base from 
which to attack the merchant ships sailing from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the 
Asiatic coast-line.597  It is unlikely much trade would have taken place during a 
state of war due to the risk of the ships being captured.  Furthermore, How and 
Wells note, Herodotus, as a subject of the Athenian Empire, was able to travel 
freely through Persian territory.  Finally, the Athenians turned to Persia for 
financial aid at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, indicating at least an 
understanding of peace between the two powers.598   
Further evidence can be found in Platos Menexenus, which mentions the 
lack of hostility between Athens and Persia after the Athenian victories at 
Eurymedon and Cyprian Salamis.599  Although Plato does not mention any 
specific treaty between Athens and Persia, he does comment that the hostility 
between the two powers ceased for a period.  Plato does not specify when this 
change in relations occurred exactly, he simply says these were the men who 
fought by sea at the river Eurymedon, and who went on the expedition to 
Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt and divers other places;  they compelled the 
king in fear for himself to look to his own safety instead of plotting the 
destruction of Hellas.600  Plutarch601 and Diodorus Siculus602 claim that the 
Persian king looked to his own safety either as a result of a signed treaty or as 
the result of a specific Athenian action, i.e. the Athenian victory at Eurymedon, 
                                                          
596 Badian, 1987, p. 3. See also Kuhrt, 2010, pp. 306-307, for the date of Xerxes death. 
597 Thucydides, II.69. 
598 How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 190. 
599 Plato, Menexenus, 241e.  
600 Plato, Menexenus, 241e. 
601 Plutarch, Cimon, XIII.5. 
602 Diodorus Siculus, XII.4ff. 
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or the successful Cypriot campaign, (see further remarks on this below). 
However, Plato seems to group the two Athenian successes together, implying 
that it took both actions to change Persian policy towards Athens.  Noteworthy 
in this sentence is that Platos subjects are not only the champions at Eurymedon 
and Cyprus, but also Egypt and divers other places.  This suggests that the 
change in Persias attitude to Athens was due not to any one specific event, but 
was the result of the Athenian victories cumulatively.  Plato recognises that 
Persian policy changed from offensive to defensive, but does not give a specific 
date or singular event for this, which, it can be argued, is due to the lapse of time 
between these events and the writing of the Menexenus.603   
Thus, we can see that a state of peace can be attested, but the more 
difficult question is whether a formal treaty was agreed.604  It should be noted 
that simply because Plato did not refer to the signing of a specific treaty does not 
mean he was not aware of the existence of one or that one did not exist.  One 
cannot cite silence in a source regarding a specific event as negative evidence 
against that event, one can only note that a particular source failed to mention 
it.605  However, this works both ways and so we are now forced to tread carefully 
with our conjectures. Looking at Platos Menexenus it is noteworthy that its 
purpose was not to recount Greek history during the fifth century, but to mock 
the nature of funeral orations, specifically Pericles funeral oration. That Plato 
includes events from the fifth century, including information regarding a state of 
peace between Athens and Persia, is fortunate for us, but his historical 
chronology is confused in places, and perhaps deliberately so.  It would appear 
that the events Plato included are ones which were so well known that he used 
them as part of an elaborate satire, which is the purpose of the Menexenus.  The 
piece is deliberately ironic; Plato has Socrates include events, about which he 
could not possibly have known since he was dead when they took place, such as 
                                                          
603 The date of Menexenus is unknown, but Kahn, 1963, p. 229 suggests it was delivered in response 
to the Peace of Antalcidas and, thus, should be dated to c. 387/386 B.C. 
604 How and Wells, 1991, Vol.II, p. 190. 
605 Stockton, 1959, is vehement in his denial of a formal peace treaty.  Arguing from silence, he 
believes that Theopompus, who denies the authenticity of the Ionic lettering of the fourth century 
inscription, had further arguments now lost to us. As we shall see, he also cites as negative 
evidence the failure to mention the peace treaty in Lysias Epitaphios and Andocides de Pace. 
However, these arguments are countered by Thompson, 1981, p. 175-177. 
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the formation of the second Athenian League and the Kings Peace of 387/6 B.C. 
Furthermore, the speech was supposed to have been originally written by 
Aspasia, who died before even Socrates.606 
Looking at other sources both Demosthenes (19.271ff) and Lycurgus 
(1.73) state a peace treaty was signed.  Demosthenes, at lines 271 ff., states that 
the treaty negotiated by Callias is in the mouths of all men, indicating that by 
the late 340s it was commonly believed that such a peace treaty existed formally.  
However, this is many years since the first mention of a stele containing the 
terms of a formal treaty appeared in Theopompus.607  Rung, noting Platos 
mention of Pyrilampes608 and Strabos mention of Diotimus,609 suggests that a 
number of embassies took place between Athens and Persia before the outbreak 
of the Peloponnesian War, in 432 B.C.610  In my opinion, if Rung is correct, then 
these embassies may in some way be connected with the Peace of Callias.  Details 
are scant, but, as will emerge later, we may be able to find a context for the 
embassy of Diotimus.  Thus, during a period of military inactivity we can see 
diplomatic relations were under way.  It seems most probable that Pyrilampes 
accompanied Callias during the peace negotiations which resulted in the Peace of 
Callias.611  We do not know enough of Diotimus embassy to Persia to date it 
confidently.  However, it seems likely he was sent to complain about Pissuthnes 
involvement in the Samian revolt of the later 440s.612 As the only grounds for 
complaint would be Pissuthnes breaking the terms of an agreement between 
Athens and Persia, we may conclude the embassy of Diotimus is evidence 
supporting an official peace treaty between Athens and Persia. Thus, we can see 
not only was there an apparent state of peace or, at least military inactivity, 
                                                          
606 For a good discussion regarding the purpose of the Menexenus see Kahn, 1963. 
607 FrGH 115 F15(4). 
608 Plato, Charmides, 158a.  Rung, 2008, p. 34 suggests there were ties of xenia between Pyrilampes 
and the Persian kings. 
609 Strabo, I.3.1. 
610 Rung, 2008, pp. 33-34. 
611 Hoffstetter, 1978, No. 278. Davies, 1971, p. 330. 
612 Hoffstetter, 1978, No. 91.  Miller, 1997, p. 110, believes that he was sent either in response to the 
Samian Revolt in the 440s or at the start of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. and that there is a 
connection between this embassy and that mentioned by Aristophanes (Archarnians 65-7).  The 
possibility of a link between Diotimus and the envoy mentioned by Aristophanes is suggested by 
the connection of Diotimus love of wine and the volume of wine drunk by the envoys in 
Aristophanes.  Both Hoffstetter, 1978, and Rung, 2008, p. 34 suggest that it is unlikely that Diotimus 
stayed in Persia for 12 years, as joked by Aristophanes (Archarnians 65-7).    
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between Athens and Persia, but also it seems probable that this was the result of 
an official treaty. 
 
Authenticity 
Turning our attention to the authenticity of the evidence for a formal 
peace treaty, we find Theopompus is the primary classical source which denies 
it, contrary to Isocrates and Plutarch. Theopompus claims that the Ionic lettering 
of the stele containing the decree, indicates it is a forgery.613  However, 
Thompson provides two convincing arguments for the legitimacy of the stele.614 
Firstly, as the treaty was concluded between Persia and Athens and her allies, it 
would be reasonable to have it inscribed in Ionic letters. He also suggests that 
the stele, which Theopompus saw, was a re-inscription from the fourth century, 
erected after the conclusion of the Peace of Antalcidas. He suggests that the 
original stele may have been destroyed by the Athenians in 412 B.C. when Persia 
began aiding Sparta in the Peloponnesian War.  We may further suggest that the 
original stele may perhaps have actually been destroyed at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War. The argument against the veracity of the treaty due to the 
lettering on the stele, therefore, is not a strong one and, although it is not wise to 
sweep it to one side completely, explanations for the Ionic lettering can be found. 
Although the argument against the Ionic lettering may not have been Isocrates 
only argument, as argued by Stockton,615 we need to be careful speculating on 
this without evidence.  
  
Additional arguments against the authenticity of the treaty rest on the 
lack of evidence in the fifth century, followed by the sudden wealth of it in the 
fourth. However, this can be explained by considerations of politics in the two 
centuries and the purposes of the sources which mention and omit mention of 
the treaty. Thucydides does not mention the treaty, but since the Peace of Callias 
concerns Athens and Persia and not Athens and Sparta, we should not be too 
                                                          
613 FrGH. 688 F15 (4). 
614 Thompson, 1981, p. 165. 
615 Stockton, 1959, p. 62. 
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surprised by this omission.616  Likewise Herodotus does not mention the Peace, 
but his history ends well before 449 B.C., when, I believe, the peace was signed.617  
In contrast to Herodotus and Thucydides, the fourth century sources most likely 
were writing in response to the conclusion of the Peace of Antalcidas and, 
therefore, they were concerned very much with Graeco-Persian relations. 
Cawkwell comments that the process of creating a peace simply to shame the 
Peace of Antalcidas makes the idea of a fabricated treaty even less credible.618 
How would Athens have invented a treaty and had the supposed terms inscribed 
in stone without a massive outcry by sources other than Theopompus? 
 
Of the sources which do mention the treaty, it may be surprising that 
Isocrates Panagyricus only mentions it briefly.  However, the treaty was not 
necessary to fulfil the purposes of his speech and also, it can be argued that if a 
treaty did exist, as I believe it did, it was common knowledge in the 380s and, 
therefore, did not need explicit mention, especially in a context where it was not 
the main subject of the speech. Thompson maintains that Isocrates implies that 
one existed and, if we are to assume a treaty between Athens and Persia is 
fiction, then it almost certainly follows that Isocrates himself  invented (it).619   
Plutarch states that the Athenian double victory at Eurymedon so 
dashed the King's hopes that he agreed to the notorious peace.620  Plutarchs 
reference to Callisthenes supposed denial of the treaty, at XIII.5, suggests that 
Callisthenes was his primary source for this section of Cimons Life. Plutarch 
states AeA?A?AoAjAd A?A?AfAfAdAnAcA?AhAbAm jЄ A?AbAnì oA?ІAoA? nApAhAcA?AnAcA?Ad o ? h A?A?AlA?A?AlAjAh, Al ?У A?A? 
A?AjAdA?A?Ah ?AdA? A?A?A?AjAh AoA?Am ?oAoAbAm A?e ?A?AhAbAm (the Persians never agreed to observe any 
such terms ... this was merely how they behaved in practice, because of the fear 
                                                          
616 Thucydides omits mention of other notable events which we know occurred so we must be 
cautious reading he omission of the Peace of Callias as negative evidence.  See Goldstein, 1975, for 
a discussion on the discrepancy in manuscripts between A, B, E, F, M and G, and manuscript C for 
Thucydides, VIII.56.4.  Where manuscript C uses A?A?ApAoЗAh the other manuscripts use A?A?ApAoAjІ; the 
presence of A?A?ApAoAjІ c uld potentially indicate Thucydides awareness of an official treaty between 
Athens and Persia. 
617 Cf. pp. 145-148. 
618 Cawkwell, 1997, p. 120. 
619 Thompson, 1981, p. 165. 
620 Plutarch, Cimon, XIII.5. Justin, 3.1.1-2, incorrectly claims that the Greek victories over Persia 
upset the Persian nobility to such an extent that they assassinated Xerxes at about the time of the 
Greek victory at the Eurymedon River. 
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which the victory of the Eurymedon had implanted in them.)621 Callisthenes 
argument for a de facto peace treaty is based on the naval pursuits of Pericles and 
Ephialtes.  However, Bosworth notes that, since the sentence in Plutarch is a 
compound sentence, the translation should not read that Callisthenes denies X 
and maintains Y,622 where X would be the peace treaty and Y the claim that the 
Persians allowed the naval expeditions of Pericles and Ephialtes through fear.  
Bosworth believes that Plutarchs Cimon XIII.5 actually means that, although 
Callisthenes did not mention a peace treaty, he did comment on the naval 
expeditions of Pericles and Ephialtes.  "In other words the idiom draws attention 
to an omission of significant detail and reports what variant material is actually 
given.623  Bosworth concludes that Callisthenes did not deny the existence of a 
peace treaty between Athens and Persia, but simply omitted mention of a peace 
treaty and, instead, reported the actual behaviour of the King.  Thus, we can 
conclude that the evidence in Plutarch from Callisthenes confirms the change in 
relations between Persia and Athens, but no more.624 
 
Terms 
The biggest argument used against the authenticity of a peace treaty is 
the apparent inconsistency in the sources giving its terms.  Plutarch says that the 
Great King agreed to move his forces no nearer the Aegean coast than the 
distance which a mounted rider can cover in a day, and to keep his warships and 
bronze beaked galleys out of the water bounded by the Cyanean Islands and the 
Chelidonian Islands.625  Diodorus Siculus states that the satraps of the Persians 
are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian 
                                                          
621 Plutarch, Cimon, XIII.5. 
622 Bosworth, 1990, p. 2. 
623 Bosworth, 1990, p. 2. 
624 Holladay, 1986, proposes a media via, suggesting a cessation of hostilities as the result of the 
Egyptian disaster, followed closely by the recall of Cimon and the Athenian victory at Cyprian 
Salamis, which also resulted in the death of Cimon.  He suggests that, with Persias foreign policy 
defensive rather than offensive and with Athens militarily fatigued, hostilities simply ceased.  He 
denies an official signing of a treaty between Athens and Persia and attributes the fourth century 
stele to Callias descendants, who would emphasise Callias deeds in contrast to the Kings Peace of 
387/6 B.C.  This would suggest that, had Callias family had inscribed a fictitious treaty. However, 
it is far more likely that the family had the terms of the treaty re-inscribed in the fourth century, 
after the destruction of the original. 
625 Plutarch, Cimon, XIII.5. 
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warship is to sail inside of Phaselis or the Cyanean Rocks.626  Blamire surmises 
that these two clauses, concerning the kings army and fleet, must have 
constituted the core of the agreement,627 but suggests that others may have 
existed, for example, such as Diodorus Siculus claims that the Athenians are 
not to send troops into the territory over which the King is ruler.628  It is worth 
noting, as Thompson does, that it appears much of the discrepancy regarding the 
terms of the peace treaty were half-truths and selective presentation as a result 
of the rhetorical style of our sources.629 
The terms concerning limiting the kings forces may be divided into two 
parts: limitations on Persian land forces, and limitations on the Persian navy.  
The limitations on Persian land forces, despite first appearances do not create 
serious problems.  Diodorus Siculus distance of three days march for the army is 
roughly equivalent to Plutarchs distance a mounted rider could travel in a day 
from the coast, i.e. roughly 60 miles depending on conditions.  Demosthenes also 
states that the kings army was not to come within a days ride of the coast.630  
It is likely that the exact distance was written down in official documentation 
and the distance given by these two sources most probably came from the fourth 
century stele mentioned by Theopompus.  Thus, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch 
have recorded them in terms which an Athenian could comprehend.  That 
Plutarch does not mention the distance travelled by foot and Diodorus Siculus 
does not mention the equivalent by horse is not surprising as only one form of 
measuring the same distance was necessary.  Only if the distance by foot and 
horse were different, would it be worth mentioning both.  Badian make the 
attractive suggestion that the distance would have been described originally in 
parasangs, so it would be natural for Greeks to interpret the distance in a way 
that would make sense to them.631   
Isocrates states that, after the Athenian victory at Eurymedon, the Persian 
                                                          
626 Diodorus Siculus, XII.4.4. 
627 Blamire, 1989, p. 146. 
628 Diodorus Siculus, XII.4.4, cf. pp. 144-145 for further discussion. 
629 Thompson, 1981, p. 164. 
630 Demosthenes, XIX. 273. 
631 Badian, 1987, p. 34. 
148 
 
army was not allowed to march across the Halys River,632 the modern Kizilirmak 
in eastern Turkey.  Although this limit is not impossible, I would think it would 
be highly improbable that Artaxerxes would agree not to send any army across a 
place which is over one thousand kilometres from the coast of Asia Minor.  
Badian suggests that the limit of the Halys was imposed on the Royal Army, 
rather than on any general armed forces.  This would be a reasonable 
interpretation of this clause since the Royal Army was not the same as the 
personal army of the satraps of Asia Minor.  He suggests that the purpose of 
this clause must have been to ensure that there would be no preparations for an 
invasion of Europe: historically, that was the only purpose for which a royal 
army had ever appeared in Asia Minor ... and the only conceivable purpose for 
which one would be needed.633  
 
The discrepancy of the limitations for the Persian fleet is also not too 
difficult to explain. The Cyanean rocks or islands, mentioned in Diodorus Siculus 
and Plutarch, according to Aelius Aristides are in the entrance to the Black Sea.634 
The Chelidonian Islands, also mentioned in Plutarch, are seemingly the 
peninsula off the south east coast of Lycia, near modern day Kumluca in Turkey.  
Diodorus Siculus does not mention the Chelidonian Islands, but states that the 
Persian navy was not to sail inside of Phaselis which we may assume is the city 
only a few miles north of the Chelidonian Islands along the Lycian coast.  
Isocrates also mentions Phaselis as a point beyond which the Persians were 
forbidden to sail.635  So we can see that the Persian navy was forbidden to sail out 
of the Black Sea, beyond Byzantium, and also it was forbidden to sail beyond the 
satrapy of Lycia.   
 
Diodorus Siculus mentions two additional terms, which are not found in 
the other sources.  Firstly, that all the Greek cities are to live under laws of their 
own making.636  We know that Diodorus Siculus used Ephorus for this section 
                                                          
632 Isocrates, XII.59. Nearly identical information is given in VI.117-118 and XII.59. 
633 Badian, 1987, p. 35. 
634 Aelius Aristides, XIII.153.  
635 Isocrates, XII.59. 
636 Diodorus Siculus, XII.4.4. 
149 
 
in his history and the mention of an autonomy clause for the Asiatic Greeks is 
present in this account and that given by Lycurgus only.637  Thompson notes that 
these two accounts are the latest accounts chronologically and the presence of an 
autonomy clause in these two accounts alone is significant.  It is worth bearing in 
mind that Diodorus Siculus was writing in the first century B.C. and not the 
fourth century B.C.  The lapse of time between the sources may have allowed for 
romantic embellishment of the terms.  Thus, it is not too far-fetched to imagine 
that, since Diodorus Siculus was consulting sources, which themselves were only 
mentioning the treaty in contrast to the Kings Peace, the addition of an 
autonomy clause as an embellishment is not impossible.  The fourth century 
sources declare the Spartan abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, so it would be 
appropriate for a contrast in the Peace of Callias, where the Great King gave the 
Asiatic Greeks autonomy.  I disagree with Thompsons suggestion that the 
silence of this clause in other fourth century sources is due to its lack of rhetorical 
place, since this clause would have made a perfect contrast to the Kings Peace.638  
It is unknown whether the Ionian Greeks were allowed political autonomy by 
Persia at this time, however, I would suggest not, or, at least, not at the behest of 
Athens since the Athenian League did not have a significant enough claim to 
them at this time and were not in a position to negotiate more than the security 
of mainland Greece. 
 
Diodorus Siculus also mentions a reciprocal term that the Athenians 
would not attack the Persian Empire if the king kept to the terms.  For our fourth 
century sources it would not be necessarily pertinent to their aims to mention 
every term of the peace treaty, only those pertaining to their arguments and so 
we should not necessarily be surprised to find this clause not mentioned.  Green 
suggests this final clause explains the Athenian withdrawal from the Eastern 
Mediterranean ... and the final abandonment of Kimonian policy.639 Although 
all the evidence for the peace treaty has a pro-Athenian bias to it, we should not 
forget that of the two powers the Persian Empire was mightier. Artaxerxes I 
                                                          
637 Lycurgus, I.73. 
638 Thompson, 1981, p. 173. 
639 Green, 2006, p. 184. 
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would expect concessions from Athens if he was to agree to limit the movements 
of his armies and navy. 
 
Dating 
The final cause of doubt for a peace treaty is the discrepancy in the 
sources concerning the dating of the treaty.  Plutarch places the treaty 
immediately after Cimon's defeat of Persian forces at Eurymedon in 466 B.C.640 
However, Diodorus Siculus (XII.4) places it as a consequence of Cimons last 
expedition to Cyprus in 450-449 B.C.  Blamire suggests this discrepancy is due to 
their different sources.641  It is commonly accepted that Diodorus Siculus account 
of the fifth century followed that of Ephorus and so, Blamire believes, Plutarchs 
dating may have derived from a misunderstanding of Kallisthenes.642   
Evidence against Plutarchs date can be found when we consider that 
rather than ceasing military operations after Eurymedon, as one would expect 
from a peace treaty, the Greeks and Persians simply moved the theatre of war 
from the coast of Asia Minor to Egypt and Cyprus.  We learn from Diodorus 
Siculus that Athenian involvement in Egypt only stopped when they were 
defeated at the White Fort in 461 B.C.  Had there been a peace treaty between 
Athens and Persia, we would expect Artaxerxes to complain to Athens directly 
about her behaviour rather than send Megabazus to Sparta in an attempt to 
distract Athens.643  Also, during this time Pericles and Ephialtes conducted their 
naval sweeps along the coast of Asia Minor which Meiggs dates to c. 462- 461 
B.C.644  Badians argument that these naval sweeps beyond the Chelidonian 
Islands is evidence of their political opposition to Cimons foreign policy 
concerning Persia is surely correct.645  As there is no evidence in our sources that 
there was a boundary beyond which the Greek fleet could not cross, we cannot 
take this as evidence that a term concerning a boundary was broken when the 
                                                          
640 Plutarch, Cimon XIII.5. I accept the date in Meiggs, 1972, p. 81, for the Greek victory at the 
Eurymedon River. 
641 Blamire, 1989, p. 144. 
642 Ibid, p. 144. 
643 Cf. p. 223, for a discussion concerning Chabrias, who was recalled from Egypt at Persias behest 
in the fourth century. 
644 Plutarch, Cimon, XIII.4. Meiggs, 1972, p. 79. 
645 Badian, 1987, p. 9. 
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Greek fleets of Pericles and Ephialtes crossed it.  Rather than suggesting that a 
peace treaty signed in the 460s had been broken by this time, or was broken by 
these specific actions, or indeed not broken because these actions did not break a 
specific term, it would be more logical for us to assume that a peace treaty had 
not been signed by then.  The most we can say is that both Pericles and Ephialtes 
sailed along the coast of Asia Minor and there is no known Persian retaliation for 
these actions. 646  Finally, we find evidence of Athenian Persian fighting over the 
Aegean islands, Cyprus and Egypt from 452 B.C. and 449 B.C.647  The continued 
fighting contradicts Plutarchs statement that peace was concluded as a result of 
the Athenians victory at Eurymedon, unless it was broken immediately.  
 
The evidence in Herodotus of an Athenian embassy at Susa in the 460s 
does not necessarily mean that an official peace treaty was concluded at that 
time.  If an official peace treaty had been concluded during this embassy, we 
would expect Herodotus to say so at this point.  However, as we have seen, we 
would not expect to hear of a treaty signed in 449 B.C. as it was in a period after 
which Herodotus was writing.  Badian reminds us that the omission in 
Herodotus should not be taken as negative evidence and claims that Herodotus 
is in any case deliberately suppressing what the Athenian embassy was doing.648 
Much can be made of the ambiguous language in Herodotus when he describes 
Callias as being in Susa on other business.  However, whilst Callias was in 
Persia Athens was still in an alliance with Sparta against Persia, and did not 
repudiate this alliance until 462 B.C. after the Athenian dismissal from Ithome in 
464 B.C.649  Thus, we can see that Callias may have opened talks with Persia in 
the 460s but no treaty was actually agreed at this point and a later date is, thus, 
                                                          
646 Burn, 1984, p. 276, who notes the comments of Corinth to Athens in Thucydides, I.40.4, 
concerning the Athenians alliance with Corcyra against Corinth.  Burn notes that the apparent 
implication is that unless there was a treaty preventing it, the Greeks assumed that war was the 
natural state of affairs between states.  We can suggest this was also true regarding the Persian 
Empire. 
647 It is worth noting that the Athenian campaign for Cyprus between 452 B.C. and 449 B.C. was 
because the Persians seem to have reclaimed it after Pausanias captured the island in the 470s. Unz, 
1986, suggests that Thucydides, rather than depicting events in a strictly chronological order, had a 
tendency to jump ahead to the conclusion of campaigns such as Egypt.  His reconstruction of the 
chronology of the Pentecontaetia suggests that a Peace was concluded in 451 B.C. rather than 449 
B.C. 
648 Badian, 1987, p. 7. 





Although there are inconsistencies concerning the Peace of Callias I do 
not believe they are enough to deny its existence.  Diodorus Siculus, who gives 
the most information regarding the peace treaty, is known for his historical 
inaccuracy when dating events, but he is not credited with creating events from 
fiction.  The silences in Thucydides and Herodotus are not enough evidence to 
deny the existence of a peace treaty.  The mention of an Athenian embassy in 
Susa in the 460s may be taken only as evidence that there were overtures for 
peace by the Athenians during this time.  Further speculation would be putting 
words into Herodotus mouth to suit our own theories.  The events during this 
period lend support to the theory of an official peace treaty signed in 449 B.C., 
after the Athenian victories in Cyprus.  The military activity in Cyprus and Egypt 
prior to 449 B.C. indicates that the war between Athens and Persia so far as we 
can tell was simply moved there from the Ionian coast: it had not stopped during 
this time. 
The contradictory terms presented by our sources may not be so, after all, 
but were simply attempts to interpret the terms in ways that fellow Greeks could 
understand.  Thus, these apparent contradictions should not be taken to discredit 
the treatys authenticity.  Badian explains that the Peace of Callias must be 
assumed to have been made, not because the contracting parties had come to 
love one another and wanted to be friendly, but because they had fought each 
other to a standstill and had come to think that there was more to be lost than 
gained by the continued fighting.650 It is therefore natural to conclude that a 
peace treaty was signed in 449/8 B.C., in order that both sides could consolidate 
what they possessed at that time.  
The Peace of Callias is important not only because it is seemingly the first 
time that Persia negotiated with a Greek state, rather than simply issuing 
demands, but also because of the wider implications concerning Greek foreign 
policy.  Similar to Persian backing of a Greek state in the fourth century, the 
Peace of Callias was Persian recognition of Athens hegemony over Greek foreign 
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affairs in the Aegean which, consequently, prevented Sparta from participating 
in them for the foreseeable future.  Of the other Greek states, none were affected 
more than Sparta, who became victims of their own conservatism and others, 
such as Corinth, Thebes and Argos, seem to have been indifferent.  Significantly 
for the Greeks, the Peace of Callias concluded Persian attempts to invade 
mainland Greece. 
 
Pissuthnes and Samos 
Despite the Peace of Callias, by the late 440s Pissuthnes, satrap of Lydia, 
had become involved in the hostilities between Samos and Athens.651  Civil 
unrest on Samos occurred during the 440s, after Athens had intervened in the 
Samian dispute with Miletus and established a democracy on the island.  Those 
Samians opposed to the new democracy requested aid from Pissuthnes against 
Pericles, who had been sent from Athens to put down the unrest.  Pissuthnes 
sent men to Samos to help them retrieve the hostages from Lemnos and to 
support the Samian attempt to secede from the Athenian Empire. 652  After their 
initial victory over the Athenian forces left on the island by Pericles, the Samians 
were decisively defeated in a naval battle when he returned and Samos, itself, 
was besieged.  The Samians subsequently lost the siege, in the ninth month, their 
walls were removed and the island was fined.653  
Of interest to this study is the involvement of Pissuthnes and rumour of 
the Phoenician triremes sent to Samos, which Pericles was forced to intercept 
after his second victory there.  The involvement of Pissuthnes indicates a friendly 
relationship existed between Samos and the satrap at this time.  Diodorus Siculus 
gives us further details of the episode, but the basic facts are the same as in 
Plutarch and Thucydides.654  In all three accounts we find evidence that Samos 
requested the aid of Pissuthnes, who not only responded positively but also 
proactively.  Clearly, despite the Peace of Callias, Pissuthnes was willing to 
                                                          
651 Thucydides, I.116, Diodorus, XII.27, Plutarch, Pericles XXV. 
652 Ibid. Although Thucydides does not explicitly say that Pissuthnes provided the 700 mercenaries 
for the Samians, it is likely that this was the case. The Samians would have been unable to recruit 
mercenaries from Pissuthnes territory without his permission.  
653 A good discussion of the rebellion of Samos can be found in Meiggs, 1972, pp. 188-192. 
654 Diodorus Siculus, XII. 27. 
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intervene against Athens when invited.  We might conjecture that Persia was 
beginning to adopt a new foreign policy with a view to regaining control of the 
islands along the Ionian coast.  However, despite Pissuthnes initial involvement 
in the Samian rebellion, it is noteworthy that none of the sources state that the 
Phoenician fleet actually appeared.  Had it appeared, this demonstration of force 
by Persia would break the terms of the Peace of Callias and would begin an 
official renewal of hostilities between Greece and Persia.  It was one thing to 
send some mercenaries to a rebellious island when requested and during a 
period when Athens was trying to reassert its control of its Empire in the wake of 
its defeat in Egypt.  However, it was another to send the royal fleet to attack the 
Athenian fleet putting down the same rebellion.  We could conjecture that in the 
time since the Peace of Callias was agreed Persia had become sufficiently secure 
to begin attempting to expand its influence in the Aegean, but only 
opportunistically and covertly.655  However, we should be mindful that these 
actions may also have been those of a rogue satrap.  That Pericles took the threat 
of the arrival of the Phoenician fleet seriously confirms that Athens was aware 
and wary of such attempts by Persia. 
Marsh and Lateiner, discussing Tissaphernes relationship with the 
Phoenician fleet at Thucydides, VIII.81, believe that the Phoenician fleet usually 
was mobilised at the instigation of the Great King, not at the whim of a satrap.656  
In light of this, we may suggest that Pissuthnes support of Samos was not an 
official directive from Artaxerxes I.  S.K. Eddy thinks that Pissuthnes may have 
covertly supported a number of the states which failed to pay tribute in the years 
440-438.657 Therefore, although it is unlikely that Artaxerxes I ordered Pissuthnes 
support of Samos and despite the embassy of Diotimus,658 it is likely that 
Pissuthnes did receive sanction retrospectively. 
                                                          
655 Cf. Eddy, 1973, p. 245. 
656 Marsh, 1932, p. 19. Lateiner, 1976, p. 287. Cf. p. 196. 
657 Eddy, 1973, pp. 251-252. 
658 As mentioned above, p. 148, the involvement of Pissuthnes in the Samian revolt and the 
rumours that the Phoenician fleet may also have become involved, may have been the cause for 
Diotimus embassy to Persia. It is worth remembering that Athenian prisoners captured by the 
Samians during the revolt were given over to Pissuthnes and so it is likely that their release was 
also on Diotimus agenda. 
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 On the other hand, Pissuthnes revolt from Darius II in the 420s suggests 
that he may have started to act independently as early as the 440s and that over 
the course of the intervening twenty years he grew accustomed to this 
independence.659  Certainly, we do not hear of reprisals for his actions which 
were seemingly contrary to the supposed interests of Artaxerxes I, i.e. support of 
Samos rebellion which directly contravened the terms of the Peace of Callias.  
Overall, the actions do not seem to have been considered a serious breach of the 
Peace and may possibly have been unauthorised. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Reviewing the Graeco-Persian relations for the period known as the 
Pentecontaetia, we can suggest that there may have been much more contact 
between Greece and Persia than is mentioned by Thucydides and it is possible to 
divide this period into two parts.  The first, during which time the Delian League 
was formed and Pausanias and Themistocles were accused of medism, indicates 
a period of mistrust of Persia based on the belief that Xerxes and Artaxerxes were 
still intent on invading Greece.  It may be suggested that had the Greeks believed 
that Persia was no longer a threat they would not have taken steps to forestall it, 
nor would the Delian League have been so active. 
The supposed evidence of Pausanias medism suggests a Spartan cover 
up for his actions: whatever they were, they were clearly an embarrassment to 
Sparta.  After the grumblings of the Hellenic League fleet about Spartan 
leadership and the Athenian use of accusations of medism prior to the Persian 
invasion as a political weapon, it is not surprising that such accusations were 
used against Pausanias.  The accusation of medism against Themistocles seems 
to have been in retaliation for those against Pausanias and Themistocles actions, 
like those of Demaratus, suggest that he medised reactively rather than 
proactively.   
                                                          
659 Ctesias FrGH 688 F14 (53), related the rebellion of Pissuthnes, which he says happened shortly 
after Darius II took the throne. I agree with the general consensus that, although Ctesias is 
unreliable, the general basic facts of rebellion are to be believed. We may conjecture that by the 
420s Pissuthnes had grown accustomed to acting on his own initiative under Artaxerxes I and this 
may have been a contributing factor to his revolt. Cf. p. 155, for Ionian and Lesbian claims of 
support from Pissuthnes in 427 B.C. 
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Notable of this period is the seeming Persian lack of aggression in 
contrast to the Delian Leagues overt aggression.  The Delian League attacked 
points on the coast of Asia Minor and Persia responded reactively.  Unlike 
Darius reaction to the Ionian Revolt, Xerxes and Artaxerxes did not try to 
retaliate until the mid-460s when they mustered the Phoenician fleet and Persian 
army which was defeated at Eurymedon.  I suggest that during the period prior 
to Eurymedon Xerxes and Artaxerxes may have been dealing with other, more 
important issues in the Persian Empire, although we cannot be certain of this due 
to lack of sources.  It is easy to forget that the Persian Empire was vast and that 
Persian kings would need to prioritise their actions.  The victories of the Delian 
League seem to have been limited and focused primarily on Byzantium, the 
Ionian Islands and Cyprus.  Moreover, we know of Persians such as Mascames of 
Doriskos who held out against the Greeks.660  Furthermore, we know that despite 
Pausanias capture of Cyprus in the early 470s, the Delian League campaigned 
against the island again in the 460s and then again in the 450s  clearly the 
Greeks were unable to hold Cyprus for very long.661  I believe that Xerxes and 
Artaxerxes were happy to leave their satraps of Asia Minor to deal with the 
Greeks whilst they themselves may have been preoccupied with other matters, 
and planned to retaliate fully when Cimon destroyed these forces which were 
still mustering at Eurymedon.  
 
The second part of the Pentecontaetia is prefaced by the Persian attempt 
to employ Sparta against Athens during the Egyptian rebellion of the 460s and to 
involve them, once again, in international relations.  We can see that during the 
preceding years Sparta had reverted to its traditional policy of isolationism.  The 
embassy of Megabazus indicates that Artaxerxes was fully aware of Greek 
politics and the dispute between Athens and Sparta, and that he was prepared to 
exploit this situation to his own gain, employing the traditional Persian policy of 
dividing and conquering his enemies; a situation which was to be repeated 
during the final years of the Peloponnesian War.  We can also see that mistrust of 
                                                          
660 Thucydides, I.94. 
661 For the campaigns against Cyprus in the 470s Thucydides, I. 94; in the 460s, Thucydides, I. 104; 
in the 450s Thucydides, I. 112. 
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Persia and mistrust of any treaties with Persia was strong enough at this time to 
prevent Sparta from acting in Persias interests by invading Athens, whether or 
not they accepted the gold, which, as we have seen, should probably not be 
interpreted as a bribe. 
The Peace of Callias significantly changed the relationship between 
Athens and Persia, allowing both powers to consolidate their territories without 
the threat of intervention by the other.  The treaty suggests that Athens 
involvement in Egypt had overstretched her resources.  It also suggests that 
whilst Artaxerxes had managed to reassert Persian might and had regained 
control of Egypt, he required assurances that Athens would not try to interfere 
there again whilst conceding Athenian victories at Cyprus and Eurymedon, and 
giving assurances not to mobilise the royal fleet beyond these places.  That the 
two sides had, effectively, fought themselves to a stalemate is apparent, but, as 
argued above, it is unlikely that this situation was not ratified by a peace treaty 
in 449 B.C. which allowed both powers to turn their attention to other matters.  
On the narrower view, it also confirmed Athenian hegemony over Greek 
international affairs, excluding Sparta from them.  Despite Pissuthnes support of 
the anti-democratic Samians in the 440s, which may or may not have had the 
tacit approval of Artaxerxes I, the treaty does not seem to have been deemed 
broken by the Athenians, although a complaint does seem to have been lodged 
by Diotimus. On the broader view, it brought to a close a period when Greece 





Chapter 5: The Peloponnesian War 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter how, during the first 
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, Persia had started to become 
involved in Greek inter-state politics.662 The Persian attitude to Greece seems to 
have led to a closer relationship between the two peoples which was prompted 
by the demands of Greek internal wars.  We noted above that prior to the Peace 
of Callias, Persia attempted to woo Sparta to support her cause against Athens 
and yet, despite Spartan attempts, we will see that it took a further twenty years 
after the outbreak of war for a Spartan-Persian treaty to be made.  The following 
chapter will look at how both Athens and Sparta vied for Persian support during 
the second Peloponnesian War and how Persia exploited this situation to her 
own benefit to secure her own borders, to reclaim the Ionian Greeks and to 
weaken any Greek threat by employing them against each other; in essence to 
reverse many of the concessions made in the Peace of Callias.  Inevitably much of 
the focus will be on the actual actions of Athens and Sparta, which willingly 
drew Persia into their quarrels. 
 
Greek Overtures to Persia 
Thucydides informs us that, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War of 
432 B.C., the Spartans and Athenians planned to send to Persia for alliances.663 
Thucydides does not state explicitly at this point whether embassies actually left 
for Persia, but clearly by this time such an alliance was a viable option for both 
the Athenians and the Spartans.  We are informed that Sparta also contacted her 
allies in Sicily and Italy, and 200 triremes were sent to help the Spartan effort.664  
From this we can deduce that, since a successful embassy went to Sicily and 
Italy, an embassy was likely also sent to Persia.  We hear nothing further from 
Thucydides of this embassy implying that either it was unsuccessful or it was 
delayed.  Hornblower also notes the relationship in the text here to the intent 
                                                          
662 Cf. pp. 132-135 above, for Persias attempt to employ Sparta when Athens was supporting 
Egypts rebellion. 
663 Thucydides, II.7. c. 431 B.C.  Hornblower, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 243, notes the use of A?AeA?AoA?AlAjAd in 
Thucydides is evidence that both parties had decided to look to Persia for support. 
664 Diodorus Siculus also notes this at XII.41.1. 
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expressed earlier at I.82, when at the start of the war Archidamus of Sparta quite 
openly declared his desire for Persian funding for the Spartan war effort.665  
From this it is apparent that Sparta recognised the need to engage, once again, in 
international relations with Persia in order to gain the necessary finances 
required for war.   It would have been natural for Athens to have looked to 
Persia at this time given their relationship as a result of the Peace of Callias. 
The trail of these embassies may be picked up during the following 
summer of 430 B.C., after the failed Spartan siege of Zakynthos.666 Thucydides 
informs us of a Peloponnesian embassy which had stopped in Thrace en route to 
Persia and attempted to persuade Sitalces, the son of Teres, to abandon his 
alliance with Athens and to send aid to relieve Potidaea, which the Athenians 
were besieging. 667 Thucydides also states that they wanted his help in getting 
across the Hellespont to meet Pharnaces, son of Pharnabazus, who was to send 
them on to the King. When the Spartan embassy arrived in Thrace, Thucydides 
says that Sitalces was already hosting the Athenian envoys, Learchus, son of 
Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon.668 Learchus and Ameiniades 
persuaded Sitalces son, Sadocus, to hand over the Peloponnesians to them who 
were taken to Athens and who were executed without trial.669  The ruthlessness 
of this violation of the sanctity of ambassadors indicates the extent of the rivalry 
between Athens and Sparta for Persian support.  
From this incident we can see that both the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians were looking to increase the number of their allies as part of their 
preparations for the war. It is worth noting that Thucydides states that both 
Sparta and Athens looked not only to Persia for support, but to any other 
foreign power too.670 We find evidence of this in the alliance made between 
Perdiccas of Macedon and Athens, and the Athenian appointment of 
                                                          
665 A?AfAfAjAnA? ? lA?Am oAjA?Am CA?AlA?A?AlAjApAm. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 243. 
666 Thucydides, II.67. 
667 We first hear of this story incidentally in Herodotus, VII.137 who concentrates on the connection 
with the fathers of Aneristus and Nicolaus. 
668 Thucydides, II.67. 
669 Gomme, 1962, pp. 200-1, agrees with Marchant, that it may have been on the orders of Cleon, 
rather than Pericles, that the Peloponnesian ambassadors were executed.  Hornblower, 1991, Vol. 1, 
p. 351, does not comment regarding whose orders the Athenians were following, but does note that 
Thucydides language indicates his indignation at the treatment of the Peloponnesian envoys 
despite Athenian justification. 
670 Thucydides, II.7. 
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Nymphodorus from Abdera to be their proxenos.671  It is plausible that it was for 
these negotiations that Learchus and Ameiniades were in Thrace when they 
captured the Peloponnesian embassy.  As noted above, the embassies sent by 
Sparta and Athens, mentioned by Thucydides at II.67, may in fact be the 
embassies which were being planned at II.7. If this is correct, it may help explain 
why an official treaty between Persia and the Peloponnesians was not 
established until 412/411 B.C.  Clearly, since Thrace and Macedon were Athenian 
allies at this time, and in control of the Hellespont, both states were able to 
intercept any Spartan envoys to Persia which journeyed via that route.   
Interestingly we hear nothing further from Thucydides regarding any 
possible embassy to Persia from Athens despite his earlier claims. However, it is 
possible that the embassy involving Diotimus took place at this time.672  We may 
conjecture that perhaps Learchus and Ameiniades were tasked with securing an 
alliance with Thrace and Macedon prior to securing an alliance with Persia after 
these objectives had been achieved.673  Thucydides states that both Athens and 
Sparta had decided to make alliances with Persia and we have seen that Sparta 
had already secured alliances and ships from Italy and Sicily.  It can be suggested 
that whilst Sparta was looking west to its allies in the Mediterranean, Athens was 
looking north-east to its allies in the Hellespont, thus we can see that alliances 
with Persia were part of a larger picture for both the Athenians and the Spartans. 
 
Pissuthnes further involvement with Ionian Greeks 
In 427 B.C., after the failed revolt of Mytilene, we find Pissuthnes 
involved again in Ionian Greek affairs.  We learn that some of the Ionian exiles 
and the Lesbians in the Spartan fleet, which had been sent to help Mytilene, 
suggested seizing some of the cities in Ionia in an attempt to cut off the 
Athenians from their Ionian resources. As part of their arguments to persuade 
the Spartan commander Alcidas the Ionians and Lesbians claimed that they 
                                                          
671 Thucydides, II.29. Previously Athens had considered Nymphodorus an enemy, but in 431 B.C. 
in order to gain favour with Teres, the king of Thrace, Athens made Nymphodorus, Teres brother-
in-law, their proxenos and secured an alliance with Thrace. Sadocus, the grandson of Teres, was 
also made an Athenian citizen and later Thracians supported Athenian forces active in Thrace. 
672 Cf. p. 138. 
673 It should be borne in mind that the Peace of Callias was not a military alliance but more a non-
aggression pact between Athens and Persian.  
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thought they could persuade Pissuthnes to come in on their side.674 Their 
arguments failed to persuade Alcidas, but it is worth noting that the Lesbians 
and Ionians felt that they would be able to persuade Pissuthnes to help against 
the Athenians. Presumably they would argue to Pissuthnes that, by helping 
Sparta to cut off Athenian access to her Ionian resources, he would be able to 
take control of the Ionian cities himself and therefore re-establish Persian control 
of that territory. We have already discussed Pissuthnes involvement in the 
Samian-Athenian hostilities above, so we can argue that the Ionians and Lesbians 
knew Pissuthnes may be willing to intervene should they approach him.675 It is 
clear that they also believed Sparta would not be averse to an alliance with him. 
Despite Alcidas declining the advice to involve Pissuthnes, we find 
evidence Pissuthnes involvement with the political stasis in Notium.676 
Thucydides describes how Notium was divided along the lines of anti-Persian 
and pro-Persian sympathies. The pro-Persian sympathisers had called in 
Arcadian and other foreign mercenaries from Pissuthnes, quartered them within, 
and effectively taken over, the city. The anti-Persian sympathisers had fled the 
city and called on the aid of Paches, the Athenian general, who then retook the 
city after capturing the general of the Arcadian mercenaries.  
We find here another instance of factional opportunism within a Greek, 
this time Ionian, city.  As with Samos, a specific faction within the city had 
turned to Persia for help in securing their control of the city.  It is unsurprising 
that an Ionian city would do this since potential Persian help was closer and 
easier to obtain than for a Greek island.  On Samos the factional conflict was 
divided along the lines of pro- and anti-democracy, whereas for Notium it 
appears to have been pro- and anti-Persian divisions.  However, if we consider 
that Athens installed democracies in many allied cities, we may speculate that 
the pro-Athenian faction was likely also pro-democracy and the pro-Persian 
faction likely was pro-oligarchy.  Thus we can see that the two situations are 
similar.  Importantly the situation also demonstrates Pissuthnes, and therefore 
                                                          
674 Thucydides, III.31. 
675 Thucydides, I.116. Cf. pp. 155-157. 
676 Thucydides, III.32. 
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Persias, attempts to remove Athenian control from what he undoubtedly 
considered Persian territory.  
Although we have confirmed evidence of Pissuthnes involvement only 
with Samos and Notium, since Mytilene suggested asking him for assistance, we 
may suggest that the Mytilenians also considered Pissuthnes a viable option as 
an alternative to Athenian dominance. If we consider the distance between these 
three locations we can see that potentially a large section of the Ionian coast may 
have felt the same in turning to Persia for assistance against Athens.  Despite the 
conclusion of the Peace of Callias of 449 B.C., Pissuthnes clearly did not see any 
problems helping the Ionian Greeks opportunistically.  Either he did not view it 
as contravening the treaty or he did not care that it did whilst Athens was 
preoccupied dealing with Sparta.  We do not know what official sanction 
Pissuthnes received for his involvement with the Ionian Greeks and we may 
suggest possibly he neither sought nor gained official backing for his actions, 
given that he was later executed for rebelling from Artaxerxes.677 Thus, we 
cannot say for certain if Pissuthnes was acting with the permission of Artaxerxes 
or simply consolidating a base from which he could later rebel.  
 
The capture of Artaphernes 
In the winter of 425 B.C., after the capture of Anactorium, Aristides, son 
of Archippus, captured Artaphernes, obtaining the messages he carried back to 
Artaxerxes from Sparta.678 The Athenians learned that Sparta had been trying to 
make an alliance with Artaxerxes but, as the many ambassadors had given him 
different messages, Artaxerxes requested some delegates with definite 
proposals.679 Although Thucydides says that the Athenians were shocked at this 
news, it is more probable that they were shocked the Spartans had managed to 
get so far in negotiations with Persia, rather than shocked that the Spartans were 
trying to make a treaty with Persia at all, since they knew from the capture of 
                                                          
677 Ctesias FRG688 F15 (53). 
678 Thucydides, IV.50. 
679 Thucydides, IV.50. Hornblower, 2011, p. 127 & 1996, p. 207, argues that the Persian documents 
were not translated from Assyrian as mentioned in Thucydides IV.50 or Old Persian Cuneiform 
supposed by Gomme, 1962, Vol. III, p. 498, but Aramaic. 
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Callimachus and Ameiniades that Sparta had been trying to secure an alliance 
before now. 
Sparta had been in talks with Persia in order to obtain money to build up 
the Spartan fleet or to obtain the use of the Phoenician fleet. Hornblower 
suggests that, although it might simply indicate indecisiveness in Spartan foreign 
policy, this claim by Artaxerxes I may have been a diplomatic ploy to make clear 
to the Spartans that, if they wanted Persian financial backing, they must make 
clear that they had no territorial claims in Asia Minor.680  This seems plausible 
given the subsequent treaty of 412/411 B.C. between Persia and Sparta.681  The 
Athenians reacted to this event by sending Artaphernes back to Ephesus with 
some of their own delegates but, on learning of Artaxerxes death in 424 B.C., the 
Athenian delegates returned to Athens having achieved nothing.  
 
Delos and Pharnaces 
 Persian intentions toward the Greek islands can be seen again when in 
426/425 B.C. the Athenians expelled the inhabitants of Delos from the island in 
order to cleanse it; interestingly the Delians were re-homed by Pharnaces in the 
town of Atramyttium in Asia.682 This re-homing of the Delians by Pharnaces 
might indicate an established relationship between Delos and Pharnaces prior to 
the Delian expulsion by Athens. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that Persia 
clearly still had a reputation for taking in refugees.  After their expulsion, we can 
conjecture that the Delians turned to Pharnaces for help and were given 
Atramyttium.  Diodorus Siculus states that it was due to Athenian suspicions of 
a Delian-Spartan alliance that they were displaced.683  
 As noted by both Hornblower and Andrewes, this episode falls in the 
middle of a 10-year gap in Thucydides regarding relations between the Greek 
states and Persia, which Andrewes suggests would have been corrected with 
subsequent revision.684 We are told later that the Delians, who were re-homed in 
Atramyttium, were mistrusted by the Persians and we learn of their ill treatment 
                                                          
680 Hornblower, 1991, Vol. II, p. 207. 
681 Cf. pp. 161-166, 179-184. 
682 Thucydides, V.1, Diodorus Siculus, XII.73.1. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. II, pp. 421-424. 
683 Diodorus Siculus, XII.73.1. 
684 Andrewes, 1961, pp. 1-18. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. II, p. 423. 
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at the hands of Arsaces, hyparch of Tissaphernes.685 We can suggest that the 
Delians applied to Pharnaces due to enmity towards Athens, in the same way 
that Notium, Samos and, perhaps, Mytilene did.  That Pharnaces gave them 
Atramyttium may indicate a policy by Artaxerxes that in order to coax the Ionian 
cities and islands back to the Persian Empire the satraps of the Ionian coast were 
to help in any way that they could, thus generating good will.  Of course, the 
notion may also simply have occurred to the satraps themselves without the 
need of an official royal edict.  The unfortunate treatment of the Delians by 
Arsaces should not detract from the fact that they were given Atramyttium. 
Interestingly, the Athenian re-homing of the Delians back to Delos mentioned by 
Thucydides V.32686 is ascribed to both religious and emotional reasons.  
Thucydides states that the Athenians brought back the Delians to Delos, moved 
by her misfortunes in the field and by the commands of the god at Delphi.  
Whilst we recognise the high esteem in which the Athenians held the Pythia at 
Delphi, we may also think that the Athenians may have finally recognised that, 
with the medism of the Delians, Notium, Samos, and, perhaps, Mytilene, 
discontented Greeks were turning to Persia and, in this way, Athens was rapidly 
losing control of her empire. Another consideration is that, of the islands that 
had turned to Persia for support Delos was not on the coast of Ionia but 
considerably further west. We may conjecture that, Athens may have thought 
that, had they not returned Delos to the islanders, there would have been a good 
reason for Persia to support their eventual return and this would have spread 
Persian power worryingly close to the Greek mainland and may have provided a 
good opportunity for Persia to strike at Greece again.   
 
Peace of Epilycus 423 B.C. 
 It is worth briefly discussing Andocides claims that, in c.423 B.C., the 
Athenians concluded a treaty with Persia as the result of an embassy led by his 
uncle, Epilycus.687  Andocides appears to be the only literary evidence for this 
                                                          
685 Thucydides, VIII.108.  The Delians were invited to dinner by Arsaces and then killed by his men. 
686 Presumably the Delians brought back to Delos by Athens at Thucydides V.32.1 were the 
survivors of the massacre at the hands of Arsaces. 
687 Andocides, III.29. 
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treaty and unfortunately even his supporters warrant that he is never a reliable 
historical witness.688  The only other potential piece of evidence to support this 
embassy is the so called Heracleides decree689, which honours his co-operation 
with ambassadors in peace negotiations.  
Harris recent analysis of the Heracleides decree inscription concludes, 
however, that it is likely it does not refer to a peace treaty between Athens and 
Persia at all.  Harris believes that, with the use of A?AeAtAh rather than A?A?AgA?AcA?AhAoA?Am, 
the Heracleides decree refers to foreign envoys coming from an unknown foreign 
king, rather than Athenian envoys returning from the Great King.690  Harris 
argues that the Ionic script suggests the inscription had been made after 403 B.C., 
but there is no certainty concerning the date of this peace itself.  The date is 
assumed on the belief that the Heracleides mentioned is Heracleides of 
Clazomenai, but this is an assumption and is not supported by the inscription 
itself.  Furthermore, Andocides does not mention any terms to the peace, which 
Epilycus had helped to conclude.  Thus, we are left with the possibility that the 
Peace of Epilycus mentioned in Andocides may not have existed.  On the other 
hand, Blamire, citing Wade-Gery, believes that a peace treaty between Athens 
and Persia is confirmed by this stele, and suggest that, if a peace treaty between 
Athens and Persia was concluded at this time, then the previous Peace of Callias 
could not have existed.691 I do not think this argument is particularly convincing 
as the recent Persian interventions in the affairs of the Ionian Greek islands and 
Delos, as discussed above, and the negotiations between Persia and Sparta, 
would warrant an Athenian embassy to Persia.  Furthermore, it is likely that, 
with the recent death of Artaxerxes I, an embassy would have been sent to Persia 
to re-establish friendly relations with Darius II, as had been established by the 
Peace of Callias with his father.  This may be the embassy led by Epilycus, but 
we must be cautious against ascribing certainty to this. 
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Tissaphernes and Sparta 
 In response to the Athenian disaster in Sicily and whilst Agis was raising 
money to build a Spartan fleet from his position in Decelea, we learn that 
Tissaphernes, governor of the coastal regions of the Persian Empire had 
journeyed to Sparta to form an alliance.692  Tissaphernes had been appointed by 
Darius II to capture Amorges, satrap of Lydia, who was in rebellion and was 
being supported by Athens.693 Thucydides states that damaging Athenian 
interests in Asia Minor and winning an alliance with Sparta were part of 
Tissaphernes strategy to end this rebellion. 694 Lewis believes that Tissaphernes 
wished to use Spartan hoplites to end the revolt of Amorges and any additional 
benefits, i.e. damaging Athenian interests in Asia and gaining the Spartans as 
allies, whilst they would be welcome they were not central to his plan.695  We 
find here that Persia, yet again, turned to using money to achieve her aims and 
during the negotiations with Sparta, Tissaphernes promised to maintain the 
Spartan army.696   
 The negotiations between Tissaphernes and Sparta beg the question - in 
what position was Tissaphernes that he had enough authority to broker an 
alliance with Sparta?  Previously Persia had dictated terms to the Greeks, with 
the exception of the Peace of Callias.  Thucydides states that Tissaphernes was 
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ AnAoAlA?AoAbA?A?Am A?Ah oЗ h e ?AoAt.697  Thucydides does not describe 
Tissaphernes as a Satrap and we learn that he gained Sardis from Amorges only 
                                                          
692 Thucydides, VIII.5. 
693 For Athenian support of Amorges Thucydides, VIII.19 and VIII.28. Westlake, 1977, pp. 319-329, 
argues that the alliance between Amorges and Athens was concluded in response to Tissaphernes 
actions and was not the cause. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. III pp. 766-767, citing Ctesias FrGH 688 F15 
(53), notes the Athenian Lykon helped Pissuthnes revolt with Greek mercenaries.  However, 
whether this was with official backing or not is unknown.   
694 Thucydides, VIII.5. 
695 Lewis, 1977, p. 87. 
696 According to Thucydides VIII.5, Tissaphernes was unable to pay his tribute to Darius due to 
Athenian intervention along the coast of Ionia and so made an alliance with Sparta in order to stop 
this intervention and collect his tribute from the Ionian cities. 
697 Those of the territory below. i.e. subject peoples of provinces. The interpretation of this title 
can be divided into two schools of thought, either that the territory below refers to on the coast 
as used by Thucydides at I.120 or it refers to the lower region as used by Thucydides at II.99, 
when AeA?AoAt is used to describe Lower Macedon. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. III, p. 766.  In this instance 
both interpretations relate to the same geographical area within Tissaphernes command, i.e. the 
coastal/lower regions of the Persian Empire. 
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when he had ended the latters revolt.698 Hornblower notes that Tissaphernes 
command area was Ionia as a general whole, which was not a common 
command. He makes a convincing argument that, taken with the inheritance of 
Sardis, which in turn implies the inheritance of the satrapy of Lydia, 
Tissaphernes seems to have been given a unique command similar to that given 
to Struthas, Tiribazus and Cyrus the younger.699 All three were given command 
of the entire region of Ionia in order to deal with a very specific threat to that 
region of the Persian Empire and, therefore, more sweeping powers were 
required than those of an ordinary satrap. It seems that Tissaphernes then, in 
response to the rebellion of Amorges and possibly with a view to dealing with 
the Athenians too, was given a more general command to deal with the problem 
and from this position Tissaphernes wished to recruit Spartan help.700  
Removing Athens from Asia Minor would not only have restored 
Tissaphernes ability to collect his tribute, but would have weakened Amorges 
rebellion making it easier to crush.  Gomme, Andrews and Dover note that the 
Sicilian disaster and the subsequent weakening of Athens may have encouraged 
Tissaphernes and the other satraps of the opportunity to remove Athenian 
influence from Asia Minor.701  However, they do concede the point made by 
Lewis that the news of Sicily may not have reached the coast of Asia Minor by 
this time.702 That said, there is no explicit evidence supporting a long time lapse.  
It is worth observing that, by this time, the peace between Persia and Athens 
clearly had collapsed.  We may conjecture that, knowing only the limitations on 
the Great King and not Athens, one of the terms may have been that Athens 
could not land forces in Asia Minor.703  Even had this not been an explicit clause, 
the Athenian support of Amorges would have been enough to provoke the King 
into sanctioning an alliance with Sparta.   
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700 Compare with Keaveney, Frustrated Frondeurs, forthcoming. 
701 Gomme, Andrews & Dover, 1981, p. 17. 
702 Lewis, 1977, p. 87, n. 5. 
703 Cf. pp. 145-146. Pericles and Ephialtes, despite sailing along the coast of Asia Minor, never 
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168 
 
 At this time, we also learn of two Greeks living at the court of 
Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who had also been sent by Darius 
to stop Athenian intervention amongst the cities of the Ionian coast and to bring 
Sparta in to an alliance with Darius directly.  These Greeks were Calligeitus, son 
of Laophon, from Megara and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, from Cyzicus, 
both exiles from their cities. 704 The presence of Calligeitus and Timagoras 
indicates once more that it was not uncommon for aristocratic Greeks to find 
refuge in the court of a Persian satrap.  It is likely that Pharnabazus had seen 
how successful the Spartans and Peloponnesians had been in removing the 
Athenians from Tissaphernes territory and, once this had been done, wanted to 
use them for the same purpose for his own satrapy. This first attempt to procure 
the Spartan and Peloponnesian fleet was not successful, Thucydides says, 
because Alcibiades was still in Sparta and the Spartans favoured supporting the 
Chians at his suggestion.705  Thucydides comments that Pharnabazus wanted to 
gain the credit for removing the Athenians from Ionia and for bringing Sparta 
into a treaty with Persia, from which we can deduce two things.706  First, that the 
Athenian actions along the Ionian coast, and the disruptions this had caused, 
was no longer considered a problem for Tissaphernes and his satrapy alone. 
Second, that Darius desire for an alliance with Sparta was public knowledge 
since there were now two satraps attempting to achieve this.  This satrapal 
rivalry between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus became acute after the death of 
Cyrus the Younger.707 
 
 Tissaphernes began working with the Peloponnesians, sending Stages to 
help Teos rebel from Athenian control, in 413 B.C.,708 and after the revolt of 
Miletus, in 412 B.C., the alliance between Tissaphernes and Sparta was formally 
ratified.  Thucydides records that the terms were agreed between Sparta and 
                                                          
704 Thucydides, VIII.6. Cf. Hoffstetter, 1978, 321 and 169. 
705 Thucydides, VIII.12. 
706 Thucydides, VIII. 6 
707 Balcer, 1983, p. 267, notes that with stronger satrapal independence came greater Persian 
cultural influence upon the Ionian Greeks. 
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the King and Tissaphernes709 indicating that official royal backing for 
Tissaphernes endeavours.  The terms of this treaty were; that all the territory 
held by the King or held by his ancestors in the past should belong to him; the 
Spartans and the Persians would attempt to prevent the Athenians collecting 
tribute from the Ionian Greeks; operations were to be carried out jointly between 
Sparta and Persia; the war with Athens could not be brought to an end without 
the consent of both parties; and Persia and Sparta were to have the same friends 
and enemies.710  The abandonment of the Ionian Greeks indicates a break from 
the general Greek policy of resistance to Persian overlordship there, which we 
find in the Spartan embassy to Cyrus in the sixth century,711 the Athenian and 
Eretrian involvement in the Ionian Revolt,712 and the actions of the Delian 
League.713  Sparta and Persia now were perforce to co-operate to achieve their 
own particular goals, although Spartan qualms soon became manifest, and once 
more the Ionian Greeks became a political issue. 
 Upon the conclusion of this treaty, we find joint operations against the 
Argives and Athenians at Miletus,714 operations on Iasus, and to capture the rebel 
Amorges.715  For Tissaphernes it was necessary to crush Amorges rebellion 
before he could bring the Ionian Greek cities back into the Persian fold.  Having 
dealt with Amorges, we find Tissaphernes fully engaged in removing the 
Athenians from Ionia.  He was personally present in the battle at Miletus716 and 
he sent Tamos717 to help in the attempt to remove the pro-Athenian faction from 
Clazomenai.718  ¢ȂȱȱȱȱȱAiApAhA?AeA?AfA?ApA?ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the part of Tamos and the Peloponnesians. Thus, we can see that, whilst 
Peloponnesian forces were working with the forces of Tissaphernes in Asia 
                                                          
709 Thucydides, VIII.18. 
710 Thucydides, VIII.18. 
711 Herodotus, I. 152-3, cf. pp. 14-15 above. 
712 Herodotus, V. 99, cf. pp. 46-47 above.  
713 Thucydides, I. 96, cf. pp. 115-116 above. 
714 Thucydides, VIII.25. 
715 Thucydides, VIII.28. 
716 Thucydides, VIII.25. 
717 Tamos is officially described in Thucydides VIII.31 as the King of Persias officer in Ionia, from 
which Hornblower rightly infers that he was an officer of Tissaphernes since Tissaphernes, as we 
have already established, had been given command over the coastal/lower regions of the Persian 
Empire which would have included Ionia. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. III, p. 840. 
718 Thucydides, VIII.31. 
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Minor, the good relationship between the two powers enabled both sides were 
able to further their respective aims. 
 By 412 B.C., Tissaphernes and Sparta had put an end to the rebellion of 
Amorges, who had been captured, and they had also captured of some of the 
Athenian controlled cities in Ionia, most notably Miletus and Teos.  The loss of 
these cities will have affected the collection of Athenian tribute, but it is notable 
that Athens was still able to collect tribute from other Ionian cities and to 
continue fighting the war.719 
 
Initial Revisions to the Spartan-Persian Treaty 
In the winter of 412 B.C. revisions to the treaty between Tissaphernes and 
Sparta were proposed by the Spartan Therimenes, who was with the 
Peloponnesian forces at Miletus.720  Since Sparta at this time had little interest in 
affairs outside of the Peloponnese and Aegean, it could be argued that her 
actions in Asia Minor had benefited only Tissaphernes, who was now able to 
collect taxes from the newly conquered Ionian cities.  Peloponnesian grumblings 
whilst they were at Miletus about the apparent one-sidedness of their 
relationship with Persia are understandable when we consider that, having 
achieved many of Tissaphernes aims, he then reduced the amount paid to the 
Spartan forces.721  
 Two significant amendments to the terms were proposed: firstly, that the 
Spartan forces and their allies were not to attack the territory of the Kings or that 
held by his ancestors, nor were the Spartans to exact tribute from any of this 
territory. Likewise the King and his subjects would not attack Sparta or her allies.  
Both of these terms recall the Peace of Callias, and we may speculate about the 
impact this treaty had upon the terms between Sparta and Persia now being 
agreed. Also included was a term stating that should any of the allies of one of 
the parties attack the other, then all members of the treaty would aid the victim. 
Clearly, now that the Athenians had been removed from Tissaphernes territory, 
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Darius did not want Sparta stepping into Athens shoes.  These revisions 
requiring the Spartans to agree not to attack any territory under Persian control 
and to punish any state which might do so is clearly an attempt by Darius to 
neutralise any potential threat from Sparta. The second proposed amendment 
was that the Spartan forces in Persian territory at the request of the King were to 
be maintained by the King.  The initial treaty made no mention that Tissaphernes 
was to pay the Peloponnesians, but this seems to have simply been understood. 
His reduction of the Peloponnesian pay from 1 drachma to 3 obols prompted the 
Spartans to request guarantees of pay from him. The revised terms seem to have 
been sent back to Sparta for approval and, upon the arrival of Spartan 
reinforcements to Cnidus with eleven Spartan commissioners, they were 
discussed with Tissaphernes.722  Spartas unease with the previous terms 
regarding the Ionians and the Greek islands can be seen in the arguments of 
Lichas, one of the commissioners.  Lichas argued that since the Ionian Islands 
had been liberated, the clause stating that all of the territory which belonged to 
Darius and had belonged to his ancestors should remain in Persian control was 
not relevant.  Conforming to this term would mean handing over these liberated 
islands into Persian control again.  In their desire for Tissaphernes support the 
Peloponnesians, apparently, originally agreed to recognise Persian domination 
over all territory currently and previously held by Persia, which no doubt 
included the Greek cities of Ionia.  Lichas complaint indicates that the 
Peloponnesians now recognised the full impact of this.  Westlake notes that by 
the time of Lichas complaint tensions between the Spartans and Tissaphernes 
had been growing for some time, believing that the specific point made by 
Lichas  was largely academic: a Persian claim to Greek territory extending as 
far as the forces of Xerxes had penetrated could hardly in 412 have been 
seriously pursued to its extreme limits.723  However, this issue was not wholly 
dead, as can be seen by the actions of Conon and Pharnabazus in the 390s B.C.724 
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 Reviewing the treaty between Sparta and Persia and its revisions we can 
see that the motivation for the initial treaty was primarily an alliance against the 
Athenians in an attempt to prevent them collecting tribute from the cities along 
the Ionian coast. These initial revisions were intended to regulate Peloponnesian 
expenses, whilst still protecting Persias interests.  The additional revision 
regarding the Kings territory seems to have been an attempt by the Spartans to 
assuage their consciences. We can see a progression from the initial treaty, where 
both parties were mutually dependant to achieve their objectives, through to this 
newly proposed revision, indicating that the Spartans and their allies were 
negotiating for more equality in their relationship with Persia.  Westlake 
suggests that Tissaphernes treatment of the Spartans suggest that he regarded 
them rather as mercenaries hired to do his bidding than as partners with rights 
equal to his own.725  The result of this attempt to gain a more equal footing with 
Tissaphernes was that the satrap left the meeting, infuriated, with nothing 
having been achieved.  Lewis accepts Thucydides view that, by this time, 
Tissaphernes was suspicious of Peloponnesian intentions and was being 
convinced by Alcibiades that an excessive strengthening of the Spartans would 
present him with a serious threat.726 Lichas complaint concerning the territory, 
which was under Persian control, coupled with Alcibiades arguments may have 
confirmed these suspicions.   
 
Alcibiades 
Prior to Spartas occupation of Miletus, Alcibiades fell out of Spartan 
favour, and his arrest and execution were ordered. Subsequently, he fled to the 
court of Tissaphernes, and he is credited with suggesting the reduction in the 
Spartan pay and with giving the advice to Tissaphernes that he should help both 
Athens and the Peloponnesians enough to ensure that they weakened each 
other.727  It is not clear whether Alcibiades already knew of the Persian policy of 
dividing its enemies but his advice certainly follows this policy.  In light of this 
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we will now turn our attention to Alcibiades and consider his involvement in the 
Graeco-Persian affairs of the fifth century.  
Briefly recapping the life of Alcibiades prior to his time with 
Tissaphernes, he is first introduced by Thucydides sabotaging the negotiations 
between Athens and Sparta in 420 B.C., and effecting an alliance between Athens 
and Argos instead.728  However, he came to notoriety when he was accused of 
mutilating Hermae the night before the Athenians Sicilian Expedition of 415 
B.C.729  He was recalled from the expedition for trial but fearing political bias he 
went into exile in the Peloponnese.730 In his absence he was condemned to death 
and was invited to live in Sparta.731  Alcibiades subsequently worked for the 
Spartans against Athens but when he was also denounced in Sparta he fled to the 
court of Tissaphernes.   
Alcibiades subsequently worked against the Peloponnesians and he is 
credited with souring their relationship with Tissaphernes.732 We are told that 
Alcibiades suggested to Tissaphernes that he should reduce the rate and 
regularity of pay for the Peloponnesian fleet and, Thucydides claims, he 
intercepted and refused admission to the cities which approached Tissaphernes 
for financial aid.733  We have already noted that he is credited with the idea that 
Tissaphernes should let the Athenians and the Peloponnesians weaken each 
other through war and, thus, avoid becoming a threat to Persian interests.734 
Thucydides claims this was not out of loyalty to Darius II or Tissaphernes but 
rather as part of a scheme, to enable his recall to Athens with all charges against 
him dropped.  Thucydides claims that Alcibiades recognised that if he appeared 
on friendly terms with Tissaphernes the Athenians would eventually recall him 
to Athens to gain Tissaphernes favour themselves and the financial benefits this 
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entailed.  The actions of Alcibiades here make an interesting comparison with 
those of Aristagoras during the Ionian Revolt, who initially enjoyed the favour of 
Darius I, but then attempted to win favour with Sparta and Athens in an attempt 
to secure his position as A?A?A?AoAlAjA?AjAm of Miletus, which had become threatened by 
his dispute with Megabates.735  It also shows that Alcibiades was attempting to 
influence Persian foreign policy for his own ends; how far what he suggested 
had already been decided by Persia is a moot point. 
 
From Tissaphernes court Alcibiades contacted the Athenian fleet at 
Samos, and persuaded them that, if Athens became an oligarchy and recalled 
him, he would be able to convince Tissaphernes to support them.736  As a result 
of this, the Athenians were persuaded by Pisander to change their form of 
government, resulting in much political upheaval within Athens, and Alcibiades 
was recalled in the summer of 411.737  He was made supreme general of the 
Athenian fleet in the war.  However, after the battle at Abydus he was captured 
and imprisoned by Tissaphernes,738 who he was attempting to bring over to 
support the Athenians.  He escaped after thirty days and made his way to 
Clazomenai from where he continued to progress the war in the interests of 
Athens.  Alcibiades worked fervently for the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war 
until the battle of Notium, where the Athenian fleet was defeated by Lysander 
and Alcibiades fell into disgrace again.  He was replaced as general of the 
Athenian fleet by ten new generals, at which point he retired to his estates in the 
Chersonese.739  After the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami and the fall 
of Athens, Alcibiades decided to approach Darius as an exile via the help of 
Pharnabazus.740  He was assassinated by Pharnabazus at the behest of Sparta and 
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we may speculate that he had outlived his usefulness to Persia and so needed to 
be removed.741 
 
Looking at the career of Alcibiades it can be seen that, although he did 
work for Tissaphernes, his relationship was different to that of other Greeks 
previously accused of medism.  Alcibiades did not work for Tissaphernes 
directly for any substantial length of time; the majority of the time he was 
working for Sparta, who had an agreement with Tissaphernes. The only time he 
was a guest of Tissaphernes whilst not working for Sparta was after the Athenian 
victory at Miletus742 and before he joined the Athenian fleet at Samos.  Therefore, 
it is on this period we will concentrate.   
Thucydides states that the primary reasons for Alcibiades flight from 
Sparta were that he had made an enemy of the Spartan king, Agis, and that he 
had been denounced by the Peloponnesians.  Ellis argues that Alcibiades had 
influence with the Spartan Endius,743 who was a xenos of Alcibiades family and 
was one of the Ephors in position in 411 B.C. As Endius finished his term in 
office just prior to Alcibiades flight from Sparta, we may speculate he was no 
longer in a position to protect Alcibiades. 744  Ellis notes that when Alcibiades 
arrived at the court of Tissaphernes he will have been received initially as a 
Spartan adviser.  In order to secure his position, knowing that news of his 
displacement from Sparta would eventually reach Tissaphernes, Alcibiades will 
have needed to work quickly to gain Tissaphernes confidence on a personal 
basis.745 
Gribble suggests that, although Alcibiades is described A?AdA?A?AnAeA?AfAjAm 
A?A?AhAoAtAh ? d ?AhA?AgA?AhAjAm to Tissaphernes as with other Greek medisers, this may not 
be entirely true.746  We are only told by Thucydides that Alcibiades advised 
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Tissaphernes twice.  Firstly, concerning the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet; and 
secondly, concerning Persian policy towards Athens and Sparta during the 
Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades suggestions concerning paying the 
Peloponnesian fleet may be genuine and will have been willingly accepted as a 
way for Tissaphernes to save money.  We have already noted how, once 
Athenian forces had been removed from Tissaphernes territory, he became less 
enthusiastic for the Spartan cause.  It is quite easy to comprehend that, having 
used these forces to his benefit, Tissaphernes took Alcibiades advice because the 
Peloponnesians had served his direct purpose and he did not wish to keep 
paying them.  Gribble also notes that Alcibiades advice on Persian foreign policy 
was the logical policy for Tissaphernes to pursue in any case.747  Therefore, 
Alcibiades influence with Tissaphernes may have gone no further than having 
suggested a couple of good ideas which were in Tissaphernes interests and 
which, as we have noted, he may already have worked out for himself.  Plutarch 
states only that Alcibiades came to occupy the highest place in his 
(Tissaphernes) favour;748 and that Tissaphernes renamed his favourite park 
after Alcibiades.749  Furthermore, Thucydides informs us that when Phrynichus 
denounced Alcibiades to Astyochus, the Spartan Admiral, Tissaphernes passed 
the information onto Alcibiades twice.750  Clearly the men had a close personal 
friendship at the time, but this does not indicate how far Alcibiades was able to 
influence Tissaphernes politically.751  By the time Alcibiades was recalled to 
Athens his position of favour with Tissaphernes seems to have ended, 
confirming that any real political influence he may have had was exaggerated or, 
at least, of limited duration.  We should not forget that after Alcibiades left 
Tissaphernes court and achieved the Athenian victory at Abydos, Tissaphernes 
had Alcibiades arrested, having been given direct orders from Darius that he was 
to wage war against the Athenians.  Mitchell notes that, during his talks with the 
Athenians in an attempt to be recalled, Alcibiades exploited the Greek custom of 
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ΒΉΑϟ΅, and suggests that, by claiming to be a ΒνΑ΍ΓΖ of Tissaphernes, Alcibiades 
managed to persuade the Athenians that he had concrete support from 
Tissaphernes, which he did not.  She maintains that Alcibiades was clearly trying 
to obtain an official ΒΉΑϟ΅ relationship with Tissaphernes; however, when 
Alcibiades attempted to formalise the friendship, his ΒΉΑϟ΅ gifts and ΈДΕ΅ were 
refused by Tissaphernes.  It appears that Tissaphernes viewed Alcibiades as a 
useful courtier, rather than an equal, as is evidenced by Alcibiades arrest.752  
Alcibiades exaggeration of his influence was not an uncommon Greek trait, as 
we have seen from Herodotus depiction of Hippias influence at the court of 
Darius I and is also apparent in Xenophons depiction of the role of Clearchus at 
the trial of Orontas.753 
 
On looking at the dates when Alcibiades fled Sparta and then went to 
Samos, we can suggest that Alcibiades was at Tissaphernes court for no longer 
than a year.754  This suggests that Alcibiades did not have much time to gain as 
much influence as is claimed by Thucydides. Furthermore, as is demonstrated by 
Alcibiades arrest, Tissaphernes did not have as much freedom with Persian 
foreign policy as Alcibiades would have liked, and once he had been given a 
direct order from Darius he was unable to act contrary to this.   
Gribble acutely points out that, as we progress through book VIII of 
Thucydides, Alcibiades influence with Tissaphernes seems to diminish until we 
find him deceiving the Athenians during their negotiations with Tissaphernes.755 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱA?ЁAcA?Amȱ
AgA?AoA? A?ІAoA?ȱAeA?A? ?AhȱAoХ A?ЁAoХ ArA?dAgЗAhAd756 indicates that, despite Alcibiades ideas, 
Tissaphernes either had no intention of supporting the Athenians or lacked the 
freedom to do this. 
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Thucydides, despite his earlier claim, recognises Alcibiades actual lack of 
influence when he states that he exaggerated wildly his influence with 
Tissaphernes to the Athenian fleet at Samos. He gives three reasons for this 
exaggeration; firstly, to increase his own reputation amongst the Athenians, 
secondly, to intimidate the 400, who had taken control of Athens and were ruling 
as an oligarchy, and thirdly, to cast doubt on the relationship between the 
Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes.757  Thus, we can see that, in fact, Alcibiades 
had very little actual influence with Tissaphernes. Alcibiades claim to have 
prevented the Phoenician fleet from sailing to the Spartans from Aspendus can 
also be seen as an exaggeration. Tissaphernes had travelled to Aspendus, with 
Lichas the Spartan general, followed by Alcibiades, supposedly to collect the 
Phoenician fleet there.  However, Tissaphernes returned from Aspendus without 
the Phoenician fleet, after the Peloponnesian defeat at Miletus.  Marsh and 
Lateiner note that Tissaphernes did not have the authority to command the 
Phoenician fleet. Marsh believes that, as Phoenicia was not part of his satrapy, 
Tissaphernes did not have command over the Phoenician fleet.758  Thus, if the 
fleet was dispatched to Aspendus for Tissaphernes use, it had been ordered 
there by Darius II himself.759 By extension of this argument, the fleet did not 
depart from Aspendus not due to the actions of Tissaphernes, but because it had 
been ordered not to.  Marsh reminds us that Tissaphernes would not have sent 
the fleet away without the official sanction of Darius II.760  Lateiner believes that 
not using the Phoenician fleet was a deliberate Persian policy and maintains that 
Persian awareness of the ineffectiveness of the Phoenician fleet against the 
Athenian navy meant that Persian commanders did not use the Phoenician 
navy  unless their numbers were overwhelmingly superior.761 This argument 
is supported by the defeat of the Phoenician fleet at Salamis, which Darius II may 
have recalled.  Lateiner plausibly notes that the threat and/or promise of the 
Phoenician fleet, which if allied with either the Spartan or Athenian fleets could 
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win a decisive battle, thus potentially ending the Peloponnesian War, was a 
cheaper and more politically effective tool for the Persians.762   
   
On reviewing Alcibiades medism we can conclude that Alcibiades, 
rather than staying at Tissaphernes court in order to medise, was actually there 
because he had nowhere else that he could go.  He had been exiled from Athens 
and Sparta, both of which had issued death warrants against him, and his 
options were extremely limited.  We can see strong similarities with 
Themistocles, who also sought refuge in the Persian Empire during his exile 
because he had nowhere in Greece he could stay.  Alcibiades, as I have argued, 
did not spend enough time with Tissaphernes to gain any significant political 
influence, despite the fact the two men apparently became personal friends.  It is 
interesting to compare Alcibiades sojourn with Tissaphernes to Themistocles 
exile in the Persian Empire.  Whilst Themistocles seems to have recognised that 
once he had taken refuge in Persia there was no possibility of effecting a return 
to Greece, Alcibiades time with Tissaphernes may be seen as a sojourn, during 
which he was planning his return to Athens.  We can suggest that this difference 
may be because Themistocles had been branded a mediser prior to his flight to 
Persia and, therefore, could not return, whereas there is no evidence that 
Alcibiades was accused of medising, even after he had stayed with Tissaphernes.  
The charges against both men were serious.  However, those against Alcibiades 
did not threaten the security of the state and, once he had removed his political 
enemies, he was acquitted of his charges. 
We can see that Alcibiades stayed with Tissaphernes only for as long as it 
took him to persuade the Athenian fleet at Samos to recall him, at which time he 
went to Samos.  Alcibiades actions whilst he stayed with Tissaphernes do not 
particularly suggest he wished to medise at that time.  He did not fight any 
engagements for Tissaphernes, he does not seem to have been there long enough 
to do this, and his activities seem to have been limited to giving two pieces of 
good advice and having a paradeisos named after him.  Interestingly, after 
Aegospotami Alcibiades did try to medise, in the conventional sense, when he 
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approached Pharnabazus, in much the same way as Themistocles had done.  By 
this time his circumstances had changed and now resembled those of 
Themistocles, in that, this time there was no effecting a return to Athens in his 
foreseeable future.  That he approached Pharnabazus rather than Tissaphernes is 
not surprising after his arrest,763 but it does suggest that Alcibiades did not 
realise that his arrest warrant had been issued by Darius II and was not a whim 
of Tissaphernes. 
 
Tissaphernes, Alcibiades and Athens 
 Turning our attention from Alcibiades alleged medism to his 
involvement in the negotiations between Persia and Athens, we can see that by 
411 B.C. Alcibiades had begun to cultivate the notion amongst the Athenian fleet 
at Samos of an Athenian-Persian treaty.764  Upon his return to Athens, he can be 
found working even harder to promote a treaty between Athens and Persia.  It is 
clear that, after the disastrous losses suffered in Sicily, the Athenians had come to 
recognise the importance of Persian finance for the war.  In the winter of 411 
B.C., just after the blockade of Chios had been reinstated and strengthened by the 
Athenians, an Athenian embassy arrived at the court of Tissaphernes.765  
Whereas the Athenians were ready to make a treaty, Thucydides claims that 
Alcibiades sabotaged the negotiations and convinced the Athenians that they 
were not offering enough766 to Tissaphernes, when he realised that a treaty was 
no longer possible.  However, Lewis offers a different interpretation of the 
situation.767  If we are to believe that Tissaphernes had gained as much as he felt 
necessary from his alliance with the Peloponnesians and that, due to the 
complaint by Lichas, he felt that they were now becoming troublesome, we may 
suggest that Tissaphernes may have begun to start considering other options 
available to him besides an alliance with the Peloponnesians. Lewis notes the 
omission in Thucydides of how Tissaphernes would have explained his complete 
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reversal in strategy to Darius, had a treaty with Athens succeeded. He suggests 
that Tissaphernes may have been seriously considering making a treaty with 
Athens, but only if he could gain enough concessions to ensure the approval of 
Darius.768  Hence, the Athenians had agreed to relinquish Ionia and the islands 
along the Ionian coast and a complete reversal of the terms in the Peace of 
Callias.  It is only when Tissaphernes wanted to include a clause in the proposed 
peace that allowed Darius to build up a fleet along the Ionian coast that the 
ambassadors backed out of the negotiations, and for good reason.  The freedom 
to build a fleet along the Ionian coast would remove the means by which Athens 
would be able to detect any preparations for another possible invasion of Greece 
and might threaten the Athenian Empire. We may conclude that the Athenians 
were willing to agree not to meddle in the affairs of Darius and, even, to cut 
some of their losses in the form of the Ionian Greeks, but they were not prepared 
to allow him any possibility that would lead to the loss of their own liberty. For 
Tissaphernes part, we may agree with Lewis, the best way for him to convince 
Darius that an alliance with Athens was more beneficial than the current one in 
place with Sparta would be to convince him that Athens would give greater 
concessions to Persia than Sparta would.  The Peloponnesians had already 
agreed not to attack the Kings territory and not to attempt to collect tribute from 
the Ionian cities, so there would be little gain in eliciting the same terms from 
Athens.  Lewis argument is convincing and helps focus our attention on the 
realities of Tissaphernes situation outside of the sphere of Alcibiades supposed 
influence.  He comments that, getting an agreement out of Athens which 
(would) satisfy the King (was) always slim.769  However, he also notes that the 
negotiations will have demonstrated to Sparta that Tissaphernes had other 
options.  It is interesting to consider how far Tissaphernes looked for the same 
concessions from both cities to see which would actually deliver.  Perhaps we 
may conclude that the negotiations with Athens were actually a demonstration 
to the Spartans that they were not Tissaphernes only possible allies, rather than 
his desire to come to terms with Athens. 
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Astyochus of Sparta 
One result of Tissaphernes reduction in pay for the Peloponnesian fleet is 
the charges of medism against the Spartan general, Astyochus.  Rumours had 
begun circulating amongst the disaffected Peloponnesians that in order to make 
money for himself he had sold his services to Tissaphernes.770  The issues 
concerning pay climaxed after Alcibiades recall and the fleet turned against 
Astyochus.  Thucydides reiterates that the fleet blamed Astyochus for the 
irregularity and shortness of their pay and, furthermore, that it was due to 
Astyochus intention to profit financially from his friendship with Tissaphernes 
that he did not try harder to recover their pay.  As a result of these complaints, 
Astyochus was nearly stoned and only escaped by taking refuge at an altar.771  
We can see that Astyochus was not very popular with the fleet for other reasons 
too. Hornblower notes that when Astyochus chastised Dorieus, a free Rhodian 
complaining about pay, Thucydides mentions that he raise(d) his bakteria 
against him, the bakteria was the Spartan stick used to signify command.  
Hornblower comments that although the bakteria was not a proper weapon, it 
was appropriate as a repressive device for coercing or threatening a helot.772  
Thus, we can see that a likely part of the problem the Peloponnesians had with 
Astyochus, as with Pausanias before him, was his rough treatment of them. 
Thucydides reports further damning rumours against Astyochus relating 
how, when the Athenian Phrynichus was trying to prevent the recall of 
Alcibiades to Athens in 411 B.C.773 Phrynichus had sent a letter denouncing 
Alcibiades to Astyochus, not realising that Alcibiades had already fled to the 
court of Tissaphernes. The letter stated that Alcibiades was attempting to 
persuade Tissaphernes to support the Athenians instead of the Spartans. 
Astyochus response to Phrynichus letter was to visit Tissaphernes and 
Alcibiades, rather than report anything back to Sparta and, according to 
Thucydides, turned informer himself.774   
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The final evidence for the supposed medism of Astyochus is rooted in the 
complaints within the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus.775  The complaints were 
that both Astyochus and Tissaphernes had refused action against the weakened 
Athenian navy, after the failed Sicilian expedition, and they were still delaying 
action when the Athenian fleet was suffering from political unrest whilst 
stationed at Samos.  Astyochus did eventually order the Peloponnesian fleet to 
attempt to draw the Athenian fleet into a battle, but the Athenians refused battle 
and retired to Samos. 
 
Looking at the supposed medism of Astyochus, his apparent motivation 
is personal financial gain from Tissaphernes.  Whilst Ellis notes that the entire 
Spartan fleet was in the pay of Tissaphernes,776 this misses the point, which was 
that the average sailor only sought what he considered just pay, whereas 
Astyochus was suspected of profiteering.  Ellis is correct, however, when he 
notes that in Sparta Astyochus was acquitted of the charges brought against him.  
Furthermore, the only reference to Astyochus in Xenophon concerns him 
supporting Hermocrates in denouncing Tissaphernes, where he is described as a 
trustworthy witness.777  The primary case against Astyochus seems to be based 
on two things.  Firstly, lack of pay from Tissaphernes for the Peloponnesian fleet, 
secondly betraying Phrynichus confidence by reporting the contents of his 
letters to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.  When Thucydides states that Alcibiades 
suggested to Tissaphernes to reduce the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet he also 
states that Tissaphernes successfully bribed the captains of each ship to gain their 
help with this.778  Astyochus may well have received a bribe along with the other 
captains, or indeed a larger bribe considering his rank as admiral; however, it 
could be claimed that, like the other captains, he did not directly betray Sparta in 
doing this.   
With regards to betraying Phrynichus confidence we may suggest that, 
rather than going to Tissaphernes to betray Phrynichus, he went there to protest 
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about the supposed support Tissaphernes was giving the Athenians.779 This 
seems the more likely actions of a man who is later found being treated with 
respect and was seemingly acquitted of the charges of medism.  It is worth 
noting that Spartans convicted of medism either escaped to Persia, as did 
Demaratus, or they were condemned and executed, as was Pausanias.  The fact 
that Astyochus was both alive and apparently well in Sparta after these charges 
had been brought against him by the Peloponnesians further confirms his 
apparent acquittal. 
Having acquitted Astyochus of the charges of medism, we can look to 
their causes.  It is clear that the Peloponnesian fleet was disaffected and this 
stemmed from their irregular and reduced pay from Tissaphernes.  Despite 
previous pro-Persian sentiments, we can see that the negative connotations of 
medism could quickly be recalled when the relationship between Sparta and 
Persia soured.  However, it should be noted that the charges against Astyochus 
are now an exception to the general rule of pro-Persian sentiment.  We can see 
how, even remotely, Tissaphernes, and, therefore, the Persian Empire, was able 
to affect Peloponnesian morale.  By financing the Peloponnesian fleet and then 
removing this Tissaphernes had created an environment whereby the 
Peloponnesians were more desirous of a treaty with Persia than previously and 
would make further concessions in future negotiations.  
 
Spartan-Persian Treaty  Third Revisions 
 Within three months of the breakdown in negotiations between Sparta 
and Tissaphernes both sides recognised the need for an alliance in order to 
achieve their aims; Sparta was unable to defeat the Athenian fleet and thus win 
the war, and Tissaphernes was unable to remove the remaining Athenians from 
his territory.  In these new revisions to the treaty no mention is made regarding 
the territory of Darius beyond that which he currently held. Furthermore, 
Tissaphernes agreed to pay the Peloponnesians as in the second treaty, i.e. to pay 
those Peloponnesians in Persia who had been invited there by Darius, until a 
Persian fleet arrived to relieve them. However, the treaty also stated that, once 
                                                          
779 Ellis, 1989, p. 75. 
185 
 
the Kings fleet had arrived, the Peloponnesians would be responsible for 
funding their own fleet but, should they wish, Tissaphernes could finance the 
fleet and the Peloponnesians would be able to repay him after the war had 
finished. Also, there was a clause stating that the Kings fleet and the 
Peloponnesian fleet were to act in concert and a peace treaty with Athens could 
only be concluded if both Sparta and Persia were involved.780 We see in these 
third revisions that the clause, which had previously stated that all of the 
territory belonging to Darius and his ancestors should be relinquished to Persia, 
was replaced with one stating that only the territory belonging to Darius at that 
time would be included. The clause regarding the funding of the fleet suggests 
that, whilst Tissaphernes was willing to compromise, he wanted Sparta to 
remember which was the dominant power in their relationship.  The necessity 
for three revisions to the treaty show the difficulties of both sides working 





Sparta and Pharnabazus 
 Despite the third revisions of the treaty, Tissaphernes continued to pay 
the Peloponnesian fleet inadequately,781 and, so, Sparta sent Clearchus to make 
an agreement with Pharnabazus, who was still making overtures to the 
Peloponnesians for assistance in removing Athenian control from the Ionian 
cities in his satrapy.782  Similar to Tissaphernes apparently demonstrating his 
other options to the Spartans prior to the third revisions of the treaty, we find 
here that when Tissaphernes continued to be difficult the Spartans were able to 
go to Pharnabazus instead.  At this time Byzantium had offered to revolt783 and 
the potential to interrupt the Athenian controlled grain routes to Greece was an 
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additional incentive for the Spartans to visit Pharnabazus in the Hellespont. 784  
Clearchus was sent to Chalcedon and Byzantium because he was proxenos of 
Byzantium.785  Krentzs belief that Clearchus only aims were to arrange a treaty 
with Pharnabazus and to bring about the rebellion in Byzantium seems short 
sighted. 786 I agree it is likely that Xenophon had read Thucydides prior to his 
writing the Hellenica, but it is unlikely that the Spartans had not considered the 
Athenians grain supplies when they agreed to support Pharnabazus and the 
rebellion of Byzantium. After 20 years of war, during which time Athens crop 
fields had been routinely destroyed, the Athenians were dependent on the grain 
coming from the Hellespont. As we observe at the end of the Peloponnesian War, 
once these supplies were intercepted the city starved. Sparta will have known of 
this Athenian dependency on grain from the Hellespont and, we must assume, it 
was a factor in their decision to support Pharnabazus and Byzantium. 
Having concluded an arrangement with Sparta, we can see that 
Pharnabazus enthusiastically supported the Peloponnesians whilst they were 
operating in the Hellespont. At Hellenica I.1.6 we find evidence of Pharnabazus 
cavalry supporting the Spartans in an engagement against the Athenian forces at 
Abydos.  This episode in Xenophon continues the narrative of the Peloponnesian 
war from Thucydides. 787  Xenophon also narrates Alcibiades statement that the 
Peloponnesians had unlimited funding from the King at that time, most likely 
referring to the financial support given by both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes to 
maintain the Peloponnesian fleet.788 Furthermore, after Hermocrates the Sicilian 
had denounced Tissaphernes at the Spartan assembly, he visited Pharnabazus 
and received funding before he asked for it.789  Hermocrates will be discussed 
in greater detail later, but it is worth noting here that Pharnabazus financial aid 
also extended to Spartas allies and we can see that Persian influence by this time 
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still reached as far as Sicily.790  We find Pharnabazus helping the Peloponnesians 
further when Alcibiades blockaded Chalchedon, after his success at Abydos.791 
The Peloponnesians, led by Hippocrates, were defeated in battle and 
Hippocrates himself was killed.  The result of this second defeat was the 
conclusion of a temporary treaty between Athens and Pharnabazus, who agreed 
to give the Athenians 20 talents and to convey Athenian envoys to the Great 
King.  It was also agreed that the Chalchedonians should pay Athens the usual 
tribute and their missed arrears and the Athenians would not wage war against 
Chalcedon until their envoys returned.792 The Chalchedonians had clearly not 
been paying tribute to Athens prior to this, which indicates it is likely they were 
paying some form of tribute to Pharnabazus. Whether this was due to pro-
Persian or anti-Athenian sympathies is not apparent. It is worth noting that, 
although the Athenians and their allies requested safe conduct ... to the king, 
the envoys never actually made it there as they were delayed by Pharnabazus for 
three years, on the advice of Cyrus the younger, before returning to Greece 
having achieved nothing.793 
Xenophon mentions that at the same time that the Athenian embassy 
journeyed to Darius II, an embassy of the Lacedaemonians was also sent.794 We 
do not hear of this embassy later in Xenophon and may conjecture that it may be 
the same embassy that visited Cyrus with Lysander at Hellenica, 1.V.2. Looking at 
the Spartan embassy we find that two of the three had previously worked 
alongside either Tissaphernes or Pharnabazus.  
                                                          
790 We find during the Persian invasion Gelon of Sicily, hedging his bets but still suitably 
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Pasippidas previously had been exiled from Sparta having been held 
responsible for the rejection of the Spartan sympathisers at Thasos, in collusion 
with Tissaphernes.795 It is believed that he had been recalled from exile by the 
time of the embassy to Darius, since he is mentioned at the time of the Spartan 
embassy sent to Susa after Alcibiades victory at Chalcedon.  It would be 
impossible for Pasippidas to hold a command at this time, if he was still an exile.  
Clearly he had been acquitted of the charges of medism by this time.796 
Hermocrates was a very prominent Syracusan general and had been exiled from 
Syracuse after the naval battle at Cyzicus.797 We have seen above that, by 
working with the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War, Hermocrates came 
into contact with Pharnabazus and was able to use this to his own advantage.  It 
was whilst he was working with the Spartans that Hermocrates was denounced 
by his political opponents and exiled.798 Later he approached Pharnabazus since 
he had struck up a friendship with (him),799 accepted his gold to rebuild a fleet 
and hired mercenaries for a personal campaign against Syracuse in which he was 
killed.800  Whilst this seems to have been the last time Persian influence may have 
been felt as far as Sicily, it demonstrates that when offered the opportunity to 
expand her influence Persia couldnt resist. 
Hermocrates demonstrates that, although not a mainland Greek, but a 
Sicilian, his contact with Pharnabazus via Sparta enabled him to access Persian 
gold to fund his own personal agenda.  It may seem obvious but, had 
Hermocrates not led a fleet to assist Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, he would 
not have come into contact with Pharnabazus.  We are told that Hermocrates was 
a persuasive orator and a more than competent general;801 he likely persuaded 
Pharnabazus of the advantages of giving him gold to build a fleet and 
mercenaries to man it.  We might even suppose that this may be an early 
example of Persian intervention in Greek affairs in order to consolidate a 
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Greek fighting force for Persian use.  As we shall see, this practice became 
common in the fourth century.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
Pharnabazus funded Hermocrates campaign in order to secure the extra 35 
Sicilian triremes, which had previously been part of the Peloponnesian fleet and 
which were now absent.  We may conjecture that, although Hermocrates had 
been exiled from Sicily, this did not mean that, once he returned, the men who 
had previously been under his command would not serve with him again.  
Diodorus Siculus claims that Pharnabazus was influenced by his personal 
friendship with Hermocrates may not be implausible; Pharnabazus no doubt 
respected Hermocrates for his military capabilities.   Thus, we may conclude that 
the combination of Hermocrates persuasion, the respect Pharnabazus probably 
had for Hermocrates military abilities and, also, Pharnabazus desire to reunite 
the 35 Sicilian triremes with the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet led to 
Pharnabazus granting gold to Hermocrates to campaign against Sicily.   
 
It is perhaps as a result of the last two skirmishes in the Hellespont, at 
Hellenica, I.2.15-17 and I.3.5-9, in addition to the attempt by the Athenians to 
contact Darius II, that Cyrus the Younger was appointed Karanos. We can see 
from the first half of Hellenica I that Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes clearly did 
not have control of the situation on the Ionian Coast.  Tissaphernes seems to have 
been more successful than Pharnabazus in protecting the Ionian coast from 
Athenian incursions; however, he appears to have been concerned primarily 
with his own satrapy and not with the Ionian coast as a whole. We are told that 
Cyrus arrived in Ionia at the same time as a Spartan embassy from Persia led by 
Boeotius and so it is reasonable to assume that this embassy is somehow 
connected with the arrival of Cyrus. Xenophon states that Boeotius and his 
colleagues announced that the Spartans had achieved everything they wanted 
with the King.802 Although we are not told what their aims were, we may 
conjecture that Boeotius may have been sent to Darius to complain about the lack 
of co-ordination between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. It is worth 
remembering that although Tissaphernes negotiated with the Spartans, the treaty 
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made was with the King and Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were merely acting 
on his behalf. Thus, the issues over pay with Tissaphernes and not employing the 
Phoenician fleet may have been discussed and Cyrus the Younger subsequently 
sent to take command of the situation.  The appointment of Cyrus the Younger 
as Karanos, with wider powers than either Pharnabazus or Tissaphernes, will 
have provided strong leadership for the entire area rather than the divided 
leadership, which had been in place until then.  It indicates that a possible reason 
for Alcibiades success is that, although Tissaphernes was able to utilize the 
Peloponnesians against Alcibiades successfully, he did not want or was unable to 
help Pharnabazus do the same. A possible reason for this may be that 
Tissaphernes recognised that by stabilizing Pharnabazus satrapy he would 
enable Pharnabazus to encroach on his own satrapy should the occasion arise. It 
is worth noting that in the Persian court rivalry amongst the satraps was keen 
and was used as a tool by the Great King to ensure that his satraps did not 
become a threat to himself.803 
 
Lysander and Cyrus 
We learn that, upon the appointment of Cyrus as Karanos, Lysander, who 
was also newly appointed, visited Cyrus with some Lacedaemonian 
ambassadors.804  Krentz believes that these were probably the same ambassadors 
who had already seen Darius II, mentioned above, i.e. Pasippidas, Hermocrates 
and Proxenus, however, it seems more likely to me that the Spartans would use 
Boeotius and his colleagues again since he seems to have been connected with 
Cyrus appointment and likely knew the prince.805 According to Xenophon, 
Lysanders purpose was to denounce the proceedings of Tissaphernes, and at 
the same time to beg Cyrus himself to show as much zeal as possible in the 
prosecution of the war.806  The result of the meeting was Cyrus promise of full 
backing from both himself and the King and we learn that, although initially 
Cyrus asserted he only had the power to give 30 minae per vessel, however 
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many that may have been per month as expressly decreed by Darius, Lysander 
persuaded him to increase the sailors pay from three obols to four obols.807  
We learn later that, in response to Cyrus support of the Peloponnesians, 
the Athenians attempted to send some ambassadors of their own to Cyrus, but 
were refused an audience.   Xenophon notes that when Tissaphernes tried to 
intercede on their behalf he was unable to convince Cyrus to adopt his policy.  
Krentz suspects that the Athenian embassy was led by Alcibiades, believing that 
the generalised expression of the Athenians808 and the lack of specific names of 
those involved in the embassy conceals his failure in these negotiations.809  
Although this is possible, it is unlikely. 
We can suggest that Cyrus support for the Peloponnesians was based 
largely on his personal friendship with Lysander. Whilst this friendship is 
similar in some respects to that of Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, we can see that 
due to his royal status Cyrus was able to act more independently with regards to 
this friendship.  Cyrus treatment of Kallikratidas, who was Lysanders 
replacement upon the completion of his term in office as admiral, supports this 
notion. Xenophon tells us that Cyrus delayed his audience with Kallikratidas, 
infuriating the Spartan.  Kallikratidas comments from this episode highlight the 
official Spartan policy toward Persia, i.e. that the Spartans were courting Persia 
purely for financial help.  That Kallikratidas did not obtain pay for his sailors 
because he refused to court Cyrus, demonstrates the degree of control Cyrus had 
over this Spartan-Persian relationship.  It also demonstrates how much this 
relationship was founded on personalities.  When the Peloponnesian fleet 
requested that Lysander resume command of the fleet from Kallikratidas, we are 
told that this request was supported by Cyrus.810  Furthermore, when Lysander 
was reinstated as admiral (nominally as vice-admiral under Arakos), in response 
to this request, and sent with ambassadors to obtain funding from Cyrus, he was 
given all the finances he asked for.  Indeed, he was given further funding when 
                                                          
807 Xenophon, Hellenica, I.5.6.  Mitchell, 1997, p. 119, notes that the story, as given by Xenophon, 
displays the language of friendship-making. 
808 Xenophon, Hellenica, I.5.8. 
809 Krentz, 1989,  p. 137, n. 8-9. 
810 Xenophon, Hellenica, II.1.7. 
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Cyrus was recalled to court.811  It is apparent that the tensions between Lysander 
and Kallikratidas are mirrored in the relationship, or lack of relationship, 
between Kallikratidas and Cyrus, leading to the reinstatement of Lysander.  
The strong relationship between Cyrus and Lysander, and by extension 
between Cyrus and Sparta, leads me to conclude that Cyrus may already have 
been fostering this relationship with a view to using Spartan hoplites to support 
his claim to the throne against that of his brother Artaxerxes.  We may suggest 
that Cyrus close relationship with Lysander stemmed not only from Cyrus 
admiration of Lysanders military abilities,812 but also from the belief that 
Lysander was more likely than Kallikratidas to support Cyrus in his rebellion, 
due to the A?AdAfA?A? which existed between them. 
With Cyrus support, Lysander defeated the Athenian fleet at Notium in 
406 B.C. and at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.; he later took Athens itself at the end of 
the siege in September 404 B.C.813  Plutarch attributes the installation of the thirty 
tyrants at Athens to Lysander and also the installation of Agesilaus to the 
Spartan throne after the death of Agis.814 The installation of Agesilaus over 
Leotychides demonstrates the amount of personal influence Lysander carried in 
Sparta at that time.  This is especially true when we consider that he was able to 
manipulate the interpretation of an apparently negative oracle in favour of 
Agesilaus.815  Lysanders military prowess is evident from the fact he was given 
the command of the Spartan navy and it is easy to assume that he was heavily 
involved in the Peloponnesian war before 408 B.C. to warrant his receiving this 
command. Certainly his influence increased by his association with Cyrus, who 
seems to have favoured him.  In the Oeconomicus Xenophon tells us of Lysanders 
praise of Cyrus paradeisos at Sardis,816 demonstrating Lysanders close personal 
relationship with Cyrus, which recalls the paradeisos Tissaphernes named after 
                                                          
811 Xenophon, Hellenica, II.1.6-15. 
812 Diodorus Siculus, XIII.70.3 claims that when they first met, Lysander A?A?AlAjAiA?AhA?Am AoA?Ah ?AhA?AnAeAjAh 
A?A?Am o ?Ah AeA?AoA? ЗAh ?AcAbAhA?A?AtAh A?A?AfA?AgAjAh (he stirred up the youths enthusiasm for the war against 
the Athenians). 
813 Plutarch, Lysander, XIV. 
814 For the Thirty see Plutarch, Lysander, XV, for the installation of Agesilaus see Plutarch, Lysander, 
XXII. 
815 The events and Graeco-Persian relations of the 4th century will be dealt with in full below, pp. 
182-208. 
816 Xenophon, Oeconomicus, IV. 
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Alcibiades.817  The degree of friendship between Cyrus and Lysander can be seen 
in that it seems Lysander went to Cyrus on a personal initiative in order to 
acquire money for his fleet and that he was given this money, not as the 
representative of Sparta, but on a personal basis. This may not have been the 
original intent of the embassy, but it was the result, as is demonstrated by 
Lysanders treatment of Kallikratidas when Kallikratidas took over the fleet. It 
may be argued that, if the money given to Lysander was for the Spartan fleet in 
general, rather than Lysanders personal fleet, he would have left the money 
with Kallikratidas rather than telling Kallikratidas that he must ask for it 
himself if he wanted it and must make his own arrangements to pay his men.818  
On this same note it may also be argued that, if Lysander was given money on a 
personal basis, it may have been that his relationship with Cyrus became greater 
than initially expected and his status increased whilst he was there. Therefore, it 
seems likely his personal importance may have been the result of his journey to 
Cyrus to ask for the money rather than the reason for it.  Thus, we find that 
personal relationships now start to take precedence over political ones. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
Reviewing Graeco-Persian relations during the Peloponnesian War, we 
can see that due to the complex and shifting nature of these relations it is 
necessary to furnish a detailed narrative since those relations are no longer as 
simple as they had been at the start of the fifth century.  We see that the many 
embassies from Greece to Persia were primarily concerned with funding from 
the start of the War, and both Athens and Sparta sent embassies to Persia to win 
Persian financial support.  Most striking about these early attempts for an 
alliance is the complete reversal of Greek opinion of Persia. The Peace of Callias 
seems to have been concluded not because both parties desired peace, but 
because they had fought themselves to a stand still. Similarly, the Spartans had 
refused to work for Persian interests in the 460s, when Megabazus was sent with 
gold for them. However, in the space of 30 years we find both states pro-actively 
trying to make an alliance with Persia. Clearly during those years not only had 
                                                          
817 Plutarch, Alcibiades, XXIV 
818 Plutarch, Lysander, VI. 
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the relationship between the Greek states broken down, but also the relationship 
between the Greek states and Persia seems to have improved to such an extent 
that an alliance with that power was preferable to negotiations aimed at 
preventing the outbreak of war in 432 B.C. 
By 425 B.C. Sparta had sent a number of embassies to Persia, but it was 
not until 412 B.C. that any formal alliance was concluded.  It seems likely that 
Persias support for Sparta was connected with Athens Sicilian disaster and 
diminishing influence amongst the Ionian Greek cities.  We may conjecture that 
Persia did not wish to repudiate its alliance with Athens until Athens was in a 
weakened state and Persia could take advantage of this.  That said, Persia did not 
have a direct reason to repudiate the treaty until Athens supported the rebellion 
of Amorges, which directly conflicted with Persias interests. It should be born in 
mind that Tissaphernes seems to have been sent to deal with Amorges in the first 
instance and his agreement with Sparta was simply part of his strategy to do this.  
Tissaphernes treatment of the Peloponnesians after the capture of Amorges 
suggests his lack of interest in an alliance with Sparta once his primary aims had 
been achieved.  What is apparent is that Darius II used his support of Sparta as 
leverage to confirm formal Greek renunciation of the Ionian Greeks and Greek 
recognition of his territory.  The primary reason there were so many rescripts of 
the treaty between Sparta and Persia was because of the difficulties defining 
what territory belonged to Persia.  Also, we should not discount the effect the 
distances involved when negotiating the terms may have upon the negotiation.  
It is easy to recognise that some of the terms, which were later revised, may have 
been agreed initially by Sparta as they wished to speed up the process in order to 
gain Persian gold sooner. This leverage seems to be a precursor to the Kings 
Peace of 387/6 B.C. Despite Darius IIs nominal involvement in the Spartan-
Persian treaty and its revisions, it is clear that Tissaphernes viewed the 
Peloponnesians as hired mercenaries rather than allies. That Tissaphernes 
treatment of the Peloponnesians could induce them to make an alliance with 
Pharnabazus, demonstrates the disunity within the Persian satrapal system.  The 
lack of coordinated action from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, despite the 
Athenian encroachment into Ionia and Asia Minor, indicates that the Persian 
195 
 
custom of inducing the satraps to vie for power amongst themselves, thus 
distracting them from rebelling against the king, could interfere with more 
general Persian foreign policy.  This is demonstrated further by the appointment 
of a Karanos, in the person of Cyrus the Younger, to co-ordinate a response to the 
Athenian threat to Persian interests. Although we have mentioned above that 
Cyrus seems to have arrived as the result of the embassy of Boeotius, I suggest 
that this was not precisely the case. The Athenian successes against Pharnabazus 
and the lack of co-ordination are the more likely reason for Cyrus appointment 
and Boeotius, perhaps, may simply have been the messenger of these events. We 
do not know when Boeotius was sent to Darius II, but it is likely that he will have 
waited to travel back at the same time as Cyrus when the opportunity arose.  The 
appointment of Cyrus the Younger further changed the dynamic of Graeco-
Persian relations.  For the first time the official relationship became based heavily 
on personalities.  Cyrus apparent youthful enthusiasm for the war against 
Athens and his friendship with Lysander resulted in regular pay for the 
Peloponnesian forces enabling them to defeat Athens in the Hellespont and, 
thus, in the War. We can see that the Peloponnesian War acted as a catalyst in the 
development of Graeco-Persian relations.  It was because of this war that Sparta 
looked for Persian support, which overrode the previous, apparent aversion to 
an alliance.819   
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Chapter 6: Towards a Common Peace 
 
The Rebellion of Cyrus the Younger 
The Spartan-Persian alliance during the latter years of the Peloponnesian 
War marked a distinct change in the relationship between Greek and Persian, 
and how the two peoples viewed each other. It could be argued that Greek 
involvement in the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger was the direct result of this 
alliance and marked the advent of the prolific use of Greek mercenaries 
overseas.820  It is worth noting that by the end of the fifth century B.C. two 
generations had passed since the Persian invasions of 490 B.C. and 480/479 B.C. 
Furthermore, the Peloponnesian War had been waged from 432 B.C. until 404 
B.C., and Persians had helped to fund the Peloponnesians from 412 B.C. 
Therefore, two, perhaps three, generations of Greeks will have grown up 
associating Persia with funding for the Peloponnesians War whilst losing the 
negative feelings resulting from the Persian Invasions of the early fifth century. 
Negative feelings also will have diminished as the survivors of the Persian Wars 
died from old age. 
Not only will the Greek view of Persias political relationship with Greece 
have changed, but culturally the Greeks will have become more familiar with 
Persia.  M. Miller notes that, as a result of the spoils from the Persian Wars, 
Persian material culture will have been divided amongst those who fought and 
would have eventually filtered down through all levels of society.821  
Furthermore, we may argue that the continued campaigning in Asia Minor 
during the Pentecontaetia and the numerous embassies to Persia during the fifth 
century will have encouraged familiarity with Persia.822 Thus, during the course 
                                                          
820 Xenophon, Anabasis, passim. 
821 Miller, 1997, p. 45. Miller specifically notes that the Greeks will have benefits from the spoils 
from the wrecked ships off Mount Athos and the capture of Mardonius tent at Plataea. She 
believes that this will have been distributed amongst those Greeks present, following the example 
of the Athenians who planned to distribute the silver from the mines at Laurium before they were 
persuaded by Themistocles to build up their navy. Herodotus, VII. 144. 
822 Cf. Miller, 1997, passim, for the effect of Persian material culture on Athens during the fifth 
century and specifically the impact of Persian material culture on Athenian culture after the 
Persian Wars. Although Miller concentrates her study specifically upon Athens, we may suspect 
similar trends occurred across Greece. Also, Balcer, 1983, pp. 259-260. 
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of the fifth century, Persian material culture likely will have spread, however 
unevenly, throughout Greece. 
The Peloponnesian experiences of working for Tissaphernes, 
Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger meant that these Greeks had become 
experienced in campaigning in Asia Minor prior to Cyrus rebellion.  
Furthermore, it is clear that the Spartans had largely lost their fear of 
campaigning further in-land than the coasts of Asia Minor.  M. Trundle notes 
that, although the idea of hiring mercenaries was not unusual during the sixth 
and fifth centuries,823 it is at the end of the fifth century, with the conclusion of 
the Peloponnesian War, that Greeks serving as mercenaries for non-Greek pay-
masters really took off.824  A number of factors caused this; the political 
upheavals which took place during the Peloponnesian War led to a large number 
of exiled Greeks turning to mercenary service to make a living.  Many Greeks 
had lost their primary source of income during the war, in the case of Athens 
those who had previously farmed small holdings were destroyed by the annual 
Spartan invasions.  Inflation of basic food prices, due to fewer farmed goods in 
Greece and the import of cheaper foods, which in turn were in high demand, 
forced many Greeks to look for better paid work.825  H.F. Miller, citing 
Rostovtzeff, suggests that another cause of the inflation was the increasing 
availability of money from external sources in the forms of bribes, gifts and cash 
subsidies from Persia and, later, Macedon.826  Isocrates, although prone to 
rhetorical exaggeration, is informative when he states that mercenaries were 
wandering around for lack of even their daily bread.827  Although poverty in 
Greece may have made it impossible for some Greeks to stay at home, wealthy 
                                                          
823 We find Greek cities hiring mercenaries from other Greek cities, for example, the Athenian 
tyrant Pisistratus hiring Argive mercenaries in 546 B.C. (Aristotle), Athenian Constitution, XVII. 
824 Trundle, 2004, pp. 44-46.  Trundle notes an earlier instance of this in the Carians and Ionians 
who took service with Psammetichus in the sixth century B.C. (Herodotus, II.152-4; Diodorus 
Siculus, I.66.12, 67.1-3, 68.5), but describes this as an isolated incident prior to the fifth century B.C. 
825 Miller states that in general prices doubled between 404 and 330, but wheat went up from two 
drachmae in 404 to ten around 300, while oil trebled in price. Miller, 1984, p. 154 following W. W. 
Tarn, 1930, pp. 98, 103, 110; C.A.H. V. pp. 24ff.; G. Glotz, 1926, p. 237. 
826 Miller, 1984, p. 154. 
827 Isocrates, Philippicus, 120. 
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Greeks, such as Xenophon, also became mercenaries, attracted by the promise of 
fame and Persian gold. 828 
Miller also believes that another factor was the growth of the Greek 
population since they did not practice primogeniture.  Property was divided 
equally amongst the sons of a family resulting over time in smaller, poorer land 
holdings.829  However, Miller does not take into account that the Greeks had been 
at war for 27 years and much of this excess man-power will have been absorbed 
by the military losses on both sides. A notable example of this are the Athenian 
losses suffered as a result of their disastrous Sicilian campaign.830   
Taking into consideration these circumstances, and bearing in mind that 
many of these dispossessed Greeks had experienced 27 years fighting in the 
Peloponnesian War, it is not too surprising that many Greeks turned to 
mercenary service for their living.831   
 
We have mentioned above that the increase in mercenary service is most 
noticeable with the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, against his brother, 
Artaxerxes II.832  Cyrus the Younger had also been a contender for the throne 
and, upon losing, attempted to assassinate Artaxerxes II.  The failed assassination 
resulted in the loss of Cyrus prestige and lands, which Ruzicka believes were 
given over to Tissaphernes.833  That Tissaphernes was unable to take full control 
of these lands seems to have been the result of a Cyrus fleeing back to Sardis 
and resuming control de facto, although not de jure.  Ruzicka believes that this 
situation was tolerated by Artaxerxes II, who was distracted by rebellions in 
Egypt and who was still receiving tribute from Cyrus.  He notes that for 
Artaxerxes this was a pragmatic arrangement which would permit him to 
concentrate on the recovery of Egypt.834  However, whilst Artaxerxes II was 
preparing for his Egyptian campaign, Cyrus was planning his rebellion.  Cyrus 
                                                          
828 Miller, 1984, pp. 59-60. 
829 Miller, 1984, p. 157. 
830 Thucydides, VII. 59-87. 
831 I suggest that any Greek under the age of 35 in 404 B.C. will have struggled to remember a time 
of peace prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. 
832 Artaxerxes II took the throne of Persia upon the death of Darius II, in 404 B.C. 
833 Ruzicka, 1985, p. 208. 
834 Ruzicka, 1985, p. 208. 
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will have been fully aware that Artaxerxes tolerance for him would end with his 
Egyptian campaign and likely planned to act whilst Artaxerxes and the majority 
of his forces were absent in Egypt.  Xenophon records how Cyrus sent 
messengers to Sparta and appealed to the Spartans to show themselves as good 
friends to him as he had been to them in their war with Athens.835 The message 
referred to the financial aid Cyrus had given to Sparta from his personal funds, 
due to his friendship with Lysander, and also referred to the Phoenician navy, 
which had supported the Spartans in the war against Athens.836  In response to 
this request Sparta sent Samius, the Spartan admiral, to Cyrus and also sent 
Cheirisophus with seven hundred hoplites, which joined Cyrus army in 
Cilicia.837  P.A. Rahe suggests that Cyrus, aware of their fighting reputation, 
desired to combine Greek hoplites with Persian cavalry, an idea, he suggests, 
which was originally conceived by Megabyzus during his rebellion from 
Artaxerxes I in the 440s.838  Thus, Greek hoplites would seem an obvious source 
of man-power for Cyrus given his experience of them during the final years of 
the Peloponnesian War and also given that his own area of influence, and, 
therefore, the geography from which he could recruit his own men, had been 
curtailed by Artaxerxes II.  It is worth noting that when Cyrus recruited his 
Greek mercenaries, they were led to believe they would be fighting either against 
the Cilicians839 or against Tissaphernes.840  When they became suspicious of 
Cyrus true aim they mutinied.841  Thus, we can see that whilst the Spartans were 
now happy to campaign further in-land than they had previously, they did not 
wish to antagonise Artaxerxes II.  Sparta may have become bolder, but Spartas 
                                                          
835 Xenophon, Hellenica III.1.1. 
836 The most notable use of the Persian funded navy was at the naval battle of Notium. 
837 For Samius, see Hellenica, III.1.1. In the Anabasis we are told that the Spartan triremes were being 
commanded by Tamos not Samius, Anabasis I.2.21.  Diodorus claims that Tamos was the barbarian 
commander of the fleet but that the Spartan Samus, clearly a corruption of Samius, was the admiral 
contacted in the first place and Cheirisophus was the Spartan general commanding the hoplites. 
Diodorus Siculus, XIV.19.5. 
838 Rahe, 1980, p. 88. 
839 Diodorus Siculus, XIIII.19.3. 
840 Xenophon, Anabasis, I.1.6-9. 
841 Xenophon, Anabasis, I.3.I. Hamilton, 1970, suggests that between 405 and 401 there were three 
factions influencing Spartan foreign policy.  The first two were led by Lysander and Agis 
respectively, both of these factions favoured Spartan overseas campaigning and the financial 
benefits this brought, the primary difference between the two factions being that of leadership.  
The third faction influencing Spartan foreign policy was led by Pausanias, who favoured a 
conservative foreign policy akin to that of the early fifth century. 
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lingering fear of Persia meant the Spartans were still respectful of Artaxerxes II.  
Xenophon states that Cyrus also used personal connections to recruit 
mercenaries, to support the army he had raised from his own territory in Ionia.842 
Miller suggests the likelihood that a system for recruiting mercenaries which 
utilised the Greek institution of proxenoi was in place by the time Cyrus recruited 
his Greeks. She suggests that the majority of the mercenaries recruited were the 
equivalent of the retainers of the Greeks Cyrus had contacted.843  Thus the 
Greek army was originally composed of separate contingents commanded by 
Xenias, Proxenus, Sophaenetus, Pasion, Meno, Clearchus and Chirisophus.844  
L.G. Mitchell notes that these generals were nearly all there as ΛνΑΓ΍ of Cyrus, 
which we may suggest was likely the due to their campaigning with him during 
the Peloponnesian War.845 
 
 We need not discuss here the details of Cyrus rebellion and the retreat of 
the Greek mercenaries back to the coast of Asia Minor. Suffice it to say that, 
although defeating Artaxerxes IIs army at Cunaxa, Cyrus was killed in the battle 
and the Greek mercenaries were pursued to the coast of Asia Minor chased by 
Persian forces. The closeness of Cyrus and his Greek mercenaries is noticeable 
early in his campaign and a good example of this is found in the trial of Orontas, 
who had betrayed Cyrus three times. Cyrus invited Clearchus the Spartan to sit 
as one of the judges, which was unusual given that Persians generally believed 
non-Persians to be inferior.846  That said, we can see that the relationship between 
Cyrus and his mercenaries was essentially pragmatic.  Furthermore, their 
reluctance to fight against Artaxerxes II suggests that they still held a certain 
amount of fear and respect for him at this time. 
 
                                                          
842 Xenophon, Anabasis, I.2.1-4, names: Clearchus the Lacedaemonian exile, Aristippus the 
Thessalian, Xenias the Arcadian, Proxenus the Boeotian, Sophaenetus the Stymphalian, Socrates 
the Achaean and Pasion the Megarian 
843 Miller, 1984, pp. 105-106.  See also Mitchell, 1997, p. 120. 
844 Roy, 1967, p. 287. 
845 Mitchell, 1997, p. 120. 
846 Xenophon, Hellenica, I.6. Cf. p. 77 for the mistrust of Demaratus by Achaemenes in Herodotus, 




We may observe that the actions of the Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor 
can be seen as a direct forerunner to Spartan campaigning in Ionia, ostensibly to 
liberate the Ionian Greeks, who had sided with Cyrus against Artaxerxes and 
who expected reprisals.  The experiences of the Cyreans in Persia was a turning 
point in Graeco-Persian relations in that, after this, we find further instances of 
Greeks being employed overseas as mercenaries.  As a result of the Greeks 
obtaining a wider knowledge of the Persian Empire and deploying their 
mercenaries in Asia Minor, Persian fear of a Greek invasion became a new factor 
in Persias Fourth century foreign policy; an inversion of the Fifth century 
situation. 
 
The Spartan invasion of Asia Minor 
After the defeat of Cyrus, Artaxerxes gave the satrapies which had 
previously belonged to him to Tissaphernes, who then demand(ed) the 
submission of all the Greek cities in Ionia.847  These cities sent ambassadors to 
Sparta requesting protection from Tissaphernes reprisals.  Thus, we find that the 
issue of the liberation of the Ionian Greeks from Persia resurfaces again.848  
Xenophon gives no further details of this embassy, but states that Sparta sent 
Thibron, as governor, to the Greeks in Asia.849  Westlake suggests that 
Tissaphernes was likely the cause of the Spartan invasion, primarily because of 
his belligerence to the Ionian Greeks in the belief that the Spartans would not 
send the requested aid.  However, all of the evidence would seem to be against 
this theory.850  He was given command of the combined Spartan and Athenian 
troops and others he had raised from mainland Greece; 851 he was later joined by 
                                                          
847 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.1.3.  Ruzicka, 1985, p. 205, notes that Tissaphernes may have been given 
the lands of Cyrus as early as 404 B.C., as the result of Cyrus attempted assassination of Artaxerxes 
II. Also, cf. p. 184. 
848 Cf. R. Seager and C. Tuplin, 1980, passim, for a discussion on the concept of the Greeks of Asia 
Minor being considered a whole body. 
849 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.1. 
850 Westlake, 1981, pp. 277. 
851 Xenophon states specifically that the Athenians sent cavalry who had served under the Thirty, 
indicating the Athenian attitude at the time. The Athenians obviously did not trust Sparta or 
Spartan elements within the city. Sending a large portion of these Spartan elements to serve in Asia 
Minor not only obeyed the orders sent from Sparta but also removed a large portion of the Pro-
Spartan threat from the city.  This brings to mind similar action by Polycrates who sent political 
opponents to Egypt for Cambyses campaign, and, also, when Thebes sent men with Leonidas to 
Thermopylae. Cf. p. 17 and p. 101. 
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the remnants of those Greek mercenaries who had marched with Cyrus against 
Artaxerxes. The embassies sent by the Greeks of Asia Minor instigated the 
Spartan campaigning there, and we can suggest that the Ionian Greeks merely 
gave Sparta the excuse it needed to execute a plan already conceived.  Ryder 
argues that the Spartan surrender of the Ionian Greeks in favour of Persian aid 
during the final years of the Peloponnesian war had caused concern in Sparta as 
early as 406 B.C.852  At the start of the fifth century Sparta had refused to help the 
Ionian Greeks, led by Aristagoras, due to the distance of Ionia from the 
Peloponnese. Similarly, Sparta relinquished leadership of the Hellenic League to 
Athens in 478 B.C. after the area of operations had moved to the coast of Asia 
Minor.  However, in 401 we see a very different response to the Ionian plea for 
help.  The Spartan experiences during the Peloponnesian War and their 
involvement in Cyrus rebellion had changed the Spartan attitude of 
isolationism.  It is interesting to ponder that, had Cyrus won at Cunaxa, the 
Spartan relationship with Persia may have been very different.  The march of the 
Ten Thousand had not only proved that the Persian Empire was not 
impregnable, but it also widened the scope of Greek geographical knowledge. 
This knowledge, combined with the recent naval experiences from the 
Peloponnesian War, meant that many in Sparta no longer felt that the distance 
was so great as to be prohibitive.  Spartas involvement in Cyrus rebellion 
soured the Spartan relationship with Persia and, shortly after the Ionian Greek 
cities requested help, Agesilaus authorised Thibrons invasion.853 
 
In Asia Minor Thibron subdued some of the Ionian Greek cities whilst 
other cities willingly joined him.  Notable were Teuthrania and Halisarna, cities 
belonging to Eurysthenes and Procles,854 the sons of Demaratus, the exiled king 
of Sparta, who had joined Xerxes on his invasion of Greece.  Likewise, Gorgion, 
ruler of Gambrium and Palaegambrium, and Gongylus, ruler of Myrna and 
                                                          
852 Thucydides, VIII.58. Xenophon, Hellenica, III.1.3, Ryder, 1965, p. 11. Thucydides, VIII.37, states 
that in the terms of the peace treaty between Sparta and Persia, Sparta agreed not to attack, injure 
or exact tribute from any cities or countries that belong to Darius, including those cities on the 
Ionian coast.  Cf. p. 165 above. 
853 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.2.15 
854 Procles had served with Cyrus in his Anabasis, and informed the Greeks of Cyrus death after the 
battle of Cunaxa. Anabasis, 2.1.3 
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Gryneum, both of whom were descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, joined 
him.855  Gongylus, the father, is best known as the man who returned the Persian 
nobles to Xerxes, who had been captured by Pausanias on Cyprus, and 
supposedly he also bore Pausanias first letter to Xerxes in the 460s.856  The 
presence here of Gongylus descendants settled with their own cities indicates 
the family had provided some good service to Xerxes, or to one of Xerxes 
successors, after Gongylus had arrived in Persia, and they had been rewarded 
accordingly.857  This reminds us once again that refugees were welcome in the 
Persian Empire. 
We do not learn what happened to Gongylus and Gorgion after 
Agesilaus retreat from Asia Minor.  Presumably they were punished for joining 
Thibrons forces during the Spartan invasion.  It is interesting to observe that due 
to their location the descendants of Demaratus and Gongylus were caught 
between the Peloponnesian invasion force and the Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus forces. Therefore, they seem to have had little choice but to side 
with whichever one was on their door step at the time. 
 
Dercylidas in Asia Minor 
Thibron was replaced by Dercylidas, whilst he was at Ephesus, preparing 
for the campaign into Caria.858  From the actions of Dercylidas, who exploited the 
tension between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, we can see that the Persian 
response to the Spartan invasion had reverted to the same response as when the 
Athenians had supported Amorges and were fighting in Asia Minor. Both 
satraps were dealing with the Spartan invasion without working together, thus, 
Dercylidas was able to come to terms with Tissaphernes and concentrate his 
efforts against Pharnabazus.  Dercylidas, after some initial campaigning in 
Pharnabazus satrapy, also made a truce with him which allowed Dercylidas to 
                                                          
855 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.1.6-7 
856 Thucydides, 1.28. We are not told why Gongylus wished to medise, we know simply that he was 
exiled from Eretria for his pro-Persian sympathies. Xenophon, Hellenica, III.1.6. 
857 Ibid. 
858 Hellenica, III.1.8.  Thibron had been denounced by Spartas Ionian allies for exploiting them and 
so Dercylidas was sent to replace him.  Westlake, 1981, p. 259, notes that Thibrons treatment of the 
allied Ionian Greek cities suggests lack of funding. 
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winter his troops in Bithynian Thrace. 859 This truce was later renewed allowing 
Dercylidas to cross the Hellespont to Greece, to build a wall cutting off the 
Chersonese to protect it from Thracian invasions.860 According to Diodorus the 
truce was set for 8 months.  
When Dercylidas returned to Asia, Sparta received ambassadors from the 
Ionian Greek cities advising that Dercylidas should attack Tissaphernes own 
establishment at Caria, in order to persuade him to give the Ionian Greek cities 
their independence.861  Westlake points out that, although Tissaphernes held the 
superior command, Dercylidas seems to have concentrated his efforts against 
Pharnabazus, who was given little aid by Tissaphernes.862  It is likely, therefore, 
that the Ionian Greeks believed that if Dercylidas were to attack Caria, this 
would put pressure on Tissaphernes to grant them autonomy.863  This tactic 
seems to have worked as Dercylidas was ordered to invade Caria prompting 
Tissaphernes to arrange a meeting for himself, Pharnabazus and Dercylidas, to 
discuss the terms of a possible truce.  That Tissaphernes organised this meeting 
is significant as it indicates the degree of disruption Dercylidas was causing in 
Asia Minor.  Dercylidas terms, which became a Spartan slogan for much of their 
campaigning in Ionia, were that the King should allow the Greek cities their 
independence,864 whilst Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus terms were that the 
Greek army should leave the country and the Spartan governors should be 
withdrawn from the cities.865  Whether both sides actually wanted to agree a 
formal treaty is unclear and appears unlikely given the generally local nature of 
the skirmishes.  Neither set of terms may be seen as conducive to arranging a 
permanent treaty with a wider significance, yet we are told that the two sides 
made a truce to last until both Artaxerxes and Sparta had been consulted.  In 
making the truce, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear to have achieved their 
aim of halting the Greek forces, de facto.  Xenophon does not return to this matter, 
                                                          
859 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.2.1. 
860 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.38.7, Xenophon, Hellenica, III.2.8. 
861 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.2.12. 
862 Westlake, 1981, p. 259. 
863 Westlake, 1981, p. 258, notes that Artaxerxes was apparently content that the Ionian Greek cities 
pay tribute to him, but that it was Tissaphernes who desired to deprive them of their autonomy. 
864 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.2.20. 
865 Ibid.  
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which we may propose is confirmation of this.  The terms given by each side 
were not likely to be approved by the other and yet, by seeking permission from 
their respective higher authorities, time was bought.  We may observe that the 
Persians appear to have benefited more from this situation than the Spartans, 
who were prevented from harassing Persian territory, which gave Tissaphernes 
and Pharnabazus time to recover before resuming hostilities.  At the same time 
the delay forced Dercylidas forces to remain unproductive whilst using up their 
limited supplies.  It can be suggested that Tissaphernes request for a truce and 
the terms given by each side were simply a Persian delaying tactic, which 
temporarily neutralised the Spartan military threat.  Dercylidas demands that 
Artaxerxes give the Ionian Greeks their independence, suggests that he was 
unable to achieve this aim by military means alone.  It is worth noting that 
Dercylidas was outnumbered considerably by the Persian army; Diodorus 
Siculus tells us that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had twenty thousand 
infantry and ten thousand cavalry whereas Dercylidas had in all not more than 
seven thousand men.866 For Dercylidas the decision to risk his men, who were 
so greatly outnumbered, in a pitched battle or have them safely removed to 
another place does not seem too difficult to comprehend, especially if we 
consider the decreasing number of Spartiates back in Sparta.867  Westlake 
disputes Xenophons reasoning that Tissaphernes proposed negotiations from 
fear of the Cyrean Greeks with Dercylidas.  He conjectures that Tissaphernes 
lack of interest in fighting was motivated by the belief that he stood a better 
chance of achieving his aims by deceit and/or bribery rather than by military 
efforts.868 Westlake is probably correct in this assertion, we know that 
Tissaphernes was a wily character;869 however, it should be borne in mind that 
                                                          
866 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39.5. As these seven thousand men will have included roughly that many 
Cyreans we can suggest that Diodorus Siculus is exaggerating the low number of Greeks for 
dramatic purposes. That said, I still believe that the Persian forces will have outnumbered the 
Greeks by roughly 2:1. 
867 When Agesilaus campaigned in Asia Minor he took with him primarily allied troops and 
neodamadeis, emancipated helots, only taking 30 full Spartiates in advisory roles. Xenophon, 
Hellenica. III.4.2. Cartledge, 1979, p. 276 notes the omission of spartiate or perioikic hoplites and the 
large number of neodamodeis sent with Agesilaus in 397 B.C. 
868 Westlake, 1981, p. 264, bases this belief on the lack of Spartan finances at this time, maintaining 
that Tissaphernes perhaps hoped that this would result in the withdrawal of Dercylidas. 




Greek hoplites had a reputation for being better than Persian infantry.  
Furthermore, the Cyreans had an even stronger reputation, having survived 
months of harassment during their return to the coast of Asia Minor. Therefore, I 
dont think we can discredit Xenophons reasoning out of hand. The reputation 
of the Cyreans as well as the general reputation of Greek hoplites, I believe, will 
have been a factor in Tissaphernes reasoning. 
 
The invasion of Agesilaus 
Shortly after the accession of Agesilaus at Sparta in 397 B.C., we learn 
from Xenophon that a Syracusan merchant, named Herodas, arrived in Sparta 
stating that he had observed Phoenician triremes being prepared for 
Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes II.870  It is worth remembering that the Persian 
Royal Navy predominantly comprised Phoenician ships and that the Royal Navy 
was employed only at the command of the king himself.  Therefore, the sight of 
them suggests they were part of grander naval plans for the Aegean wider than 
heretofore seen.871  Certainly the Spartans will have viewed it this way, and they 
may have learnt that Conon had begun working with Pharnabazus by this time 
too.872  In response to this information and on the advice of Lysander, Agesilaus 
prepared to campaign in Asia Minor himself. We learn that when Agesilaus had 
reached Ephesus Tissaphernes sent to him,873 asking him why he was there. On 
Agesilaus response, that his intent was to liberate the Ionian Greeks, 
Tissaphernes suggested making a truce until he could send to the King.874 As 
we are not told the outcome of the previous messengers sent by Tissaphernes, 
Pharnabazus and Dercylidas, mentioned in the Hellenica at III.2.10, we are left to 
assume that those proposals were unsuccessful.  Tissaphernes response to 
Agesilaus may be seen to confirm this.  Buckler astutely notes that, since 
Agesilaus only had six months provisions for his forces, Tissaphernes seems to 
                                                          
870 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.4.1. Note the similarity with Plutarch, Nicias XXX where the Athenians 
learn of their defeat at Syracuse from a barber.  Mosley, 1973, p. 8, notes both instances for their 
evidence of how information on foreign policy was transmitted informally.  
871 Cf. p. 50 above for the creation of Persias navy by Cambyses. Also, cf. p. 173 for observations of 
the command of the Phoenician fleet. 
872 It seems likely that the fleet Herodas saw being prepared was part of the same fleet under 
Conons command. 




have been simply buying time for these supplies to run out whilst saving his 
own troops from any fighting.875  We may observe that Tissaphernes was simply 
repeating the tactics, which had seemingly already worked on Dercylidas and 
which would buy time for the completion of the Persian fleet observed by 
Herodas.  Buckler rightly calls Tissaphernes disingenuous as the conversation 
between Agesilaus and Tissaphernes borders on farcical and Tissaphernes broke 
his side of the agreement immediately.  Although Westlake believes that 
Tissaphernes breaking of the truce is questionable and may have been Spartan 
propaganda, this seems unlikely given Tissaphernes subsequent behaviour.876  
Hamilton suggests that one reason Agesilaus agreed to the truce with 
Tissaphernes was so that he could familiarise himself with the locality.  He 
suggests also that Agesilaus used the time to establish his own authority over his 
army, which had previously been under the commands of Thibron and 
Dercylidas.877  He notes that during the time of the truce Agesilaus ended a lot of 
the civil disorder that was affecting the Ionian cities at the time, earning good 
will and becoming further acquainted with the geography of Ionia.  The result of 
the truce was that Agesilaus was delayed from damaging Tissaphernes land, 
allowing time for Tissaphernes reinforcements to arrive.  From his new position 
with an army to back him Tissaphernes demanded that Agesilaus leave Ionia to 
avoid a declaration of war.   
Agesilaus eventually was recalled to Sparta by the outbreak of the 
Corinthian War, having campaigned for only 2 years in Asia Minor.  Whilst in 
Asia Minor his most notable success was his victory over Tissaphernes at the 
battle of Sardis.878  This resulted in Tissaphernes execution and replacement by 
Tithraustes.879  Krentz correctly notes that the direct intervention of Artaxerxes 
                                                          
875 Buckler, 2003, p. 61. 
876 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.4.6. Westlake, 1981, p. 265. 
877 Hamilton, 1991, p. 96.  Xenophon, Hellenica, III.4.7-10, finds Agesilaus curbing Lysanders 
authority and Lysanders departure for service in the Hellespont. 
878 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.4.22-25.  Cf. Gray, 1981, for discussion on the particulars of the Battle of 
Sardis. 
879 Westlake, 1981, pp. 268-276, suggests that Tissaphernes inactivity and refusal to work with 
Pharnabazus was reported to Artaxerxes as potentially rebellious.  His defeat at Pactolus, he 
suggests, was the final evidence which condemned him.  For a detailed discussion and 
bibliography regarding the relationship of Tissaphernes and Agesilaus see Orsi, 2008, pp.209-224. 
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highlights the severity of the Persian defeat in this battle.880  Upon his 
appointment Tithraustes sent a message to Agesilaus claiming that Tissaphernes 
had been the cause of the conflict between Sparta and Persia, he had now been 
executed and that the Ionian Greeks were free to govern themselves. Therefore, 
Artaxerxes required that Agesilaus withdraw from Persia.  Agesilaus agreed to 
withdraw as far as the territory of Pharnabazus whilst he waited for instructions 
from Sparta and was given supplies from Tithraustes to ensure he marched his 
army to Phrygia.881  
Through his satraps we can see a change in Artaxerxes IIs policy towards 
the Spartan invasion of Asia Minor.  Tissaphernes had made a number of treaties 
in order to send to Artaxerxes for advice on the terms offered by Sparta, in this 
we can see that it was necessary for Tissaphernes to consult Artaxerxes II each 
time and, thus, all refusals in reality came from Artaxerxes.  However, 
Tithraustes arrived in Asia Minor with a new policy having already been 
decided, i.e. that Artaxerxes was willing to let the Ionian Greeks govern 
themselves autonomously provided they paid the tribute they had previously 
paid to Persia. We do not know from Xenophon whether Ionian Greek tribute 
had previously been discussed, but it seems that after Agesilaus victory at 
Sardis, Artaxerxes was willing to make nominal concessions to Sparta and the 
Ionian Greeks.882   
The Spartan invasion of Asia Minor was a significant turning point in the 
relationship of the Greeks with Persia.  The Spartan invasion broke Persian trust 
in them and put Persia on the defensive, making it necessary for Artaxerxes II to 
consult the other Greek states in order to remove these forces.  Whilst we can 
observe a continued Persian policy of exploiting factionalism in Greece, we can 
see, also, that it opened the way for the other states to attempt to break Spartas 
dominance in Greece. 
                                                          
880 Krentz, 1989, p. 191. 
881 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.4.26. Diodorus Siculus, XIV.80, informs us that Tithraustes concluded 
with him a truce of six months. 
882 Diodorus Siculus account of the battle of Sardis differs drastically to that of Xenophon. The 
Oxyrhynchus Historian, Hellenica in the London fragments XI.3-12.4 gives a very similar account to 
that of Diodorus Siculus. McKechnie and Kern, 1988, p. 146, comment that Diodorus Siculus 
probably took his account from the account given by the Oxyrhynchus Historian. 
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We may also observe that as a result of the multiple re-negotiations of the 
terms of the treaty between the Spartans and Persians, with which we have been 
dealing in detail, both sides will have become better acquainted with each other 
when negotiating later treaties.  A detailed treatment of these negotiations serves 
to highlight the increasing complexity of the relationship between the Greeks 
and Persia, especially when we compare these negotiations with the simple 
diktats sent from Persia in the fifth century. 
 
The Corinthian War 
After the 6 month truce, Agesilaus resumed his campaigning in Asia 
Minor and we find that Artaxerxes II resorted to the tactic used by Artaxerxes I 
to remove the Athenians from Egypt in the 460s.883  An embassy from Persia is 
recorded in Polyaenus, being sent to Greece, in 397/6, on the advice of Conon the 
Athenian.884 According to Polyaenus, Conon suggested bribing the political 
leaders of the cities of Hellas in order that they would declare war on Sparta.  
He also notes that after war was declared Agesilaus was recalled from Asia 
indicating that his recall was, indeed, behind the Persian bribe.  We are given no 
details by Polyaenus regarding those involved in bribing the Greeks, but 
Plutarch records Agesilaus statement that the King was driving him out of Asia 
with the help of ten thousand archers,885 referring to the archer motif on Persian 
darics.  Fuller information can be obtained from Xenophon, who states explicitly, 
Tithraustes ... sent Timocrates of Rhodes to Greece with gold to the value of 
fifty talents of silver and told him to distribute the money on the basis ... that 
they would make war on Sparta.886  If we are to believe that it was Conon's idea 
to bribe the Greek states, we can assume that he, and through him Tithraustes 
who I believe sent Timocrates, understood how to manipulate the hostile Greek 
feelings toward Sparta.  Xenophon states that Thebes, Corinth and Argos, 
accepted the bribe and that Athens, contrary to the Oxyrhynchus Historian, did 
                                                          
883 Cf. pp. 132-135. 
884 Polyaneus, Stratagemata, I.48.4. 
885 Plutarch, Agesilaus XV. The reference to the archers also indicates the Greek familiarity with 
Persian darics and may suggest a wide dissemination of these within Greece by this time. 
886 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.5.1-2. Also, Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1, Pausanias, III.9.7-8, Plutarch, 
Artaxerxes, XX who believe that Tithraustes sent Timocrates, but the Oxyrhynchus Historian, 
Hellenica (London Fragment VII.5) implies Timocrates was sent by Pharnabazus. 
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not accept the gold, but still agreed to wage war against Sparta.887 Anti-Spartan 
sentiments in Greece are demonstrable by the fact that there were at least 4 Greek 
states willing to wage war against Sparta by 397/6 B.C., one of which supposedly 
needed no further motivation in the form of Tithraustes bribe.  We noted above 
that this bribery may have been the suggestion of Conon.  This may be indicative 
of Greek attitudes towards Persia; that Persian gold could be used to defray the 
expenses of their inter-state wars.  It is also indicative of Persias attitude towards 
the Greeks that they would take Persian gold when offered. The gold sent to all 
four states collectively, whether accepted or not, seems to have been the catalyst 
for the outbreak of the Corinthian War, but the primary cause of the war seems 
to have been general dissatisfaction with Spartan aggression after the 
Peloponnesian War.888  We can surmise that the Persian gold, although not the 
primary cause of the Corinthian war, was an extra bonus which offset the costs 
of the campaign.  G. Schepens notes that the Oxyrhynchus Historian offers a 
different chronology to Xenophon that Timocrates arrived with Persian gold 
after hostilities had started.889  I prefer the chronology of Xenophon because once 
war had broken out in Greece and Agesilaus had been recalled, there would 
have been little point in Artaxerxes II sending gold  Persia would no longer 
have been affected.  However, it was in the interests of Artaxerxes II to remove 
Agesilaus from Asia Minor and I believe that, knowing the unrest in Greece, 
Artaxerxes II knew it was likely the Greeks would accept the gold to offset the 
costs of war against Sparta.  We find Artaxerxes II employing the familiar 
Persian tactic of exploiting Greek inter-state divisions; a tactic employed by 
Cyrus the Great, Darius I, Xerxes and Darius II.890 
 
Argos 
                                                          
887 Cf. p. 205, for the Oxyrhynchus Historian. 
888 McKechnie & Kern, 1988, p. 135. 
889 Schepens, 2012, p. 215.  Schepens later argues that Xenophons account demonstrates his Spartan 
sources for this period, which exploited the chronological coincidence of the war that had 
broken out in Greece with the one they were conducting in Persia in order to gloss over 
dissatisfaction with Sparta, p. 232.  March, 1997, p. 266, also believes that the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian offers a different chronology to Xenophon, but interprets Timocrates arrival as prior to 
the Demaenetus affair. 
890 For Cyrus the Great see pp. 13-16, for Darius I see pp. 23, 30, 49, for Xerxes see Herodotus, VII. 
32, and for Darius II see pp. 158-164. 
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Turning our attention to the causes of unrest in Greece, we can see that 
Argive acceptance of Persian gold is not at all surprising since Argos was 
constantly contesting Spartas leadership of the Peloponnese.  Sparta will have 
been even more of a threat to Argos after the Peloponnesian War with its 
increased revenue from the other Greek states and from its campaigning in Asia 
Minor.  It is also worth pondering whether the treaty between Argos and Xerxes 
witnessed by Callias was still in effect? At present there is no way to know this. 
 
Thebes 
Theban enmity toward Sparta was to such a degree at this time that they 
had refused to permit Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis when he was preparing his 
invasion of Asia Minor.891  Hammond claims that when Thebes sheltered 
Athenian exiles from the Thirty Tyrants, prior to the Corinthian War, both 
Ismenias and Androclidas, who accepted the gold on behalf of Thebes, helped 
the exiles to plan their return to Athens.892 Contrary to Pausanias and Plutarch, 893 
I.A.F. Bruce suggests that it is unlikely that Ismenias deliberately caused the 
Corinthian War and believes that the Theban  Athenian alliance was a defensive 
one.  He notes the Spartan aggression against Orchomenus before the Theban 
ambassadors visited Athens to request an alliance.894  It is worth bearing in 
mind that an alliance with Athens may not have been guaranteed considering 
that Thebes, along with Corinth, had demanded the destruction of the city when 
it fell at the end of the Peloponnesian War.895  Lendon notes that fear of Spartan 
imperialism and discontent at Spartan attempted interference with Theban 
internal politics were major factors in Theban defection from Sparta.896  Whilst 
these sentiments seem to have replaced Theban fear of Persia, we should not 
                                                          
891 Xenophon, Hellenica, III.4.3-4. 
892 Hammond, 1977, pp. 449-50, refers to Xenophon, Hellenica, II.4.1 and Diodorus Siculus, XIV.6.3, 
who states that in Thebes, when the exiles were recalled by the Thirty Tyrants, they voted that 
anyone witnessing an exile being led off and did not render him all aid within his power should 
be subject to a fine. 
893 Pausanias, III.9.9, Plutarch, Lysander, XXVII.1. Also, Diodorus Siculus, XIV.82.7 for Ismenias 
persuading the Aenianians and Athamanians to secede from Sparta. 
894 Bruce, 1960, p. 82. 
895 Xenophon, Hellenica, II.2.19. 
896 Lendon, 1989, p. 309, argues that the envoy sent to Thebes for men for Agesilaus campaign 
against Persia was actually an attempt to support philo-Laconian factions in Thebes. 
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ignore long standing Theban pro-Persian sympathies which were apparent 
during the Persian invasions. 
 
Corinth  
As with Thebes, it is probable that Corinth accepted Tithraustes gold due 
to dissatisfaction with Spartan aggression at this time.897  However, we find that 
accepting this gold caused civil unrest and dissension in Corinth. Xenophon 
mentions that during the Corinthian war a revolution took place due to a faction 
in Corinth desiring peace with Sparta.898  This faction opposed those who had 
accepted the Persian gold, which obliged Corinth to continue the War, primarily 
because much of the fighting was taking place in Corinth and damaging 
Corinthian land.  The account of the revolution given by Xenophon indicates that 
not everyone in Corinth was in favour of a war against Sparta, especially once 
the fighting had started.  Therefore, it was necessary for Pharnabazus to 
encourage his Corinthian allies to continue energetically with the prosecution of 
the war, and to show the King that they were men whom he could trust.899  
Thus, we can see that by accepting the gold the Corinthians, and likely the other 
Greek states which accepted Persian gold, seemingly became allies with Persia.  
Pharnabazus language here indicates that Persia was firmly in control of this 
relationship as we find that it is the Greek states who seemingly need to win 
Artaxerxes IIs trust and not him trying to win theirs. 
 Before leaving the Corinthians, Pharnabazus left more money with them, 
with which Corinth built a new fleet and took control of the gulf around Achaea 
and Lychaeum.  It is apparent that Corinthian finances were not adequate prior 
to the additional gold given by Pharnabazus to carry on campaigning against 
Sparta to the extent desired by Pharnabazus.  We may add that the receipt of this 
additional funding was a possible result of the civil unrest in Corinth mentioned 
above. Hamilton notes that the U-turn in Corinthian and Theban attitudes 
towards Sparta in the period between 404 B.C. and 395 B.C. stemmed from the 
Spartan refusal to listen to the proposals of Corinth and Thebes at the end of the 
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899 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.9. 
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Peloponnesian War; both Corinth and Thebes had proposed that the Athenians 
be enslaved and their city destroyed.900  Not only did Sparta ignore the proposals 
of its allies but, furthermore, Lysander took all of the spoils from the war directly 
back to Sparta.  Thebes was able to declare a tithe of the spoils from Decelea for 
Apollo at Delphi, but Corinth received nothing, despite having suffered from 
lack of income due to interruptions to trade during the war.901  The anger of the 
Corinthians and Thebans is understandable, for they had entered into the 
Peloponnesian War as a member of the Peloponnesian League, and, thus, allies 
of Sparta.  Spartas refusal to consult its allies or share the spoils with them 
demonstrated a new Spartan attitude, which threatened Corinth and Thebes.  
This new Spartan attitude towards its allies is demonstrated by the Spartan 




Turning our attention to Athens, the Oxyrhynchus Historian claims that 
Athens did accept Persian gold.903  However, he also states that all had long 
been illdisposed towards the Spartans, looking out for a way that they might 
make the cities adopt a war policy.904 
Athenian enmity towards Sparta will have increased upon the conclusion 
of the Peloponnesian War and with the Spartan introduction and support of the 
Thirty Tyrants, which caused so much civil unrest in the city.  Hamilton suggests 
that many Athenians dreamt of the old glory days when Athens had its empire 
and many Athenians would have eagerly joined an alliance against Sparta in an 
attempt to reclaim its former position in Greece.905  He further notes that Spartas 
unwillingness to arbitrate over the Phocis-Locris affair confirmed Spartas policy 
of aggression to Athens.906  The sending of Demaenetus as an envoy to Conon 
seems to support the notion of revived Athenian imperialism in the fourth 
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century, although the subsequent abandonment of him would suggest that, at 
that time, the Athenians were still fearful of Spartan retribution.907  R. Seager 
suggests that Thrasybulus, Aesimus and Anytus, named by the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian as those men in Athens who censured Demaenetus, did so due to the 
fear of a war against Sparta without allies and being unprepared.908  However, he 
notes that, on the strength of the Theban speech to Athens persuading the 
Athenians to make an alliance, Xenophon believed  the Athenians were eager 
for the restoration of the empire.909  We can agree that, despite the apparent 
Athenian desire to regain her Empire, there were rivalries in the demos 
concerning when the opportune moment would be to instigate the break from 
Sparta. We have seen that similar divisions existed in Corinth.910  The naval 
successes of Conon in the Aegean would have given the Athenian demos 
confidence, but the more conservative members of the demos clearly did not 
want to rebel against Sparta without allied backing. The offer of Persian support 
by Timocrates will have put pressure on this internal splitting of opinion, and 
Athens eventually decided to join Argos, Corinth and Thebes against Sparta. 
We find further evidence of an AthenianPersian agreement when 
Xenophon retrospectively narrates the previously omitted naval operations of 
the Corinthian War and he introduces Conon, the exiled Athenian general, who 
was working with Pharnabazus.911  We will discuss the deeds of Conon later, but 
it is worth noting here confirmation of an apparent Athenian-Persian agreement, 
albeit possibly an unofficial one, in a united effort against Sparta.  We see Conon 
and Pharnabazus working together against Abydos and Sestos, pro-Spartan 
cities which were supporting Dercylidas in Asia.  Conon is clearly working with 
Pharnabazus against Greek cities ostensibly because of their Spartan 
sympathies.912  
                                                          
907 Demainetos took a trireme from Athens to aid Conon without the authority of the Athenian 
people. 
908 Seager, 1967, p. 96.  Strauss, 1984, believes that the sending and then abandonment of 
Demaenetus was simply a symptom of the personal rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus. 
909 Seager, 1967, p. 98. 
910 Cf. pp. 206-207 above. 
911 Xenophon, Hellenica IV.8. 
912 Xenophon, Hellenica IV.8.6-7. 
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The Oxyrhynchus Historian informs us of another embassy sent after the 
Corinthian War had broken out. On this occasion we are told that ambassadors 
had been sent to the Great King (led by) krates and Hagnias and 
Tele(sag)oros.913  This is mentioned in the context of Athens anti-Spartan 
actions prior to the Demainetos incident.  We are told by both the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian and Harpocration914 that the embassy, which appears to have been led 
by Hagnias, was captured by the Nauarch Pharax and sent to Sparta where the 
ambassadors were executed.915  After the fate of these ambassadors the 
Oxyrhynchus Historian continues where Polyaenus finishes by telling us that the 
money sent to bribe the Greeks was brought by Timocrates, of whom little else is 
known beyond this role.916 Bruce, attempting to reconcile our two sources, 
suggests that this Athenian embassy led by Hagnias was actually an Athenian 
attempt to secure the gold offered by Timocrates, which had been initially 
rejected by the Athenians.917 
 
Conon 
When discussing the Corinthian war it is appropriate to discuss Conon, 
the Athenian general who worked with Pharnabazus during the Corinthian War.  
Conon was elected as one of the ten generals who replaced Alcibiades after the 
Athenian naval defeat at Notium.  He was the only general of the ten who was 
not condemned after the Athenian victory at Arginusae and one of the few who 
escaped the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami, making his way to the court of 
Evagoras at Salamis on Cyprus.918  Conon was unable to return to Athens and, 
whilst at the court of Evagoras, he was appointed commander of the Persian 
fleet.919 None of the sources explain much about the circumstances surrounding 
Conons appointment; we are simply told that Conon fled to the court of 
                                                          
913 Oxyrhynchus Historian, Hellenica, VII.1. Although only three names are found here, Mosley 
claims that the embassy contained more than three men. Mosley, 1973, p. 56. 
914 Harpocration, Lexicon sv Hagnias. 
915 This is the second time we hear of the violation of the sanctity of ambassadors. Cf. p. 154 above. 
916 Pausanias, III.9.8-9, Xenophon, Hellenica, III.5.1, Plutarch, Artaxerxes. XX.  
917 Bruce, 1966, p. 277. 
918Xenophon, Hellenica, II.1.29. Diodorus Siculus, XIII. 106.  
919 Mitchell, 1997, p. 68, citing Diodorus Siculus, XIII.106.6 and Isocrates IX.53, suggests that Conon 
and Evagoras were xenoi and notes that Athens gave Evagoras citizenship in 411 B.C.  He also 
notes the aid Evagoras had given to Athens during the Peloponnesian War when Sparta was trying 
to blockade Athens in 407 B.C. 
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Evagoras and that the King appointed him commander of the fleet.  Ctesias 
story that there was some correspondence by letter between Conon and 
Artaxerxes and a discussion between Conon and Evagoras about Conons 
travelling up to the court of Artaxerxes is as acceptable as any, although there are 
variants in the sources.920  Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos agree on the detail of a 
letter; Cornelius Nepos states that Conon took this option as preferable to 
performing proskynesis to Artaxerxes.921 Cornelius Nepos continues that Conon 
actively befriended Pharnabazus in an attempt to re-establish Athens status 
within Greece.922 The fragments of Ctesias imply, also, that the initiative for 
Conons appointment may have come from Conon himself.  Diodorus Siculus, 
omitting details, states simply that Pharnabazus appointed him as the admiral of 
the Persian fleet.923  He says that Pharnabazus, after persuading Artaxerxes II, 
appointed Conon specifically because his experience of naval warfare against the 
Peloponnesians; Pharnabazus had been on the receiving end of Conons skills 
during the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War.924  Diodorus Siculus also states 
that Pharnabazus, when he went to Cyprus to commission the building of the 
Persian fleet, had discussions with Conon before he appointed him to the 
supreme command of the fleet.   
 
Conon will have been aware that as a refugee in the Persian Empire he 
will have needed to offer something in return for his safety, as others had before 
him.  Although he was not at the court of Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes or 
Artaxerxes, being at the court of Evagoras did still mean that Conon had taken 
refuge within the Persian Empire.925  It is worth remembering that Conon still 
commanded a few ships from his Athenian fleet, which had escaped 
                                                          
920 Ctesias FrGH 688 F14 (73-74). 
921 Plutarch, Artaxerxes, XXI. Cornelius Nepos, Conon, III. 
922 Cornelius Nepos, Conon, IV.  
923 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39. 
924 March, 1997, p. 257, conjectures that Conons appointment may have been suggested by 
Pharnabazus when he visited Artaxerxes in 398, whilst Dercylidas was wintering in Bithynian 
Thrace. However, cf. Ctesias above. 
925 We have seen how Conons predecessors had taken refuge at the court of the satraps of either 
Hellespontine Phrygia or Ionia or at the court of the Great King himself.  However, considering 
Artaxerxes IIs support Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, Conon will have quite sensibly decided 
not to take refuge at any of these courts, aware of Alcibiades fate at the behest of Sparta, until he 
had gauged the political situation more fully.   
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Aegospotami with him and which would have been valuable as a nucleus for 
this new Persian fleet.  We are not told what the discussions with Pharnabazus 
were about, whether or not Pharnabazus needed to persuade Conon to take the 
command, but Diodorus Siculus says that Conon took on the role in the hope of 
re-establishing Athens as the leading state of Greece and to win great personal 
renown for himself.926  Isocrates maintains that Conons intent was to overthrow 
the Spartan fleet.927  With Conons help Artaxerxes II was able to put a check on 
Spartas advance into Asia Minor and go on the offensive, providing an 
opportunity for Athens to build up a fleet again and, thus, act as a balance to 
Spartas dominance of Greece.928  D.A. March maintains that, due to the old 
problem of lack of Persian funding, Conon was unable to act effectively until 
after Agesilaus had been recalled to Sparta.929 
Conon, as commander of the Persian fleet, proceeded to take over the 
islands in the Aegean from Sparta; most notable was Rhodes, which, when it 
changed allegiance, deprived Sparta of weapons and grain unwittingly sent from 
Egypt.930  During his command of the Persian fleet Conon encouraged the 
defection of many of the Greek islands; Diodorus Siculus claims that Conon and 
Pharnabazus induced Cos, Nysiros, Teos, Chios, Mitylene, Ephesus and 
Erythraea, Cythera and all of the islands of the Cyclades to revolt from Sparta.931  
On the advice of Conon, Pharnabazus encouraged the cities and islands to revolt, 
claiming that the Persians would leave them to govern themselves 
independently and not build any fortified citadels within the cities.932  Thus, we 
find a new Persian approach to the question of independence for the Ionian 
Greeks, which is not dissimilar to that of Mardonius when settling the Ionian 
cities after the Ionian Revolt at the beginning of the fifth century.933  The islands 
will have also been persuaded by Conons victory over the Spartan fleet at 
                                                          
926 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39.3. 
927 Isocrates, Panegyricus 154. 
928 In Diodorus Siculus we only hear of Conon helping Pharnabazus after a truce had been made 
with Agesilaus during the Spartan invasion of Ionia. Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39. 
929 March, 1997, passim. 
930 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.79. 
931 Diodorus Siculus XIV.84. 
932 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.1. 
933 Herodotus, VI.43. Cf. p. 33 above. 
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Cnidus,934 demonstrating his ability to break Spartas control of the Aegean.  Fear 
of retribution after this Spartan defeat will have been less and the promise of 
independent governance without interference from Persia will have been 
tempting.  It should be noted that, although the islands were promised 
independence in their choice of governance, they would still have been 
considered part of the Persian Empire once they had seceded from Sparta and so 
would have been expected to pay tribute to Persia.  Thus, we find Persia 
employing both military and diplomatic tactics in order to break Spartan 
dominance of the Aegean.  We can see here a Persian compromise regarding the 
islands along the Ionian coast, which recalls the behaviour of Mardonius after the 
Ionian Revolt in the 490s B.C.935 
With Conon working for Persia, he was able to break Spartas control of 
the Aegean, after which he was free to go to Athens where he began rebuilding 
the long walls to Piraeus and Athens city walls.936  In breaking Spartas 
dominance of the Aegean Conon was also attempting to reinstate some of 
Athens influence there.  According to Xenophon, Conon was winning over for 
Athens the islands and the cities on the coast of the mainland.937  However, 
Seager notes that Diodorus Siculus distinguishes between those islands which 
expelled the Spartans, but did not join the Persians, and those which did join the 
Persians.938  We have already noted above how during the Corinthian War 
Pharnabazus and Conon visited the Corinthians with gold to ensure they 
continued in the prosecution of the war.  It is interesting to ponder the possibility 
that part of the discussions between Pharnabazus and Conon in Cyprus included 
terms that enabled Conon to rebuild Athens defences once Spartas dominance 
of the Aegean had been broken.  Xenophon claims that when Conon persuaded 
Pharnabazus that rebuilding Athens walls would be a heavy blow against 
Sparta, Pharnabazus gave Conon extra financing for this.939  In response the 
Spartans sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus hoping that he would either bring 
                                                          
934 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.83, Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.3.11. 
935 Cf. pp. 33-34 above. 
936 Diodorus Siculus, XIV. 85, Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.12. 
937 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.12. 
938 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.84.4. Seager, 1967, p. 101. 
939 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.9, Diodorus Siculus, XIV.85. 
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(Tiribazus) over into an alliance with (Sparta) or, at least, stop him from 
maintaining Conons fleet.940  If we are to believe Xenophon, Conon was 
rebuilding Athens walls not only with Pharnabazus money but also seemingly 
with his prior consent.  Thus, we can infer that the Greek states understood 
satrapal rivalry within Persia and exploited it as the need demanded.  
Conon died in Cyprus after a term in jail, having been arrested by 
Tiribazus.941  Hammond suggests that Artaxerxes was wary of Conons double 
dealing and did not wish to create another Alcibiades.942  We know that Athens 
erected a statue to Conon, in gratitude for his bringing Persian gold to rebuild 
Athens city walls and the Great Walls to Pireaus.  However, whether or not we 
can claim, as Hammond does, that Artaxerxes was wary of Conon creating a 
position of power for himself based on his image as a liberator and Persian 
friend, as Alcibiades did, may be stretching our evidence.  We can say with a 
degree of certainty that Conon had fulfilled his purpose in the eyes of 
Artaxerxes943 and also that he had gained some reputation as a liberator944 and so 
we can take the view that retiring him to stop him causing trouble would have 
seemed wise.  With Spartan dominance of the Aegean broken and Athens 
regaining its strength, having an Athenian in charge of the Persian fleet may 
have seemed an unnecessary risk after the task was completed; the last time 
Athens had had a strong unchallenged navy it caused trouble for Persia, 
liberating Greek islands in the Aegean and cities along the Ionian coast.  
Therefore, we may suggest that Artaxerxes II did not wish to replace one 
troublemaker with another one. 
Looking at the role of Conon we may view him as one of the first Greeks, 
about whom we have much information, to make the transition from mediser, as 
we have previously defined the term, to mercenary.  He had been staying with 
Evagoras since 405 B.C., but it was not until Spartas invasion of Ionia that Conon 
became active in the Aegean, i.e. like Hippias before him he was not used by 
                                                          
940 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.12. 
941 Lysias, XIX, 39-41. 
942 Hammond, 1977, p. 462. 
943 March, 1997, p. 268, notes that Conons limited command is demonstrated by his need to request 
men from Leonymus when his Cypriot mercenaries were close to rebellion.  
944 W. Dittenberger, SIG, No. 126. 
221 
 
Persia until needed.  Whether he offered his services to Persia, as is implied by 
Ctesias, or whether he was approached by Pharnabazus and accepted the job, 
as is stated in Diodorus Siculus, does not really matter.  What is notable is that 
Conon was managed to do a task with a limited scope when Athenian interests 
coincided with those of Persia.  Once the task had been completed we could 
argue that Conon was no longer in Artaxerxes employment, thus, Tiribazus was 
not condemned for arresting him.  Apparent from the activities of Conon is his 
seeming realisation that, so long as he kept his Persian employers happy, he 
could also work on his own interest.  Thus, we find Conon rebuilding the walls 
of Piraeus, whilst he is employed by Persia.  He may have been arrested by 
Tiribazus, but this was without the authority of Artaxerxes II.  The only 
contentious actions we may attribute to Conon was his liberation of the Ionian 
Greek islands, leaving them to govern autonomously.  This may be interpreted 
as an attempt not only to diminish Spartan supremacy, but also to weaken 
Persian control of the islands.  However, this is speculation and is dependent on 
interpretation of Conons motives, which we will never be able to ascertain.  
Also, we must remember that Persia accepted this.  What is clear from the actions 
of Conon is that he provided an example that employment as a mercenary, rather 
than simply medising, was politically acceptable to the Greeks.  It is also clear 
that of all those compelled to seek refuge in Persia, he accomplished the most. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
The period from Cyrus the Youngers rebellion and the subsequent 
actions of the Greeks culminating in the Corinthian War demonstrates another 
shift in Greek attitudes to Persia.  As a result of Persias involvement in the 
Peloponnesian War, the Greeks and Persians became more familiar with each 
other.  The increase in the availability of mercenaries also expanded the Greek 
geographical knowledge of Persia.  It is worth noting that, despite limited 
evidence, there were also Greek mercenaries working in Persia but not for Cyrus 
the Younger.945  We also find instances of Greek generals employed as military 
specialists.  Although we know more about Conon due to his role in both the 
                                                          
945 See Nicarchus the Arcadian (Xenophon, Anabasis, III.3.5.) and the Greek mercenaries employed 
by Mania (Xenophon, Hellenica, III.1.10-13). 
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Peloponnesian War and Corinthian War, prior to him Phalinus of Zacynthus was 
employed by Tissaphernes as a specialist in hoplite warfare.946 It might even be 
argued that Artaxerxes IIs previous experience with Phalinus in his army at 
Cunaxa helped to persuade him to employ Conon as a naval specialist. This 
trend continues into the Fourth century with Persian attempts to re-conquer 
Egypt.947  The Spartan invasion of Ionia was facilitated by the growing familiarity 
between Greeks and Persians, and was successful enough for Artaxerxes II not 
only to employ Conon, but also to send gold to the dissatisfied Greek states.  The 
contrast between the Spartan invasion in the fourth century and the response to 
Aristagoras in the fifth century is striking and highlights the change in Spartan 
attitudes to Persia and Spartas growing confidence largely due to the 
Peloponnesian War, even if Cyrus mercenaries originally baulked at the idea of 
going against the king. 
The bribing of the Greek states and the outbreak of the Corinthian War 
demonstrate Persias reciprocal familiarity with the Greeks.  We have already 
noted above that the bribe itself should be viewed as a catalyst for the 
outbreak of the Corinthian War, rather than the cause, and Persias support of 
Sparta in the final years of the Peloponnesian War would likely reassure those 
Greek states allied against Sparta.  Due to the effectiveness of Persian gold, we 
can see that by the outbreak of the Corinthian War Persian support had become a 
desirable commodity itself.  Thus, we can see that through his ability to fund the 
Greek states, Artaxerxes II strengthened his position of influence over the Greeks 
by sowing seeds of dissent. 
In this period, a notable change we find is that Artaxerxes II apparently 
increases Persian use of diplomacy and also the use of his subordinates, who 
seem to have possessed a large degree of independence at the time.  Artaxerxes 
is, at first, forced to act defensively in response to Spartas invasion.  It may be 
simply that more sources are available for this period, however, we find that 
whilst campaigning in Asia Minor, Dercylidas made four truces with 
Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, and he also met with them to discuss terms to a 
possible treaty.  Agesilaus also made two truces with Tissaphernes and 
                                                          
946 Xenophon, Anabasis, II.1.7. Plutarch, Artaxerxes, XIII. 
947 Cf. pp. 226-228, for the employment of Iphicrates.  
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Tithraustes whilst campaigning.  Furthermore, we find that Artaxerxes was 
willing to recognise Ionian Greek autonomy provided the cities resumed paying 
tribute.  This treatment was also applied to the Ionian Greek islands which 
Conon and Pharnabazus won over from Sparta.  Thus, we can see that 
Artaxerxes II recognised that Asia Minor and the islands along the coast would 
be more stable if he granted them nominal concessions.  By exploiting the 
tensions within Greece and granting these nominal concessions Artaxerxes II was 
able to stabilise the Persian Empire.  There is a notable shift in Persian tactics 
from defensive diplomacy, stalling the Spartan advance in to Persia with truces, 
to offensive diplomacy, bribing the Greek states to wage war against Sparta at 
about the same time as Conon is employed to lead the Persian fleet.  We will see 
later that, with the Persian Empire in the west more stable, Artaxerxes and his 
successors were able to take advantage of their position of influence to maintain 
peace in Greece in order to recruit Greeks as mercenaries to help take back other 




Chapter 7: The Kings Peace & the Rise of Macedon 
 
Greece in the fourth century B.C. was in a period of significant turmoil.  
Having defeated the Athenian Empire in the Peloponnesian War and having 
invaded Persia, Sparta was the dominant state in Greece until its defeat by 
Thebes in 371 B.C.  However, it is clear that Sparta, and subsequently Thebes, 
was unable to dominate Greece fully without Persian backing.  Persian gold was 
able to support Sparta against Athens, but later it was also able to support 
Athens, Corinth, Thebes and Argos against Sparta. So we begin to see that, on 
the one hand, Persian gold itself was desirable to the Greeks to fund their wars 
against each other, and, on the other hand, the threat of Persian gold being 
bestowed upon their enemies could be used as a potent threat against the Greeks.  
Both the appeal and the threat of Persian gold were used by Persian kings in the 
fourth century to control not only Persias relationship with the Greek states, but 
also their relationship with each other via the Kings Peace and its renewals.  The 
Kings Peace allows us to divide Persian foreign policy in the fourth century into 
two general phases; defensive and offensive.  Prior to the Kings Peace Persia 
employed a defensive policy aimed at protecting the Empires borders by 
dividing the Greek states against each other.  Having secured its borders in the 
Kings Peace and its revisions, Persia became the great arbiter of Greek affairs, 
which allowed the Great King to employ Greek mercenaries as part of Persias 
offensive foreign policy against Cyprus and Egypt to recover these former 
territories.  This chapter will look at the events of the fourth century and the 
ways Persia attempted to control the Greek states and the subsequent reaction to 
this by the Greeks. 
 
Towards a Kings Peace 
 In 393/2948 after 4 years of war with Corinth, Athens, Thebes and Argos, 
which, as we have seen, was financed by Persia, Sparta sent Antalcidas to the 
                                                          
948 Philochorus apud Didymus, On Demosthenes, VII.11-28, suggests another embassy which Keen, 
1995, believes took place in to 392/1 based on the archonship of Philocles mentioned in 
Philochorus.  DeVoto, 1986, p. 191, believes the embassy in Philochorus and that in Xenophon are 
two separate embassies. However, A.G. Keen, 1995, believes they are the same embassy and 
Cawkwell, 1981, p. 70, noting Andocides De Pace, suggests that, after the initial meeting with 
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Persian satrap, Tiribazus, to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with Persia.  We 
may suggest that Sparta had learnt from the Peace of Callias that when a Greek 
state concluded a peace treaty with Persia, this enabled that Greek state to 
achieve a dominant position in Greece.  It should be noted that the previous 
treaties between Sparta and Persia were symmachia alliances against Athens and 
not peace treaties in the same sense as the Peace of Callias.  Those Greek states 
which had been warring against Sparta, not wishing to lose their funding from 
Pharnabazus, sent their own embassy to Tiribazus.949   
 No treaty was concluded at this time, however, foundations were laid 
which enabled the Kings Peace, which was agreed 5 years later.  On the 
evidence of Andocides950, Cawkwell concludes that the terms for this attempted 
treaty were not simply dictated to the Greeks by Tiribazus, as sent down by the 
King, and there appears to have been opportunity for negotiating them.  This ties 
in with the political situation in Greece at the time; Sparta was unable to impose 
a peace treaty on the other Greek states, which offered them the opportunity to 
the debate and to reject the terms proposed by Sparta.  Xenophon is silent on the 
details of these negotiations beyond the term calling for political autonomy for 
all of the Greek cities. This may be interpreted as an attempt to limit Athenian 
imperial ambitions and also to damage the interests of Corinth, Argos and 
Thebes.  Ryder notes that, in 392 B.C., whilst Antalcidas had initially intended to 
make a bilateral treaty between Sparta and Persia, the arrival of the other envoys 
inclined Antalcidas to offer up the Asian Greeks in return for Persian support of 
an autonomy clause.951  Each state allied against Sparta feared losing the cities 
under their own authority: in the case of Athens it was the islands of Lemnos, 
Imbros and Scyros, the Thebans had captured cities in Boeotia, and the Argives, 
who had created a state of isopoliteia with Corinth.952   
 The failure of the Greeks to agree to this treaty did not prevent Tiribazus 
from supporting Sparta with Persian gold, given to Antalcidas, and by arresting 
                                                                                                                                                              
Tiribazus, at which time initial terms were proposed, the envoys returned to their cities with the 
terms and then met at Sparta after forty days, at which time the treaty was to be sealed with oaths. 
949 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.12.  Mosley, 1973, pp. 17-21, for an argument supporting the 
authenticity of Xenophons account. 
950 Andocides, De Pace, XII-XV.  Cawkwell, 1981, p. 70. 
951 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.12. Ryder, 1965, p. 28. Seager, 1974, p. 36. 
952 Bengtson, 1970, p. 209. 
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Conon on the charge of misusing the gold given him by Pharnabazus.  Tiribazus 
had been persuaded by Antalcidas that, once Conon and the Phoenician fleet had 
removed Spartan influence from Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean, 
funding from Persia should have stopped, as is seems to have been when 
Tissaphernes became difficult about paying the Peloponnesian fleet once Athens 
had been removed from Asia Minor at the end of the second Peloponnesian War; 
it should have not been used to rebuild Athens walls and the walls to Piraeus.953  
Tiribazus inability to persuade Artaxerxes II of this led to his replacement by 
the, seemingly, pro-Athenian Struthas. 
 We may suggest that despite Spartan promises, Artaxerxes II did not 
trust this state, which had invaded Asia Minor to liberate the Ionian Greeks only 
two years earlier.  Ryder rightly argues that, despite misgivings concerning the 
restoration of Athenian influence in the Aegean, things had not yet gone very 
far and the Athenian attitude to (Persian) claims in Asia Minor seems to have 
been respectful.954   
 
The Kings Peace of 386 B.C. 
The reappointment of Tiribazus to Asia Minor in 387/6, led to a renewed 
effort by Antalcidas to gain Persian support.  It is likely that the reappointment 
of Tiribazus was motivated by Athens involvement in Evagoras Cypriot 
rebellion.  In 390 B.C. Evagoras and Athens made an alliance, resulting in 
Thrasybulus operations in the Hellespont against Artaxerxes.955   In 387 B.C. 
Athens sent further aid to Evagoras in the form of 800 peltasts  and ten 
triremes under the command of Chabrias.956   Athenian attempts to support 
Cyprus may have been considered as tantamount to Athenian reassertion of their 
control over the Aegean, as it was in the fifth century. 
                                                          
953 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.85 claims that Tiribazus arrested Conon due to jealousy of Conons 
successes with the Phoenician fleets.  
954 Ryder, 1965, p. 29. 
955 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.24. Diodorus Siculus XIV.98. Cf. Tuplin, 1983, pp. 178-179, who dates 
the Cypriot War with Persia beginning 391/390 B.C. in order for Athens to send 10 triremes to 
Evagoras in 390/389 B.C.  He further conjectures (pp. 182-185) that the limited assistance offered to 
Evagoras by Athens, i.e. only 10 triremes, was due to the impending departure of Thrasybulus to 
Rhodes. 
956 Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1.10. 
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In his meeting with Antalcidas Tiribazus agreed that Persia would 
support Sparta if the Athenians and her allies did not accept the peace treaty 
dictated by the Artaxerxes II.957  There may be truth in Ryders suggestion that 
Tiribazus, wanting to secure Athenian interest in accepting a Pan-Hellenic peace 
treaty, did not summon Athens until after a reinforced Spartan fleet had 
threatened Athenian control of the Hellespont and the import of grain to 
Athens.958  Also, due to the mobilization of the Spartan army, the Argives were 
also prepared to accept the peace treaty.959  It is for these reasons that, when 
Tiribazus finally called a meeting in 386 B.C., all parties came  with 
alacrity.960  
Artaxerxes terms were that the Greeks of Asia, and also Cyprus and 
Clazomenai, were subject to the King and all others were to be autonomous, with 
the exceptions of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were to be governed by 
Athens as they had been in the past.  Cawkwell on the basis of Isocrates, On the 
Peace, 16, believes that the autonomy clause may have given more details 
regarding what each city possessed and also concerned the removal of 
garrisons,961 which is possible, but it is not certain. 
 
The Kings Peace of 386 B.C. signifies a number of important changes for 
the Greeks and also demonstrates the degree of Persian influence over Greece.  
The most notable feature of the Peace is that it had no stipulated duration and 
included all of the Greek states, not simply those fighting in the Corinthian 
War.962   Thus, we can see that it was intended to be inclusive and long lasting. 
                                                          
957 Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1.25. 
958 Ryder, 1965, p. 35. 
959 Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1.15. 
960 Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1.31, Isocrates Panegyricus,120. Those leading these embassies were 
Antalcidas for Sparta, Hermogenes, half-brother of Callias the younger, for Athens (cf. Hoffstetter, 
1978, No. 145.), and Callisthenes, Callimedon and Dion.  Antalcidas is known to us primarily in 
connection with the many fourth century Graeco-Persian treaties, but his military credentials are 
confirmed by his participation in the naval battle at Cyzicus where he captured an Athenian 
trireme. Plutarch, Artaxerxes, XXII states he was an ephor 370/369 B.C.  Rice, 1974, p. 171, claims he 
was likely a supporter of Agesipolis against Agesilaus.  Hermogenes, Callisthenes, Callimedon and 
Dion are known to us only from their involvement in the Kings Peace. 
961 Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 72-73, also notes that Didymus comment on the treaty of 375 B.C. being 
similar to that of 386 B.C. would suggest that the autonomy clause and the removal of garrisons 
may date back to the treaty of 386 B.C. 
962 Ryder, 1965, p. 2, notes that the unilateral nature of the Kings Peace of 386 B.C. is observed 
primarily in contrast to preceding peace treaties, which were of a deliberately bilateral nature. He 
228 
 
Traditionally, Greek treaties were for a fixed duration and so we may suggest 
that this was a Persian innovation.  By appointing Sparta to enforce the treaty in 
Greece, Persia was able to enforce stability in Greece whilst preventing the Greek 
states becoming involved in Cyprus and Egypt.  The benefit of supporting Sparta 
over the other states was that Artaxerxes had curbed Spartas overseas ambitions 
in Asia Minor and Sparta had not shown itself interested in being involved in 
Cyprus or Egypt at that time.  Furthermore, Sparta had instigated the idea of a 
Kings Peace, recognising it was the only way to gain dominance over the other 
Greek states, and they had little choice but to accept it.  It should be reflected that 
whilst Artaxerxes II accepted the alliance of Corinth, Thebes, Argos and Athens 
against Sparta in the Corinthian War, it is doubtful he would have been too keen 
on a larger alliance in which he did not play a part, which may have constituted 
a threat to his interests. 
Ryder astutely notes that the autonomy clause was included for no other 
reason than that it suited primarily ... the interests of the Spartans and Persia, to 
whom the principle of city-state independence was a means rather than an 
end.963  That the Spartans hoped to profit by their enforcement of the autonomy 
clause is apparent from their subsequent treatment of Thebes, Corinth and 
Argos.  Sparta used the autonomy clause to prevent Thebes from signing the 
treaty on behalf of Boeotia and to disband the isopoliteia of Argos and Corinth.964  
Once the clause had served Spartas direct interests, it seems to have been largely 
ignored.  Spartan treatment of Mantinea demonstrates not only Spartan 
disregard of the autonomy clause, but that Sparta had reverted to acting in terms 
of what best suited Sparta rather than what was in accordance with the Peace.  
Seager notes that the Phliasian exiles and Olynthus both appealed to Spartas 
personal military desires, rather than Spartas position as prostates (defender) of 
the Peace.965  
                                                                                                                                                              
gives as an example the refusal of the Athenians and Spartans to include Argos in the peace treaty 
concluding the Thirty-Years in the Fifth Century. 
963 Ryder, 1965, p. 39.  
964 Seager, 1974, pp. 39-40, notes that having used the autonomy clause against Thebes, Argos and 
Corinth, Sparta does not appear to have used it against the smaller states of Mantinea, Phlius or 
Olynthus. Rather, Sparta simply issued orders to these cities from its position of military strength 
with no consideration of the autonomy clause. 
965 Seager, 1974, pp. 40-41. 
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Ryder suggests that the Persian support of the autonomy clause was not 
necessarily due to Persian attempts to re-conquer the islands of the Aegean, but 
rather to prevent a single Greek state becoming strong enough to dominate the 
Aegean.966  During the 380s Persias primary interests were the consolidation 
Asia Minor and the re-conquest of Cyprus and Egypt.  The removal of an added 
distraction, in the form of Greek interference in the Aegean, enabled Persia to 
concentrate on these interests. We can enlarge this argument and suggest that, 
with the Greek states in a weaker position, they were less likely to launch major 
campaigns against each other, thus, freeing up much needed mercenaries for 
Artaxerxes campaigns against Cyprus and Egypt, as well as to protect Asia 
Minor. This may be deemed another example of the Persian policy of dividing its 
enemies with a view to dominating them, although in this instance Persia was 
dividing the Greek states to protect itself, and Sparta was utilising the situation 
to its own benefit. 
A final comment ought to be made concerning the Greek need for outside 
intervention to settle their disputes. By backing one Greek state over the others 
since 411 B.C., Persia had created a situation where the Greek states, rather than 
trying to settle their disputes amongst themselves, turned to Persia to arbitrate 
them.  This gave Persia more control over the Greeks than it had ever previously 
held and it also gave Artaxerxes II the opportunity to turn his attention to other 
matters, such as the re-conquest of Cyprus and Egypt, without fear of major 
Greek intervention. 
 
The stipulation that the Greeks of Asia Minor were to belong to 
Artaxerxes was a clear message that he would not tolerate Greek interference in 
his interests in the Aegean.  However, we still find minor instances where both 
Athens and Sparta became involved in Asiatic concerns, which contradicted 
Persian interests.  Chabrias, who had been sent by Athens to Evagoras in Cyprus, 
subsequently assisted the rebel Pharaoh, Akoris, and, although Artaxerxes was 
able to reclaim Cyprus, Chabrias involvement in Egypt hindered Persias re-
conquest there.  Diodorus Siculus claims that Chabrias acted without first 
                                                          
966 Ryder, 1965, pp. 32-33. 
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securing official Athenian authorisation are contradicted by evidence from his 
later statement that Chabrias returned to Athens when recalled, after he had 
been denounced, at the behest of Pharnabazus.967  If we assume that Chabrias 
had been acting outside of the official Athenian line, it is peculiar that he was not 
punished when he returned to Athens.  Rather, he was commissioned as one of 
the generals against Sparta when the Athenians deemed Sparta to have broken 
the Kings Peace, which we will discuss below.968  In response to Chabrias recall 
and at Persias request, Iphicrates was sent to Pharnabazus.969   
Similarly, when Glos, son-in-law of Tiribazus, rebelled against Artaxerxes 
II at the start of the 380s, Sparta made an alliance with him. This was supposedly 
in an attempt to improve their bad reputation in Greece resulting from their 
abandonment of the Ionian Greeks in the Kings Peace; a popular theme 
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.970  This appears to be the same Glos 
who had fought with Cyrus against Artaxerxes II and brought news of Cyrus 
death to the Greeks after the battle of Cunaxa.971  We may speculate that this is 
one of the reasons why Glos approached Sparta for an alliance and their 
previous dealings with him may have persuaded them.  We are led to believe 
that Sparta was looking for a pretext for war with Artaxerxes II, however, given 
his reluctance to leave Asia Minor in 397/6 B.C., it is more probable that it was 
Agesilaus who was looking for a pretext for war with Artaxerxes II, rather than 
all of Sparta.  Also, Ryder correctly observes that, despite Xenophon, Spartan 
unpopularity was likely more closely connected to Spartas heavy-handed policy 
in Greece rather than to its abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, contrary to the 
popular theme they promoted during Agesilaus campaign in Asia Minor.972  
Ryder also notes Belochs suggestion that, perhaps, the alliance with Glos 
                                                          
967 Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.3-4. 
968 Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.7 
969 Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.4. Diodorus Siculus, XV.29. For a fuller discussion of this Persian 
campaign against Egypt, cf. pp. 226-228. 
970 Diodorus Siculus, XV.9.3-5. 
971 Xenophon, Anabasis, II.1.3. 
972 Ryder, 1965, pp. 52-53. Rice, 1974, argues that Agesilaus aggressive imperialist policy during 
386-379 was only rivalled by Agesipolis, who practised a more moderate policy but who died 
campaigning against Olynthus. 
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signified eventual renewed Spartan interest in the Ionian Greeks.973  However, 
nothing seems to have come of this Spartan alliance with Glos.   
Persias Cypriot and Egyptian Campaigns 
With the removal of the Greeks from Asia Minor Artaxerxes was able to 
concentrate his attention on further consolidating his empire.  We mentioned 
above Athens support of Evagoras revolt, which motivated Artaxerxes II to 
dictate the Kings Peace to the Greeks. Therefore, it is worth briefly recapping the 
events of this rebellion. In 390 B.C. Artaxerxes determined that Evagoras 
subjugation of the other cities on Cyprus was an act of revolt. 974  Diodorus 
Siculus says explicitly that a primary motive for the enmity between Artaxerxes 
II and Evagoras, and, therefore, the motive behind Artaxerxes alliance with the 
other kings of Cyprus in 390 B.C., was the strategic position of Cyprus and its 
great naval strength whereby it would be able to protect Asia in front.975  The 
strategic significance of Cyprus was due to its proximity to both Asia Minor and 
Egypt, whilst at the same time being physically separate from them.  This 
military significance is as true now as it was then and has been the case 
throughout the history of conflict in the Middle East.976  Cyprus was pivotal in 
any Persian attempts to re-conquer Egypt.977  Once secure, Cyprus remained 
under Persian control until the time of Alexander the Great, a fact which was 
reasserted by Artaxerxes II in his Kings Peace as a reminder to both the Greeks 
and the Cypriot kings.978  We are told by Diodorus Siculus that, with the Kings 
Peace concluded, Artaxerxes was able to prepare for his war with Evagoras.979  G. 
Shrimpton proposes an attractive chronology for Persian, Cypriot and Egyptian 
operations for 390-380 B.C., suggesting that, after Evagoras defeat at Citium in 
387/6 B.C., Artaxerxes decided to campaign against both Egypt and Cyprus 
simultaneously, to prevent them from aiding each other.980  He correctly notes 
                                                          
973 Ryder, 1963, p. 106. 
974 Cf. Costa, 1974, for a review of the career of Evagoras prior to 391 B.C. 
975 Diodorus Siculus, XIV.98-99. 
976 There are still British military bases on Cyprus and European forces used it during the Crusades 
of the Middle Ages. 
977 It is noteworthy that Cimons activities in Egypt in the 460s also involved Cyprus. Thucydides, 
I.112, Diodorus Siculus, XII.3, Plutarch, Cimon, XVIII. 
978 Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1.31. Cf. p. 220 above. 
979 Diodorus Siculus, XV.110. 
980 G. Shrimpton, 1991. 
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that Persias main objective through the mid-390s was the recovery of Egypt,981 
as well as, we would add, the defence of Asia Minor, which was hindered by 
Evagoras revolt.  
Diodorus Siculus informs us that, at the start of his rebellion Evagoras 
made an alliance with Akoris, king of Egypt, and received a strong force from 
him.982 This recalls the one-time alliance of Egypt and Samos in the sixth century 
in the time of Polycrates.983  When Evagoras had cut off transport supplies to the 
Persians besieging Cyprus, Akoris also sent supplies and money to him enabling 
him to withstand the siege.  The alliance between Evagoras and Akoris was 
significant enough to induce Artaxerxes II to send both Tiribazus and Orontes to 
deal with them; the location of the island was such that any instability there 
seems to have been considered a threat to the Persian Empire.  In 385 B.C., 
Evagoras, on his return from Egypt and finding his home city of Salamis 
besieged, entered into negotiations with Tiribazus.984  The terms offered were 
that Evagoras was to withdraw from all cities of Cyprus, that as king of Salamis 
alone he should pay the Persian King a fixed annual tribute, and that he should 
obey orders as a slave to master.985 However, it was not until Tiribazus was 
replaced by Orontes that Evagoras agreed to the amended terms to obey as a 
king the orders of the King.986  We can suggest that it was only because Orontes 
had denounced Tiribazus and felt obliged to produce speedy results in the 
matter of Cyprus, that Evagoras was offered this amendment.   
The significance of Evagoras rebellion to this study is that we find that, 
similar to the operations of Conon in the fourth century, the conflict between 
Greek and Persian had moved to Cyprus.  However, unlike the fifth century 
when Artaxerxes I came to terms with Athens in the Peace of Callias, Artaxerxes 
II was able to reassert Persian authority over all of the Greeks and to compel 
Athens to cease helping Evagoras.   We can see here most clearly evidence of the 
reassertion of Persian authority over its territories. 
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We noted above that a primary aim of Persian in the fourth century B.C. 
was the re-conquest of Egypt. We find under Artaxerxes II 3 failed campaigns 
against Egypt, the first of which took place after the surrender of Evagoras of 
Cyprus.  It has been suggested that Akoris, motivated largely by his desire to use 
Evagoras as a buffer between Persia and Egypt, had organised the wider 
rebellion of the Levant, of which Evagoras was merely a part.987  Ruzicka notes 
that it is likely Artaxerxes preparations for an Egyptian campaign in 392-391, 
were interrupted by Evagoras rebellion and the Egyptian campaign, which 
resulted from these preparations, took place 390/389-388/387.988  It has been 
suggested that, with the collapse of Evagoras rebellion and the conclusion of the 
Kings Peace in 387/386 B.C., subsequently, Chabrias went to Egypt upon the 
recommendation of Evagoras.989 Knowledge of this Persian campaign against 
Egypt is limited and based mostly on conjecture using Isocrates, but it is 
apparent that it did not succeed.990   
 
The next Persian invasion of Egypt did not occur until 374 B.C.991  
Commanded by Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, who commanded the mercenary 
forces numbering twenty thousand.992  This campaign also failed due to a 
number of factors. Firstly, Pharnabazus spent a number of years planning and 
equipping for the campaign, giving ample time for Nectanebo, king of Egypt, to 
strengthen Egypts defences and he was able to resist long enough for the annual 
floods to make the campaign untenable for the Persians, who were forced to 
                                                          
987 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 86. 
988 Isocrates, Panegyricus, 140-141.  Ruzicka, 2012, p. 66, pp. 249-250. n.1, pp. 68-69. 
989 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 102. 
990 Isocrates, Panegyricus, 140-141. 
991 Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.1, claims that Chabrias was initially employed by Akoris.  However, by 
the time Persian preparations were complete Akoris had been succeeded by his son Nepherites II, 
who was then deposed by Nectanebo, in 380 B.C. Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 74-75.  See also, K. Mysliwiec, 
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against Egypt in the fourth century. 
992 Threats of Persian action against Athens led to Chabrias recall and Iphicrates was sent to 
Pharnabazus, as noted above, p. 178. Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.1-5. 
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withdraw.993  We are told that Iphicrates, fearing that he would be arrested as 
Conon had been, fled the Persians and returned to Athens.994  
Another reason for the failure of the campaign seems to have been the 
contrasting leadership styles of Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, who seems to have 
become exasperated at the delay starting the campaign.995  Iphicrates had been 
sent to Pharnabazus after Evagoras capitulation in c. 381/380 B.C., thus, he had 
been with Pharnabazus for about 6 years before the invasion of Egypt.  Ruzicka 
notes at least one occasion when Iphicrates mercenaries became restless due to 
lack of pay and it is likely that his exasperation at Pharnabazus delays was 
primarily due to the effort it was taking to control his mercenaries for such a long 
period of time.996  Lack of Persian pay was not a new problem for the Greeks and 
the Spartans suffered from the same issue during the latter years of the 
Peloponnesian War.997  
The contrasting leadership styles led to arguments between Pharnabazus 
and Iphicrates during the initial operations of the invasion, causing 
Pharnabazus suspicions of Iphicrates intentions.998  Diodorus Siculus states that, 
it was a combination of Iphicrates insistence on a quick campaign and the 
slander of jealous Persians against Iphicrates that caused Pharnabazus 
suspicions.999  Ruzickas belief that Iphicrates flight to Athens was likely due to 
quarrelling with Pharnabazus concerning the specific operations of the 
                                                          
993 Diodorus Siculus, XV.41. Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 118-119, suggests that the Persian withdrawal was 
due to inclement weather, primarily the annual gale force winds at the time of the flooding, as well 
as the flooding itself.  However, he also notes that due to the long period of preparation and the 
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994 Diodorus Siculus, XV.43.  
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possible threat from the island during his campaign in Egypt. 
996 Polyaenus III.9.56 records Iphicrates treatment of some rebellious generals in his mercenary 
army. 
Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 108-109 suggests the generals were motivated to rebellion due to their treatment 
by and lack of pay from Pharnabazus.  
997 Thucydides, VIII. 29. Cf. pp. 165, 176. 
998 Cook, 1983, p. 218, notes that the delays and suspicions were not necessarily symptoms of 
Pharnabazus senility and reflects that Agesilaus successfully campaigned in Egypt when he was 
in his eighties.  Rather, they were symptoms of Artaxerxes micro-management and suspicions, for 
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999 Diodorus Siculus, XV.43.2. Persian jealousy and mistrust of non-Persians is a common theme 
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. A good example is the mistrust of Demaratus by 
Achaemenes in Herodotus, VII.263. 
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campaign, is likely correct, but we should not discard Diodorus Siculus 
assertion that Iphicrates was also the victim of Persian slander.1000  A good 
example of the mistrust of Greeks by Persia can be found in the treatment of 
Histiaeus by Megabazus and Demaratus by Achaemenes, brother of Xerxes.1001 
The failure of the Persian campaign was likely closely linked to 
Iphicrates return to Athens.  Diodorus Siculus states that Iphicrates was blamed 
by Pharnabazus for the failure and we can suggest this is probably correct in 
that, without Iphicrates to control the Greek mercenaries vital to the campaign, 
Pharnabazus would have been unable to renew his attack when the Nile flooding 
had receded.  Furthermore, he may have feared that his Greek mercenaries 
would go over to Nectanebo, who already employed a number of mercenaries 
and may have seemed a more reliable paymaster.1002 
We have already seen how Persia employed Conon to break Spartas 
control of the Aegean and we may suggest that the employment of Iphicrates 
was with a similar scope, this time in Egypt.1003 Of interest here is the willingness 
by Athens to send one of their generals to be employed by Persia. This indicates 
that Persian influence in Athens, if not also in the rest of Greece, was to such an 
extent that it was difficult for the Greeks to refuse his requests and it was 
economically advantageous to accept them.  
When Iphicrates returned to Athens from Egypt, Ruzicka believes he was 
replaced by Timotheus, the son of Conon.1004  Also, Datames was sent to aid 
Pharnabazus and then seems to have taken over from Timotheus; Ruzicka 
suggests that this indicates a Persian intention to carry on their Egyptian 
campaign and, despite the loss of Iphicrates, their desire for Greek 
mercenaries.1005  If this is correct, we can see two further Egyptian campaigns, or 
at least two parts to the same campaign, which involved the recruitment of 
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Greek mercenaries and which seem to coincide with both the peace negotiations 
of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C., which we will discuss below.1006      
 
The Second Athenian League 
Before we discuss the peace treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C., it is 
necessary to turn our attention briefly to the second Athenian League, created in 
response to Spartan aggression when it took on its position as enforcer of the 
Kings Peace. 
In 377 B.C. the decree of Aristoteles (I.G.ii2.43) invited Greeks and 
barbarians, islanders and those living on the Greek mainland, to join Athens in a 
defensive alliance against Spartan aggression, in contrast to Athens earlier 
Delian League against Persia.  As early as 384 B.C. Athens had made bilateral 
treaties with Chios, Mytilene, Byzantium, and Rhodes and it is likely that a 
number of other alliances had been made since then.  Thebes joined in 377 B.C. 
after it had sought and, apparently received, aid from Athens in response to 
Spartas capture of the Theban Cadmeia and the imposition of a Spartan garrison 
there.  The removal of this Spartan garrison and the formation of a League, 
Cawkwell believes, caused not only Sphodrias attempt to capture Piraeus, but 
also was the reason for the Spartan embassy which was in Athens at this time.1007  
The acquittal of Sphodrias led to the Athenian declaration that the Kings Peace 
of 387/6 had broken down.1008 
By 375 B.C. this new Athenian League had 75 members, according to 
Diodorus Siculus XV.28.3, although only 58 names appear on the decree stele.1009  
The decree assured the autonomy and freedom of all of its members, assured 
them of freedom from occupation and tribute, assured them that Athens would 
not acquire territory in the area belonging to its allies, and promised aid would 
                                                          
1006 Cf. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 125. 
1007 Cawkwell, 1973, p. 55. Also, R.M. Kallet-Marx, 1985, for a discussion and dating of the Theban 
alliance with the second Athenian League, which he also believes to be the result of the raid of 
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joined and their name should be added to the stele, and he suggests that it is likely other states had 
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be given to its members if they suffered aggression.1010  There may be evidence, 
suggested by the deletion of lines 12-15 on the stele, that when the League was 
formed in 377 B.C. it was still respectful of the Kings Peace.  Lines 15-20 state 
that only those who AgAí ?A?AnAdAfA?AtAm A?A?nA?Ah were invited to join the League.  Thus, 
we can conclude that, whilst Athens was leading a League aimed at checking 
Spartan aggression, it did not wish to antagonise Artaxerxes II, and, indeed, was 
still constrained by the Kings Peace and kept rigidly within its terms. 
 
The Peace Treaties with Persia in 375 B.C. and 371 B.C. 
In 375/4 B.C., the Greeks were compelled by Artaxerxes to renew the 
Peace of 387/386 B.C.1011  The Persian campaign against Egypt in 374 B.C. 
suggests that Artaxerxes II wished to settle the disputes in Greece in order to 
free-up Greek mercenaries for this campaign.1012  Although Seager suggests that 
the Athenian initiative for the negotiations of 375 B.C. was due to the failure of 
the decree of Aristoteles,1013 Philochorus, in Demosthenes, mentions Artaxerxes 
involvement in these negotiations.1014  This treaty seems to have broken down 
within a year or so1015 and it was not until 371 B.C., after Thebes had coerced 
Thespiae and Tanagra into their Boeotian League and had destroyed Plataea, 
that the Athenians called for another attempted renewal of the Kings Peace of 
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B.C.  Thus, he dates the breaking of this peace treaty to autumn 373. 
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387/386 B.C.1016  Despite confusion in Diodorus Siculus, Isocrates Plataicus 
indicates that Thebes was, indeed, party to this peace1017 and was excluded only 
from the later treaty of 371 B.C. The Plataean complaint, that Thebes attacked the 
city in a time of peace, would be groundless had Plataea still been at war with 
Thebes.  Also, a Spartan garrison was present in Plataea and was then removed 
in accordance with the terms of the peace of 375 B.C.  Had Thebes not been party 
to this peace, it is unlikely that Sparta would have recalled the garrison.1018  
Ryder suggests that whilst Thebes was threatened with expulsion from the peace 
of 375 B.C., it was, in fact, included.1019 
Ryder, noting Callistratus reference to rumours that Antalcidas may 
arrive with money from the King1020 believes Antalcidas was still with the king 
when the Athenian envoys were in Sparta in 371 B.C. and that, had the king 
initiated this peace treaty, he would have sent a representative as he did in 387 
B.C.1021  Therefore, he believes it is unlikely that Artaxerxes did initiate the talks 
in 371 B.C.  However, Xenophon refers to the Kings message regarding the 
autonomy clause, which suggests that, prior to the Athenian embassy to Sparta, 
Artaxerxes had sent out, at least, a rescript of the treaty of 375 B.C. and that the 
Athenian envoys were in Sparta to swear to this rescript.1022  Therefore, we may 
suggest that Antalcidas was with Artaxerxes II in response to this re-script sent 
sometime between 375 B.C. and 371 B.C., and had not yet returned by the time 
the Athenian embassy had arrived in Sparta. 
 
Terms 
Roos suggests that the two treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C. were simply a 
confirmation of the treaty of 387/6 B.C. and from these we may cautiously infer 
some of the possible terms for the treaty of 387/6 B.C.1023  The least contentious 
given in 371 B.C. was a reassertion of the autonomy clause and the assertion that 
                                                          
1016 Roos, 1949, p. 277, notes that Xenophons account omits mention of Artaxerxes in the peace of 
371 B.C., although he was likely involved as per the peace of 375 B.C.   
1017 Isocrates, Plataicus.  
1018 Roos, 1949, p. 274. 
1019 Ryder, 1963, p. 237. 
1020 Xenophon, Hellenica, VI.3.10ff. 
1021 Ryder, 1965, p. 127. Also, Seager, 1974, pp. 54-55. 
1022 Xenophon, Hellenica, VI.3.10ff. 
1023 Roos, 1949, p. 278. 
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the foreign garrisons within each state were to be removed.1024  Ryder believes 
the removal of garrisons was an Athenian attempt in 375 B.C. to protect Thebes 
from Spartan aggression since Sparta would be compelled to remove its garrison 
for Plataea.1025  In addition to these terms the landing of the exiles on Zacynthus 
by Timotheus, may suggest that a returning of exiles may have been a term of 
the peace of 375 B.C.  Cawkwell postulates the possibility that it may have been 
present in the peace of 387/6 B.C. also.1026  Cawkwell notes that, despite 
Xenophons claims that resumption of hostilities was due to Timotheus actions, 
hostilities did not resume until over two years later, indicating that it is 
improbably the direct cause.1027   
Xenophon mentions in his account of the peace of 371 B.C. a clause 
regarding the dissolution of armaments.1028  Cawkwell conjectures that this also 
may have been present in the peace of 375 B.C. and 387/6 B.C., citing the hanging 
of the gates on the harbour at Piraeus as possible evidence that they had 
previously been removed in adherence to a demobilisation clause of 387/6 B.C.; 
they were then rehung when the acquittal of Sphodrias was deemed to have 
broken that peace.1029   
An addition to the peace of 371 B.C., apparently not present in 375 B.C., is 
a sanctions clause, which offered a lack of obligation by impartial states to 
enforce the terms of the treaty on transgressors.1030  Noting the common view 
that this is deemed an Athenian invention allowing the city not to become 
involved in the struggle between Thebes and Sparta, Cawkwell observes that the 
                                                          
1024 Cawkwell, 1981, p. 72, suggests that the autonomy clause was fully defined, rather than stated 
as a general concept.  He notes that, in the treaty of 366 B.C., Xenophon states that each city was to 
hold its own territory (Xenophon, Hellenica, VIII. 4.10) and believes this probably came down 
from the treaty of 375 B.C. 
1025 Ryder, 1963, p. 240, suggests this garrison had the potential to threaten Thebes should Sparta 
wish to invade. 
1026 See Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 80-83, concerning the possible return of exiles clause for 387/6 B.C., 
375 B.C. and 371 B.C. 
1027 Cawkwell, 1963, p. 95. The exiles were landed in mid-375 and hostilities were not resumed 
until autumn 373. 
1028 Xenophon, Hellenica, VI.3.18. 
1029 Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 74-76, suggests that the removal of the gates of Piraeus was a good will 
gesture by the Athenians to show openly that they were not building ships and generally re-
arming.  Thus, the re-hanging of the gates was a declaration that Athens was re-arming and a 
symbolic gesture that the period of peace had ended. 
1030 Xenophon, Hellenica, VI.3.18. 
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clause also invites those volunteers who wish are to give aid to the cities being 
unjustly treated.1031   
It is apparent from the treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C that the threat of 
Persian intervention was sufficient to compel the Greeks and Artaxerxes was 
happy to let his prostates enforce stability in Greece without becoming personally 
involved as long as it did not directly affect his interests. It appears that 
Artaxerxes was willing to support whichever Greek state was deemed the most 
militarily powerful: thus, after 371 B.C. Athens alliance and hegemony over the 
sea is recognised in concert with Spartas hegemony over land.  Although we 
hear very little about Artaxerxes, it seems likely the treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 
B.C. were, in fact, instigated by him; his involvement in 371B.C. B.C. is probable 
given that we know he was involved in 375 B.C. 
 
The ramifications of Leuctra  
A major ramification of the peace of 371 B.C. was the exclusion of Thebes 
from the treaty, as we noted above; this was shortly followed by Spartas defeat 
at Leuctra.  We are informed by Xenophon that, in 367 B.C., Ariobarzanes sent 
Philiscus of Abydus with gold to help re-establish peace in Greece.1032  Diodorus 
Siculus claims that it was Artaxerxes himself who sent Philiscus and that all but 
the Thebans responded willingly.1033  Ryder notes that, as Ariobarzanes was the 
Kings officer, the two accounts are not entirely incompatible, however, he 
conjectures that, if Diodorus Siculus is mistaken, this could be early evidence of 
Ariobarzanes pursuing his own agenda in advance of his rebellion two years 
later.1034  The secret recruitment of Greek mercenaries had occurred with the 
rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, which had only failed with his death in the battle 
of Cunaxa, and so we may conjecture that this may have seemed a good model 
for Ariobarzanes to copy. 
                                                          
1031 Cawkwell, 1981, p.78. 
1032 Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.26. 
1033 Diodorus Siculus, XV.70.2.  Theban presence at the meeting is attested by Xenophon, Hellenica, 
VII.1.27 and by Diodorus Siculus himself, who states that it was the Thebans who were unwilling 
to commit Messenia to Spartan control. 
1034 Ryder, 1965, p. 80. 
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Thebes had risen to prominence in Greece, having defeated Sparta at 
Leuctra and invaded Laconia in both 370 B.C. and 369 B.C.  The actions of 
Thebes, in calling a conference for a new Koine Eirene, indicates that the Greeks 
now recognised that with the Kings favour came the ability to dominate the rest 
of Greece.  The conference called by Philiscus failed, according to Xenophon, 
over the issue of Messene, and Philiscus started to raise a large mercenary army 
to fight on the side of the Spartans.1035   
This incident seems to demonstrate yet another occasion of Persian 
intervention in what, at first, seems to be a purely Greek matter.  It may simply 
be that Ariobarzanes, due to his personal friendship with Antalcidas, was trying 
to help Sparta in their war against Thebes.  That Philiscus felt it necessary to 
leave mercenaries with the Spartans is evidence of Spartas military decline.  
Although we have commented that this may at first seem to be an entirely Greek 
matter, it is worth remembering that, once Artaxerxes had intervened in Greek 
affairs by officiating the Kings Peace, he had a vested interest especially in Greek 
mercenaries which he required for his re-conquest of Egypt, which was not 
complete until 343/342 B.C.1036 
 
Peace of Thebes in 367 B.C. 
In 367 B.C., we find further embassies from the Greeks to Artaxerxes II to 
negotiate terms for a new koine eirene.1037  We are told that the Thebans sent 
Pelopidas and, from Thebes allies, Antiochus of Arcadia and Archidamus of 
Elea.  According to Plutarch, Pelopidas was sent specifically due to his 
reputation.1038  Sparta sent an embassy led by Euthicles and Athens sent 
Timagoras and Leon.1039 We are given the impression by Xenophon that the 
embassy of Pelopidas led the negotiations and Pelopidas claimed to be the only 
man of them who could say his country, i.e. Thebes, had fought not against but 
                                                          
1035 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.1.27, also Diodorus Siculus, XV.70.2. states that two thousand 
mercenaries were left with Sparta. 
1036 Bengtson, 1970, p. 266. Diodorus Siculus, XVI.51. 
1037 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.1.33. 
1038 Plutarch, Pelopidas, XXX. 
1039 It is uncertain whether they were part of an allied embassy sent with Sparta or whether they 




with the King at Plataea, as previously noted above.1040  This argument seems to 
have been novel in negotiations with Persia; previously Athens and Sparta had 
negotiated from the stance that they would not negatively affect Persian interests 
in the future, having already done so in the past whilst Pelopidas was able to 
recall previous good service to Persia. 
The terms dictated by Pelopidas were similar to those of previous 
treaties, but with stricter applications. They asserted that Messene was to be 
liberated from Sparta and that Athens should draw up her ships on land.1041  
These terms were designed to cripple both Athens and Sparta, removing their 
military advantages in the forms of Athens navy and Spartas luxury to train 
Spartiates for purely military purposes.  Thebes also removed the lack of 
obligation clause, which was introduced in the treaty of 371 B.C., which allowed 
impartial states not to become involved in inter-state conflicts.  
 
   Having spoken of this embassy to Persia, Xenophon is silent on the 
subsequent peace treaty, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus at XV.76.3, beyond 
saying that when the Thebans sent representatives to the Greek states the terms 
were refused, following the example of Corinth.1042  This causes a contradiction in our sources.  
Xenophon states that during the congress in Susa, when Leon complained of 
Thebes terms, Artaxerxes offered Athens the opportunity to present fairer terms 
if they had them.1043  Thus, it is plausible there were further negotiations and, 
later, an agreement was made, about which Xenophon is silent.1044  Cawkwell 
argues that the Corinthian embassy to Sparta, when the Sparta were invited to 
join them in a peace treaty with Thebes, is Xenophons only reference to the 
peace treaty of 366/365 B.C.1045  Xenophons account, therefore, suggests that this 
peace treaty was primarily an agreement between Thebes and Corinth, and a few 
                                                          
1040 Cf. pp. 104-105 above. 
1041 Xenophon, Hellenica, V.1.36. 
1042 Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.40.  Ryder, 1957, p. 200, notes that Ephorus was Diodorus Siculus 
source here and so Diodorus information, despite its lack of details, would seem trustworthy.  
However, he concludes his article that, perhaps, Diodorus was not following Ephorus but a pro-
Theban source and was repeating Theban claims that the peace treaty of 366/5 B.C. was common 
to all Greeks when, in fact, it involved much fewer states. 
1043 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.1.37. 
1044 Cawkwell, 1961, pp. 81-82, suggests it is at this treaty of 366/365 B.C. that Athens claims to 
Amphipolis and the Chersonese is recognised by both Artaxerxes and the Greeks. 
1045 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.4.7 
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other Greek states, and he makes no mention of Athenian or Persian 
involvement.   
The question of whether this treaty was a further Kings Peace, similar in 
nature to those discussed above and linked to the negotiations of 367 B.C., rests 
on whether Athens and Persia were involved; having observed already that 
Sparta had declined.  It has been noted that Athenian campaigning in the 
Aegean, in 367 B.C., suggests lack of Athenian involvement.1046  The Athenian 
involvement in the rebellion of Ariobarzanes is certainly connected to Thebes 
embassy to Susa and possibly to a later treaty of 366/365 B.C.  Ryder argues that, 
in backing the unpopular Thebans and then providing a rider for the Athenians 
during the negotiations of 367 B.C., Artaxerxes appeared weak and Athens took 
advantage of this.1047  Cawkwell, arguing that Xenophons account is in some 
degree not to be trusted,1048 suggests that Athens involvement in Ariobarzanes 
rebellion may have been politically motivated to put pressure on Artaxerxes 
prior to confirmation of a treaty of 366/365 B.C., to ensure recognition of 
Athenian claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese.1049  In light of Athens desire 
to re-possess Amphipolis and the Chersonese, which affected both powers, it 
seems likely that an official treaty did involve both Athens and Persia.  
Therefore, we agree with Cawkwell that Athens may deliberately have put 
pressure on Artaxerxes in order to achieve these aims. The lack of Spartan 
involvement indicates that not all of the states were on side with this Theban-
led treaty, although it also indicates that, due Spartas diminished status in 
Greece by this time, the other Greeks were unconcerned about this. 
 
Another result of the Theban led negotiations is that Timagoras, the 
Athenian, was executed for working against the interests of Athens.1050  Charges 
                                                          
1046 Ryder, 1957, p. 203. 
1047 Ryder, 1965, p. 82.  Ryder further notes that in the 380s Chabrias presence in Egypt provoked a 
strong enough reaction that he was recalled. However, despite Timotheus leaving Ariobarzanes 
before his revolt became open, fear of Artaxerxes as had existed in the 380s was clearly no longer 
an issue for the Athenians in the late 360s. 
1048 Cawkwell, 1961, p. 83. 
1049 Cawkwell, 1961, p. 85. 
1050 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.1.33. 
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of medism had been, all but, dropped by the 460s due to the Greek desire to win 
Persian backing to support their own wars, making this instance noteworthy. 
When he was denounced back in Athens, Timagoras was accused of 
refusing to share quarters with his colleague, Leon, and of working hand in 
glove with Pelopidas in all negotiations.1051  Plutarch claims that, during his stay 
at Artaxerxes court, Timagoras sent a secret message to Artaxerxes and was 
richly rewarded.1052  Plutarch also records a comment by Ostanes, a brother of 
Artaxerxes, who, he claims, said Timagoras, remember this table; it is no slight 
return which you must make for such an array.1053  We may assume that, if 
Plutarchs facts are correct, Timagoras did promise Artaxerxes some sort of 
service, although we do not know what this service may have been.  It is a well-
known fact that within the Achaemenid court, as we have discussed above,1054 
nothing was for free, however it is hard to imagine what Timagoras could have 
promised to Artaxerxes which Artaxerxes could not have gained from Athens 
without subterfuge.   
It is worth noting that charges of bribe taking did not surface until 
Demosthenes XIX.136-137 and, also, that accusations of accepting bribes was a 
common political weapon used against political opponents.  Thus, actions may 
have been misrepresented deliberately by Timagoras political enemies.  We 
must, therefore, be cautious in pronouncing Timagoras guilty of accepting bribes 
when he was condemned on other charges.  Furthermore, charges of bribery 
would have been difficult to prove due to the customary exchange of gifts, which 
would have taken place at the Persian court.1055 
Whilst a strict charge of medism is not used against Timagoras, he is 
condemned on the grounds that he had worked against the interests of 
                                                          
1051 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.I.37-38. 
1052 Plutarch Artaxerxes, XXII.5-6, claims Timagoras received ten thousand darics, and eighty milk 
cows to follow in his train because he was sick and required cow's milk; and besides, he sent him a 
couch, with bedding for it, and servants to make the bed  and bearers to carry him down to the 
sea-coast, enfeebled as he was. 
1053 Plutarch, Artaxerxes, XX.5-6, see also Plutarch, Pelopidas, XXX. 
1054 Cf. Demaratus, pp. 75-79, Themistocles, pp. 130-132. 
1055 See Perlman, 1976, p. 229.  Also, Tuplin, 1997, p. 174, notes that the acceptance of extravagant 
gifts from Persia was not uncommon.  Furthermore, we may suggest that in a gift-based culture 
gifts carried the expectation of a commensurate service in return. In light of the evidence above it is 
easy to see how such gifts can be politically interpreted as a bribe.  In this context, the extravagance 
of Timagoras gifts will have condemned him.  
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Athens.1056  From this we can discern a further aspect to the definition of medism, 
which seems to encompass working for Persia against the specific interests of a 
home state rather than working for Persia against the interests of Hellas in 
general, as was the case during the Persian Wars. 
 
The Satraps Revolt 362-360 
Despite the peace treaties involving Persia, both Athens and Sparta 
worked against Persian interests when they became involved in the revolts of the 
satraps from the Great King in the late 360s. The actual revolt of the satraps is a 
highly debatable matter, with scholarship arguing either: that it was an 
organised event, involving a co-ordinated effort between a number of satraps, 
primarily Ariobarzanes, Mausolus, Autophradates and Datames; or, that the 
individual events were related only through the proximity of their dates.1057 A 
number of different arguments regarding this issue can be found in A.R. Burn, 
Hornblower and M. Weiskopf.1058   
In summary, we can state that Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, revolted in 
369/8.1059  In 366/5 B.C., Ariobarzanes was declared a rebel and then in 365/4 B.C. 
came the rebellion of Orontes.  Ruzicka suggests that fear of Tiribazus influence 
with Darius, the designated successor to Artaxerxes, may have played a part in 
the rebellions of Orontes and Autophradates.1060  When Autophradates and 
Mausolus were sent to deal with Ariobarzanes they too rebelled.  Ruzicka 
suggests that when Autophradates rebelled, fearing that his lack of success 
against Datames and Ariobarzanes would result in his replacement, Mausolus 
followed suit in order not to become isolated as the only remaining loyal satrap 
                                                          
1056 Xenophon, Hellenica, VII.1.38. 
1057 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 78, suggests a coalition of Ariobarzanes, Orontes, Autophradates and 
Mausolus and suggests that Datames acted separately from these satraps.  He dates this coalition to 
c. 361 B.C. 
1058 Weiskopf, 1989, presents a good argument that all of the events were related and that the 
overall rebellion was the consequence of a number of smaller incidents which had a knock on 
effect. Cf. also, Burn, 1985, pp. 375-384, and Hornblower, 1982, pp. 256-260. 
1059 See Moysey, 1992, and Ruzicka, 2012, p. 127, for causes of Datames rebellion. 
1060 Ruzicka, 1946, pp. 77-80, suggests that the death of Tiribazus in 361 B.C. may have led Orontes 
to seek reconciliation with Artaxerxes. By 361 B.C. Orontes controlled all of the land on the Ionian 
coast from Pergamum to Cyme.  Ruzicka thinks Orontes probably wished for this to be officially 
recognised by Artaxerxes and his betrayal of the other satraps suggests he was successful in this. 
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in Anatolia.1061  He believes that evidence for the date of Mausolus rebellion, or 
impending rebellion, can be taken from the Carian and Egyptian escort of 
Agesilaus dated 364/3.1062  
Ruzicka believes GHI 145 = IG 42 is a united official Greek response to a 
formal appeal made by Orontes as the most senior of the satraps in revolt.1063  
Despite the apparent refusal of the Greeks in GHI 145 = IG 42, Weiskopf brings 
our attention to fragmentary epigraphic evidence of an alliance between Athens 
and Orontes, which he dates to 361/0 B.C.1064  These fragments describe Orontes 
as someone who had been of service to Athens and would co-operate with 
Athens and her allies commercially.  He is honoured with a 1,000 drachma gold 
crown and perhaps, Weiskopf suggests, Athenian citizenship.  These fragments 
seem to relate to agreements between Athens and Orontes concerning the sale 
and transport of grain from Mysia in Orontes satrapy.1065  The dating of these 
fragments suggest the agreement may have been more important than a simple 
trade agreement.  Furthermore, Demosthenes XV. 9 records that Timotheus was 
sent to Ariobarzanes with instructions to help provided he does not violate (the 
Athenian) treaty with the King.  R.P. Austen suggests that, whilst avoiding 
directly breaching any peace agreements with Persia, Athens was making use of 
Persias difficulties  to increase her influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.1066  
He cites IG II2 141 as evidence of Athenian interest in the Satraps Revolt since 
                                                          
1061 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 77. 
1062 Ruzicka, 1946, pp. 76-77, believes that evidence of Mausolus involvement in Agesilaus escort 
from Egypt to Greece is to be found in the Carian aspect of this escort and suggest the Carian 
envoy travelling with Tachos may have been sent by Mausolus.  Thus, we are able to date 
Mausolus rebellion, or pending rebellion, to 364 B.C. 
1063 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 79.  Also, Rhodes & Osborne, 2003, pp. 215-216, note that the date of this stele 
GHI 145 = IG 42 is not confirmed but only conjectured by its context.  Another dates for this stele of 
344 B.C. is suggested by Beloch, 1927. 
1064 IG II2 207.  As the evidence is fragmentary, the dating of it rests on a now lost piece recorded by 
Pittakys.  Much debate surrounds Pittakys copy in relation to the archon name listed, Nikomachou. 
Nikomachus is not a name listed in the list of archons and was amended first by Rangabe to 
Kammachou and then later by Moysey to Kallimachou. Kallimachus was archon 349/8.  However, 
Osborne suggests that Nikomachou is a mistaken copy of Nikophemou, who was archon 361/0.  
Weiskopf, 1989, p. 77. 
1065 Orontes had been demoted from his satrapy of Armenia after Persias Cypriot campaign against 
Evagoras in the 370s, when he had slandered Tiribazus and been proved false.  He was demoted to 
the satrapy of Mysia in the Hellespont. Diodorus Siculus, XV.11 and XV.90. 
1066 Tod & Austen, 1944, p. 100. 
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Strato, vassal king of Sidon, was likely part of this revolt.1067  These two pieces of 
evidence suggest that Athens was pro-actively securing her commercial interests 
in the Hellespont, whilst attempting not to directly antagonise Artaxerxes II. 
 
When Tachos,1068 king of Egypt, also revolted from Artaxerxes II in c. 362 
B.C., we learn from Diodorus Siculus that he recruited Greek mercenaries for his 
cause, specifically Spartans led by Agesilaus, and also that he placed Chabrias, 
the Athenian, in command of the naval contingents.1069  Chabrias previous 
dealings with Egypt made him an obvious candidate.  Plutarchs claims that 
Agesilaus was employed by Tachos as a mercenary1070 are disputed by Trundle, 
who believes a more formal arrangement was in place.1071  Bengtson notes that 
every enemy of Persia became the natural friend of Egypt.1072  Due to Spartan 
dissatisfaction with Persias support of Thebes, we can see that Sparta was 
certainly estranged from Artaxerxes.1073  Trundles suggestion is more 
persuasive as it is unlikely Sparta would risk one of its Kings in anything less 
than an official campaign.  Egyptian finances also seem to have been a factor in 
the symmachia in light of Xenophons claims that after the campaign Agesilaus 
sailed home in great haste, although it was winter, having received a great 
sum, so that the state would be in a position to take action against its enemies the 
following campaigning season.  
Tachos campaigns against Phoenicia and Syria resulted in internal 
rebellion and his being deposed by Nectanebo II.1074  Tachos fled to Artaxerxes 
                                                          
1067 Tod & Austen, 1944, pp. 98-100, note Stratos close relationship with Tachos, who he sheltered 
in 359 B.C., and also Stratos death when Persia recovered Sidon at the conclusion of the Satraps 
Revolt.  Rhodes and Osborne 2003, p. 88-91, date IG II2 141 to 378/7-377/6, based on the requirement 
for the decree to be published within ten days. 
1068 Tachos took the throne of Egypt in 363/2 B.C. and almost immediately rebelled against 
Artaxerxes. 
1069 Diodorus Siculus, XV. 90-92. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 137, suggests that Tachos had been planning his 
rebellion since 364 B.C. and that the Egyptian-Spartan symmachia may be datable to then. Clearly 
Artaxerxes II had managed to subdue at least this area of Egypt after the failed attempt led by 
Pharnabazus in 374 B.C. Cf. pp. 226-227 above. 
1070 Plutarch, Agesilaus, XXXVI. 
1071 Trundle, 2004, p. 156, it is hard to see that a king of Sparta, with advisers and 1,000 
neodamodeis hoplites, could be anything but an ally of the power for which he was fighting. 
1072 Bengtson, 1970, p. 347.  
1073 Diodorus Siculus, XV.90.2.  Ruzicka, 2012, p. 138, suggests that Agesilaus involvement may 
have been an attempt to force Artaxerxes II to make concessions. 
1074 See Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 147-150, for the Egyptian inter-dynastic struggles of this time. 
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but, no longer Pharaoh, did not bring Egypt back into the Persian fold.  Plutarch 
states that Agesilaus joined Nectanebo and was rewarded with two hundred and 
thirty talents of silver, but we may believe Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon are 
likely correct when then both claim that he stayed supporting Tachos.1075 
The actions of Athens and Sparta, prior to the rebellion of Tachos, suggest 
that at this stage of the satraps revolts they took advantage of this situation as 
best they could but they were still sufficiently respectful to avoid direct conflict 
with Artaxerxes II.  The rebellion of Tachos seems to have changed such 
sentiments.  It is possible that the rebellion of Tachos was a subconscious signal 
to the Greeks that there was enough turmoil in west of the Persian Empire 
allowing them to work openly against the interests of Artaxerxes II, who now 
supported Thebes in Greece to their detriment.  Certainly this seems to have 
been the motivation for Sparta, which had already refused to join in the treaty 
initiated by Thebes in 367 B.C. It is unlikely that either state would have foreseen 
that Tachos would fall to his own internal rebellion. 
 
Mausolus & Athens Social War (359 B.C.) 
Shortly after the conclusion of the revolt of the satraps, Athens was 
embroiled in the social war with some of its Aegean allies: namely Rhodes, 
Byzantium and Chios.1076  We hear from Diodorus Siculus of Mausolus, satrap of 
Caria, sending aid to the defecting allies of Athens.1077  Whilst Demosthenes 
claims that Mausolus was the instigator of the Social War, we can see that he is 
mentioned as a passing reference, thus, his culpability may be viewed primarily 
as rhetoric.1078  The real cause of the Social War was undoubtedly deep-seated 
dissatisfaction with Athenian leadership.1079  Schäfer notes the establishment of 
cleruchies upon Athens allies, probably begun as early as 365 B.C., undermining 
                                                          
1075 Plutarch, Agesilaus, XXXVII, Diodorus Siculus, XV.93, Xenophon, Hellenica, II.28-31.  Plutarch, 
Agesilaus, XXX, states that Agesilaus died on the return journey to Sparta from Egypt, at a location 
on the Libyan coast called the Harbour of Menelaus.  
1076 Ruzicka, 1998, p. 60-62, suggests that these islands had been detached from alliance with Athens 
in 364 B.C. by Epaminondas in an attempt to assert a Theban naval hegemony and thus validate 
Thebes position as prostates of the peace treaty of 367 B.C.  He further asserts (pp. 64-67) that these 
islands joined Thebes willingly, believing Thebes to be acting with Persian backing, in an attempt 
to avert embroilment in a potential Athenian - Persian war. 
1077 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.7.3. 
1078 Demosthenes XV.3, Diodorus Siculus, XVI.7.3. Hornblower, 1982, pp. 206-211. 
1079 Ryder, 1965, p. 89. 
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Greek communities like Samos, and the reintroduction of the syntaxeis, the 5% 
trade tax.1080  Ruzicka notes that it was when the Athenians demanded syntaxeis 
from their recalcitrant allies, Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes, that they rebelled. 
He believes that, although Mausolus did not initiate the rebellions, he may well 
have been instrumental in bringing these states together, noting that Athenian 
operations against Rhodes potentially could threaten Mausolus interests on 
other islands, such as Cos and Samos.1081  Demosthenes XV.15 may be a reference 
to Mausolus introduction of Carian garrisons on Rhodes and we find a Carian 
garrison on Cos in 351 B.C.1082 both of which seem to be in reaction to Athens 
actions.   
During these Athenian naval operations, Chares joined Artabazus, who 
was, once again, in rebellion.  When Artaxerxes III, known as Artaxerxes Ochus, 
took the throne, in 359/8 B.C., he had ordered his satraps to disband their 
mercenary armies in an attempt to quell the rebellions, which had dominated the 
preceding decade.1083  Thus, when Artabazus rebelled he called on Chares, who 
was lacking finance for Athens naval operations.  When Chares joined 
Artabazus and stopped his Aegean operations, the allies and Mausolus appear to 
have become inactive too, which Ruzicka ascribes to poor sailing conditions due 
to the end of the season; it is also likely that Mausolus was occupied fighting 
against Artabazus.1084  We are later informed by Diodorus Siculus that Artaxerxes 
Ochus sent an embassy to Athens demanding the recall of Chares.1085  The 
Athenians obeyed and concluded their Social War, hearing that Artaxerxes had 
promised Athens enemies that he would join them in their war against the 
Athenians with three hundred ships1086 if they did not.  We may conclude that, 
after sustaining such losses at Chios in 357 B.C. and at Embata in 356 B.C., the 
                                                          
1080 Schäfer, 1885, p. 165. Ryder, 1965, p. 89. 
1081 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 92. 
1082 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 93. 
1083 Artaxerxes III took the name Artaxerxes Ochus, when he was crowned.  His father Artaxerxes 
II, was known as Artaxerxes Memon. 
1084 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 95, notes that although not mentioned in the ancient sources, it is likely that 
Mausolus was involved in Artabazus rebellion fighting against him, as the strongest satrap in the 
region.  Whereas the other satraps had been forced to disband their mercenary armies, Ruzicka 
believes that since Mausolus mercenaries were primarily for guard duty etc., it is unlikely these 
were disbanded and, therefore, he would have been the only satrap in Anatolia with enough men 
to counter Artabazus. 
1085 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 95.  Cf. Salmond, 1996, for a discussion regarding the career of Chares. 
1086 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.22.2. 
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Athenians could ill afford to continue to fight their rebellious allies, especially 
against Persian backing.1087  Ruzicka suggests that at this time Athens also sent 
an embassy to negotiate with Mausolus, in order to neutralise his continued 
hostility.1088   
The rebellion of Artabazus may be viewed as part of the usual turmoil 
which took place during the succession struggles for the Achaemenid throne.  It 
is unsurprising that Athens might ignore Chares opportunistic involvement in 
this, given Athens attitude to Chabrias involvement in the rebellion of Tachos.  
The embassy from Artaxerxes Ochus, however, indicates that upon taking the 
Persian throne he was able to reassert Persian power over Athenian foreign 
policy as it conflicted with Persian interests, and that he was well aware that he 
could bring the Athenians to heel by threatening to support their enemies: a 
policy frequently employed against the Greeks by Artaxerxes II. 
 
From the accession of Artaxerxes Ochus, Greek and Persian foreign 
policy seem to be divided into two parts. We will see that Artaxerxes Ochus was 
primarily preoccupied with the re-conquest of Egypt, resulting in possibly two 
campaigns in the 350s and the final, successful campaign in 343 B.C. Artaxerxes 
Ochus, like his predecessor, required Greek mercenaries for these campaigns.   
At the same time, Macedon under the leadership of Philip, was emerging as a 
new power, thus, diverting much Greek attention towards north Greece.  It is 
necessary, therefore, to discuss both situations which impacted on the Greeks 
and Persia. 
 
Artaxerxes IIIs Egyptian campaign 351-350 
Diodorus Siculus suggests two possible expeditions by Artaxerxes Ochus, 
in 358 B.C. and in 351 B.C. 1089  Cook claims that effectively Ochus was 
commander of the Kings armies from about 362 B.C.,1090 thus, plausibly he 
could have commanded an invasion of Egypt as a prince in 358 B.C. before he 
                                                          
1087 Buckler, 2003, p. 383.   
1088 Ruzicka, 1946, p. 97. 
1089 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.40.4 only seems to mention the one invasion by Artaxerxes III of 351 B.C. 
1090 Cook, 1983, p. 222. 
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took the throne.1091  Ruzicka suggests that the lack of information on this 
campaign points to its failure and holds that it was cut short due the death of 
Artaxerxes II, compelling Artaxerxes Ochus to return to Persia and assert his 
claim to throne.1092 
 
The invasion of 351 B.C. is more certain, but it is still only mentioned in 
passing by Diodorus Siculus who claims that Artaxerxes Ochus sent out generals 
and armies in this invasion, but did not accompany them himself, which 
contradicts Demosthenes and Isocrates.1093  Ruzicka believes that the 300 ships 
used to threaten the Athenians in 355 B.C. may be evidence of a Persian fleet 
being assembled for this campaign.1094  The presence of Greek mercenaries within 
the Egyptian forces are unsurprising since Greek mercenaries had been involved 
on both sides in previous Persian campaigns against Egypt.  Diophantes of 
Athens and Lamius of Sparta were with Nectanebo during Artaxerxes Ochus 
invasion of 351 B.C. and we are able to learn fragments of information about this 
invasion when he describes the invasion of 343 B.C.1095  We may suggests that 
Mentor and his four thousand Greek mercenaries, who were sent to Tennes, king 
of Sidon, by Nectanebo in 346 B.C.,1096 also may have been present in Egypt as 
early as 351 B.C. as well as the garrison at Pelusium, which later was defeated by 
Artaxerxes Ochus in 343 B.C. 
 
The Persian reconquest of Egypt in 343 B.C. 
The re-conquest of Egypt by Artaxerxes Ochus eventually came in 343 
B.C. and was not only a long term desire of both Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes 
Ochus, but was also in response to Nectanebos support of rebellious factions in 
both Phoenicia and Cyprus.  We noted above that Nectanebo had sent four 
                                                          
1091 Bengtson, 1970, p. 350, suggests that perhaps the deposed Tachos accompanied Artaxerxes 
Ochus in 358 B.C. 
1092 Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 151-153, cites the Byzantine chronographer George Syncellus, Eclogia 
Chronographica, 487.  He also postulates a number of reasons, including lack of preparation and 
Artaxerxes IIs death, why the sources do not record further information regarding this campaign. 
1093 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.48.2. 
1094 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 158. 
1095 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.48.2.  Ruzicka, 2012, p. 161, notes the presence of Diophantus and 
Lamius does not necessarily confirm the involvement of Athens, but merely confirms that Greek 
mercenaries were popular in Egypt and Persia during the mid-fourth century B.C. 
1096 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.42. 
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thousand mercenaries to Tennes, king of Sidon, indicating that Egypt was secure 
enough not to need Mentor and his mercenaries at that time.  It is worth 
postulating that these mercenaries were part of the reason why the Persian 
invasion of Egypt in 351 B.C. had failed.1097  Diodorus Siculus states that it was 
with the aid of Mentor and his mercenaries that the Sidonians were able to defeat 
the satraps of Phoenicia when they first rebelled.  If Nectanebo was hoping to 
divert the Persian threat of invasion away from Egypt, it would be logical for 
him to help the Sidonian rebellion, to create a buffer between Egypt and the 
Persian Empire.  Mentor changed allegiances to Artaxerxes Ochus when Tennes 
was betrayed by the Sidonians, ending the Phoenician revolt.1098 
  Whilst the Phoenicians were rebelling, the kings of Cyprus also united in 
revolt from Persia.  The rebellion of the Cypriot kings does not seem to have 
lasted long and we may assume that, by this time, since Artaxerxes Ochus was 
with his army in Phoenicia, Idreaus, Phocion and Evagoras, who quelled the 
Cypriot rebellions,1099 may have simply joined him in Egypt.  In preparation for 
the re-conquest of Egypt, Diodorus Siculus informs us that, Artaxerxes sent 
envoys to the greatest cities of Greece requesting them to join the Persians in the 
campaign against the Egyptians.1100 We learn that, although Sparta and Athens 
declined to send anyone to Artaxerxes, Lacrates of Thebes and Nicostatus of 
Argos were personally requested by Artaxerxes.1101  Lacrates of Thebes 
commanded a thousand men, whilst Nicostratus of Argos commanded three 
thousand men.1102  Artaxerxes divided his Greeks into three contingents between 
Lacrates, Nicostratus and Mentor of Rhodes, who were each accompanied by a 
Persian; Rhosaces, Aristazanes, and Bagoas, respectively.1103  Ruzicka notes that 
the combination of a Greek commander with a high ranking Persian was an 
                                                          
1097 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 182, suggests that the loss of men at Lake Sebonis, which Diodorus Siculus 
places as part of the 343 B.C. campaign, should actually belong to the 351 campaign reasoning that 
with the presence of Mentor and therefore his knowledge of Egypt this is unlikely to have occurred 
in the later campaign. 
1098 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.45 and XVI.50. 
1099 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.42.7. 
1100 Diodorus Siculus, XVI. 44.1. 
1101 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.44.1. 
1102 Six thousand Ionian Greek mercenaries also joined Artaxerxes Ochus army.  As these were 
Ionian Greeks, we may be able to speculate that, unlike Thebes and Argos, they were likely 
compelled to service. Diodorus Siculus XVI.44.4. 
1103 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.47. 
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effective guard against potential Greek perfidy,1104 and the terminology used by 
Diodorus Siculus suggests that the Greeks seem to have held equal command 
status to their Persian counterparts, although this does not necessarily follow.1105  
It seems that the Athenians and Spartans declined Artaxerxes request primarily 
because twenty thousand Greek mercenaries, still under the commands of 
Diophantes and Lamius, were still serving under Nectanebo.1106 We are told that 
a Spartan garrison of five thousand men, under the command of Philophron, 
guarded the fortress of Pelusium, on the entrance to Egypt on the Nile.1107   
Diodorus Siculus claims that Artaxerxes Ochus III subdued Egypt partly 
by use of his army and partly by the employment of treachery, turning the native 
Egyptians against the Greek mercenaries until the cities of Egypt capitulated 
voluntarily.  Nectanebo having fortified Memphis ready for a siege, fled to 
Ethiopia.  Many of the Egyptian cities surrendered because the Greek 
mercenaries realised that they would no longer be paid by Nectanebo and, also, 
because the local Egyptian soldiers likely realised that no reinforcements would 
be forthcoming.  The presence of Greek mercenaries both in the Persian and 
Egyptian forces suggests that they were pivotal to the re-conquest of Egypt and 
had Artaxerxes Ochus not divided the Greek mercenaries from their Egyptian 
counterparts, we may suggest the campaign would have been longer.  It has been 
noted that the intelligence which Mentor could provide, after a decade in Egypt, 
was likely the gallant actions, for which he was rewarded, as noted by 
Diodorus Siculus.1108  
Noteworthy of this Persian campaign is the lack of official Athenian and 
Spartan backing of the Persians whilst there were Spartan and Athenian 
mercenaries active in Egypt.  Although it could be claimed that, as mercenaries, 
Diophantes and Lamius may have been acting in a private capacity and without 
sanction from their home states, it is interesting that neither of them was recalled.  
It might be argued that, by not recalling them, Sparta and Athens condoned their 
                                                          
1104 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 198. 
1105 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 183, notes the terminology strategos, synarchontes, synestratueto used to describe 
the actions and statuses of the Greek commanders. 
1106 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.42-48. 
1107 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.44. 
1108 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.52.1-2. 
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opposition to this Persian campaign. I would suggest that whilst it may seem 
that this complicity suggests political, if not actual, rebellion, it is likely that, had 
Artaxerxes Ochus demanded their recall, Athens and Sparta would have 
complied as neither state was in a position to refuse.  It is also worth noting, as 
we shall see below, that the Greek states were preoccupied with the rise of 
Macedon and none were in a position to fight wars on two fronts at this time.  
 
The Rise of Macedon 
The political upheavals in Greece and Persia seem to have allowed for 
Philip to secure Macedon and also to look towards Greece for expansion.  In 359 
B.C., the same year that Artaxerxes Ochus was crowned, Philip became the 
guardian of Amyntas, infant king of Macedon.1109  Philip was able to increase 
Macedons political standing and power within Greece so quickly largely due to 
the turmoil between the Greek states at the time.  Sparta and Thebes were in 
conflict, Athens was fighting its Social War, and the Sacred War was being 
fought by the Phocians and Boeotians.  Thus, many Greek states were 
preoccupied with their own affairs and regarded Macedons rise only in relation 
to their own interests, i.e. with a view to gaining Macedonian military support 
for their own wars.1110  Philips defeat of Argaeus, a rival for the throne, who had 
obtained Athenian backing resulted in a treaty with Athens, and Macedons 
supposed relinquishment of Amphipolis.1111  With Macedonian backing in the 
Sacred War, Thebes was able to defeat the alliance of Athens, Phocis and the 
Thessalians of Pherae, culminating in the Macedonian victory at the battle of the 
Crocus Field.1112  Philip was made archon of the newly re-formed Thessalian 
League in 353 B.C  In 352 B.C. Philip led his army to Thrace challenging 
                                                          
1109 It is unknown when Philip actually deposed his nephew, but Bengtson suggests that it was 
likely before 354 B.C. Bengtson, 1970, p. 285. 
1110 Hornblower, 2011, p. 268. 
1111 Two years later, Philip attacked and subjugated Amphipolis to Macedonian rule. The defeat of 
Argaeus will have been a major set-back for Athens, despite the subsequent treaty in which Philip 
renounced Macedonian claims to Amphipolis.  Hammond, 1994, p. 24, notes that, the number of 
men sent by Athens in support of Argaeus, matched those sent in 432 B.C. against Perdiccas II, 
when Athens was much stronger, indicating the strength of Athenian feeling on this matter.  Thus, 
the loss of these men in 359 B.C., about 4000 in number, will have been all the more damaging to 
Athens.  Furthermore, with the defeat and subjugation of the Illyrians, Philip was able to double 
the size of both Macedon and its army. 
1112 Bengtson, 1970, p. 289, notes that the Phocian mercenaries were able to defeat Philip twice in 
353 B.C. before his ultimate victory at the Crocus field. 
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Athenian authority there.1113  This is the first time we find Philip fighting in the 
Chersonese to secure territory for Macedon, and Hammond believes this 
campaign led to Macedon control of the Bosporus.1114 After the fall of Phocis, 
Athens sent envoys to Philip to negotiate a treaty, resulting in the Peace of 
Philocrates of 346 B.C.1115 
 
Philip shelters Artabazus 
During this period there is little contact between Macedon and Persia.  
Parmenion and his Thebans aided Artabazus in his revolt from Artaxerxes in 353 
B.C. and Philip provided a place of exile for Artabazus and his son-in-law 
Memnon, in 350 B.C.1116  We are given no further details by Diodorus Siculus 
concerning Artabazus and Memnon, and Persian-Macedonian communications 
are silent until after Philips League of Corinth of 337 B.C.  This is explicable by 
Philips inability to spare men to become involved in Persian affairs, due to his 
own campaigns, and Persias preoccupation with the Phoenician and Cypriot 
rebellions followed by the re-conquest of Egypt.  By 342 B.C. Philip had 
furthered his interests in Thessaly, defeating the remaining Greek states not 
already allied with him at Chaeronea, and Persia had subdued its rebellions and 
re-conquered Egypt.  Hammond believes in the possibility that at this time, c. 
343/342 B.C., an agreement was reached by Philip and Artaxerxes.  Plutarch 
mentions that, as a boy, Alexander entertained Persian envoys at the 
Macedonian court in Philips absence.1117  Hammond links this to a reference in a 
ȱ ȱ ¡¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ A?AdAfA?A?ȱ AeA?A? 
                                                          
1113 Whilst Philip had been fighting Onomarchus in the Sacred War, the Athenian general Chares 
had captured Sestos and Cersobleptes had ceded all Thracian cities, except Cardia, to Athens. 
1114 Hammond, 1994, p. 50. 
1115 See Ryder, 1965, appendix IX for a good discussion of this treaty. 
1116 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.52.  They were both offered clemency by Artaxerxes III as a reward to 
Mentor for his services during Artaxerxes Egyptian campaign in 343 B.C.  Hammond, 1994, p. 130, 
on the basis of Ephorus, XXVI, suggests that Parmenion was sent to Artabazus by Philip in his 
position as leader of the Thessalian League. 
1117 Plutarch, Alexander, V. Hammond, 1994, p. 130 notes that the ambassadors were sent at the 
instigation of Artaxerxes himself, rather than in response to an embassy sent to Persia by Philip. He 
argues that Artaxerxes would have known of the link between Philip and Hermeias, ruler of 
Atarneus, in the person of Aristotle, son-in-law of Hermeias, who Philip had invited to his court in 
342 B.C. to educate Alexander.  Hammond believes that it was this link, in the persons of Aristotle 
and Hermeias, which prompted Artaxerxes to send the envoy.  
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AiApAgAgA?ArA?A?ȱ ȱȱȱǯ1118  Kuhrt, citing Bosworth, holds that 
Plutarchs account should be rejected, especially in light of Philips actions 
against Byzantium in 340 B.C., which we will discuss below.1119  Plutarchs 
account is designed to emphasise Alexanders prowess, thus, Philip was absent 
when the supposed Persian embassy arrived.  However, in reality, with Philip 
absent a treaty cannot have been concluded.1120 
In 340 B.C. Byzantium had been in negotiations with Athens, which had 
in turn been in negotiations with Artaxerxes Ochus, about an alliance against 
Philip.1121  This anti-Macedonian alliance manifested itself when Artaxerxes 
Ochus ordered his satraps to support Perinthus with food, money, mercenaries 
and missiles whilst it was besieged by Philip.1122  Persian intervention at 
Perinthus is a clear sign that Artaxerxes Ochus recognised the threat posed by 
Philip.1123  Diodorus Siculus states that Artaxerxes ЀA?AjAlЏAgA?AhAjAmȱAoAjІ A? dAf ? ?A?AjAp 
(viewed Philip with suspicion).1124  The great speed of Philips expansion of 
Macedonian influence signified his eventual encroachment upon Persias 
territory and, in 336 B.C., Philip sent Attalus and Parmenion to Asia Minor, 
assigning to them a part of his forces and ordering them to liberate the Greek 
cities,1125 employing the traditional common slogan in an attempt to unify the 
Greeks.  Justin explicitly claims that Philip had the Greek states who attended the 
council at Corinth prepare for war and it is implied that the conference was a 
deliberate precursor for this.1126  
 
                                                          
1118 Hammond, 1994, p. 130.  See Arrian, Anabasis, II.14.2 and Plutarch, Alexander, V.  
1119 Kuhrt, 2010, p. 417. See also, Buckler, 1994, p. 109. 
1120 Buckler, 1994, p. 110, notes that the embassy mentioned in Plutarch cannot be dated. Therefore, 
we may suggest that this was a general account of a non-specific embassy from Persia to Macedon 
in order to high-light the prowess of Alexander.  It was not the purpose of the account to relate 
political history and, thus, such details were omitted. 
1121 Demosthenes, IX.71, Ps. Demosthenes, XII.6-7. 
1122 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.75.2, Arrian, Anabasis, II.14.5. Hammond, 1959, p. 130, argues that, when 
Artaxerxes Ochus sent help to Perinthus, he broke a Macedonian-Persian non-aggression pact in 
which Philip undertook not to intervene in Asia ... and Artaxerxes agreed not to cross into Thrace 
or act against Philip at sea. 
1123 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.77, Demosthenes XVIII.76 & 139.  Philip divided his forces to attack both 
Perinthus and Byzantium. 
1124 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.75.1-2. 
1125 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.91.3. 
1126 Justin, Epitoma, IX.5.1-6, Diodorus Siculus, XVI.89.4. See Buckler, 1994, pp. 112-118, for a 
discussion on the League at Corinth and Philips election as hegemon against Persia. 
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Between 359 B.C. and 336 B.C., we can see that Artaxerxes Ochus was 
largely preoccupied with consolidating his control of Persia by disbanding the 
mercenary armies of his satraps and then successfully re-conquering Egypt.  We 
have already discussed above the Egyptian invasions of 358 B.C., 351/350 B.C. 
and 343/2 B.C., the last of which was delayed by Cypriot and Syrian rebellions in 
349 B.C.  We are hampered by lack of information regarding Persia in our Greek 
sources after 342 B.C. and before 336 B.C.1127  However we do know that, in 338 
B.C., Artaxerxes Ochus was assassinated, and replaced by Arses, who in turn 
was assassinated and replaced by Darius Codomannus in 336 B.C. 1128  Whatever 
the actualities of the situation, this is clear evidence of succession problems and 
turmoil within the Persian Empire which seem to have distracted Persia from 
dealing with the growing threat from Philip of Macedon. 
During Philip and Macedons rise to prominence in Greece there is much 
less diplomacy between Greece and Persia.  Hornblower suggests that the lack of 
Persian intervention in Greek affairs is due to the Persian belief that Philip was 
keeping Greece under control and, therefore, it was in Persias interests not to 
send help to the Greek states against the advance of Macedonia.1129  Hornblower 
further argues that Artaxerxes Ochus welcomed Macedonian limitations on 
Athenian naval power.  However, we should be mindful that Artaxerxes Ochus 
was also preoccupied with re-conquering and stabilising recalcitrant elements of 
the Persian Empire for which he required a substantial number of Greek 
mercenaries.  Artaxerxes II intervened in Greece in the 370s in order to free-up 
mercenaries for his Egyptian campaigns, thus, Artaxerxes Ochus, in fact, may not 
have welcomed Macedonian aggression which impacted on his designs.  It is 
more likely that these distractions prevented Persia from becoming involved.  
Buckler believes that, in deliberately omitting Artaxerxes Ochus from the Peace 
                                                          
1127 Ruzicka, 2012, p. 201, noting Diodorus Siculus lack of details regarding Artaxerxes Ochus 
activities in Egypt, suggests that his army did not move south of Memphis. Further, he cites 
evidence of Nectanebos actions in Egypt outside of Memphis and the Delta and also the presence 
of another Egyptian king at Thebes, Memphis and in the Delta, suggesting lack of Persian control 
after Artaxerxes Ochus had returned to Persia. 
1128 According to Diodorus Siculus, XVII.5, Artaxerxes Ochus was assassinated by a eunuch named 
Bagoas, who placed Artaxerxes Ochus son Arses on the throne. Bagoas later killed Arses and his 
family, extinguishing the direct royal line and put Darius Codomannus, an extended member of 
the royal family, on the throne. According to Diodorus Siculus, in Bagoas attempt to poison Darius 
he was discovered and he was forced to drink the poison himself. 
1129 Hornblower, 2011, pp. 270 ff. 
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of Philocrates in 338 B.C., Philip was both declaring his position as sole mediator 
in Greek affairs and was also, in effect, making a Greek declaration of 
independence, thus, the treaty made at Corinth was tantamount to a declaration 
of war against Persia.1130  Diodorus Siculus states explicitly that Philip spread 
the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians at the League of Corinth, 
which effectively concluded the era of negotiations between Greek and 
Persian.1131  
 
Alexander the Great 
We have already noted above Plutarchs account of Alexanders reception 
of Artaxerxes Ochus supposed embassy in 342 B.C. Prior to this we find 
Alexanders involvement in Persian affairs when he interfered in Philips plans 
for marrying Arrhidaeus to the daughter of Pixodarus satrap of Caria.1132 The 
account is noteworthy in that the initial marriage proposal was suggested by 
Pixodarus, rather than Philip indicating that the satrap of Caria recognised the 
growth of Macedonian power in Greece. The instability within the Persia Empire 
seems to have provoked Pixodarus to attempt an alliance with the new super-
power of Greece.1133  Shortly after this Philip was assassinated and Alexander 
swiftly took the Macedonian throne. 
 
Alexanders siege of Thebes 
It seems clear that Darius III did not send aid to the Greeks whilst 
Alexander was securing his control of Greece, despite Theban claims of an 
alliance with Darius III.1134  Although we should not discredit the long friendship 
between Thebes and Persia, it is possible the Thebans were bluffing in an attempt 
to encourage rebellion from the other Greek cities.  Whilst a Theban-Persian 
understanding is not impossible, Diodorus Siculus says that Darius started to 
                                                          
1130 Buckler, 2003, p. 512.  See also Bengtson, 1970, p. 302, Hornblower, 2011, p. 288. Roebuck, 1948, 
gives a good account of Greek affairs in the lead up to the meeting at Corinth. 
1131 Diodorus Siculus, XVI.89. 
1132 Arrhidaeus was Philips illegitimate son by Philinna of Larissa. Plutarch, Alexander, X. Philip 
banished four of Alexanders friends as punishment for his meddling. 
1133 From Scot-Kilverts dating of Plutarch we may place this embassy to have taken place in 336 
B.C. Scott-Kilvert, 1960, p.? 
1134 Diodorus Siculus, XVII.9.5-6 
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prepare against Macedon, only after Alexander had secured the leadership of all 
Greece.1135  Furthermore, the proposed timescale does not favour an alliance; 
both Alexander and Darius took to their respective thrones in 336 B.C., during 
which year Alexander also began the siege of Thebes.  Persian successions were 
notoriously turbulent and it is unlikely that Darius would have had time to 
secure his throne and then respond to a Theban request for an alliance against 
Alexander, especially in light of the time it would take for envoys to travel 
between Thebes and Persia before Alexander besieged the city.  If there had been 
an understanding, at least, between Thebes and Persia at this time, we can see 
that it was not honoured.  The destruction of Thebes enabled Alexander to 
prepare his campaign against Persia, which he undertook in 336 B.C. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
We noted at the beginning of this chapter the dramatic change in the 
relationship between Greek and Persian, which led to Persia asserting its 
position of authority over the Greeks.  We can suggest that Persia was interested 
in Greek affairs chiefly when they directly affected Persian interests; these were, 
primarily, stability within the Empire and the re-conquest of Egypt.  We can see 
that these Persian interests also affected its relationship with the Greeks and as 
the familiarity between Greek and Persian increased, Persia recognised the need 
not only to prevent the Greeks interfering in Egypt, Cyprus and Asia Minor, but 
also the need to employ Greeks in its campaigns against Egypt.  Thus, a 
relatively stable Greece was necessary in order to free up these mercenaries. 
Persias support of Sparta in the second Peloponnesian War 
demonstrated to the Greek states that, if they wished to dominate Greecem 
Persian sponsorship was now necessary.  When Sparta approached Persia, in 392 
B.C, it was to conclude a bilateral treaty, similar in nature to those concluded in 
the fifth century with Tissaphernes. This similarity is emphasised by Spartas 
willingness again to abandon the Greeks of Asia Minor in order to gain Persian 
backing against its enemies in Greece.  However, Spartas invasion of Asia Minor 
had damaged their previously special relationship and Persia had supported 
                                                          
1135 Diodorus Siculus, XVII.7.1-3. 
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Spartas enemies in Greece to remove these invading forces. The presence of 
Athenian, Argive, Corinthian and Theban envoys meant that any treaty would 
be common to all of these states, and, therefore, required their approval.  Thus, 
the Greeks were now in a position to negotiate the terms of their treaties. It 
should be noted that, despite this new ability to negotiate in their treaties, the 
negotiations were amongst themselves not with Persia, which had adopted the 
role of arbiter.  
Persian claims to Cyprus and Clazomenai in the Kings Peace in 387/6 
B.C. indicates that that Persian influence over Greece had increased further since 
392 B.C. By 386 B.C. Persia was able to force the Greeks to recognise Persian 
authority over Cyprus, and secure the island in preparation for the Persian re-
conquest of Egypt.  The impact of the peace on the Greeks was that it 
demonstrated Persias support for Spartas dominance of Greece, but it also 
limited any Greek threat to Persia by preventing any one state from becoming 
strong enough to dominate the others without Persian backing. Thus, the Kings 
Peace created a situation whereby Persian support against their enemies made 
the Greeks compliant with Persias wishes.  
These sentiments can be seen to have continued in the treaties of the 370s. 
Artaxerxes II intervened to settle the inter-state wars in Greece seemingly in 
order to recruit the Greek mercenaries necessary for his Egyptian campaigns.  
The debate whether or not Artaxerxes was involved in the treaty of 375 B.C. 
emphasises the fact that the apparent threat of Persian interference alone was 
enough to make the Greeks resolve matters.  It might also suggest that the 
Greeks needed this Persian threat in order to conclude their treaties; the second 
Athenian League does not seem to have been strong enough to replace the need 
for Persian backed treaties, which induced all of the Greek states to abide by the 
terms.  
Thebes usurpation of Spartas dominance over Greece does not seem to 
have affected Persias attitude to the Greeks. Thus, in 367 B.C., Artaxerxes II was 
willing to back Thebes claims to the prostates. The degree of power the Koine 
Eirene had over the Greeks is indicated by Thebes ability to liberate Messene 
from Sparta and to attempt to beach Athens fleet.  Although being militarily 
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dominant, we find that Thebes, the old friends of Persia, still required Persian 
support to confirm its position in Greece.   
 
Having spoken of the many treaties of the fourth century, it is necessary 
to recognise another trend, which seems to run in the background to all of these 
political negotiations: the use of Greek mercenaries by Artaxerxes II and 
Artaxerxes Ochus, as well as some of their rebellious satraps.  The effectiveness 
of Greek mercenaries over standard Persian forces will have been emphasised by 
the Greek victory at Cunaxa, despite the death of Cyrus the Younger, and their 
ability to return to the coast of Asia Minor whilst being harassed by Persian 
forces.  By the fourth century, like Artaxerxes II, the Greeks realised the 
usefulness of Greek mercenaries as a commodity, which they could use also to 
demonstrate their displeasure with Persia, by supporting subversive elements of 
the Empire.  This is most notable when Sparta became involved with Egypts 
rebellion from Persia in 362 B.C., possibly in response to Persian backing of 
Thebes liberation of Messene.  We also saw in 343 B.C. that, apparently, neither 
Athens nor Sparta recalled Diophantes and Lamius, who were campaigning, 
perhaps privately, with Nectanebo of Egypt, which may also be interpreted as 
signs of their displeasure with Persias backing of Thebes in Greece.  Certainly 
there is a correlation between Persian involvement in Greek inter-state wars and 
Persias desire for Greek mercenaries for its Egyptian campaigns and also, 
conversely, Greek mercenary support of subversive elements of the Persian 
Empire by states which were disappointed with their treatment by Persia. 
Despite this Greek support, it should be noted that Athens and Sparta obeyed 
Persian commands to recall their mercenaries when these commands were 
issued.   Thus we may suggest that the use of mercenaries by the Greeks was to 
display their displeasure with Persia but not necessarily to provoke Persian 
anger. 
 
We can see that the Greek preoccupation with medism in the fifth century 
was abandoned for the most part during the fourth century.  Persian support 
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was now a desirable tool to promote self-interest by the various Greek states and 
those charges which were brought were, in consequence, rare. 
The rise to prominence of Macedon does not seem to have affected the 
general policy of Persia toward Greece.  Artaxerxes Ochus did not seem to heed 
the expansion of Macedonian influence until Philip began campaigning in Thrace 
when it was perceived that Philip might threaten Persian interests.  That said, it 
would appear that during Philips rise to prominence Persia was distracted.  
When Artaxerxes Ochus took to the throne he had suffered the usual succession 
problems, and, during his early years, he needed to suppress a number of revolts 
from his satraps before he could re-conquer Egypt.  By the time Persia became 
stable enough to interfere in Greek affairs again, Philip was planning an invasion 
and Persia could no longer call on any Greek mercenaries.1136  Moysey contends 
that, despite the traditional view that the Achaemenid dynasty and Persian 
Empire was a sick man, in the latter half of the fourth century, the dynastic 
disputes and satrapal attempts to exploit these weaknesses were not new in 
Achaemenid history.1137  Indeed, the strength of the Persian Empire under 
Artaxerxes Ochus may be ascertained by his re-conquest of Egypt in the 340s.  It 
was primarily the dynastic upheavals of the decade after Artaxerxes Ochus, with 
the short reigns of Arses (Artaxerxes IV) and then Darius III, i.e. 336-330, that 
gave Alexander the Great the necessary opportunity to invade the Persian 
Empire.   
  
                                                          
1136 Sparta, Athens and Thebes were unable to supply any after their defeats at Chaeronea and 
Argos and Corinth were, likely, uninterested as pro-Macedonian states. 







The relationship between Persia and the Greeks was constantly evolving 
from the initial contacts in the sixth century until the invasion of Alexander the 
Great in the fourth century.  As a result of our detailed study we are able to reach 
the general conclusion that the period in question can be divided into three parts; 
that prior to the Persian Wars, the Persian Wars until the Peloponnesian War, 
and from the Peloponnesian War until the rise of Macedon.  From their first 
contacts and throughout all three periods, Persia largely dominated its 
relationship with the Greeks, and it did so through a number of devices.   
The most obvious device was that of dividing her enemies in order to 
conquer them piecemeal.  This Persian policy of offering friendly submission to 
her enemies before conquering them not only reduced the number of those 
remaining, but also it caused internal divisions and dissention within their ranks 
so that those who did stand against Persia were doubly weakened: they were 
fewer in number and also, subsequently, mistrustful of each other.  This general 
policy can be observed particularly during the time of the Persian conquest of 
Ionia by Cyrus the Great, and, subsequently, was followed by Darius and Xerxes.  
We can see that this policy begins with Cyrus the Great offering his enemies 
friendly submission, as is seen in his tale of the dancing fish to the Ionians, who 
did not submit when initially approached, with the exception of Miletus, and 
were denied the generous terms previously offered when subsequently they 
were conquered.1138  This was followed by heavy-handed rule.   
It is of some importance to observe that this policy was not always 
carried out in person by the Persian king, by was sometimes delegated to 
subordinate: for example, Cyrus did act in person, but under Darius we find 
Mardonius and Megabates being employed for Thrace and Macedon, and Datis 
for Athens and Eretria.  Likewise, under Xerxes it was employed by Mardonius 
to separate the Athenians from the Hellenic League, prior to Plataea.1139 
This policy was employed throughout the period of contact between the 
Greeks and the Persian Empire, evolving to fit the situation at hand.  In the 490s 
B.C., prior to Datis invasion of Greece, Darius offered friendly submission to the 
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Greek islands, a number of which submitted including the militarily strong 
Aegina and wealthy Paros.1140  The secondary benefit of their submission, noted 
above, can be exemplified in the suspicions of medising factions within the 
Athenian army at Marathon and within Athens itself.1141   Similarly, prior to 
Xerxes invasion of Greece in 481 B.C., he offered the Greeks early submission, 
which was accepted by the Aleuadae of Thessaly and, later, Thebes and 
Argos.1142  As we noted above, this offer was also extended to Athens, after 
Xerxes departure from Greece and prior to their second abandonment of the 
city, in an attempt to separate them from the Hellenic League.1143  The 
subsequent suspicions caused by Xerxes invasion led to the later accusations of 
medism against Pausanias and Themistocles, which, in turn suggest there may 
have been accusations against less famous Greeks too. 
Another aspect of this Persian policy was the befriending and 
encouraging of Greek tyrants and states, which subsequently became friendly to 
Persia, i.e. Persian support of a tyrant ensured his loyalty.  This can be seen in 
Darius Is support of Syloson of Samos after the assassination of his brother 
Polycrates1144 and, also, in the speech of Histiaeus to the Ionian tyrants on Darius 
Scythian campaign, which informs us that the Greek tyrants recognised that their 
positions were largely dependent on Persian support. 1145  At the same time, if 
these rulers did not fulfil their obligations in the way that the king required, then 
they could be disposed of in various ways.  Histiaeus himself fell under the 
kings suspicions and was kept a virtual prisoner in the royal palace.  Polycrates 
is an example of one who aimed at too much power, whilst Aristagoras actually 
wasted it.  Persian support of Greek tyrants clearly became known as far as 
Greece since both Hippias of Athens and, possibly, Demaratus of Sparta went to 
the Persian Empire, having been deposed from their respective cities, looking for 
Persian support to be reinstated.  Although, Herodotus does not say this 
explicitly of Demaratus, it is unlikely that he accompanied Xerxes invasion 
                                                          
1140 Herodotus, VI.49 and 132. 
1141 Herodotus, VI.109, cf. p. 64, 66. 
1142 Herodotus, VII.6, 149 and 233. 
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without this in mind.  Thus, in addition to exercising rule within the Empire by 
means of compliant rulers, a natural extension was this taking in of exiles 
because they could be employed to further Persian expansion.  Indeed, we can 
see this employment of Greeks for this particular purpose even extended to non-
political figures, such as Democedes. 
The Persian policies of offering friendly submission and Persias support 
of Greek tyrants, can be seen as the direct cause of Greek medism, which gained 
negative connotation only when Persias interests ran counter to those immediate 
interests of the Greeks. Thus, Athens willingly offered friendly submission to 
Persia in 507/6 B.C. but, when Persia supported Hippias claims to be reinstalled, 
Athens worked against the interests of Persia by supporting the Ionian Revolt of 
499-496 B.C.  Similarly, many Greeks submitted prior to Datis and Xerxes 
invasions, preferring to accept friendly terms rather than being conquered.  No 
doubt, as argued by Kelly, pro-Persian propaganda was disseminated by Persia 
and her allies in order to persuade the Greeks of the benefits of early 
submission.1146   
The success of Persias policy can be seen in the Greek reaction to the 
expansion of the Persian Empire, which was, in general, a lack of resistance.  
Initially we find that some of the Ionian Greeks, such as the Phocaeans and 
Teians, fled Asia Minor.1147  Also, the Ionians rebelled twice after they had been 
conquered.  However, by the time the Persian Empire consolidated its control 
over coast of Asia Minor little resistance is found amongst the Greeks until Datis 
invasion and not much more is found in response to Xerxes invasion.  Indeed, 
many Greek islands, such as Aegina, and states, such as Thessaly, voluntarily 
surrendered.  Others, such as Macedon and Thebes, actively collaborated when 
called upon by Persia.  Others actively sought alliances with Persia to help 
progress their own interests and to overcome their enemies.  Prime examples are 
Athens alliance with Persia in reaction to the threat of a Spartan invasion of 
Attica, and the presence of the Aleuadae at Xerxes court, who were aiming at 
mastery of all of Thessaly.  It should also not be ignored that some states and 
island chose to hedge their bets by neither openly supporting nor resisting 
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Persian expansion, such as Argos and Syracuse.  Thus, we can see that whilst 
Persia was expanding her borders she was deemed the most dominant power in 
the Aegean and so the Greeks either courted her power or submitted to it.  
Notable of this period is the apparent abandonment of the Ionians after their 
conquest by Cyrus the Great.  Sparta had been on friendly terms with Croesus, 
and threatened Cyrus the Great when he initially conquered the Lydians and 
Ionians, but did not follow up on this threat.  Interest in the Ionian question was 
dramatically rekindled with the intervention of the Athenians and Eretrians in 
the Ionian Revolt, and this interest continued until the Peloponnesian War. 
The claims of Herodotus and Thucydides that exiled Greeks could 
influence the Persian king of the time, indicates the status of the Persian king in 
Greek psyche, i.e. the statuses of these individuals was increased by their 
supposed ability to influence the king of Persia.  As the result of discussions on a 
case by case basis, we have seen that these tales largely contain exaggerations 
and whilst these Greeks, such as Hippias, Demaratus, Alcibiades, and, possibly, 
Themistocles introduced their own ideas for discussions what they were 
suggesting seems to have been in agreement with policy already decided by the 
king.  That said, these claims of influence over the Persian king are useful in 
gauging the Greek reaction to the status of the king of Persia.  An example of this 
can be found in Aristophanes Archarnians, where the chorus claims that the king 
of Persia had heard of Aristophanes fame and good advice to Athens.1148   
Persias inability to conquer Greece separates the period of early relations 
between Greece and Persia, whereby the majority of Greeks courted Persian 
favour, from the next period, whereby the Greeks actively rejected Persia. Under 
Cyrus the Great, Darius I and Xerxes, the Empire was ruled with a view to 
expanding its borders.  This policy can be seen in Persian attempts to conquer 
Scythia, and to expand Persian borders through Thrace and Macedon; we even 
find Persian interests as far as the west Mediterranean from the tale of 
Democedes of Croton who escaped whilst reconnoitring Greece for Darius and 
was pursued as far as Italy.1149  After the Greek victories in the Persian Wars, 
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however, the Empire looked to consolidating its borders, seemingly in reaction to 
the activities of the Delian League.  
The Peace of Callias was the natural outcome of this situation.  It would 
appear that, whatever details we lack, both sides had fought each other to a 
stand-still, and a solution was sought.  We need to emphasise that, although we 
do not know what the Athenians yielded, the Persians were forced to offer 
concessions in the form of limitations on the movements of the Persian army and 
navy. 
Despite Persias inability to conquer Greece, we find the Persian policy of 
enticing, or attempting to entice, Greeks into submissive alliances. Also Persia 
continued to spreading dissension and exploit divisions within Greece. This 
policy was employed to protect Persias borders and interests, and to supress 
rebellions within the Empire, rather than enabling Persia to expand her borders.  
Herodotus informs us of the Argive alliance with Persia, renewed with 
Artaxerxes I upon his accession.1150  Also, prior to the Peace of Callias Artaxerxes 
I sent Megabazus to Sparta in an attempt to entice Sparta into working for 
Persias interests by attacking Athens, who was at that time supporting Egypts 
rebellion from the Persian Empire.1151  This Persian policy came to fruition during 
the Peloponnesian War of 430-404 B.C., when both Athens and Sparta sent 
numerous embassies to Persia in order to gain Persian support against the 
other.1152  The eventual treaty with Sparta in 411 B.C. can be seen as the result of 
this Persian policy, however, we should bear in mind that this treaty was 
concluded after nearly two decades of envoys from Sparta to Persia, and only 
when Persia wished to defeat Amorges and the Athenians who were supporting 
his rebellion.1153  It is apparent that the actions of the Delian League eventually 
removed the Greek fear of further Persian invasions, which was prevalent during 
and after the Persian Wars and is exemplified by the charges against Pausanias 
and Themistocles.  Thus, these actions and the desire to gain a strong ally against 
their Greek enemies enabled the Greeks to come to terms with Persia.  With the 
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Spartan-Persian treaties also came the abandonment of the Ionian Greeks, again.  
The question of the Greeks of Asia Minor was re-opened at this time with the 
Spartans initially acknowledging the Kings dominance in this area in exchange 
for Persian gold.  Some years later, when this financial need was not so acute, the 
Spartans attempted but failed to liberate the Ionian Greeks.  The Ionian Question 
was put to rest with the conclusion of the Kings Peace, and the Greek 
acknowledgement of Persian over-lordship there. 
Persian support of the Greeks from the start had self-evidently been from 
self-interest.  We have seen that, once the rebellion of Amorges had been 
defeated, Tissaphernes lost interest in working with the Peloponnesians.1154  
Likewise, although the Peloponnesians then turned to Pharnabazus for support, 
it should be noted that he, too, was interested in an alliance primarily to remove 
the Athenian threat from his territory.1155  As we have seen from our examination 
of the complex set of negotiations which took place at this time, the situation was 
far from simple.  Greek interest in Asia Minor overlapped with Persian interest 
there, resulting in much diplomatic wrangling and this contrasted greatly with 
the simplicity of the diktats of an earlier period.  The situation only became 
simpler with the arrival of Cyrus the Younger that Persia, who worked for the 
interests of Sparta, and we may suggest that here, also, he had an ulterior agenda 
of gaining Spartan support against his brother Artaxerxes II.1156   
The conclusion of the Peloponnesian War begins the final period in 
Graeco-Persian relations, and we find the Greeks return to their sixth century 
attitudes towards Persia, especially after Spartas withdrawal from Asia Minor.  
Throughout the fourth century B.C. we find Artaxerxes II and his successors 
employing this Persian policy of dividing Persias enemies was much increased 
as the Greeks recognised the benefit of acquiring Persian support against their 
Greek enemies.  Furthermore, the negative connotations of medism were lost as 
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likely that whilst working with the Peloponnesians Cyrus the Younger had hopes of succeeding 
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the result of Realpolitik, and were only occasionally resurrected for political 
purposes. We may attribute this change to four things.  Firstly, the generation 
who had fought in the Persian Wars was long gone by the start of the fourth 
century.  Secondly, as a result of Persian involvement in the Peloponnesian War 
and Spartas invasion of Asia Minor, there was increased familiarity between 
Greek and Persian.  Thirdly, from this familiarity paradoxically rose the 
realisation on both sides that each others interests could be accommodated.  
Finally, inter-state animosity had reached such an intensity after the 
Peloponnesian War that the Greeks preferred to look to Persia for support 
against their enemies, rather than attempt to arbitrate a peace settlement 
amongst themselves. Thus, Artaxerxes II supported Corinth, Thebes, Athens, and 
Argos against Sparta in the Corinthian War. In the Kings Peace Artaxerxes II 
supported Sparta to the detriment of the other Greek states.  The subsequent 
revisions of this Peace can be seen as continuing this Persian policy in that it 
ultimately supported one state over the others to prevent them from working 
together against the interests of Persia.  
The phenomenon of political refugees also vanishes and Conon is a 
pivotal figure in this transition.  He may be seen as the last political refugee and 
one of the first of those Greeks who took a command within the Empire.  
Subsequently, those who might perhaps once have been political refugees 
became legitimately employed by the Empire to further Persian interests.  Thus, 
we find Iphicrates of Athens employed on Persias Egyptian campaign in 374 
B.C. and, later, Lacrates of Thebes, Nicostatus of Argos, and Mentor of Rhodes 
were all employed in the Persias reconquest of Egypt in 343 B.C. 
The increase in diplomacy during the fourth century may be seen as a 
Persian reaction to the activities of the Greeks in the fifth century. Greater 
familiarity with Greece as a result of the Peace of Callias, their treaties with 
Sparta during the Peloponnesian War and then, later, during the Spartan 
invasion seems to have convinced Persia of the benefits of diplomacy with the 
Greeks.  However, it is also clear that diplomacy was often only one tool in 
Persias foreign policy.  Artaxerxes II was unable to remove Sparta entirely from 
Asia Minor without inciting the Corinthian War and without employing Conon 
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to defeat Spartan naval forces.  Furthermore, the Kings Peace demonstrates that 
whilst the Persian king was happy to engage in diplomatic negotiations, it was 
still necessary to advertise that military force could and would be used if 
necessary.  For the Greeks the desire for Persian support against their enemies 
within Greece, in the form of Persian gold and backing in the various attempts at 
common peaces, overrode previous negativity towards the Persian Empire, 
unless Persian interests ran contrary to each citys immediate interest. However, 
lack of unity within Greece meant that it did not return to its previously anti-
Persian and hostile stance prevalent during and immediately after the Persian 
Wars.  At best, the Athenians and Spartans showed their discontent by 
supporting subversive elements within the Persian Empire, but it is noteworthy 
that when commanded to desist from this they obeyed.  Thus we find that by the 
start of the Peloponnesian War in 430 B.C., Greek attitudes largely had returned 
pre-existing sixth century views.  They recognised the desirability of Persian 
support, albeit largely in the form of gold, to achieve their particular aims.  These 
views continued until the accession of Alexander the Great and, even then, 
Thebes optimistically seems to have held out hope of Persian support against 
Alexander. 
Thus, having been able to conveniently divide the period of Graeco-
Persian relations into three phases, we can see that whilst Persia was a dominant, 
if relatively unknown, power in the sixth century B.C., the Greeks either looked 
for alliances or, at least, tried not to antagonise Persia.  Greater familiarity and 
conflicting interests led to the rejection of Persia by some Greek states and, 
consequently, Greek hostility and opposition during and after the Persian Wars.  
Finally, when the threat of Persian invasion had been removed, Greek hostility 
towards each other had increased, and the Greeks had recognised the advantages 
of Persian friendship, the Greeks returned to their previous stance of the sixth 
century.  Throughout these three phases we can see that the one constant is that 
in her dealings with the Greeks, Persia, by and large, was able to control this 
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